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You could call this technique “Deep Nonsense,” meaning I guess a linguistic flow of strings, 
strands, loops, that through the very manner of its formal construction flouts the ordinary cingula 
of “sense” and through its defiance of sense’s limits manages somehow to “show” what cannot 
ordinarily be “expressed”. (David Foster Wallace, The Empty Plenum) 
I think I summed up my position when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a 
form of poetry. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value) 
Poets utter great and wise things which they do not themselves understand. (Plato, The Republic) 
But what other philosopher has found the antidote to illusion in the particular and repeated 
humility of tracking the uses of humble words, looking philosophically as it were beneath our feet 
rather than over our heads?  (Stanley Cavell, On Wittgenstein) 
Most really pretty girls have pretty ugly feet . . . 
(David Foster Wallace, Broom of the System) 
There is nobody at the window in the painting of the house, by the way. I have now concluded that 
what I believed to be a person is a shadow. If it is not a shadow, it is perhaps a curtain. As a 
matter of fact it could actually be nothing more than an attempt to imply depths, within the room. 
Although in a manner of speaking all that is really in the window is burnt sienna pigment. And 
some yellow ochre. In fact there is no window either, in that same manner of speaking, but only 
shape. So that any few speculations I may have made about the person at the window would 
therefore now appear to be rendered meaningless, obviously. Unless of course I subsequently become 
convinced that there is somebody at the window all over again. I have put that badly. 
(David Markson, Wittgenstein’s Mistress) 
People said the poet and the philosopher were lovers, but it never looked that way. One had an 
apartment and ideas and money, and the other had his legend and his poetry and the fervor of the 
true believer, a doglike fervor, the fervor of the whipped dog that’s spent the night or all its youth 
in the rain. (Robert Bolaño, 2666) 
For I am a Rain Dog, too. 
(Tom Waits, Lyrics to “Rain Dogs”)
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In a political moment characterised by post-truth ideologically generated misinformation 
and algorithmically propagated discourses, questions of fact, of inquiry, of perspective are 
paramount. This work examines what it means to write literature or to do philosophy while 
encountering a world of diffuse truths. It asks how can we retain clarity without erasing 
the fact that perspectival knowledge is always already embedded, piecemeal, contextual? 
To answer this question, I turn to a more foundational one, that has plagued philosophy 
since Plato proclaimed, “there is an old quarrel between philosophy and poetry” (Republic, 
607b5–6). My thesis picks up on a central aspect of the quarrel, the claim that art doesn’t 
lead to truth. I ask: what is the nature of literary inquiry and how can literature distinguish 
itself as an autonomous form of intellectual inquiry, if it can at all?  Beginning with David 
Foster Wallace’s “The Empty Plenum”, I argue for a novel ‘perspectival’ or ‘mystical’ 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logio-Philosophicus. Contrary to dominant literary 
scholarship, I claim that it is Wittgenstein’s Saying–Showing distinction that offers us a 
guide for conceiving of the true value of literary inquiry, and thereby provides us with a 
robust response to Plato. The ‘ancient quarrel’ can thus be addressed resolutely. What does 
literature offer? Literature is free to communicate where philosophy is unable—to show 
what philosophy cannot say. Using the examples of Davidson, Heidegger, Wallace, 
Wittgenstein, Borges and Lerner I  flesh out the notion of showing in literature, and how 
it functions to induce a perspectival shift in order that the reader may see the world ‘aright’, 
whatever ‘aright’ may be. This dissertation may be best conceived as a contribution to the 
project of questioning inherent power-dynamics and ideological bias that inform the 







A Note on translation 
Evidently for a dissertation examining the manner in which language informs our 
modalities and morphologies of truthfulness, it must be understood that translation is 
inevitably an act of creation, rather than fidelity, or equivalence. Consequently, in engaging 
with specific translations over others there are a number of critical preconditions which 
have governed my choices, and I will discuss my reasons for privileging specific 
translations in what follows. The primary texts in translation that I examine are works by 
Plato, Wittgenstein and Heidegger. I will reference in the text where interesting alternate 
significations arise, or otherwise where secondary translations are consulted, they will be 
footnoted.1 
I rely for my exegesis of Plato’s Republic on Allan Bloom’s recent translation. My choice 
here is grounded in a recent analysis of English translations offered by Richard Polt. 
Bloom’s translation is widely praised by scholars and critics as a faithful and intelligent 
rendering of the material. While alternatives offered by Grube, for instance, are arguably 
more readable and thus valuable for classroom use, in the trade-off between accuracy and 
readability Bloom’s near verbatim translation has a lot to offer. 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logio-Philisophicus (hereafter abbreviated to the Tractatus, or TLP), 
while translated initially by Ogden, was later re-translated by Pears and McGuinness. Since 
it was offered in 1961, the Pears-McGuinness translation of the Tractatus (henceforth, 
PMT) has been near universally acclaimed as a decided improvement on Ogden’s earlier 
translation (OT). While OT was authorised by Wittgenstein initially, commentators have 
focused on the improvements in terms of clarity and accuracy of PMT (see Urmson, 298–
300). With very few exceptions commentaries have either directly or indirectly seconded 
this opinion—evident in their typical inclusion of PMT and omission of OT in 
abbreviations, bibliographies and acknowledgements. Consequently, while textual 
disagreements persist, I will rely in what follows on the PMT treatment. 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (referenced intext as, PI) was published 
posthumously in 1953 and was edited and translated by Anscombe. A new edition was 
translated by Hacker and Schulte in 2009. In this dissertation the later edition is treated as 
 





authoritative. While based on Anscombe’s translation—which benefits from Anscombe’s 
personal acquaintance with Wittgenstein—the later addition includes a number of 
improvements: adjustments to exceedingly loose translations offered by Anscombe, and 
updates to translations which, while initially valuable, have the potential to be misleading 
in today’s context given the evolution of the English language. 
The secondary literature I draw upon in justifying the translations of Heidegger upon 
which I rely include Macquarrie and Robinson’s (1962) translation of Being and Time. A 
more recent translation of Being and Time exists by J. Stambaugh (1996); however, while 
this translation has many virtues and may be argued to be a more user-friendly guide for 
Heidegger novices, I follow Wheeler (2011) in conceiving of the standard Macquarrie and 
Robinson translation, at this time, as the first choice in Heidegger scholarship. My 
reasoning is that given the relative brevity of my engagement with Heidegger, and the 
impossibility of a deep dive at this time, I have followed convention and for the most part 
relied on the older tried and true translations. Furthermore, as the Macquarrie and 
Robinson translations of key terms are so thoroughly entrenched in English-language 
discussions of Heidegger, this in itself offers a compelling reason to stick with it and avoid 
confusion. I also draw on the useful collection of English translations of the most 
philosophical of Heidegger’s earliest writing offered by Kisiel and Sheehan’s (2007) 
Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings. 
My selections in reliance upon Schopenhauer translations is worth mentioning, as his 
primary work, explored albeit briefly here, is known under three different titles: The World 
as Will and Representation, The World as Will and Idea and The World as Will and Presentation—
by Haldane and Kemp, Payne, and Aquila respectively. While all offer largely acceptable 
renderings of Schopenhauer’s word vorstellung, I will refer to Aquila’s translation in the 






There has never been, and perhaps never will be, an adequate resolution to the ‘ancient 
quarrel’ between the poets and the philosophers. What is clear is that in Plato’s ideal 
society, in one of the forms in which it exists today—academia’s ivory tower—the poets 
have been forcibly ejected. The methods of inquiry deemed admissible by the analytic 
hegemon are quite specific, and position literature squarely on the outside. I enter this 
dialogue by considering the relevance of an under-examined ficto-critical essay “The 
Empty Plenum: David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress” (hereafter abbreviated to “The 
Empty Plenum”) by author David Foster Wallace, as a frame for exploring literature’s 
relation to philosophy, by drawing on the distinction between showing and saying in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
This study argues that certain questions, at once possessed of a recognisable philosophical 
warrant, can be irreducibly posed by and through literature. My argument, in brief, is that 
literature can show some part of what philosophy cannot say. It is in this sense that 
metaphysical novels and poetry are not limited to illustrating or alluding to philosophy, 
and in this sense that philosophical literature can distinguish itself as an autonomous form 
of intellectual inquiry, rather than derivative or decocted philosophy. It is on these grounds, 







This Introduction examines Plato’s ‘ancient quarrel’, his ejection of the poets from his ideal 
society, and the modern form in which this quarrel persists in the academy. I will examine 
the questions: what is the nature of literary inquiry and how does it differ from 
philosophical inquiry? Plato’s quarrel serves as a frame for understanding the importance 
of these questions and the dialogue that has arisen around them. 
Chapter I begins by providing a brief background on Wallace’s article “The Empty 
Plenum” and the text it analyses, Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress, before evaluating both 
Ramal and Ryerson’s interpretations of the relevance of “The Empty Plenum” to Wallace’s 
overall conception of the relation between literature and philosophy. I then examine what 
I take to be the major pitfalls in both critics’ arguments; that is, a failure to recognise the 
importance of the mysticism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus if we are to comprehend Wallace’s 
conception of the relation between philosophy and literature. 
Chapter II considers the various interpretations of the central paradox of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus: that if we adopt Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, then the Tractatus itself 
is rendered a series of nonsensical pseudo-propositions. I argue that to correctly resolve 
this paradox is to conceive of the Tractatus as a project intended to serve as elucidatory, 
prompting a ‘perspectival shift’ in order to acquaint us with mystical experience, rather 
than an attempt to communicate propositional truths. I then draw on Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between showing and saying, to argue that literature’s distinctive abilities rest 
in its capacity to show what cannot be said. I argue the relevance of a mystical interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’ Tractatus has been overlooked by theorists who have focused primarily on 
exegesis of his later Philosophical Investigations. This is a failing, I argue, as the Tractatus 
provides fruitful avenues for inquiry into the intersection between philosophy and 
literature. 
Chapter III explores what these fruitful avenues are. I examine how this notion of showing 
might be best understood in literary terms; that is, how showing here has a technical sense 
and can be understood by examining devices and techniques such as: use, absences, 
emotional implications, bland fact and deep nonsense. I draw examples for each from 
Wallace and his reading of Wittgenstein’s Mistress. In this way I also provide an evaluation of 
the success of Wallace’s own philosophical narratives in the light of his own critique and 




Chapter IV then examines how the perspectival shift described by Wittgenstein can be 
more fully understood through a process of triangulation: I turn to Heidegger’s 
hermeneutics, notions of situatedness and phronesis, the author Ben Lerner’s conception 
of the poem as necessarily a record of failure, Davidson’s work on Metaphor and Borges’ 
reflections on writing. 
Chapter V offers a radical contextualising of the entire argument: I examine why it is 
important to ask these questions about the role if literary inquiry, in the current political 
moment characterised by post-truth or ‘truthiness’. I examine the implications of ‘canon’ 
and the dangers in viewing the perspectival shift induced by literary works as intrinsically 
moral. In seeing the world ‘aright’, I argue, one is always encountering a world of diffuse 
truths, where perspectival knowledge is embedded, piecemeal and contextual. It is this, I 
argue, which points to the power embedded in the maintenance of the disciplinary ‘break’ 
between literature and philosophy. 
Chapter VI examines the connection between my exegesis and creative work, Murmurations, 
both in terms of content explored in the creative work, and the endeavour to induce a 
perspectival shift in the reader, by Showing or gesturing towards the archetypes and 
universals embedded within a purported ‘lover’s discourse’, in the form of Roland Barthes. 
In the Conclusion, I return to the roots and look at how this discussion relates to Plato’s 
‘ancient quarrel’. 
 
The ancient quarrel  
Poets utter great and wise things which they do not themselves understand. 
Plato, The Republic, Book II, Section V. 
Plato’s ‘ancient quarrel’ provides the context for the questions I seek to examine; questions 
such as: what is the nature of literary inquiry and how does it differ from philosophical 
inquiry? And, considering that the ‘ancient quarrel’ between philosophy and literature 
concerns, among other things, if and how literature can distinguish itself as an autonomous 





The quarrel is epitomised in Plato’s notorious claim that the poets (and perhaps 
rhetoricians)2 must be banished from the ‘just’ city—the philosophical republic. Plato’s 
fictionalised Socrates states that, should any dramatic poet happen to show up, “there is 
no man of your kind among us in our city, nor is it lawful for such a man to arise among 
us”. Further, the fictionalised Socrates asserts: “Only so much of poetry as is hymns to 
gods or celebration of good men should be admitted into a city” (607a). It should be noted 
that while many argue Plato was the first to articulate the quarrel, some of Plato’s 
philosophical predecessors, such as Xenophanes and Heraclitus, directed severe criticisms 
against the poets (Nightingale, 65). But whether Plato was the first philosopher to discern 
the presence of this deep conflict between philosophy and poetry, while an interesting 
question, is somewhat tangential to our purposes, as it is the enduring ramifications of his 
critique that concern us here. 
Much of the final book of The Republic is an attack on poetry, indeed this quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry continues thematically throughout Plato’s work, and is perhaps best 
presented in four dialogues: The Ion, The Republic, The Gorgias, and The Phaedrus. 
Consequently, interpretive dispute rages over what Plato meant by poetry and whether, for 
instance, his critique applies to sculpture, music, or the arts in general. Indeed, parallel 
debates are being played out between many art forms and philosophy, even though the 
scope is limited in this thesis to literature.3 Plato speaks always of ‘poetry’ or ‘the poets’ 
rather than literature—there being no ancient Greek word for the latter. The idea that 
there is a sort of writing, characterised by a greater density of meaning, or a higher quality 
(however we would like to define quality) is a new one. In what follows I will assume, 
however, that Plato’s injunction applies more broadly than poetry, to include literature in 
several forms. At this stage I will leave the definition of literature as broad: for a loose 
 
2 Indeed, Plato associated poetry and rhetoric very closely. In Gorgias (502), he characterises poetry as a kind 
of rhetoric; holding that the ontological and psychological bases of the criticism of poetry serve also as the 
bases of the criticism of rhetoric. Whether poetry and rhetoric should in fact be grouped together, and 
whether any interesting relation exists between the two, are controversial questions not to be examined in 
this thesis, as my interest resides in philosophy’s relation to the literary arts. I will note the bearing of Borges’s 
distinction between poetry and rhetoric, where he writes: “all poetry consists in feeling things as being 
strange, while all rhetoric consists in thinking of them as quite common, as obvious” (18). 
3 Nonetheless, the overlap between theorists’ engagement with this topic for dissimilar disciplines is telling: 
rhetoric, theatre and music being but three examples. Peter’s Antithetical Arts, for instance, concerns the 
‘ancient quarrel’ between literature and music, while Andro Linklater’s The Santorini Experiment describes the 
way philosophy ended its ‘ancient quarrel’ with theatre. Jeff Mitscherling, in The European Legacy, considers 
the ancient and current quarrels between philosophy and rhetoric. Whether some common essence could be 




definition, in the style of Roberto Bolaño, one might say literature can include prose, novel 
or short story; dramaturgy, poetry or essay; criticism, prose or verse. 
Plato offers numerous and interrelated grounds for his theoretical expulsion of the poets 
from the just society, outlined within The Republic. While some of these justifications 
depend heavily on specific epistemological and metaphysical doctrines that hold little 
appeal for many contemporary philosophers, all can nonetheless be formulated in ways 
that resonate with modern philosophy’s broad conception of itself. 
For instance, Plato argued that poets brought no new knowledge to their audience, 
prioritised emotion over reason and made half-baked ideas sound attractive (Republic, 395). 
He criticised literature’s capacity to engage and incite our emotions while bypassing our 
rational faculties and distrusted the poet’s ability to construct simulacra of real persons and 
events. Consequently, poetry functions as a distraction from the slow and hard struggle to 
comprehend what lies behind reality’s often-misleading presentations of itself. He opposed 
the poet’s self-image as being subject to divine inspiration, which he felt revealed poetry 
to lack any secure, transmissible and impersonal body of knowledge that might ground a 
claim to any depth of understanding. Not only did he view the poet’s imaginative capacities 
as non-rational, but he also perceived the poet to be essentially amoral; that is, entirely 
unconstrained by truthfulness, in their acts of creation. Taken together, Plato arguably 
viewed poetry as posing a fundamental threat of corruption to the soul of the poet and 
that of his readers and listeners, thereby creating further obstacles to humanity’s attempts 
to achieve self-knowledge and live a good life through a lucid grasp of reality—the task to 
which he viewed philosophy to be distinctively, indeed uniquely, devoted.  
The continual relevance of the objections to literature presented by Plato should be evident 
in the way analytic philosophy attempts to get its bearings, or self-situate, by adopting a set 
of goals, and a certain methodological toolkit that excludes the literary. Conflict persists 
today over what we should understand philosophy to be and what methodologies are 
considered acceptable. It may be misleading to talk about a monolithic singular 
philosophical project in light of the influence of movements like poststructuralism, 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, feminism and postcolonialism, which raise serious 




Nonetheless a dominant philosophical culture undeniably exists, in which certain 
methodological tools are drawn upon.4 This methodological toolkit could be said to 
include, for instance, forms of logical and conceptual analysis, laboriously self-critical 
arguments and thought experiments, and goals of clarity and reasoned argument set against 
literary methods of inquiry and expression (Beaney, 1998). ‘Clarity’ is of course a very 
unclear notion, but, whatever it is,5 it comes with a deep distrust of rhetorical 
embellishment and devices.6 It should be noted, however, that despite such an apparently 
blunt polemic expulsion of the poets, Plato at times exalted poetry and the narrative arts. 
In the passage in which he ejects the poets, he also refers to the poet as “holy” (Republic, 
534). Goldstein, among others, has argued that he intended the descriptor holy just as 
seriously as the banishment. Indeed, Goldstein writes: “Plato wasn’t one of the many 
philosophers insensible to deep aesthetic stirrings” (6). Plato, himself, is often proclaimed 
to be one of the greatest literary artists in the Western philosophical canon. Plato seems to 
hope that poetry can muster up a respectable philosophical comeback, convincing him that 
it shouldn’t be ejected, writing: “nonetheless, if poetry has any argument to bring forward 
that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to 
admit it, for we are ourselves very susceptible to its charms” (395). This thesis, then, is in 
a sense an attempt to bring forth such an argument: to demonstrate that there exist 
functions that literature can serve that are not available to philosophy.7 
A recent collection, The Wounded Animal, provides a parallel attempt to reopen the issue of 
the ‘ancient quarrel’ which the editor Stephen Mulhall claims to have marked, and indeed 
defined, philosophy from its inception. The authors address this debate by considering the 
Tanner Lectures titled “The Lives of Animals” by novelist J. M. Coetzee. Interestingly the 
philosopher Christine Korsgaard presented a Tanner Lecture several years later, 
approaching the same topic—our responsibilities towards animals (2004). Her method, 
however, is strictly philosophical, presenting a Kantian argument without suggestion of 
literary device. In contrast Coetzee’s essays are peppered with meta-fictional, experimental 
devices. Nonetheless Coetzee’s approach is arguably deeply didactic, and therefore fails to 
 
4 For a fuller discussion, see Chase (2010), Analytic Philosophy and Dialogic Conservatism. 
5 For further on the notion of clarity, see Leibniz’s Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas where clarity is 
examined in the context of ‘clear and distinct’ perception. 
6 For a thorough treatment of the nature of clarity, see Cohen’s (1986) case for analytic philosophy as 
essentially concerned with “reasoning about reasoning” (49). 
7 That is, not available to philosophy as philosophy. A mode with delineated instruments of inquiry designed 
to exclude the literary. Much philosophical content has been examined and elucidated by methods not 





fulfil some of the potential of literary inquiry. While beyond the scope of the present thesis, 
a contrast between the two works, and evaluation of how successful they are in conveying 
their arguments, offer insight. A further valuable point of inquiry, also beyond the scope 
of this thesis, concerns the fact that it has been Platonists in later antiquity who found 
ways to defend poetry against Plato’s critiques, a case made by Miles and Baltzly (2018) in 
translating Proclus’s commentary on Plato’s Republic. Indeed, Neo-Platonists of late have 
argued for a mystical purpose for poetry, or at least for the form of poetry of which they 
approve—though this is couched in different terms. They also discuss the limits of 
language in conveying experience beyond language.8 I will turn now to the writings of 
David Foster Wallace, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Relevance of Wallace and Wittgenstein 
David Foster Wallace provides footing for my entry into the ‘ancient quarrel’. Wallace’s 
interest in the intersection between philosophy and literature has often been overlooked 
in the emerging canon. Yet Wallace provides a penetrating analysis of this intersection in 
“The Empty Plenum”. Consequently, I focus on this text, elucidating its major themes, 
and intending through this close analysis to highlight Wallace’s overarching theory of 
successful philosophical narrative.         
Other thinkers, Randy Ramal and James Ryerson, provide interpretations of this text from 
which I diverge. I evaluate Ryerson and Ramal’s claims concerning Wallace’s conception 
of philosophy’s relation to literature, and Wallace’s specific understanding of the aims of 
literature, as elucidated in “The Empty Plenum”. Neither Ryerson nor Ramal do justice to 
Wallace’s conception of the relationship between philosophy and literature. While each 
raise important issues, I argue that at the root of Wallace’s discussion of the relation 
between philosophy and literature in “The Empty Plenum” is the saying-showing 
distinction made in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. By considering this distinction, overlooked by 
both writers, we can better understand Wallace’s conception of the intersection of 
philosophy and literature.9         
 
8 For other recent studies of non-discursivity evidencing this kind of Platonism, see Rappe (2007). 
9 It is worth mentioning here that, while Kant draws a similar but tangential distinction between the 
noumenal and phenomenal world, he doesn’t have the focus on conveying experience beyond language but 
more on the bracketing off of this unknowable noumenal world; therefore this will not be a focus in what 




To make this case I explore the distinction in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
between that which can be said and that which can only be shown. I then argue for the 
relevance of this notion to the ‘ancient quarrel’. I aim to both provide a comprehensive 
reading of Wallace’s conception of novelistic inquiry’s relation to philosophy, set out in 
“The Empty Plenum”, and also to argue Wittgenstein’s Saying–Showing distinction bears 
on the ‘ancient quarrel’ between the philosophers and the poets, demonstrating that 
literature acts where philosophy is unable to—it shows what philosophers cannot say.  
CHAPTER I: The Empty Plenum 
In this chapter I will introduce David Foster Wallace, then examine the ficto-critical essay 
“The Empty Plenum”. I will evaluate the current interpretation of Wallace’s work by 
Ryerson and Ramal before making my case for the relevance of the saying-showing 
distinction made in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to Wallace’s conception of philosophy’s 
relation to literature. 
1.1 David Foster Wallace 
David Foster Wallace is often-labelled progenitor of a third wave of literary modernism 
christened the ‘New Sincerity’ or post-postmodernism.10 He is widely considered one of 
the most influential and innovative writers in recent decades.11 Laurels aside, a critical 
literature surrounding his work has developed only in recent years. Amidst the still inchoate 
field of Wallace studies there exist works exploring Wallace’s innovative writing modes 
and voices and his thematic concerns, including: the fragmentation of thought (Stern and 
Mclaughlin, 2000); the relationship between happiness and boredom and tensions between 
the beauty and hideousness of human physicality (Feeney, 2011); solipsism (Krajeski, 
2008); freedom (Wallace, 2008); mindfulness (McGurll, 2014) and moving beyond the 
irony and meta-fiction associated with postmodernism (Wallace, 1993). It is well 
established that Wallace had serious and abiding interests in academic philosophy.12 His 
oeuvre is marked by philosophical concern with ethics and morality, epistemology and a 
distinctively Wittgensteinian interest in our everyday words and the world outside them. 
 
10 For a detailed examination of Wallace’s formative influence on contemporary fiction, see Boswell, 
Understanding David Foster Wallace. 
11 His work having, as well as public acclaim, garnered national attention and critical praise, receiving the 
MacArthur Fellowship and the Aga Khan Prize for Fiction. 
12 Wallace was, for a time, a graduate student in philosophy at Harvard, beginning with an interest in 
mathematical logic. See also his undergraduate thesis, Fate, Time and Language, published posthumously by 




Ryerson writes, “[Wallace’s] serious early engagement with philosophy would play a lasting 
role in his work and thought, including his ideas about the purpose and possibilities of 
fiction” (2). 
I should note that since completing this thesis greater attention has been paid to Wallace 
studies in general. Attending and presenting at the annual David Foster Wallace 
Conference in 2018 and 2019, I witnessed a number of scholars workshopping as yet 
unpublished or in-the-process-of publishing works, examining Wallace’s relation to animal 
rights, his influence on millennial-modernism, the concept of self-transcendence, worship, 
devotion, religion and spirituality. Wallace’s bearing on political freedom, responsibility, 
the nature of empathy and a whole host of topics of philosophical import.13 The trend has, 
however, been to attend to particular works and particular topics of moral/cultural import. 
But there has been scant work done on the topic of Wallace’s conception of the 
relationship between philosophy and literature more broadly.  
Wittgenstein claimed that “it’s only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do 
that you can solve their problems” (75). And, indeed, it is Wallace’s views on the purpose 
and possibilities of fiction, in relation to philosophy, that are the focus of this thesis. In the 
embryonic field of Wallace studies there exists only one established collection concerning 
Wallace and philosophy (Cahn, 2015) yet this text explicitly concerns his exploration of 
Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality (Wallace, 1985). A recent 
collection, Gesturing toward Reality (2015), is the first in which there is direct address of 
Wallace’s thought to literature’s relation to philosophical inquiry. The titular allusion to 
Wittgenstein of gesturing towards reality is no accident, although the term gesture is 
problematic, which I will demonstrate. It nonetheless emphasises the influence of 
mysticism in Wittgenstein’s work, pre-empting the topic of this thesis. Despite this titular 
reference to Wittgenstein, the majority of the essays in Gesturing Towards Reality remain 
thematically concerned.14 The only piece in the collection to overtly take as its focus 
Wallace’s thought concerning literary/philosophical inquiry is an article by Randy Ramal, 
 
13 At the Sixth Annual David Foster Wallace Conference at Illinois State University I presented an excerpt 
from Murmurations. At the fifth conference, I presented a paper on Wallace’s theory of the intersection 
between literature and philosophy. 
14 Within this collection, some writers espouse overt spiritual or religious angles on his work; see, for instance, 
Bulger’s essay ‘A Less “Bullshitty” Way to Live: The Pragmatic Spirituality of David Foster Wallace’ or the 
way Wallace deals with topics including loneliness, boredom and depression. See Andrew Bennet’s ‘Inside 




responding to James Ryerson’s introduction to Fate, Time and Language.15 Both critics 
explore how this topic is elucidated in “The Empty Plenum”.16 These pieces by Ramal and 
Ryerson will be examined in detail in the following chapter. 
While much work has been done analysing Wallace’s major works, Infinite Jest (Burn, 2012), 
Broom of the System (Boswell, 2003) and The Pale King (Boswell, 2012), including the ficto-
critical essay “Consider the Lobster” (Kaiser, 2014), little attention has been paid to 
Wallace’s article “The Empty Plenum”. It will be argued in the following section that this 
is a major oversight, given Wallace’s “The Empty Plenum”, a review of Markson’s novel 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress, is essential to understanding Wallace’s conception of literature’s role. 
1.2 The Empty Plenum  
To introduce Wallace’s “The Empty Plenum”, I should begin by outlining the novel it 
evaluates—David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress. This work may be categorised to be a 
highly stylised, experimental novel in the tradition of Samuel Beckett. It is presented as a 
series of statements made in the first person, in which the protagonist, a woman named 
Kate, believes herself to be the last human on earth. Wittgenstein’s Mistress is heavy with 
allusions, references, and parallels drawn between Kate and fictional and historical 
characters, most notably: Helen of Troy, Achilles, Vincent van Gogh, William Gaddis, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, William Shakespeare and Johannes Brahms. Many of these cameos 
are used to orient the reader towards certain themes, particularly those of language and 
memory. 
Wallace held this novel in high esteem given that Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress and 
Wallace’s own first novel The Broom of the System (1987) were both formally and thematically 
concerned with Wittgenstein’s writing—yet Wallace believed Markson was better able to 
express the existential worry he wished to depict in Broom. That is, the consequences of 
living in the kind of world Wittgenstein’s Tractatus described. Ryerson writes: “Wallace felt 
that Markson’s novel had succeeded in uniting literature and philosophy in the way that 
he, in Broom, tried but failed to do” (27). Wallace praised Markson’s novel, considering it 
“an imaginative portrait of what it would be like actually to live in the sort of world the 
 
15 Fate, Time and Language explores Wallace’s philosophical background, examining his undergraduate honours 
thesis “Richard Taylor’s ‘Fatalism’ and the Semantics of Physical Modality”. 
16 As an addendum Wallace’s title refers to the solipsism felt in the empty world Markson conjures in 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress: “damnation to ghostliness among ghosts, curating a plenum of statues, mistaking 




logic & metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus posits”, and that it “transforms metaphysics 
into angst” while revealing that “philosophy is first and last about spirit” (1990, 49). He 
felt Markson had succeeded in fusing philosophy and fiction by demonstrating the vital 
role of the novel of ideas in joining “cerebration & emotion, abstraction & lived life, 
transcendent truth-seeking & daily schlepping”. In other words, Markson had delivered on 
Wallace’s literary-philosophical ideal of “making heads throb heart like” (ibid).  
For the above reason Wallace’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s Mistress raises concerns equally 
relevant to his own development as they were to his analysis of Markson’s achievement, 
and so provides a reflection on his conception of literature more than any other ficto-
critical analysis of a text provided by Wallace.17 My analysis of Wallace’s “The Empty 
Plenum” proves useful to understanding his own work’s development. It also seems fitting 
that his work be assessed in the narrative vein he elected to be measured against, by the 
parameters he sets for others. To understand Wallace’s philosophical ambitions in 
literature, then, it is worth looking in detail at what Wallace thought Markson had achieved 
and why. 
1.3 The Vocational Travelogue 
To understand what Wallace took Markson to have achieved, we should return to the 
central questions of this thesis: can metaphysical novels do more than allude to or illustrate 
philosophy? Put differently, how is the purpose of Markson’s novel Wittgenstein’s Mistress 
different from that of Wittgenstein’s own philosophical text, the Tractatus? And can 
Markson’s novel do more than allude to or illustrate Wittgenstein’s Tractatus? To answer 
this from Wallace’s perspective I think it is instructive to look at his notion of the 
vocational travelogue.  
Wallace, in his collection Both Flesh and Not, utilises the idea of the ‘vocational travelogue’ 
as a shorthand reference to the way fiction has previously offered a form of imaginative 
tourism: a means by which readers could gain insights into places or cultures they’d 
otherwise never get to see. Modernity, globalisation and television have, however, rendered 
this function obsolete.18 Wallace claims that in its place modern technology has created 
 
17 It should be noted that Wallace has given some attention to other writers including McElroy, DeLillo, 
Pynchon and Gaddis. None, however, have received the sustained attention given to David Markson in “The 
Empty Plenum”. 
18 This is illustrated, for instance, in major vocational travelogue-style novels, such as Hailey’s “Airport and 




such extreme vocational specialisation that few people are now “in a position to know 
much about any professional field but their own; and thus that a certain amount of fiction’s 
touristic function now consists in giving readers dramatized access to the nuts and bolts of 
different professional disciplines and specialties” (5). Akin to mathematical melodrama 
fiction,19 Wallace asserts that many take it for given that if the novel delves into 
philosophical content, then it does so in this fashion—as a modern vocational travelogue 
of esoteric technical philosophy. His concern is that metaphysical novels, understood in 
such a vein, would be rendered derivative or vaguely sensationalist, and that they would 
function merely as an intellectual shibboleth in various forms, whether by riding on the coat 
tails of genius through allusion, dropping references ‘like bricks’ throughout the work, or 
parroting a philosopher’s lines in parodic homage.20   
Incidentally the concern Wallace raises about fiction rendered derivative has overtones of 
Plato’s concern about mimêsis, or poetry functioning as a copy of a copy. One of the 
dangers of imitation, according to Plato in Book 10, is that Poetic mimêsis, like the kind 
in a painting, is the imitation of appearance alone, and its products thus rank far below 
truth (596–602). Through the imitation of appearance, it has been argued that artistic 
mimêsis intensifies a weakness present in existing objects, and consequently not only fails 
but fails twice, or doubly; see Murray (27–46). 
This idea of the vocational travelogue raises the very question I claimed emerged from 
Plato’s rejection of the poet from the ideal society, but set in the present context: is 
literature limited to being but a translation of philosophy; that is, the making of abstruse 
ideas accessible? In this case, is the novel of ideas rendered derivative or secondary? Or 
does literature go beyond philosophy—that is, is there something the novel alone can say? 
On this question of the status of literature dealing with philosophical content or theory, 
Wallace writes that “Wittgenstein’s Mistress, with regards to its eponymous master, does more 
than just quote Wittgenstein in weird ways, or allude to his work, or attempt to be some 
sort of dramatization of the intellectual problems that occupied and oppressed him”. He 
expands: “I do not mean to suggest that David Markson’s achievement here consists just 
in making abstract philosophy ‘accessible’ to an extramural reader, Markson’s is not a pop 
 
19 For instance, Fermat’s Last Theorem or A Beautiful Mind. 
20 Wallace’s example is Candide, in which Pangloss’s statement “‘all for the best in the best of all possible 
worlds’ is a neon sign out front of what is, except for its end, little more than a poisonously funny parody of 
the metaphysics of Leibniz, and which succumbs to the hazard of most parody and gets the point of Leibniz’s 




book, and it is not decocted philosophy or a docudrama-of-the-week” (86). Wallace claims 
that though Wittgenstein’s Mistress requires critical ‘clarification’ by reference to the Tractatus, 
the novel is not merely written ‘in the margins of’ the Tractatus—the way for instance 
Voltaire’s Candide marginalises The Monadology or Nausea, simply by ‘dramatising’ it. 
What then does it do? What does its achievement consist of that puts it above decocted 
philosophy or derivative illustration, or above vocational travelogue status? The following 
sections consider what Ryerson and Ramal took this achievement to be. I will respond to 
their claims before turning to my own interpretation. 
1.4 Ryerson on solipsism 
Ryerson, in his introduction to the posthumous publication of Wallace’s undergraduate 
thesis in philosophy, draws attention to the role that philosophy played in Wallace’s fiction 
and other writings (2011, 1–33). He claims that while Wallace abandoned philosophy as a 
formal pursuit, it was nonetheless formative for his cast of mind, and repeatedly crops up 
in the subject matter of his writing. Ryerson provides an exposition of where philosophical 
topics surface in Wallace’s novels Broom of the System, Infinite Jest and The Pale King, among 
other writings,21 and in this introduction he indicates that Wallace wanted to unite literature 
and philosophy in the same way David Markson did in Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Ryerson 
writes: “Wallace felt that Markson’s novel had succeeded in uniting literature and 
philosophy in the way that he, in Broom, tried but failed to do” (27). 
Ryerson does not, however, explore what this same way amounts to, nor does he expand 
on the views Wallace propounds in “The Empty Plenum”, concerning his conception of 
the nature of philosophy and its relation to literature. Ryerson’s focus rests mainly upon 
Wallace’s approval of Markson’s ability to imaginatively render the Tractarian solipsist’s 
world, focusing on the way solipsism has similarly haunted Wallace’s work. Ryerson writes 
“for Wallace, this was a harrowing equation, the dark emotional takeaway of the Tractatus’ 
severe anti-metaphysics. This was also, for Wallace, what Markson had rendered 
imaginatively in his novel. Without ever raising these ideas explicitly, Markson had 
conveyed them with a special kind of clarity” (27). Ryerson then continues to loosely relate 
this to Wallace’s insistence that the task of fiction is to ‘make heads throb heart like’; that 
is, to draw out the emotional implications of the literary work without getting lost in its 
 
21 For instance, the morality of consuming sentient beings is considered in “Consider the Lobster”, the 
question of beauty in athletics in “Federer as Religious Experience”, illusory freedom in “A Supposedly Fun 




abstract and intellectual details (14). Ryerson is undeniably correct when he points to the 
importance of the conjured solipsism and loneliness in Wittgenstein’s Mistress: 
Wallace had read the Tractatus, of course (he wrote to Lance Olsen that he thought 
its first sentence was “the most beautiful opening line in western lit”). He knew 
that Wittgenstein’s book presented a spare and unforgiving picture of the relations 
among logic, language, and the physical world. He knew that the puzzles solved 
and raised by the book were influential, debatable, and rich in their implications. 
But as a flesh-and-blood reader with human feelings, he also knew, though he had 
never articulated it out loud, that as you laboured to understand the Tractatus, its 
cold, formal, logical picture of the world could make you feel strange, lonely, 
awestruck, lost, frightened—a range of moods not unlike those undergone by Kate 
herself. The similarities were not accidental. Markson’s novel, as Wallace put it, 
was like a 240-page answer to the question, “What if somebody really had to live 
in a Tractatusized world?” (27) 
Indeed, Wallace wrote “Mr Markson has in this book succeeded already on all the really 
important levels of fictional conviction … He has fleshed the abstract sketches of 
Wittgensteinian doctrine into the concrete theatre of human loneliness” (24). Wallace 
describes Wittgenstein’s Mistress at one point in his essay to be “an immediate study of 
depression & loneliness [that] is far too moving to be the object of either exercise or 
exorcism” (98). In fact, Markson in an interview with Joseph Tabbi asserts that the central 
concept of the book was the idea of aloneness.    
I would, however, consider it misleading to claim, as Ryerson has, that this is what so 
attracted Wallace to Wittgenstein’s Mistress. In contrast I take the major point for Wallace to 
be not the particular conjuring of solipsism, but the having conjured the emotional 
implications of the text, when Wallace writes: “I can think of no lit.-practitioner (as 
opposed to new- or post-structural theorist) who’s captured the textual urge, the emotional 
urgency of text as both sign and thing, as perfectly as has Markson here” (127).  
Wallace held the novel in such high regard because it was not so much an attempt to posit 
grounds for solipsism, but to express solipsism as felt. This could be called, perhaps tritely, 
both ‘the felt experience of encountering metaphysics’, and ‘giving the reader imaginative 
access to this felt experience’. As Wallace writes: “I guess a big part of serious fiction’s 




give her imaginative access to other selves … if a piece of fiction can allow us imaginatively 
to identify with a character’s pain, we might then also more easily conceive of others 
identifying with our own. This is nourishing, redemptive; we become less alone inside” 
(127).  
I do not doubt the importance of solipsism to Wallace, it being a theme to which he 
regularly returns.22 However, Ryerson seems to allude to, yet not follow through with, a 
major issue: much writing has concerned solipsism—the value of Markson’s Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress to Wallace lay in his “[never] raising these ideas explicitly”, yet nonetheless 
“conveying them with a special kind of clarity” (27, emphasis added). It was this method of 
rendering that Wallace most admired in Markson—and this, I demonstrate in a later 
section, concerns a distinction between Showing and Saying developed by Wittgenstein in 
his Tractatus. This same distinction, I will demonstrate, provides a novel way to address the 
question set out in this thesis. 
1.5 Ramal on explanation 
Randy Ramal, continuing from where Ryerson left off, aims to explore Wallace’s views 
specific to understanding the aims of literature (177–199). Beginning with a concern for 
Wallace’s conception of the nature of philosophy, Ramal turns to the question: is 
philosophy such that it can be used to make the same points Wallace wanted to make in a 
narrative form? This is a question that Ramal, in reading Wallace, answers in the negative. 
In brief, Ramal demonstrates how Wallace’s background in Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
helped him develop his views on the natures of philosophy and literature. He argues that 
Wallace conceived of the nature of philosophy to be concerned with describing and 
clarifying everyday concepts without interfering with, or attempting to change, what was 
described. This being the case, he asserts that Wallace found “philosophy as such [to be] 
unsuitable for the thinker, the artist, or the creative writer who wants to not only describe 
and analyse concepts but also offer therapeutic alternatives to existential problems” (188). 
Ramal quotes Wallace saying, “I just think that fiction that isn’t exploring what it means 
to be human today isn’t art” (McCaffery, 26). Consequently, Ramal concludes that Wallace 
attempted to do in literature what could not be done in philosophy—that is, express and 
deal with existential matters. Ramal argues that by incorporating philosophical narratives 
 
22 As Ryerson writes, Wallace’s engagement with Wittgenstein’s philosophy was a lasting affair, particularly 




into his literature, Wallace found this to be a creative way of reinventing literature and 
using it to fight aesthetic and existential crises.23 
Consequently, Ramal primarily reads Wallace as desiring to articulate moral perspectives 
on human nature beyond the confines of traditional philosophy, and thereby to be able to 
discuss moral and existential issues he found to be important. He claims that Wallace felt 
literature could escape the confines of philosophy, by avoiding theorisation and the 
offering of explanations, writing: “[Wallace] believed that theorizing about human nature 
… entails certain dangers from which the narrative philosopher ought to steer away” (190). 
Ramal argued Ryerson’s interpretation of “The Empty Plenum” failed in that it focused 
on only half of Wallace’s critique: “On the one hand, he saw the novel as a realistic portrait 
of the negative consequences of living in the kind of world that Wittgenstein depicted in 
the Tractatus”, but, according to Ramal, Ryerson ignored the important anti-explanation 
component of Wallace’s thinking, that “on the other hand, [Wallace] also found that 
[Wittgenstein’s Mistress] suffers from the same fate as many narratives that promote 
metaphysical, or generalized, theories—namely the temptation to offer an explanation for 
the radically diverse and complex existence we have” (190).  
Ramal argued that Wallace must have encountered the references to the danger of 
theorising in Wittgenstein, who held theoretical explanations to be too generalised and 
distorting of the phenomena they seek to explain. To understand Wittgenstein’s critique 
requires examination of his approach to explanation outlined in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Applying this approach to psychological research reveals conceptual 
confusions stemming from underlying essentialism, referentialist and reductionist 
assumptions, leading to misconceived notions of causality, explanation and 
systematisation, leaving experimentation with unsound conceptual underpinnings. Here 
Wittgenstein is concerned with explanation, and the tendency to theorize and stipulate 
psychological, emotional or causal explanations as the needed factors behind a proper 
understanding of what is real and meaningful.24 
 
23 Ramal will go on to argue that Wallace took the state of American fiction to be in both aesthetic and moral 
crises, and that there was a consequent need to ‘reinvent literature’ by writing a new kind of fiction to tackle 
existential issues including: nihilism, depression, boredom, dullness, and the effects of entertainment on 
people’s lives. See Wallace’s journalistic assignment “Consider the Lobster”, and the existential themes of 
boredom and dullness in unfinished novel The Pale King. 
24 For example, Wittgenstein attacks the idea that psychological theorizing necessarily explains the inner life 
of people by questioning whether core foundations of natural sciences—causality and systematization—are 




Wallace seems to have been aware of this point. As his critiques of Markson’s novel 
suggest, when it comes to existential issues relating to boredom, death, making responsible 
choices, etc., it is doubtful that theories could perform the job they are supposed to do, 
whether in philosophy or literature. Wallace’s worry here, which was also Wittgenstein’s 
concern, is that whereas theories are often promoted to be the explanation of where 
meaning and sense reside, the latter could easily escape the scope of theorising. 
Ramal’s arguments fairly capture Wallace’s disapproval of Markson’s use of explanation. 
For example, amidst his otherwise passionate advocacy and praise of Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress,25 Wallace writes: “What I’m negative on is the particular strategy Markson 
sometimes employs to try to explain Kate’s ‘female’ feelings both of ultimate guilt & of 
ultimate loneliness” (263). Wallace’s major critique of Wittgenstein’s Mistress is that it 
attempts to offer psychological explanations for Kate’s emotional condition. Wallace, for 
instance, finds the presentation by Markson of the death of Kate’s son, and her separation 
from her husband, to be a very particular type of emotional explanation and objectionable 
reduction, asserting “the presentation of personal history as present explanation, one that 
threatens to make Wittgenstein’s Mistress just another madwoman monologue in the 
Ophelia–Rhys tradition, is oblique & ever artful, but still prominent & insistent enough to 
make it hard (for me) to blink its intent” (264).    
It should be noted that what Wallace finds disappointing about Markson’s novel is not so 
much that it fails to offer an explanation but rather it fails “because it’s an explanation” 
(emphasis added). This is perhaps in part because Wittgenstein felt that to solve 
philosophical problems we do not need better philosophical theories; we should not aim 
for explanation, but rather for a detailed description of the use of our words, providing a 
“perspicuous representation” (PI, 122) by means of which we can gain a more profound 
understanding of language. Wallace writes, in reference to Markson’s apparent settling on 
a character-archetype, and narrative explanation for Kate’s emotional condition, that: “it 
seems very interesting to me that Mr. Markson has created a Kate who dwells so 
convincingly in a hell of utter subjectivity, yet cannot, finally, himself help but objectify 
 
between things, of causal connections that are universal and omnipresent. In contrast, Wittgenstein argued 
that we need not presume there are neural processes correlated with associating or with thinking; such that 
it is possible to read off thought processes from brain processes. He writes: “why should there not be a 
psychological regularity to which no physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of 
causality then it is high time they were upset. See for further Hacker (2013).  
25 Though it should be acknowledged that in the “The Empty Plenum” Wallace also expresses unease about 




her—i.e., by ‘explaining’ her metaphysical condition as emotional/psychical, reducing her 
bottled missive to a mad monologue … Markson is basically subsuming Kate under one 
of the comparatively stock rubrics via which we guys apparently must organize & process 
fey mystery, feminine pathos, Strengthless & Female fruit” (262).   
Indeed in reference to explanation in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Wallace expresses his 
affirmation of the way the novel inverts the received formulae for ‘successful’ fiction, in 
that its success is where it fails to conform; that is, “it’s when Kate is least particular, least 
‘motivated’ by some artfully presented but standardly digestible Evian/Valentinian/post-
Freudian trauma, that her character & plight are most affecting. For (obvious tho this 
seems) to the extent that Kate is not motivationally unique, she can be all of us, and the 
empty diffraction of Kate’s world can map or picture the desacralized & paradoxical 
solipsism of U.S. persons in a cattle-herd culture that worships only the Transparent I” 
(263). 
My major objection to Ramal is, however, the centrality he assigns this opposition to 
explanation in Wallace’s criticism of Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Markson’s offering of 
explanations was objectionable to Wallace foremost because Markson attempted to say 
what could only be shown, a Wittgensteinian distinction I shall examine in the following 
section. By doing so I hope to illustrate the way Ramal’s anti-explanation reading of 
Wallace can be subsumed under this more general point. 
1.6 Saying and showing in “The Empty Plenum” 
In what follows I examine what I take to be the major pitfalls in both readings: that is, 
their failure to recognise the importance of Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction in 
the Tractatus. This distinction I argue is pivotal. It casts light on where literature’s value 
resides, and what Wallace takes Markson, in Wittgenstein’s Mistress, to have succeeded in 
doing. 
Ryerson, when providing a rough layman’s guide to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, quotes 
Wittgenstein, stating: “anything in language that does not depict a possible state of 
affairs—that is, anything that does not depict possible fact—is, strictly speaking, 
meaningless” (27). He does not, however, follow on this discussion. But he does at one-
point assert Wallace may have had a strong misreading of Wittgenstein’s work, given 




the Tractatus was ‘a big motivation’ for its disavowal by Wittgenstein” (27). This is a view 
Ryerson claims is misguided as the biographical literature suggests that Wittgenstein was 
perfectly at ease with the solipsism of the Tractatus, indeed even mystically consoled by its 
suggestion that ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual truths are unutterable. In contrast to 
Ryerson, I argue that Wallace was not in fact oblivious to the paradox of the Tractatus, but 
aware of it and its implications for what can be said and what can only be shown. It is rather 
Ryerson, who provides the strong misreading of Wallace, by believing him to be oblivious 
to the alternate mystical reading of the Tractatus, which I argue he was not only aware of, 
but that gave foundations to his argument in important ways.  
While Ramal recognised Wallace’s knowledge of this saying-showing distinction—as 
evidenced when he quotes Wallace writing that Wittgenstein’s Mistress succeeds “in a deep-
nonsensical way that’s much more effective than argument or [allegory]” (84)—Ramal 
even finds that by deep-nonsensical ways Wallace may be referring to the ending of the 
Tractatus where Wittgenstein writes “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who 
understands me finally recognizes them as senseless/nonsensical (unsinnig), when he has 
climbed out through them, on them, over them” (Tractatus, 6.54). Ramal believes that 
Wallace uses this to say something obviously positive about Markson’s novel. But ‘obviously 
positive’ seems to be where Ramal’s analysis stops. Indeed, Ramal dismisses further 
analysis, stating: “the Tractatus is notoriously difficult to understand, and this is not the 
place to analyse its complexity or to gauge Wallace’s understanding of it” (74). Indeed, 
where Ramal delves into the Philosophical Investigations, and its relevance, I am of a mind 
with Cora Diamond, who holds that to understand Wittgenstein’s work:  
One must be struck by his insistence that he is not putting forward philosophical 
doctrines or theses; or by his suggestion that it cannot be done, that it is only 
through some confusion one is in about what one is doing that one could take 
oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all. I think that 
there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value, and which can be grasped 
if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy. But that view of philosophy is 
itself something that has to be seen first in the Tractatus if it is to be understood in 
its later forms, and in the Tractatus it is inseparable from what is central there, the 





Consequently, given the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown 
resides in his earlier work, my focus on the Tractatus is my point of departure from both 
readings. I have argued above that Ryerson and Ramal both provide analysis of important 
aspects of Wallace’s “The Empty Plenum”, yet both are guilty of a glaring oversight: they 
fail to examine the influence of the saying-showing distinction on Wallace. Wallace’s 
discussion of philosophy’s relation to literature circles around this central distinction. 
However, before demonstrating this I will defend the informativeness of this distinction, 
a defence resting on the plausibility of a mystical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. 
The following Chapter II elaborates on saying-showing distinction, and then in Chapter 






CHAPTER II: Mysticism of the Tractatus 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has 
used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
(6.54, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). 
Ryerson and Ramal misread Wallace, due to a lack of engagement with the influence of 
Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction. The root of Wallace’s analysis can best be 
understood in terms of this overlooked distinction. But how should we understand this 
distinction—what cannot be said but only shown? And how does this relate to literature?  
In order to understand this distinction, we must understand Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, a text infamous for its ambiguity and for the contention over its meaning. 
Unsurprisingly there exist a variety of interpretations of what Wittgenstein was up to. In 
what follows I will evaluate these various interpretations. I conclude that proper 
understanding of the Tractatus requires conceiving it to be an elucidatory project intended to 
acquaint us with mystical experience, rather than an attempt to communicate truths. I hold 
that the point of the Tractatus is not that its readers should come to apprehend some set of 
truths, but that they should come “to see the world aright”. Of course, a great deal more 
light needs to be shed on what this notion of ‘rightness’ or indeed ‘seeing’ signifies, in 
Wittgenstein’s phrase. This will be discussed below in the section on seeing the world 
aright. But first we must better understand the saying-showing distinction and see how it 
plays a central role in the Tractatus.  
2.1 Senseless or nonsense? 
The Tractatus aims to chart the limits of thought by revealing the relationship between 
language and the world. To do so Wittgenstein proposed a picture theory of meaning, 
according to which the conditions for a proposition’s having sense rest on the possibility 
of its representing or picturing a state of affairs. Consequently when a true proposition is 
thought or expressed, each constituent part corresponds to some aspect of the world—
though importantly the picture theory allows for false pictures; for instance, “It is raining” 




natural science, rendering senseless (sinloss) a daunting number of statements which are 
used in language. It is important, however, to distinguish the senseless (sinnlos) from 
another group of statements which cannot carry sense, the nonsensical (unsinnig), as 
nonsense became the hinge of Wittgensteinian interpretive discussion during the last 
decade of the 20th century. Nonsensical propositions, like senseless propositions, are more 
radically devoid of meaning than senseless propositions; in that they transcend the bounds 
of sense.   
Since only what is “in” the world can be described, anything that is “higher” is excluded. 
Nonsensical propositions include propositions of traditional metaphysics and the 
propositions of ethics and aesthetics—given these attempt to capture the world as a whole, 
they are also excluded. Similarly, the notion of solipsism—the very notion of a subject, for 
it is also not “in” the world but at its limit. While some nonsensical propositions are 
blatantly so (“Toby is identical” rather than “Toby is identical to himself”), others seem to 
be meaningful (“8 is a number” and “there are objects” for instance), and only analysis 
carried out in accordance with the picture theory can expose their nonsensicality. 
Wittgenstein does not, however, relegate all that is outside the bounds of sense to oblivion: 
he makes a saying-showing distinction that does additional crucial work, which shall be 
seen. 
2.2 The saying-showing distinction 
‘What can be shown cannot be said’, that is, what cannot be formulated in sayable (sensical) 
propositions can only be shown. The distinction between Saying and Showing first 
seriously emerges in Part 4 of the Tractatus in connection with the idea that a proposition 
shows, but does not say, what its sense is (4.022ff.). What can be shown, we are told, 
cannot be said (4.1212). By the end of the work the catalogue of what can be shown has 
expanded to include: the logical form of reality (4.121); the logical relations between 
propositions (4.1211, 6.1201 and 6.1221); the limit of empirical reality (5.5561); the truth 
in solipsism (5.62); and the mystical (6.522). Many philosophers have been ill-at-ease with 
this distinction. Russell, for one, claimed it left him “with a certain sense of intellectual 
discomfort” (TLP, xxi). But the apparent connection between the notion of showing and 
mystical things that ‘make themselves manifest’ made others hesitant to accept the 




Nonetheless it can plausibly be argued that the distinction is the pivot on which 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus turns. Evidence of the centrality of the distinction comes in 
numerous forms. For one, in a letter to Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein complained that 
Russell did not understand the main message of the Tractatus, explaining that: “the main 
point is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions—i.e., by language . . . and 
what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which, I believe, is the cardinal 
problem of philosophy” (Stern, 69–70). This division would be the means by which 
Wittgenstein would “set a limit . . . to the expression of thoughts” (TLP, 3). 
Further evidence that this distinction served as the main message of the text emerges when 
Wittgenstein writes to Ludwig von Ficker about his book, which he hoped Ficker would 
publish. Wittgenstein writes that he had once meant to include in the preface a sentence 
that might provide a key to understanding the work for him: “my work consists of two 
parts, the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second 
part that is the important point … I’ve managed in my book to put everything firmly into 
place by being silent about it … For now, I would recommend you read the preface and 
the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point” 
(ProtoTractatus, 16). The saying-showing distinction can then be seen to be central to 
understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractarian project. He uses the distinction to carry out what 
he perceives to be philosophy’s mission: to clarify our thoughts, sharpen the boundaries 
of what can and cannot be said, and circumscribe the limits of the natural sciences and 
philosophy (4.1–4.115). In order to properly understand the saying-showing distinction, 
we must firstly consider Wittgenstein’s Tractarian project and the paradox of the Tractatus.  
2.3 The paradox of the Tractatus 
The Tractatus aims to chart the limits of thought by revealing the relationship between 
language and the world. Outlined above, Wittgenstein proposes a picture theory, according 
to which, when a true proposition is thought or expressed, each constituent part corresponds 
to some aspect of the world. This correspondence itself, however, he claimed we could 
not say anything about; rather, this correspondence could only be shown. Given this picture 
theory of meaning, Wittgenstein claims the only meaningful propositions are those that 
picture contingent states of affairs, falsely or truly. It follows that only states of affairs that 
can be pictured can be represented by meaningful propositions. This means that what can 




propositions, including, firstly, the propositions of logic (as these propositions do not 
represent states of affairs, and the logical constants do not stand for objects). all 
propositions of ethics, aesthetics, the mystical, and indeed, philosophy itself.26 
Yet Wittgenstein also claims what I will refer to as Assumption (A): the purpose of the Tractatus 
is to communicate truths. Wittgenstein states that one aspect of the work’s value consists in 
the fact that “thoughts are expressed” in it (29), and that “the truth of the thoughts 
communicated . . . here seems to me unassailable and definitive” (29). Infamously, 
however, were (A) correct, then this generates a serious paradox rendering the Tractatus 
incoherent. By laying out his theory of meaning in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein draws a limit 
to the expression of thoughts entailing the meaninglessness of any attempt to elaborate 
this very theory of meaning. Consequently the Tractatus’ picture theory of meaning renders 
the propositions of the Tractatus nonsensical, because, if we take the picture theory to be 
true, then to try to say how the world, and language, must be for meaning to be possible 
is to try to say something about the logical form that sentences share with reality (2.16–
2.18); but, according to that very theory, the attempt to do such a thing can only issue in 
nonsense, since logical form cannot be represented (4.12). Yet, given (A), Wittgenstein 
claims that the Tractatus communicates thoughts whose truth is ‘unassailable and 
definitive’. Here then is the paradox of the Tractatus: if its constituent sentences are true, 
then they are nonsense. How can true thoughts be communicated by nonsensical pseudo-
propositions?  
2.4 Interpretations of the saying-showing distinction 
Given this ambiguity, understanding the Tractatus has been an ongoing topic of contention 
and confusion since its publication. Indeed, since its publication several waves of 
interpretations have come to dominate. Some fundamental disagreements informing 
interpretation revolve around the realism of the Tractatus, the notion of nonsense and its 
role in ‘reading’ the Tractatus itself, and the reading of the Tractatus as an ethical tract. Of 
concern, for our purposes, is elucidating the various positions on what the saying-showing 
distinction is doing in the context in which Wittgenstein articulates it. In what follows I 
will examine how theorists have attempted to make sense of what is going on, given the 
Tractatus’ apparently incoherent nature. 
 




I will outline several interpretations of the Tractatus wholesale and their bearing on this 
question. Some interpret the Tractatus as espousing ‘realism’, positing the existence of 
objects, states of affairs, facts—via a ‘linguistic turn’— “The world is all that is the case” 
and “Objects form the substance of the world” (TLP, 2.021). If one has a straightforward 
reading of the ‘picturing’ relation espoused in the text, this makes sense. The issue, 
however, of the Tractatus’ realism requires addressing the question of the limits of language, 
and particularly what there is ‘beyond’ language. Consequently, the necessary preceding 
interpretative question concerns the very presence of metaphysics within the book and the 
status of the propositions of the book themselves. Interpretive discussions of the status of 
‘nonsense’, that which lies beyond the bounds of language, became necessary. 
i. Traditional, metaphysical readings 
The quandary arises concerning what it is that inhabits the realm of nonsense, given 
Wittgenstein asserts there is something to be shown rather than said, which he 
characterises as the ‘mystical’. Traditional readings of the Tractatus accepted the existence 
of the unsayable, the nonsensical.27 These traditional interpretations of the Tractatus 
conceive it therefore to be a classical piece of metaphysics: attempting to determine the 
world’s relation to language and truth. See for instance Wedberg’s initial sections of his 
work: “Tractatus’ teachings of the world”, “of language” and “of philosophy”. Soames 
(197–254) more recently offers a similarly ‘traditional’ reading, devoting an entire chapter 
to the metaphysics of the Tractatus. These traditional ‘metaphysical’ readings commonly 
ignore or fail to highlight the concept of nonsense and Wittgenstein’s views on 
philosophy—some may, similarly to Soames, claim that Wittgenstein deliberately violated 
language rules to show us something about the rules of language (252–253). Or as Wedberg 
(1962) argued a compromise is necessary: that Wittgenstein is asserting that true 
philosophy is the pursuit to prove all other philosophy nonsense. Similarly, Hacker (2000, 
356) treats the Tractatus as providing a refutation of transcendental idealisms, by regarding 
the incoherence of the Tractatus as demonstrating the falsity of its central doctrines.  
 




ii. Resolute nonsense readings 
More recent readings tend to take the nonsense to be merely nonsense. These readings 
tend to deny that the Tractatus points at metaphysical truths and draw upon his words in 
6.54—the famous ladder metaphor—to justify throwing out the Tractatus itself, including 
the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. Such non-
sympathetic readings assert that because the Tractatus’ theory of meaning implies its own 
nonsensicality we should reject the Tractatus and leave it at that. Relatedly, modern 
‘resolute’ readings emphasise the fact that Wittgenstein is insisting that he is not expressing 
any philosophical sentences in the Tractatus. Diamond (1988), for instance, holds the only 
reasonable way of reading the Tractatus is to consider all philosophical sentences to be 
nonsense. This reading takes seriously the claim that the ladder must be thrown away: to 
understand Wittgenstein you must realise that all philosophical propositions, like the ones 
in the book, are mere nonsense. Below, however, I will offer two distinct ways of 
interpreting the Tractatus which, rather than rejecting and dismissing it, attempt to make 
sense of the apparent paradox. 
iii. Ineffable interpretations 
A special tradition that has developed in the interpretation of the nonsense concept may 
be called ‘ineffable truth’ interpretations. This ineffable reading takes up the traditional 
metaphysical view that the Tractatus is a work of metaphysics, which puts forward 
substantive claims about the nature of a language-independent reality;28 however, these 
interpretations emphasise that ‘nonsense’ is not something that should immediately be 
discarded. On this view, the Tractatus provides a speculative account of what the relation 
between language and this independent reality must be in order for language to represent 
the world, but it is only by assuming that Wittgenstein accepts there are ineffable truths 
about reality mirrored in language that we can begin to understand the distinction between 
what can be said and what can only be shown, and the Tractatus’ clear suggestion that it is 
intended to convey lasting insights—enabling us to “see the world aright” (TLP, 6.54) even 
while it requires us to throw away the very nonsensical propositions that enabled us to see 
the world aright. Thus, the metaphysical-sounding assertions with which the work opens 
are, by its own lights, incoherent. Yet we must use them to grasp the essential and ineffable 
nature of reality that is necessarily reflected in any language in which thoughts are 
 




expressed. It has been argued that the majority of the Tractatus’ foremost interpreters 
subscribe to this reading.29 See, for instance, Anscombe’s (1971) case that the Tractatus 
‘nonsense’ concept is illustrating a distinction between what can be said and what can only 
be shown. Sullivan (2003) similarly argues that this distinction needn’t require ‘quasi-
truths’, just an attempt to express something that is understood by the reader, what co-
author Moore (2003) calls an ‘ineffable’ understanding. 
iv. Therapeutic readings 
On what we can call a therapeutic reading, far from being a work of metaphysics, the Tractatus 
represents the unfolding of a therapeutic strategy. This begins with the temptation to make 
metaphysical pronouncements from a philosophical perspective and ends with the 
realisation that these pronouncements are nonsensical: the so-called philosophical 
perspective is an illusion, consequently we are no longer tempted to ask or answer 
philosophical questions, but willingly confine ourselves to the realm of what can be said, 
the propositions of natural science.30 
v. Problems for each 
Each school of interpretation can be considered problematic for different reasons.  In 
short, one could argue the resolute readings are unappealing in that they offer ‘uncharitable’ 
readings, ending what is otherwise a fecund conversation.31 On the one hand, the 
metaphysical reading and its more nuanced ineffable counterpart hold that the metaphysical 
truths about reality that the Tractatus attempts to communicate are truths that cannot be 
said but make themselves manifest. This requires accepting that Wittgenstein’s 
propositions are indeed nonsense, but a special, illuminating sort of nonsense. The 
fundamental problem with reading Wittgenstein’s remarks as nonsense that conveys 
ineffable truths about the world is that there is an obvious tension in the idea that 
Wittgenstein is putting forward metaphysical doctrines while also claiming that 
metaphysical propositions are nonsensical. This reading must contradict or ignore the 
 
29 McGinn (1999) points to such a case in Anscombe (1971), Black (1964), Russell (1971), Ramsey (2013) 
among others. 
30 A position advocated for by Cora Diamond (2002), James Conant (2002) and Tom Ricketts (1995) among 
others. 




book’s preface and closing assertions where the Tractatus claims itself to be nonsense, plain 
and simple—not special illuminating nonsense. 
On the other hand, it is a paradoxical feature of the therapeutic reading that it regards the 
remarks of the Tractatus as communicating nothing, but nevertheless bringing about the 
reader’s realisation that nothing is being communicated. The work is at the same time held 
to provide the insights necessary for its own self-destruction and to provide no genuine 
insight that is not ultimately obliterated in the final act of self-annihilation. As such, we are 
offered an unappealing alternative between considering Wittgenstein’s remarks nonsense 
that conveys ineffable truths about the world and as nonsense that conveys nothing 
whatsoever. 
vi. A promising alternative reading  
As neither option provides a fully satisfactory resting place, a further elucidatory 
interpretation is available to us.32 This approach enables us to find a way between these 
two alternatives: allowing the remarks to achieve something, while stopping short of 
holding that they convey ineffable truths about reality. Marie McGinn provides an 
‘elucidatory’ interpretation to navigate between these two alternatives, though it diverges 
from my own. McGinn, in viewing nonsense to be ‘elucidatory’, opposes the traditional 
reading of the Tractatus as presenting a self-undermining metaphysical theory, and opposes 
the resolute reading—which is contradictory, in asserting that once you’ve climbed the 
ladder you are to throw it away. She rightly asks: how can we have got anywhere by 
climbing the ladder if the ladder is itself an illusion? McGinn’s solution is to regard 
Wittgenstein’s nonsense as elucidatory. In attempting to provide an interpretation that will 
resolve the paradox, McGinn states that: 
[What is needed is an interpretation] which avoids the suggestion that there are 
ineffable truths about reality, but which allows that there is something behind 
Wittgenstein’s remarks; which permits these remarks to fall away completely, but 
which allows that the remarks accomplish something important; which avoids 
 
32 Indeed there have been a number of writers who have tried to develop a third way, incorporating what 
they see as insights and avoiding what they see as flaws in both the ineffabilist and therapeutic readings. The 





committing Wittgenstein to any metaphysical doctrines, but which does not fall 
into the paradox of self-destruction. (496–497) 
I follow on this suggestion and defend an interpretation which does not assert the existence 
of any ‘ineffable truths’, yet on which a certain attitude towards the world is conveyed, a 
mystical attitude. Given this, I hold that the point of the Tractatus is not that its readers 
should apprehend some set of truths, but that they should come to ‘see the world rightly’ 
(a notion which much of this dissertation shall be spent defending, problematising and 
nuancing. Wittgenstein’s text is designed to get the reader to adopt an alternate perspective 
on life altogether; the perspective of mysticism. It is this mystical perspective—not some 
set of truths—that the Tractatus’ incoherence points us towards, and which the text is 
designed to encourage us to adopt. The result, therefore, is not any sort of discovery or 
addition to our knowledge; it does not enable us to do anything we could not do before; it 
is, in a certain sense, completely idle. Yet this is no fault of the work; the purpose of 
Wittgenstein’s remarks is not to alert us to facts or inform us of truths, but rather his 
work’s significance is exhausted in the change of perception it brings about. To evidence 
the centrality of this perceptual shift, consider when Wittgenstein writes 
What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds 
of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels forced to look at 
a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of 
looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You 
thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think 
of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to 
conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus, your mental cramp is relieved, and 
you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the 
different kinds of uses of it. (Wittgenstein Lectures of 1946–1947, quoted by 
Malcolm, 43) 
This interpretation holds that Wittgenstein’s remarks can bring about a change completely 
distinct from the acquisition of new information. It is essential to the idea that 
Wittgenstein’s remarks serve as elucidations that the position we have now reached does 
not amount to any sort of discovery or substantial claim but represents our becoming 
acquainted with the world in a new light, with a new clarity of vision through this 




recognised as having validity in formal logic. These are logics which challenge the standard 
truth–falsity binary that dominates analytic philosophy, they allow for truth-statements to 
be either: false, true, false and true or neither false nor true. These allow us to make sense 
both of the counterintuitive consequences of quantum mechanics and insights derived 
from Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, particularly that of the Madhyamaka Prasangika 
school.33 
I argue that we should jettison (A)—that the purpose of the Tractatus is to communicate 
truths—and adopt a ‘no-truths-at-all’ interpretation—on which Wittgenstein is self-
consciously providing a theory of meaning which renders his text incoherent with the aim 
of doing ‘something other’ than communicate truths. By jettisoning assumption (1), the 
Tractatus’ inability to be a source of propositional knowledge actually supports a reading of 
Wittgenstein’s intent as being to bring us into acquaintance with the mystical. This provides 
a means of understanding how the incoherence of the Tractatus is intended to be 
elucidatory; in leaving us with a feeling of the world’s limits that amounts to acquaintance 
with the boundaries of sense.  
A natural query arises: how can we justify rejecting (A), given Wittgenstein himself claimed 
that the truths communicated in the Tractatus were “unassailable and definitive”? This has 
been a point of contestation; however, there are reasonable grounds for rejecting (A). 
Firstly, given Wittgenstein wrote this within a preface to the book, he could hardly declare 
that the whole book and the preface are nonsensical, given his intention that the reader 
adopt the philosophical perspective espoused in the Tractatus, in order to later abandon it 
on recognising its incoherence. Similarly, he writes in his final remarks: “My propositions 
serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually 
recognizes them as nonsensical, when [they] have used them—as steps—to climb up 
beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after [they] has climbed up 
it.)” (TLP, 6.54). Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of the ladder to express the function of 
the Tractatus, demonstrating the work is to be used in order to climb above it from a 
position in which we can “see the world aright”, but thereafter recognise the Tractatus as 
nonsense and cast it away, according with his final aphorism “whereof one cannot speak, 
thereof one must be silent” (TLP, 7). 
 
33 See, for further on this, the defence of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic made by Graeme Priest and 




But how to demonstrate that a perspectival shift is distinct from the discovery of ineffable 
truths, rather than just a variation on the ineffable truths’ reading? I argue that what the 
‘something other than’ communicating truths amounts to is best elucidated through the 
saying-showing distinction. I argue this because Wittgenstein does not relegate all that is 
outside the bounds of sense to oblivion. The saying-showing distinction is made to do 
additional crucial work. “What can be shown cannot be said”; that is, what can be shown 
cannot be formulated in sayable (sensical) propositions, but this does not mean it has no 
value. This applies, for example, to the logical form of the world, the pictorial form, etc., 
which show themselves in the form of (contingent) propositions, in the symbolism, and in 
logical propositions. Even the unsayable (metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic) propositions of 
philosophy belong in this group—which Wittgenstein finally describes as “things that 
cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest, they are what is mystical” (TLP, 
6.522). In referring to the Tractatus’ propositions Wittgenstein says one must “surmount 
these propositions and see the world rightly” (TLP, 6.54), indicating again that the Tractatus 
intends not to convey propositional truths but to have the reader adopt another 
perspective on life altogether. Wittgenstein further remarks: “my work consists of two 
parts; that presented here plus all I have not written. It is this second part that is important” 
(letter to Ludwig Ficker of circa September–October 1919, tr. McGuinness). This second 
part, that which is not written, refers to something that cannot be said but only shown. It is 
evident that the mystical attitude is what Wittgenstein takes to be that which cannot be 
expressed but only shown, writing “things that cannot be put into words. They make 
themselves manifest, they are what is mystical” (TLP, 6.522).  
Yet what does Showing amount to? Or, put differently, what is this mystical attitude that 
can only be shown? And can it be defined in more than a purely negative manner? That is, 
as more than simply that which cannot be said? For one thing, in order to understand 
Showing, we should see that showing seems inextricably linked with an experience, the 
experience of “seeing the world rightly” (TLP, 6.54). On a mystical reading this is fitting, 
given where analytic philosophy aims to produce propositions which can be assessed for 
their truth value, mysticism involves having an experience which shows how things are, 
that is, which acquaints us with the limits of the world (TLP, 6.45). This will be examined 
in a few sections where I outline the mystical ‘project’ of the Tractatus, but firstly to respond 




2.5 Wittgenstein’s two philosophical periods 
Some will argue that further evidence is required to prove that Wittgenstein, in his later 
work, did not find the Tractatus wanting.34 This may be argued given the difficulty in 
reconciling the notion that Wittgenstein rejected his earlier Tractatus as inadequately 
attuned to his later ideas of ‘use’ in questions of meaning, with my assertions that 
Wittgenstein deployed the notion of showing in a literary way in fact consonant with his later 
ideas. Demonstrated earlier, Wittgenstein’s letter to Luwig von Ficker supports a unitarian 
position on this matter, nonetheless I should make a case for what change I believe took 
place between what are commonly proclaimed to be Wittgenstein’s ‘two philosophical 
periods’.  
There is a long-standing debate among Wittgenstein interpreters over the continuity 
between Wittgenstein’s early and later thought.35 The standard interpretations traditionally 
perceived a clear break between these distinct stages; however, recent interpretations, I 
believe wisely, challenge this assumption by identifying a fundamentally therapeutic 
motivation in the later Wittgenstein that should be attributed to the ‘former’. Indeed, as 
argued in this thesis, the notion that philosophy should not be approached dogmatically is 
a crucial insight of the Tractatus. The difficulty is that the later Wittgenstein goes on to 
describe his own early work as dogmatic.36 This was commonly the cause for readers’ 
perceiving a break between the earlier and later Wittgenstein, Along with his later 
distinction difference between truth-conditional and use theories of meaning that I will 
discuss below. However, I think we can clearly see them engaged in the one project: that 
is, if there is a transition to be marked between the two Wittgenstein it is in the latter’s 
‘total’ rejection of dogmatism; that is, a ‘more full’ working out of the earlier claim that 
philosophy should be approached dogmatically in its entirety. This meant a ‘doing away’ 
with formal aspects of the earlier work and the move from viewing the realm of logic to 
viewing ordinary language as central to philosophical attention, a shift from systematic 
 
34 I thank the examiner of my dissertation for raising this valuable criticism, which clearly requires some 
degree of redress, as offered here. 
35 A case is made, for instance,  by Matar (2018) regarding the fundamental continuity of the two stages in 
Wittgenstein's thought over the subject of the nature of philosophy. 
36 Indeed, heralding a rejection of dogmatic philosophy, and the dogmatism in the Tractatus itself, is a period 
commonly labelled the ‘middle period’ in which Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and what 
constituted its ‘problems’ underwent dramatic revisions. This has been recorded in volumes of 
conversations, letters and lecture notes (see for instance, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, The Blue and 




philosophical writing to the more aphoristic and an emphasis no longer on definition and 
analysis but instead on ‘family resemblance’ and ‘language-games’.  
If we look at Wittgenstein’s later preoccupations we might well understand him to be 
deepening the very anti-dogmatic stance evident in the saying-showing distinction; that is, 
we see such parallels in his move from a truth-functional ‘representational’ understanding of 
meaning to a notion of meaning as ‘use’: where the sense of a word is its function in the 
language (PI, 43). We see parallels too in his attention to ‘language-games’, demonstrating 
the conventional nature of language and thus the impossibility of providing ‘final 
definitions’ (PI, 65). We see it too in his notion of ‘family resemblances’ for understanding 
the varied uses for the same word which demonstrate the failings of ‘general’ explanations 
or necessary/sufficient conditions (PI, 66).  
In general, Wittgenstein’s later writings resemble the earlier Tractatus in making the case 
that philosophers neither do nor should supply a theory or provide explanations.37 Yet 
while the Tractatus precludes philosophical theories the Philosophical Investigations points out 
the therapeutic, non-dogmatic nature of philosophy and so could be considered more of 
a guidebook or manual in the ways of therapy. The critical break then is that rather than 
offering one philosophical method, like in the Tractatus, The Philosophical Investigations 
demonstrates that there is not one but many methods or therapies (PI, 133). The fly may 
be shew’d out of the bottle of language by many means (PI, 309). Consequently, we can 
conclude that the saying-showing distinction brought about in the Tractatus is clearly 
resonant with the later Wittgenstein’s ideas, even if Wittgenstein later rejected aspects of 
the formalism of the Tractatus as limited and parochial. 
Despite their discrepancies, the fundamental continuity between the stages resides in a 
shared approach to the question of the nature of philosophy: that is, in both, philosophy 
serves first as a critique of language, an attempt to, through analysing language’s allusive 
power, expose the traps of meaningless philosophical formulations. The ‘discovery’ in the 
Philosophical Investigations is that which enables the philosopher to break off philosophising 
“when I want to” (PI, 133). This allusion, itself, refers back to the Tractatus’ ladder 
metaphor and the injunction to silence in the face of what cannot be said, but only shown. 
 




2.6 What even is mysticism? 
It is important to differentiate my terms for clarity’s sake. A ‘mystical’ perspective can here 
be understood to refer to not so much a set of belief with propositional content that can 
be factually assessed, but rather an experientially grounded shift in perception that has 
oriented the mystic to see the world in a particular light. By contrast, a ‘religious’ 
perspective generally is taken to involve the maintenance of a set of beliefs, practices, or 
opinions with fervour, ‘faith’ and conviction. While mystical encounters may radically alter 
an individual to the extent that they adopt a religious attitude towards life, one may be 
religious without ever having had mystical experiences, and one may be a mystic without 
ever adhering to beliefs, values or a particular metaphysics in a rigid way. Indeed, 
commonly those who have mystical experiences may encounter reality in a way that 
appears more ‘direct’ and have insights of an ‘experiential’ character, and consequently 
they may develop more wariness around conceptual filters altogether. This is not 
universally the case, and there are certainly many who have inexplicable experiences which 
self-identified mystics seek conceptual frameworks for, which they then adhere to 
dogmatically.  
Nonetheless, when Wittgenstein refers to what is mystical, and its relation to showing, my 
focus has been on viewing the mystical as a ‘perspectival shift’. This is quite a specific, even 
broad, interpretation of Wittgenstein’s meaning, but one warranted I believe on account 
of the arguments presented in the previous chapter. It is unreasonable, and does little 
charity to Wittgenstein, to interpret his notion of the ‘mystical’ as reducible to a religious 
set of metaphysical doctrines. That would completely undermine the entire Tractarian 
project of calling into question metaphysical systems, given religion is historically 
dependent on, and informed by, metaphysical doctrines: a set of truths hardened into 
unimpeachable, occulted, indeed dogmatic fiats. While a valid critique of the institution of 
religion, it is an obvious category error to apply it to Wittgenstein’s notion of showing. If 
we consider philosophical discourses on the sublime and wonder the distinction between 
mystical perspectives versus ‘propositional’ perspectives becomes more evident, as shall 





i. Outlining Tractarian mysticism 
In order to understand the Tractatus as a mystical project with the character I describe, I 
should spell out exactly what this project amounts to. A clear way to structure this ‘mystical 
project’ is to describe how these beliefs can all emerge from a single ‘mystical experiential’ 
realm, and how these are characteristic of ‘genuine mystical experiences’. Bertrand 
Russell’s four characteristics of the mystics’ beliefs in ‘Mysticism and Logic’ (1917) provide 
a good starting point, given there is considerable coincidence between Wittgenstein’s 
Tractarian project and the characteristics of mysticism that Russell outlines in his essay. 
Russell describes metaphysics as an attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of 
thought: in this, metaphysics unites two tendencies in mankind’s mind, the mystical and 
the scientific. The mystical tendency manifests itself in certain moods and feelings, in 
which one has a sense of certainty and revelation. This certainty does not easily lend itself 
to expression in words, unless it be by way of paradox; but, according to Russell, four 
things chiefly characterise the beliefs, if such they may so be called, of the mystic. First, there 
is typically a belief in an insight into reality, an insight which is superior to and quite 
different from sense and reason, an insight common to the mystic and the poet but far 
clearer in the former; second, the mystic believes that reality is one, containing no 
opposition or division; third, they hold or feel that time is unreal; and fourth, they think 
that evil is mere appearance, or perhaps that good and evil are both illusory (in any case, 
their ethic involves an acceptance of the world).38 I will consider each in turn and how they 
can be seen in Wittgenstein’s Tractarian project. 
Russell claims the mystic experiences (1) a belief in having insight into reality, which 
Wittgenstein characterises as “das mystiche”, an inexpressible feeling of having “solved 
the problems of life”. This is arrived at by the second characteristic (2) a conviction in the 
unity and indivisibility of reality, brought out in Wittgenstein’s sense of seeing the world 
as “a limited whole” (TLP, 6.45). Wittgenstein holds that to have experience of the world 
 
38 An important ongoing debate rages between those who affirm a similar ‘transpersonal’ position to 
Wittgenstein, and those who dispute such a notion as resulting in a dis-engagement from the problems of 
the world, with its inequities and forms of oppression. On the surface these stances appear contradictory: 
one is either of the world, and ethically responsive to its dilemmas, striving to create a more just planet, or one 
has transcended worldly concerns and attends no longer to the needs of worldly-sufferers, such suffering being 
empty of ultimate existence, a mere illusion or superficial reality. However, it is possible that one may be 
both of the world and apart from it at once, and it would be a disservice to Wittgenstein to presume he had 
achieved pure dis-interest in human suffering. Tibetan Buddhism emphasises the fact that the ultimate 
emptiness of existence (Shunyata), ultimate reality, by no means dissolves the value of conventional reality. Both 




at all requires grasping the general nature of reality; which he claims requires the experience 
presupposed by classical logic, that something ‘is’ (TLP, 6.124); not knowledge of the truth 
of an existential proposition but an experience of an object. This logical experience is part 
of the mystical experience that ‘there is a world’. This is as, it is only with experience that 
something ‘is’, that we acquire awareness that there are objects whose possibilities of 
combination require there to be a world for those possibilities to be realised in.   
That ‘there is a world’ in turn connects with Wittgenstein’s ‘ethical experience’, which 
parallels Russell’s view (3) that ethics involves acceptance of the world; that is, as the 
mystical experience of there being a world leads to an attitude towards the world, the 
individual may find life becomes clearer or that they remain in doubt whether life has sense; 
distinguishing the happy from the unhappy person. The ‘ethical reward’ for the person of 
good conscience is in the addition of meaning to their existence, due to their acceptance 
of the world’s existence and non-attachment to the contingency of the life of one person 
alone. When Wittgenstein states “I am my world” (TLP, 5.621) we can take him to be 
refusing to identify himself with a sole life but rather to associate with the whole of 
existence. This extends to the rejection of the association with the future and past of that 
one particular individual. This is similar to Russell’s (4) feeling that time is unreal; as is 
evident when Wittgenstein expresses the conviction that the ‘eternal life’ belongs to the 
person who lives in the present (TLP6.45). As in the mystical experience, space and time 
are merely aspects of the world that are contemplated and accepted. In this way there is an 
experience of ‘timelessness’. 
The similarities between Russell’s account, and views espoused in the Tractatus are striking. 
Indeed, the marks of the experience referred to by Wittgenstein are commonplace in many 
accounts of mystical experience. For instance, the well-respected characterisation of nature 
mysticism by the contemplative scholar Zaehner39 comes close to the descriptions given 
by Russell and Wittgenstein above. This characterisation includes intense communion with 
nature; abdication of the ego; a sense of passing beyond morality; and emphasis on the 
sense of ‘naked existence’.40 We have good reason to conclude that the Tractatus describes 
 
39 For a more in-depth comparison of Wittgenstein’s mysticism and recorded mystical experiences, see 
Mcguiness’s Mysticism and the Tractatus (1966, 305–328). 
40 A parallel exists here between Wittgenstein and Huxley’s experiences under the influence of mescalin; see 




a ‘genuine mystical experience’—or at least is characteristic of commonly portrayed 
mystical experiences. 
ii. Evaluating Tractarian mysticism 
Many contend that elements of wisdom or insight are to be found in mystical experiences. 
However, whether we see value in this ‘mystical project’ will perhaps be a matter of 
whether we can relate to some of the experiences Wittgenstein describes, including those 
on timelessness, eternity, living in the present, and the nature of ethics. Even for those not 
experientially acquainted with the mystical—for whom ‘the reality or unreality of the 
mystic’s world’ is unknown—it can be plausibly argued we should default to Russell’s 
open-minded position, illustrated in the claim “I have no wish to claim (mysticism) reveals 
no genuine insight” (146). To positively assert the falsity of the mystical perspective 
without being at all acquainted with it seems foolhardy or presumptuous. And yet the 
hesitancy on the part of many analytic philosophers to engage with mysticism may in part 
stem from the discipline’s reliance upon a very specific, and arguably confining, 
methodological toolkit, which is usually adopted in seeking to understand the world. This 
view necessarily suffers from a lack of feeling for the mystical subject matter that 
Wittgenstein wishes to show. It is for this very reason that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus should 
not be misunderstood as an irrational mysticism but rather a rationally embraced 
inconsistency. The conclusion he leads us to, being, that we should be aware of the 
limitations of reason, and all that cannot be said but only shown. This conclusion is the 
consequence of rational inquiry and not of a mystical refusal to reason.  
    
The Tractatus requires a mystical reading, and perhaps we are in the wrong place to fully 
draw out this reading; but in lieu of shamanistic rituals, deep meditative jhana states and 
potent hallucinogens, the best Wittgenstein can do perhaps is suggestively show this 
mystical experience and the perspectival shift he claims is attainable. Considering the 
above, we should certainly recognise the strong grounds for a mystical reading of the 
Tractatus, which provides a response to the central paradox of the Tractatus. 
Turning to William James provides an interesting reflection on the hesitancy among 
analytic philosophers to embrace the Tractatus in its apparent inconsistency. This is as many 
analytic philosophers adhere to an ‘agnostic imperative’; that is, they hold it is always wrong 




is impermissible for S to believe either p or not-p. Yet James, in his text the Will to Believe 
(1896), challenges the claim that we must withhold belief whenever the evidence is 
insufficient. James demonstrates that it can be perfectly reasonable to believe beyond the 
evidence as it were, in issues ranging from theistic beliefs to philosophical issues and even 
including matters of practical life.       
One rationale he provides for this is that while the agnostic imperative holds that one 
should avoid error at all costs, and thereby risk the loss of certain truths, an alternate but 
equally valid strategy is to seek truth by any means available, even at the risk of error. He 
demonstrates how in numerous instances such an alternative strategy can yield more 
benefits than costs.41 James is thus arguing we should distinguish the epistemic goals of (1) 
believing truths and (2) avoiding falsehoods, and that each of us will set the balance of risk 
between them in different places, for different projects, and yet there’s no unfaultable 
arguments for setting it in one place rather than another across the board.42 James then 
provides a useful intercession, in facilitating dialogue in what may otherwise seem a conflict 
of insuperable difference in core beliefs, by providing a case that draws on the analytic 
philosopher’s own tools of reasoning to demonstrate why we should be tolerant of those 
who place the epistemic risk ratio in different locales. 
2.7 Literary mysticism and temperament  
Some might argue that how acceptable Tractarian mysticism will be to the reader will come 
down to temperament—in which case so would one’s view of literary inquiry, if we accept 
that both are tied up with ‘showing what cannot be said’.43 However, I will challenge this 
view, through consideration of the sublime. One of the most provocative issues around 
which different philosophical temperaments form is the attitude toward the whole 
experience of being mystified, bamboozled, discombobulated. Philosophical problems are 
of a sort to induce a sense of mystification, at least initially. To understand a philosophical 
problem is to be, at least initially, flummoxed. For some people, the presence of the 
mystifying is emotionally inviting, even thrilling; they revel in it and frame propositions 
 
41 For instance, James demonstrates that “there are cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary 
faith exists in its coming” (1896, 25); he does so by pointing to the example of social cooperation, that social 
collectives function by virtue of a trust by each member that the other members will behave accordingly—
cooperation then arises as a consequence of the precursive faith of those involved. These could be 
understood as ‘positive feedback loops’ arising from faith. 
42 Jacques Derrida’s discussion of ethics, and the impossibility of imposing valid laws that apply universally, 
is a (more) contemporary application of a similar idea; see Glendinning (187–203). 




about the world that only increase the mystery. For others, it is a fact of life; they put up 
with it and frame propositions about the world that best accommodate themselves to it; 
for still others, the idea of the mysterious is intolerable, and they frame propositions about 
the world that deny it.  
These contrasts in strategies, some would argue, are natural expressions of temperamental 
differences. Another issue that some argue brings out ‘temperamental philosophical 
differences’ is the sense of what makes for the best kind of explanation, which is partially 
an aesthetic judgment, and consequently also partially an emotional one. Does a reductive 
explanation that leaves no wiggle-room provide you the greatest sense of satisfaction, or 
does it make you feel vaguely disappointed? Is a good explanation, for you, one that sets 
you off on curlicue ribbons of poetic association? These questions will naturally bear on 
whether one embraces or even comprehend the Tractatus as a mystical project rather than 
mere self-undermining nonsense. Similarly, they will bear on the value one assigns to the 
literary and probably all indirect forms of communication. However, in what follows I will 
argue that a reduction to differences in ‘temperament’ is immensely deflationary and 
relativising by considering our relation to the sublime. 
2.8 On showing and the sublime 
Through consideration of the sublime I will make the case that to reduce this category of 
insight to a matter of ‘temperament’ or taste is to do violence to the value we as humans 
have found to reside in extra-linguistic phenomenal experiences, since antiquity.44 Much 
philosophical rumination has been spent exploring the notion of the ‘sublime’ as a means 
of making sense of extra-linguistic phenomenal experience, from the Ancients via the 
Enlightenment to contemporary investigations by philosophers such as Žižek (Porter, 
2016). For good reason, the sublime has consistently invited philosophical speculation as 
to the nature of the experience of mystification and bamboozlement, described above. If 
we turn to the genealogy of literary-philosophical discourse around the sublime, we can 
see this is a substantive notion, not reducible to temperament, as many have argued. To claim 
as much is a disservice to the experience of the sublime: there is something profoundly 
 
44 I would like to that my examiner for their reflections upon the relevance of this topic, it has helped me 




dismissive and problematically ‘relativising’ in reducing this state and the insights available 
to a matter of temperamental differences.  
As it touches on our topic, I will detour briefly through explorations of the sublime by 
figures including Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer, in order to 
demonstrate the wide influence and relevant of the topic, and its irreducibility to 
‘temperamental’ attitudes. It should be noted, however, that the majority of thinkers on 
this topic do demonstrate a belief that attending to ‘sublimity’ is often dependent on the 
individual’s possession of certain characteristics which allow them to be open or receptive 
to the state of sublimity itself. So, while not a question of temperament, potentially a question 
of capability remains. 
The sublime is a concept used to refer to something ‘great’ beyond measurability, be its 
greatness moral, intellectual, aesthetic or metaphysical. As an aesthetic category a central 
characteristic is that the sublime object is not reducible to the merely beautiful; sublimity 
entails the experience of the ‘sacred’ inducing awe. The classic phrase ‘a profound 
experience of art’, in today’s post-modern climate, is more often found ironically than 
sincerely, yet the category of experience continues to beguile our aesthetic theories. 
Eighteenth-century British philosophers considered the sublime as an aesthetic quality in 
nature. Shaftesbury and Dennison, for instance, examined this distinction between the 
sublime and the beautiful.45 Dennison attended to the contrariness of the experience of 
the wild beauty of nature, both of delight mingled with horror and almost despair; he came 
to utilise this distinction in a new form of literary criticism. In contrast Shaftesbury 
attended to the awe of the infinity of space; rather than establishing sublimity as an 
aesthetic quality opposed to beauty, he described it as grander and of higher importance 
than beauty. It was only in Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1756) that the sublime and the beautiful were considered 
to be ‘mutually exclusive’. I should note that in Eastern philosophy the distinction between 
the beautiful and sublime doesn’t exist; the work On the Sublime by Longinus, for instance, 
in the 1st century applied the notion of sublimity to ‘great’ language, attending to the fact 
that it inspires awe and veneration, possessing great persuasive powers.  
Highly influential was Kant’s later notion of the sublime. In both its mathematical and 
dynamic sense, it involved the superiority of our own power of reason as a super-sensible 
 




faculty over nature. Without dwelling on the particulars of his account, Kant’s conception 
of the sublime is useful in that he claims judgements of beauty describe the exercise of a 
more general faculty of judgement. Indeed Cavell (1976) and others have consequently drawn 
connections between Kant’s judgements of beauty and our intuitive judgements, while 
Fleischacker (1999) sees a connection between aesthetic judgement for Kant and moral 
and political judgement. If, then, following Kant, we view aesthetic judgements as a model 
for general judgement, then how we relate to the sublime and the beautiful has significant 
ramifications beyond temperament or taste.46  
It is important, too, to consider Schopenhauer’s relation to the sublime considering his 
influence on Wittgenstein’s own work. For Schopenhauer contemplation upon 
phenomena which bear a ‘hostile’ relationship to the human will, insofar as they are so vast 
or powerful that they threaten to overwhelm the human individual, or reduce his existence, 
brings us into contact with the sublime. Schopenhauer is referring predominantly to 
aesthetic contemplations of natural phenomena—landscapes or the starry night sky—and 
how these contemplations induce sublime experiences; however, it may be applied to 
experiences of art as well. For Schopenhauer the higher the magnitude of the threat posed 
to the human will by contemplation on the ‘contemplation-resistant’ object, the greater the 
degree of sublime feeling. For Schopenhauer, as discussed in the World as Will and 
Representation (hereafter, WWR), taking aesthetic pleasure in these ‘overwhelming’ scenes 
occurs when the subject is able to first acknowledge the sheer vastness of the object, and 
then consciously turn away from the threat it poses: “violently wrenching himself free from 
his will” (WWR I, 226). If able to do this, the subject experiences a will-less state of 
contemplation of the ‘Ideas’, in his framework. This induces a state of elevation—this is the 
feeling of the sublime. Interesting work, I believe, is yet to be done on the relation between 
the sublime for Schopenhauer and the ecstatic-from Ek-Stasis, to stand outside oneself, as 
it is explored by Judith Butler and the psychoanalytic tradition. Unlike experiencing the 
pleasure of the merely beautiful, the sublime for Schopenhauer is mixed with pain, in that 
during the experience of the sublime two elements of self-consciousness are present: a 
consciousness of liberating oneself, and consciousness of having been liberated from the 
will and its cares. It is these instances of second-order consciousness that are accompanied 
by the feeling of “exaltation” above the will (WWR I, 233) which characterise the felt-sense 
 
46 For these reasons Kant’s emphasis on the sublime has received extensive discussion within literary theory; 




of the sublime; however, they also induce pain, as the pleasure of exaltation is inextricably 
bound to the subject’s detaching from the pressures of his individual will.47  
2.8 The saying-showing distinction and literary theory 
A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely 
of jokes.48 
It is one of the chief skills of the philosopher not to occupy [them]self with 
questions which do not concern [them].49 
The relevance of Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction to the value of literature is 
clear, as without a mystical interpretation, the referential picture of language outlined in 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus would render literature to be of no cognitive value. This is because, 
unlike scientific texts, literary texts typically do not refer to objects or events that exist in 
the actual world but describe fictional scenarios. Consequently, literature does not seem to 
deliver veridical descriptions of the world. Yet given Wittgenstein’s referential picture of 
language, if statements in literary texts do not deliver veridical descriptions of the world, 
then they do not communicate truths, or seemingly do anything. This position would 
marginalise the value of literature; which would be viewed as an aberrant use of language, 
making it mysterious why people spend their time writing or reading literary texts in the 
first place. Literary language, consequently, cannot be adequately accounted for on the 
basis of such a notion of truth and reference. By contrast, were the philosophical interest 
of a literary text (as in the Tractatus) to lie not so much in the ideas in it but in what is not 
in the text, that which is shown, then literature suddenly has its own bailiwick, a sphere 
which ‘the explicitly philosophical’ (concerned with communicating propositional truths) 
cannot touch.     
At the least, we can say Wittgenstein’s approach to aesthetics is sparse and anti-formal: he 
formulated no ‘poetics’, explicated no ‘theory’ of art of literature, and could be caught 
repeatedly insisting that defining the ‘beautiful’ was impossible, that one could never say 
what the ‘essence’ of art might be. Wittgenstein had very little to say on the ‘big issues’ of 
 
47 I have given only a bare bones account, but competing accounts of Schopenhauerian sublimity exist. See, 
for instance, Neill (2003) and Vandenabeele (2003). 
48 As quoted in “A View from the Asylum” in Philosophical Investigations from the Sanctity of the Press (2004), as 
quoted in Dribble (2004, 87). 




the aesthetic, nor the specifics of trope or genre, fictionality, prose or narrative form; 
consequently, it is understandable that literary theory has largely ignored Wittgenstein’s 
existence. And yet, some have been drawn into the temptation of extracting a poetics from 
his work. This is the case because, although Wittgenstein said relatively little about 
literature directly, there is growing recognition of his work’s relevance to the relation 
between philosophy and literature. The primary engagement with Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy has, however, concerned his later work, particularly the Philosophical 
Investigations. Many writers, including Stanley Cavell, Marjorie Perloff, David Schalkwyk, 
Timothy Gould, Bernard Harrison, John Gibson, Sonia Sedivy and Martin Stone, examine 
the consequences for literary theory of Wittgenstein’s later picture of language.50 
Of course, many such works are highly relevant to our discussion, and bear on the broader 
subject of the relation between philosophy and literature. Wolfgang Huemer, for instance, 
writes on Wittgenstein’s privileging of the diversity of linguistic phenomena in the 
Philosophical Investigations—in contrast to the philosopher’s tendency to develop ideal, 
rigorously regulated language, a tendency he argues sacrifices the variety of language games 
for unattainable exactness and universality (13–26). This bears directly on the broader 
question of the methodology and language considered acceptable in today’s academic 
philosophical climate, and the tacit justification given for excluding many disciplines 
including literature (as well as philosophical thinkers outside the analytic paradigm) from 
inquiry.51 
Some theorists have drawn upon Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which approaches 
language as a social practice that focuses not on the relation between words and the world 
but moves from reference to use: emphasising how words are used in diverse contexts of 
human practice. Such attempts could likewise be viewed as a means of resisting the 
prevalent analytic referential picture of language that reduces legitimate use of language to 
the type of assertive statements and bearers of truth-value common to analytic philosophy. 
Such arguments also bear on literature’s capacity for inquiry, by recognising language’s 
varied uses in pursuit of myriad goals.     
My concern in this thesis, however, has been the bearing of Wittgenstein’s earlier 
philosophy on the relation between philosophy and literature, a much-overlooked area of 
 
50 For analysis of the primary literary engagement with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, see Huemer (2004). 
51 For a clear case for analytic philosophy’s dialogical conservatism, and the friction point between the loosely 




Wittgenstein’s philosophical relevance to the debate. Perhaps only Cora Diamond 
significantly touches on the relation between literature and Wittgenstein’s unsayable (1983, 
155–169). Diamond challenges Martha Nussbaum’s claim that to understand the relation 
between moral philosophy and literature we must have a rough story about what moral 
philosophy is. She argues that literary texts can make points that are relevant to moral 
philosophy without explicitly stating them.52 While Diamond draws the connection between 
how things are shown in literature and how they are shown in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, her 
picture of how the saying-showing distinction relates to literature is left as only a sketch. 
What’s more in defending a therapeutic approach, she overlooks the more substantial 
mystical reading of the saying-showing distinction, which I argue is more fruitful in 
characterising literature—as I will elucidate by drawing on Wallace’s “The Empty Plenum” 
analysis of Wittgenstein’s Mistress, and Wallace’s own work in the following chapter.  
In Conclusion, in this chapter I have defended the plausibility of a mystical interpretation 
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, allowing for the meaningfulness of literature, where its 
alternatives would render literature incapable of communicating truths, or seemingly doing 
anything. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s Tractarian saying-showing distinction we can 
demonstrate that in literary texts—as in the Tractatus itself—much that is valuable is not 
explicitly stated: rather, it shows itself in the way the story is told, in the language used and 
in the interpretive openness of the text. Positioning literary inquiry’s value as belonging to 
the unsayable provides novel and stimulating insights into pressing questions, including 
how literature can aid us in ‘seeing the world rightly’, in adopting a mystical perspective, 
and how it acts as a form of inquiry distinct from philosophy. In the following chapter I 




52 For a valuable debate on literature’s non-argumentative capacity, see Diamond, who argues there exists a 
variety of forms of critical reflection in extra-philosophical contexts, which are equally concerned to deepen 






CHAPTER III: The meat of literary showing 
The heart of Plato’s case against the poets is that, when it comes to a choice 
between truth and beauty, they are too ready to sacrifice truth. The heart of the 
poets’ case is that beauty is its own truth. You will find some version of the beauty-
is-truth plea in the practice of almost any writer. (Coetzee 2015, 8) 
John Coetzee in The Good Story describes the quarrel in terms of the poets accepting some 
feature of beauty as more valuable than truth, but that beauty constituted its own truth. 
Nonetheless Coetzee doesn’t take the further step of explicating on what grounds beauty 
comes to constitute truth. That connection will be delved into in this chapter. My aim, in 
this chapter, is to flesh out the meat of the Tractarian saying-showing distinction as it 
occurs in literature. Firstly, I need to allay the natural worry that much of what we shall 
want to say in this connection is precisely what, according to the doctrine being discussed, 
cannot be said. How do you communicate what can allegedly only be achieved through 
indirect communication? This is a pressing concern. Some have argued that it is not a 
distinction that can be communicated more clearly than by a ‘gesture’. Yet while showing 
is sometimes explained in terms of ‘gesturing’ at something, a major problem with such a 
characterisation is that a gesture is a lazy thing, a shorthand. Gesturing does what could 
otherwise be done in words, but with less effort, rather than saying ‘over there’ I flail my 
arm in that general direction. I’m concerned, however, with showing as expressing 
something not otherwise expressible propositionally.  
To do so, then, I will distinguish between the different categories of showing. This is 
important as, if these ideas are to be sharpened, something still needs to be said about the 
special way in which the word show is being used—otherwise the claim that certain things 
can be shown though they cannot be said will be too easily understood as a triviality which 
falls far short of Wittgenstein’s thesis (i.e. I can show you a chair but I cannot say you a 
chair). McDonough similarly argues we should recognise the multiplicity of showing 
categories in the Tractatus (250–261). Many follow McDonough in supposing there are 
different categories of showing in the work. Indeed, for the purpose of this thesis, special 
treatment of the notion of literary showing is required. After all, were there only a singular 
form of showing, someone could well ask: what is the difference between Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus and Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress? Are they both just attempts to show this 




what follows I will explore the category of showing that I think best characterises the 
literary, doing so first by drawing on examples from the Tractatus, then by providing 
illustrations with samples from Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Consequently, this chapter explores 
how this notion of showing might be best understood in terms of techniques, devices and 
themes drawn on by Foster-Wallace and highlighted in his reading of Wittgenstein’s Mistress. 
Firstly, however, I will respond to some potential criticisms in order to make the broader 
project of understanding showing in literary terms. 
3.1 Showing in a technical sense  
In identifying literature with showing over saying, there exist two critiques of my position 
which are worth responding to, as doing so further elucidates the sense in which showing 
is being used here, and its relation to literature. 
Wayne Booth in The Rhetoric of Fiction (2010) repudiates the ‘show, don’t tell’ rule, arguing 
that novelists and short story writers repeatedly violate this rule, commonly telling us how 
a dramatic situation or character should be interpreted, if only to help the reader avoid 
wasting long lengths of time trying to infer such details. Booth’s critique of the often 
unexamined ‘show, don’t tell’ prescription is useful in untangling presuppositions 
underlying the axiom and tracing the dogma to early 20th century literary theorists. 
However, as evidenced in the previous sections, Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction, 
of course, comes apart from the commonplace that literature is much more about showing 
than saying as indicated in the creative writing dictum ‘show, don’t tell’. If Wittgenstein’s 
mystical treatment of the relationship between language, meaning and reality were 
reducible to the three-word cliché ‘show, don’t tell’, then many thousands of pages would 
have been wasted by scholars the world over. Rather, as indicated, Wittgenstein’s notion 
of showing, properly conceived, must be more broadly understood. Showing may include 
concealing, framing, necessary-failure, and unanswerable questions—it isn’t a stretch to 
say showing on occasion may require ‘telling’. This of course is also a valid response to 
Booth’s critique: yes, literature may require ‘telling’ at times, for brevity or indeed for 
literary effect. Showing may be a dictum, but a talented writer knows both when to show 
and when to tell.  
Secondly, Gerald Graff in Poetic Statement and Critical Dogma (1970) provides a powerful 
critique of the contemporary idea that poetry does not deal in ‘thetic’ statements, arguing 




voice doing so is always involved in some variety of irony is to ignore how often and 
reasonably readers of many varieties do ascribe thetic intentions to poets based on what 
they actually write. While I don’t disagree with Graff’s analysis, the issue I identify is his 
critique’s implicit assumption that a poet must be engaged in a single project, say the 
‘literary’ project. Why should a writer not dip into philosophy, explication, literality, and 
the next moment into suggestiveness, opacity or concealment that reveals? A strong case 
can be made, contra Graff, that, whether or not poetry occasionally deals in thetic 
statements, the form of showing this thesis concerns itself with can exist independently 
from or alongside thetic assertions—as indeed is demonstrated in Wittgenstein’s own 
Tractatus, a text that both shows and says. Now, in order to understand showing in literary 
terms, it is useful to consider the three following examples.  
3.2 Showing through use 
Wittgenstein ‘shows’ that the propositions of logic are not strictly speaking propositions 
at all. As tautologies they do not picture states of affairs and consequently lack a sense that 
could be either true or false. Consider the following proposition which seemingly concerns 
the outside world: 
It is raining or it is not raining outside. 
This statement is an exhibition of a fact about our language and the world that in turn 
allows us to observe something about logic. “It is raining, or it is not raining outside” says 
in essence: 
"p v -p" = "p or not p"  
Given this is the case, this proposition tells us nothing about the weather, but tells us 
something about logic; it shows us how disjunction works. As is the case with all 
propositions of logic, it is a tautology, all it does is articulate or put on show the logical 
connections among the genuine propositions of our language. In fact, in understanding 
language we necessarily already grasp all that the propositions of logic articulate, practically 
not theoretically, in fact pre-theoretically: before the question of the truth or falsity of any 
proposition arises.  




that logic is coeval with the phenomena of language itself, as Wittgenstein here illustrates; 
the propositions of language demonstrate the syntactical underpinning rules of logic. This 
is not to provide a ‘justification’ but to demonstrate that we cannot conceive of the world 
as something to which the logic of our language might not apply; “logic pervades the world: 
the limits of the world are also its limits” (TLP, 5.61).  
This example of a proposition that shows the logical bones of our language illustrates the 
way showing works in general, by exhibiting things through use. This is the productive aspect 
of having oneself changed by a literary work; it points towards the affect it works on the 
reader. Bouveresse (1995) takes this further, making his subject not Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language, but his actual use of language, “and that of the poets who have 
climbed through, on and over the rungs of his ladder”. As mentioned early on, Plato, while 
disavowing poetry, had in fact a deeply poetic style of writing, himself. This is paralleled in 
Wittgenstein’s own work: the allusiveness, ‘poeticity’ and strangeness of so many of the 
aphorisms constituting the Tractatus has attracted much comment; it could readily be 
referred to as a ‘poetry of ideas’. As a consequence, so many poets, novelists, dramatists 
and artists have turned out works done explicitly or otherwise in a sort of honorary hat-
doffing to Wittgenstein.53 As Eagleton remarks, “The library of artistic works on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein continues to accumulate. What is it about this man, whose philosophy can be 
taxing and technical enough, which so fascinates the artistic imagination? … Wittgenstein 
is the philosopher of poets and composers, playwrights and novelists, and snatches of his 
mighty Tractatus have even been set to music”.54 
Bouveresse argues that Wittgenstein’s own aphoristic and gestural approach to writing 
philosophy—as if it were indeed a form of poetry—functions as a dramatisation of the 
process of working through questions, in a way that tests the limits of what can and cannot 
be said about, firstly, literary forms (e.g., poetry), concepts (e.g., barbarism), and facts of life 
(e.g., death). As can be seen, Wittgenstein embodies this aspect of language’s ‘use’ working 
effects on readers.      
3.3 Showing through absence 
This example is inspired by the Tractatus (see 5.633–5.6331), where Wittgenstein writes: 
 
53 For further on this, see Ray Monk’s (2012) biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. 




The subject does not belong to the world; rather, it is a limit of the world. Where 
in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will say that this is exactly 
like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye … And 
nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye. (TLP, 5.632–
3) 
Wittgenstein asks that we consider somebody’s visual field, where this is to be thought of 
as a three-dimensional portion of public space: a more or less complete description is 
produced of what is in it, from the point of view of the person, though with no explicit 
reference made to anything outside the field. Wittgenstein demonstrates that however 
complete the description may be, it cannot represent the fact that everything of which it 
treats is seen from a particular point at the edge of the field. For this is not itself a fact 
exclusively about what is in the field. Yet there is a sense in which this fact will be manifest 
in the form that the description takes. (The description will use terms like ‘left’ and ‘right’.) 
So, there is something which cannot be said here but which is shown by what can be said. 
The real contrast is between what we say by means of propositions and what shows itself, 
or makes itself manifest (for a further example, see TLP, 4.121 and 6.124).   
Clearly, Wittgenstein wrote that one should not say anything except that which can be said, 
captured in the infamously catchy line “whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be 
silent” (5.131). That is, one should avoid all metaphysical statements, which, under the 
Tractatus’ picture theory of meaning, would be rendered meaningless. He writes that we 
should respond to people who make metaphysical remarks by demonstrating to them that 
they have used a word without meaning. In which case, the correct method in philosophy 
would really be to say nothing except what can be said. Take the Tractatus section 5.631, 
for instance, in which Wittgenstein imagines the absence of a subject, and how this could 
be expressed in a book, by saying nothing except what can be said, yet through the use of 
illuminating ‘absences’:  
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. If I wrote a 
book called The World as I Found It, I should have to include a report on my body, 
and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were 
not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in 
an important sense there is no subject; for it [the subject] alone could not be 




That is, the point of 5.631 is that the reader must understand what is absent in the text and 
turn that absence into something that can transform one’s conception of one’s 
philosophical difficulties. On this view, a literary text (which would not classically be 
conceived as a philosophical text), such as Wittgenstein’s Mistress, composed of ordinary non-
philosophical propositions, may be able to communicate philosophically (the absence for 
instance of the subject, or a profound solipsism) through what is not in it, and not through 
the philosophical significance of anything that is actually said in it. Let’s consider Wallace’s 
comments on Wittgenstein’s Mistress.      
As noted, the final prescription in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus holds that: “anybody who 
understands what I’m saying eventually recognizes that it’s nonsense, once he’s used what 
I’m saying—rather like steps—to climb up past what I’m saying—he must, that is, throw 
away the ladder after he’s used it” (TLP, 6.53). Wallace writes, in reference to what he calls 
this “terrible and moving” final prescription, that: “this passage, like most of 
[Wittgenstein], is only indirectly about what it’s really about. It whispers & plays. It’s really 
about the plenitude of emptiness, importance of silence, in terms of speech” (2012, 9). 
Indeed, Wallace asserts that Wittgenstein’s philosophy was curiously mute in certain 
respects: “He [Wittgenstein] never actually wrote anything about the exquisite tensions 
between atomism & attendant solipsism on the one hand & distinctively human values & 
qualities on the other” (2012, 7). The ‘muteness’ of Wittgenstein, to which Wallace refers, 
can be understood in terms of the saying-showing distinction. This muteness relates back 
to the vocational travelogue: what it is that Wallace felt Markson had achieved in 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress which goes over and beyond decocted philosophy, philosophical 
allusion and illustration; that is, where Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was mute, Wallace felt 
Markson’s text Wittgenstein’s Mistress could speak. Wallace writes: “but, see, this is exactly 
what Mr. Markson does in Wittgenstein’s Mistress; and in this way Markson’s novel succeeds 
in speaking where Wittgenstein is mute, weaving Kate’s obsession with responsibility (for 
the world’s emptiness) gorgeously into the character’s mandala of cerebral conundrum & 







3.4 Solipsism, shown not told 
Consider the way Wittgenstein’s Mistress renders solipsism—it concerns the reader being able 
to, simply through bold fact, experience the conjured world of the solipsist, something 
Wallace claims to be much more effective than were Markson to provide a philosophical 
proof for Solipsism. As Wallace writes: “as can be seen Markson’s seeming use of bland 
fact still manages to evoke, to conjure a world and state of mind. Indeed, it seems it is in 
this very studied indirection, this intentional sustained error by which, as Wallace writes: 
‘Kate convinces us that, if she is insane, so must we be’” (220). It seems what he values 
highly in Wittgenstein’s Mistress is the attempt not to ‘espouse’ solipsism as a metaphysical 
position—for instance, Wittgenstein’s Mistress does not, as so many novels of ideas do, 
feature cerebral characters and lofty discussions—but rather to recreate the ‘emotional 
implications’ of the Tractatus.55 As Wallace puts it: “the difference, say, between espousing 
solipsism as a metaphysical ‘position’ and waking up one fine morning after a personal loss 
to find your grief apocalyptic, literally millennial, to being the last and only living thing on 
earth, with only your head, now, for not only company but environment & world, an 
inclined beach sliding toward a dreadful sea” (214). In this sense, as Wittgenstein would 
hold, the novel Wittgenstein’s Mistress doesn’t ‘teach’ one philosophy, and if someone 
restricts themselves to looking for teachings, they will be unable to learn anything 
philosophical from it.       
Wittgenstein makes a parallel kind of point about the ethical significance of the Tractatus 
itself. In writing to Ludwig von Ficker about his book, Wittgenstein said that the point of 
the work was an ethical one, writing in the preface: “my book draws limits to the sphere 
of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the only rigorous 
way of drawing those limits” (ProtoTractatus, 16). Clearly, Wittgenstein felt he needn’t 
provide explicit ethical conclusions, asserting them dogmatically; rather, the ethical is, as 
Wittgenstein saw it, contained in the work, but not by being spoken in it, not by being told. 
The ethical character of the Tractatus, instead, depends on the absence in it of the explicitly 
ethical.      
A caveat must be added to this picture: this is not to say that in a literary text no 
pronouncements can be made on ethics, aesthetics, or epistemology. Clearly great 
 
55 As Goldstein writes, “nothing freezes the living marrow of a novel like the brutal onslaught of pure abstract 




philosophical literature does often refer to these things directly. What these writers do not 
do, however, is inform the reader on how to think about the novel’s character; they do not 
dogmatically assert conclusions or provide explanations. This is the kind of demand that 
Wittgenstein places on readers: that they respond to what is not there by making of the 
work something that can be significant in the spirit in which they meet what happens, what 
needs to be done, and what has to be suffered. Huemer has a similar discussion, concerning 
the way Tolstoy expresses his ethics non-explicitly: “one cannot say simply that Tolstoy 
keeps his ethical views unsaid. The Tsar, in Hadji Murad, is presented with his vices etched 
very sharply indeed and Tolstoy has his usual comments on the fashionable exposure of 
breasts. What Tolstoy does not tell us is how to think about Hadji Murad himself, his life 
and his death, or how to make what we think of Hadji Murad alive in our own lives” (2004, 
130). Thus, what is not stated (a form of concealment) may indeed be a means of showing 
or ‘provoking’ in literary texts, without inviting contradiction—as will be discussed in 4.1 
in relation to Heidegger. To believe this implies contradiction is to fail to recognise that 
we are utilising here Wittgenstein’s notion of showing with a non-ordinary, highly technical 
‘sense’. 
3.5 Showing as emotional implications 
Clearly Wallace felt the novel could be more than a travelogue. He writes of philosophy 
that “a theoretical work can be so intellectually taxing … that the emotional implications 
of the text are overlooked” (cited in Ryerson, 2011, 21–22). The novel of ideas, he thus 
contended, is at its most valuable not when making abstruse ideas “accessible” or easy to 
digest for the reader, but rather when “bringing these neglected undercurrents [the 
emotional implications] to the surface” (ibid). Now these emotional implications might 
relate to parts of language usually rendered as flat and non-emotive; that is, Wallace writes 
we should be able to describe “the texture of et cetera itself”. This statement recalls to my 
mind William James, who said, “We ought to say a feeling of and, a feeling of if, a feeling 
of but, and a feeling of by, quite as readily as we say a feeling of blue, a feeling of cold” (1981, 
238). As Wallace asserts “the novel does artistic & emotional justice to the politico-ethical 
implications of Wittgenstein’s abstract mathematical metaphysics, makes what is designed 
to be a mechanism pulse, breathe, suffer, live, etc . . . The ways in which the book is 
moving, and the formal ingenuity by which it transforms metaphysics into angst and so 
reveals philosophy as first and last about feeling” (49). That is to say that, rather than being 




posited by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and enacts his philosophy.     
  
In the case of Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Wallace admired how the book was neither merely an 
illustration of a set of Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas, nor a ‘novelisation’ of the 
philosopher’s life and thought. Rather, as Wittgenstein’s work takes so long on the ‘literal’ 
level, as Wallace puts it, the “migrainous mental gymnastics required of his reader all but 
quash the dire emotional implications of W’s early metaphysics. His mistress, though, asks 
the question her master in print does not: What if somebody really had to live in a 
Tractatusized world?” Wallace claims “Markson’s book renders, imaginatively & 
concretely, the very bleak mathematical world Wittgenstein’s Tractatus revolutionized 
philosophy by summoning via abstract argument”. Wallace writes: “Wittgenstein’s Mistress 
… succeeds at transposing W’s intellectual conundra into the piquant qualia of lived, albeit 
bizarrely lived, experience. The novel quickens W’s early work, gives it a face, for the 
reader, that the philosophy does not & cannot convey”. My reading of this is that by 
placing the protagonist Kate in a cold, lonely, self-as-world cosmos, with the intention to 
capture the flavour both of solipsism and of Wittgenstein, Markson is able to go beyond 
Wittgenstein in an important sense; that is, to ‘humanise’ the intellectual problem. In this 
way Wallace was explicitly pointing at the inability of propositional thinking to ‘quicken’ 
philosophy or give it a ‘face’, to transpose intellectual conundra into the “qualia of lived 
experience”. In brief: to show what cannot be said.     
Wallace consequently sees in Wittgenstein’s Mistress a conjuring, or imaginative portrait of, 
what it would be like to live in the sort of universe described by the logical atomism posited 
in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Without having read Wittgenstein in any sense, Markson’s 
protagonist Kate unwittingly enacts his philosophy through a patient and gradual discovery 
of complexity in the most ordinary language (the mental operations hidden in a mere 
“manner of speaking”) and an attention to the ways that words set limits on what can be 
thought.  
3.6 Showing devices 
Wallace writes that Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress succeeds in doing “what few 
philosophers glean”: he succeeds in communicating the consequences, for persons, of the 
practice of theory. According to Wallace, that was something only fiction, not philosophy, 




devices outlined. Wallace draws out several devices in Markson’s work which manage to 
non-propositionally and indirectly show in the way we could imagine the early Wittgenstein 
getting at. Devices like “repetition, obsessive return, free-/unfree association swirl in an 
uneasy suspension throughout. Yet they communicate” (emphasis in text). Here are some 
concrete examples from Wittgenstein’s Mistress of how each technique works, which, as 
Wallace writes, “ring as true as a song we can’t quite place” (95). 
3.7 Showing through bland fact 
Consider, for example, Markson’s evocative use of bland fact. Markson provides a formally 
very odd monologue, consisting mostly of paragraphs expressing a series of factual 
statements. For instance: 
What I did was spill gasoline all over Simon’s old room. Much of the morning I 
could still see the smoke rise and rise, in my rear-view mirror. Now I have two 
enormous fireplaces. Here in this house by the sea, I am talking about. And in the 
kitchen an antiquated potbellied stove. I have grown quite fond of the stove. Simon 
had been seven, by the way. A variety of berries grow nearby. And less than 
minutes past my stream there are various vegetables, in fields that were once 
cultivated but are of course now wildly overgrown. (1995, 14)  
Wallace is concerned with how, through mere literal description, Markson can infuse facts 
with meaning in Wittgenstein’s Mistress: “Hers is the affectless language of fact … Markson 
directs our misprision in order to infuse statements that all take the form of raw data-
transfer with true & deep emotional import” (232). And much later Wallace refers to this 
as giving: “the familiar bitch & moan that Markson’s novel promises & comes close to 
transfiguring, dramatizing, mythologizing via bland bald fact” (235). Yet as can be seen, 
Markson’s seeming use of bland fact still manages to evoke, to conjure a world and state 
of mind. Indeed, it seems it is in this very studied indirection, this intentional sustained 
error that, as Wallace writes, “Kate convinces us that, if she is insane, so must we be” (ibid). 
In this way the sub-textual emotive agenda succeeds. It is through this freewheeling 
disorder of isolated paragraphs and “under the flit of thought” that Wallace writes: “under 
the continual struggle against the slipping sand of English & the drowning-pool of self-
consciousness—a seductive order not only in but via chaos—compels complete & uneasy 




3.8 Showing and deep nonsense 
A further example is Markson’s protagonist Kate’s use of deep-nonsensical facts via which 
she communicates isolation’s meaning; for instance, as she narrates “one of those things 
people generally admired about Rubens, even if they were not always aware of it, was the 
way everybody in his paintings was always touching everybody else” (102). Descriptions 
such as this are far more effective at communicating her solipsistic, deeply lonely state than 
the rare explicit announcement: “Generally, even then, I was lonely” (ibid). Wallace writes: 
“you could call this technique ‘Deep Nonsense’, meaning I guess a linguistic flow of 
strings, strands, loops, and quiffs that through the very manner of its formal construction 
flouts the ordinary cingula of ‘sense’ and through its defiance of sense’s limits manages 
somehow to show what cannot ordinarily be ‘expressed’”. This direct reference, as 
elsewhere, is a direct homage to Wittgenstein’s saying-showing distinction. Wallace goes 
on to claim “good comedy often functions the same way. So does good advertising, today. 
So does a surprising amount of good philosophy. So, usually on a far less explicit level than 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress, can great fiction” (270). 
In distinguishing the various categories of showing in this chapter we can see that the 
gesture towards the shown is non-trivial, and that the distinction can be carried out in a 
range of ways. We have seen that the literary work, while composed in the language game 
of information, is not used in the language-game of giving information. Showing should be 
understood as non-truth-functional ‘use’ that demonstrates aspects of experience. It may 
demonstrate through absences which, when identified, become illuminating means of 
transforming one’s conceptions of one’s philosophical difficulties. This is well illustrated 
in the case of solipsism and emotional implications of the Tractatus demonstrated in 
Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Devices such as repetition, obsessive-return, free-
association, ‘apparent’ nonsense that turns out to offer a form of deep-nonsense: the 
defiance of sense’s limits that indirect shows philosophy as felt consequence, not abstract 
theory. In the following chapter I will consider several theorists who speak to similar and 





CHAPTER IV: The perspectival shift  
When I began this discussion, I did so in the context of the ‘ancient quarrel’. What is the 
nature of literary inquiry, and how does it differ from philosophical inquiry? I have 
addressed this by making the case for a Tractarian mystical project of showing; that is, 
producing a perspectival shift in the reader. In the process of reassessing the significance 
of the notion of showing to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and its bearing on the discussion of 
the relationship between literature and philosophy more generally, I have suggested in the 
earlier chapters that the means by which showing occurs in a literary setting is akin to 
‘provoking’ a perspectival shift in the reader.56 The following chapter is, however, integral 
to further demonstrating exactly how a literary work’s act of showing serves to induce such 
a perceptual shift.    
In this following chapter I actively nuance this sense of showing with reference to a 
number of contemporary authors who I believe demonstrate affectively how literary 
showing isn’t merely gesticulating, or demonstrating, but rather involves forms of: 
concealment (Heidegger), necessary failure (Lerner), ex-formation (Wallace), framing-
effects (Davidson), and non-ontic questioning (Perloff & Heidegger). Heidegger, Gadamer 
and Davidson, as well as the novelists Lerner and Borges, enrich our understanding of art’s 
capacity to produce such perspectival shifts in the reader. The re-making/nuancing of the 
concept of showing in this chapter thus serves as an integral part of a full reading of 
Wallace Markson and Wittgenstein.  
4.1 Hermeneutics, situatedness and phronesis 
I will explore briefly the concepts of hermeneutics, phronesis and the truth of art, as they 
emerge for Heidegger and Gadamer. Both offer what I consider overlapping elaborations 
of the same basic conception of understanding: one taking our ‘situatedness’, ‘prior 
involvement’, and ‘partiality’ not as barriers to understanding, but as its enabling 
condition.57 This notion of understanding, as shall be seen, fleshes out the full depth of 
the saying-showing distinction drawn on by Wallace; to see how we shall consider their 
approach to Hermeneutics. 
 
56 I would like to thank my examiners for their valuable reflections on this distinction, and for providing 
the impetus that has led to the inclusion of this section. 




Hermeneutics has its origins in problems of biblical exegesis and the development of 
theoretical frameworks used to direct exegetical practice. In the 19th century, it expanded 
into a more encompassing theory of textual interpretation in general. It involved the 
seeking of a set of rules to provide a basis for good interpretive practice. Many conceived 
of the basic problem of hermeneutics as methodological: how to found the science of 
interpretation in a way that makes it properly scientific? It was in the 1920s that Heidegger 
put hermeneutics to a different purpose. Instead of presenting hermeneutics as a ‘theory’ 
of textual interpretation, or a ‘method’ of scientific understanding, he presented 
hermeneutics as that which allows the self-disclosure of the structure of understanding.58 In 
essence, Heidegger redeploys hermeneutics to express the way in which all understanding 
is ‘always already’ given over to that which is to be understood (to ‘the things themselves’—
die sachen selbst). To ground this notion, consider the example of a particular artwork. To 
understand a particular artwork, we need some prior understanding, even as rudimentary 
as knowledge of a set of paint marks on canvas—otherwise it cannot even be seen as 
something to be understood. More generally, if we are to understand anything at all, we 
must already find ourselves ‘in’ the world ‘along with’ that which is to be understood. All 
understanding is thus based on our prior hermeneutical situatedness: hermeneutics is in this 
vein an attempt to ‘make explicit’ the structure of such situatedness.   
  
Gadamer takes up and elaborates on this hermeneutical project in Heidegger’s 
phenomenological sense, and together they radically rework the idea of hermeneutics, 
providing an account of the proper ground for understanding, while rejecting the attempt 
to found understanding on any method or set of rules. Crucially this does not reject the 
importance of methodological concerns, but rather insists on the limited role of method and 
the priority of understanding as a dialogic, practical and situated activity. Holding that in 
mind, let’s turn to phronesis. 
For Heidegger the concept of phronesis—often translated as ‘practical wisdom’59—gives 
emphasis to our practical ‘being-in-the world’ over and against theoretical apprehension, 
but additionally phronesis constitutes a mode of insight into both our practical situation, 
and more fundamentally our existential situation, hence phronesis constitutes a mode of 
 
58 For further, see the series of lectures ‘The Hermeneutics of Facticity’, in Heidegger (2008). 





self-knowledge. Gadamer took up this central element in Heidegger’s thinking. The way in 
which Gadamer conceives of understanding, and interpretation, is as just such a practically 
oriented mode of insight, a mode of insight that has its own rationality irreducible to any 
simple set of rules, that cannot be directly taught, and that is always oriented to the 
particular case at hand.  
Now to apply phronesis and situated hermeneutics to Gadamer and Heidegger’s 
conception of art and truth, we should begin with the three lectures on ‘The Origin of the 
Work of Art’. In these lectures Heidegger elucidates the way art relates to truth not via its 
‘representational’ character—that is, the truth value of the work doesn’t consist in 
correspondence between the work and the world—but lies in the artwork’s capacity to 
‘disclose’ a world. Here Heidegger rejects the totalising ‘coherence’ conception of truth as 
‘correctness’, where truth is a matter of the consistency of a statement with a larger body 
of statements. He refers instead to an underlying, more basic sense of truth as ‘un-
concealment’ in which truth is not a property of statements, but an event or process 
through which the things of the world come to be revealed. Importantly, unconcealment 
is not simply a matter of bringing about ‘complete’ transparency—because, in the revealing 
of things, other things are necessarily concealed.60     
Gadamer’s hermeneutics elaborates on Heidegger’s idea of truth, in tandem with the poetic 
language deployed in Heidegger’s exposition (Gadamer 1997b, 47). Gadamer felt aesthetic 
theory had become alienated from the actual experience of art, art criticism had become 
aestheticised and abstracted, while aesthetic judgment was reduced to subjectivism—taste. 
There are two crucial elements to Gadamer’s appropriation of Heidegger: firstly, the 
connection of art with truth, and secondly, the focus on truth itself as the event of prior 
and partial disclosure. In turning back to the direct experience of art, and to the concept 
of truth as prior and partial disclosure, Gadamer develops an alternative to subjectivism 
that relates to the hermeneutical situatedness of early Heidegger, and the phronesis taken from 
Plato and Aristotle. The experience of art reveals not in spite of, but precisely because of 
the way it also conceals, therefore understanding is possible, not in spite of, but precisely 
because of its prior involvement.  
 
60 An obvious connection here exists with Wittgenstein’s rabbit/duck; in that seeing something in one way 





This, some might take to mean, implies that Showing is really, at least in part, not-showing. 
This is a misunderstanding however: this only indicates that the work of showing takes 
place in some instances through acts of concealment, as concealment may provoke, and 
provoking is the work of showing. The reader who makes this mistake has misunderstood 
Wittgenstein’s showing notion by binding it too tightly to the ordinary language meaning 
of ‘to show’. The notion of show, drawn upon here, can occur too through concealment. 
This connects to a famous problem for Heidegger interpretation: how to make Heidegger 
intelligible while retaining the excitement of his poetic experimental prose? This problem 
reflects the broader common dilemma around which this paper circumambulates: the way 
philosophers have had trouble pulling things out of literature. This will be discussed in 
what follows. 
4.2 On Heidegger’s intelligibility 
Heidegger’s style has left commentators to wonder what to do with many of his 
formulations that sound poetic yet seem to promise a conceptual yield,61 this includes, for 
instance, his assertion that “language speaks” (1962, 120) or that “language is the house of 
being” (1762, 313).62 The central issue, that has puzzled many, concerns interpretation: 
while Heidegger’s challenging, but original and fascinating, style of philosophy has 
motivated innumerable efforts by interpreters to ‘situate’ Heidegger’s thought, his use of 
language has been a cause for concern. Many philosophers and linguists, while attempting 
to excavate the content ‘expressed’ by Heidegger’s formulations, have lost patience with 
and dismissed his conceptual-poetic language. The challenge for Heidegger scholars then 
is balancing the apparently conflicting desires to (a) make his formulations conceptually 
intelligible so that his views have currency in contemporary philosophical discussions, but 
at the same time (b) do so in a way that doesn’t ignore the very formulations Heidegger 
uses. Davidson expresses well this difficulty: “The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it 
is hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement” (183). 
 
61 Regarding the aspect of Heidegger’s writing which is poetic and holds a conceptual promise, Benjamin 
demonstrates the poetic aspect is not accidental or secondary to the conceptual aspect but gives traction to 
thought and is supposed to accompany us and even lead us to see what Heidegger’s words point to (2005). 
62 Vandervelde illustrates how Heidegger’s formulation combines the performance of thinking with the 
description of such a performance: “When we go to the well, when we go through the woods, we are always 
already going through the word ‘well,’ through the word ‘woods,’ even if we do not speak the words and do 




This reflects this larger dilemma facing the reader who attempts to make philosophical use 
of literature, that intelligibility strictly can kill the power or excitement in the literature. If 
you try to make something relevant by making use of it, by applying it, that can be deeply 
unsatisfying, reducing it to a stylistic mode. So, there is an idea that application is another 
type of mistake. 
i. Frege’s choice 
The first temptation for interpreters can be called ‘Frege’s choice’. Either we are interested 
in truth and turn to scientific propositions or we are interested in artistic consideration, at 
which point we abandon truth. As Frege writes: “in listening to an epic, for example, we 
are fascinated by the euphony of the language and also by the sense of the sentences and 
by the images and emotions evoked. In turning to the question of truth we disregard the 
artistic appreciation and pursue scientific considerations” (221). For instance, if we 
translate Heidegger’s language into a propositional form, this may bring about some 
intelligibility, but may reduce or kill the excitement, as “surely as turning a poem into a set 
of propositions” as Vandervelde puts it.     
This point is illustrated in David Foster Wallace’s take on anti-explanation, in regard to 
jokes. He gives the example of reading Kafka with college students, and the impossible 
task of getting the students to see that Kafka is funny. Wallace points out that great stories 
and great jokes share in common a dependence on what communication theorists call ‘ex-
formation’; that is, a certain quantity of vital information being removed from the work in 
such a way as to cause “a kind of explosion of associative connections within the 
recipient”. As Wallace writes: “The psychology of jokes helps account for part of the 
problem in teaching Kafka. We all know that there is no quicker way to empty a joke of 
its peculiar magic than to try to explain it” (61). This notion of ex-formation, crucial to 
many literary texts, evidently describes a facet of showing and does so through acts of 
concealment, via the removal of information. This is a further indication that literary 
showing should be understood as closer ‘provoking’, rather than the ordinary-language 
sense of showing given it may occur through removal and concealment. 
Wallace speaks of a strange antipathy that providing such explanations arouses in readers, 
a feeling of offence, as if the joke has been blasphemed by its explanation. This resembles 
the irony in running something like a story by Kafka through the gears of a literary critical 




Wallace writes, “the literary equivalent of tearing the petals off and grinding them up and 
running the goo through a spectrometer to explain why a rose smells so pretty” (74). On 
the other hand, if we preserve the poetic aspect of Heidegger’s language without exegesis, 
this results in abandoning any concern for truth. Since, in the case of Heidegger, the poetic 
manner of saying is part of the flesh of the concept, its substance, Frege’s choice would 
force us to choose between two equally unpalatable options. 
ii. The sirens’ temptation 
A second interpreter’s temptation is to focus not so much on the scientific stature of 
Heidegger’s propositions, but their applicability to ‘real issues’ topics of a metaphysical, 
ethical, pragmatic and environmental ilk. While having the virtue of making Heidegger 
relevant to contemporary philosophical discussion through application, this approach 
arguably loses the capacity Heidegger has given us to question the privileged frame of 
reference chosen, to call into question the assumptions that accompany our contemporary 
approach to what metaphysics is supposed to be about. 
Indeed, philosophy in such an applied mode would involve the mining of Heidegger’s 
work for ideas or insights that are reframed in an intelligible conceptual form, serving a 
social or political agenda—be it feminist, gender analysis, race theory or other. Heidegger’s 
formulations are then “[spat out] as indigestible adornment or metaphorical fiber” 
(Vandervelde 1988, 64). The perils of, or a hyperbolic illustration of, such an approach is 
provided in Italo Calvino’s If On a Winters Night a Traveller where he demonstrates how in 
pre-packaging and forcing a text into a camp among anonymously pre-established 
positions, the subversive capacity of the literary work is removed and the challenge it 
provides is consequently blunted. 63 It is, as Vandervelde writes, in the ‘poietics’ of thought, 
in the production of new ways to look at issues that the text has power. 
 
63 Calvino’s character Lotaria doesn’t read to enjoy but to dissect and weaponises works of literature for the 
politics they embody. She analyses the books for general theme-based content; the book is rendered 
instrumental to determining the author’s positions with regards to ‘trends of contemporary thought’ and 
‘Problems that Demand a Solution’. Indeed, she feeds books through a machine that analyses them for 
adherence to the codes imposed by the dominant sex, class or culture. This hyperbolic approach appears to 
be an attempt by Calvino to describe his concern with an academic tendency to approach literature with 
preconceived notions as to where the value in a text should reside, the using of books to confirm already 




iii. A possible solution 
How do we face these two temptations—Frege’s choice and the Sirens’ temptation—
without succumbing to them? And how do we render Heidegger intelligible without 
flattening out what he says? Paul Vandervelde, in examining the way that the content of 
Heidegger’s ‘philosophy’ cannot be separated from the performance involved in 
formulating it, argues compellingly that if we want to keep the excitement of Heidegger’s 
fascinating formulations while bringing intelligibility, we must reject Davidson’s 
assumption that both excitement and intelligibility come exclusively from the text, and 
embrace the view that “Poetry makes beings more being [seiender]” (1988, 64) precisely 
because poetry breaks away from the language as commonly used. By breaking away from 
common language, poetry allows the seined-moment to become perceivable or hearable 
again.  
It is in ‘failing’, then, that the word unveils being, by taking away the obviousness of what 
we take for granted, allowing new configurations to arise. A work of art can thereby make 
us ‘see’ something as if for the first time. This is how “the word gives being” (Heidegger 
1959, 193). The failing of words shows the happening precisely because “it is only in the 
beginning that beings ‘become’ [je nur im Anfang das Seiende ‘wird’]” (1959, 122). It is this that 
we can understand as the perspectival shift effected through poetry and literature, by 
Heidegger and Gadamer’s lights. This provides a rich alternate route to understanding the 
capacity of art and metaphor to produce perspectival shifts in the reader. 
4.3 Lerner: the poem as always a record of failure 
It isn’t a system 
It is a gesture whose power derives from its  
Failure, a child attempting to gather  
Us into her glitter-flecked arms 
(Ben Lerner, Mean free path) 
I will provide a brief detour via Ben Lerner’s (2016) “The Hatred of Poetry” an essay in 




art of poetry, and not a reason to turn away from it. As Lerner writes, “poetry and the 
hatred of poetry are for me … inextricable”. Curiously enough, Lerner, in the essay, begins 
his examination also with Plato’s famous claim that an ideal city is no place for poets, poets 
who would only corrupt and mislead the young. He then draws on the common felt 
‘hatred’ of poetry as the starting point for a defence of the art. Plato’s Socrates fears and 
resents the corrupting power of poetic performance, and defends language as the medium 
of philosophy from the unreason of poets, who just make stuff up, rather than discover 
genuine truths. His guiding accusations is: what do you know, poet? What do you really 
contribute? Such questions, Lerner points out, remain on the tongues of our everyday non-
poetry reader today, and on many poets’ tongues too. Referencing Allan Grossman and 
the story of Caedmon, the first English poet, Lerner makes the case that poetry arises from 
a desire to get beyond the finite and historical to the transcendent and divine. Yet in the move 
from the impulse to the actual poem, the song of the infinite is compromised by the 
finitude of its terms. Thus, the poet is viewable as a tragic figure, and the poem always a 
record of failure (2016).  
In viewing the poem as ‘always a record of failure’ Lerner helps us elucidate our notion of 
showing. Literary showing clearly cannot function by ‘succeeding’ in recording correctly 
the transcendent or divine; rather, it provokes in the reader an impulse—that is, the desire 
to get beyond the finite and historical to the transcendent and divine. Lerner indicates that 
the failure to ‘experience’ transcendence is no argument against showing; rather, it merely 
demonstrates that the urgency and possibilities of poetry must exist alongside a sense of 
its impossibility. ‘Impossibility’ here means that the poem is definitionally incapable of 
realising the impulse out of which it arises, “As if there were a principle of failure built into 
the practice” (16). Why can poetry not realise the impulse out of which it arises? To answer 
this question Lerner refers to Grossman’s case for the existence of an undecidable conflict 
between the poet’s desire to sing an alternative world and the “resistance to alternative 
making inherent in the materials of which any world must be composed” (18). The 
difference he draws is between virtual poems and actual poems: “I live in the space between 
what I am moved to do and what I can do” (ibid), limitations that exist both for the 
individual, and by virtue of the structure of the art form. As Lerner puts it in relation to 
John Ashberry, in his novel Leaving the Atocha Station (2011) through the mouth of his 





It is as though the actual Asberry poem were concealed from you, written on the 
other side of a mirrored surface, and you saw only the reflection of your reading. 
But by reflecting your reading, Asberry’s poems allow you to attend to your 
attention, to experience your experience, thereby enabling a strange kind of 
presence. But it is a presence that keeps the virtual possibilities of poetry intact 
because the true poem remains beyond you, inscribed on the far side of the mirror: 
“You have it, but you don’t have it. / You miss it, it misses you. / You miss each 
other” (222). 
This necessary limitation and this principle of failure are pointed at by the fact that the 
poet’s apology for the unworthiness of his art, for the insufficiency of his song, is 
traditional and generic. Indeed there is no shortage of poets asserting poetry must be 
abolished—that the border between art and life must be done away with—or indeed that 
the only possible remaining poetic gesture is to do away with poetry altogether (this has 
long been the rallying cry of the avant-garde). The poet’s claim to renounce poetry, we 
should note, resembles nothing more than the philosopher’s claim to do away with 
metaphysics. What struck me while reading Lerner’s Lichtenberg Figures is the seemingly glib 
but telling line, which itself evokes Wittgenstein deeply, that: “Nothing is as metaphysical 
as the claim to break from metaphysics” (36). 
4.4 Borges: on stars and arguments 
Borges (2002) comments disdainfully on the definition of poetry commonly held as “the 
expression of the beautiful through the medium of words artfully woven together” (30) 
claiming that while perhaps good enough for a textbook, the definition is fairly feeble. 
Surely, he asks, there must be something more important, which drives us not only to try 
our hand at poetry, but to feel that we know all about it. Fittingly, to our theme, as shall 
emerge, he writes: “we make a very common mistake when we think that we are ignorant 
of something because we are unable to define it. If we are in a Chestertonian mood we 
might say that we can define something only when we know nothing about it” (31). I 
appreciate Borges’ view of poetry as akin to a scented breeze, or the colour blue, or a 
strong emotion: experiences so deeply felt in us that their particularity cannot be captured 
by other words. Borges adds valuably to our conception of literary showing, in which 
literature provides intimations that can best be shown not through ‘naming’ explicitly, but 





Interestingly Borges claimed his own philosophy was derived from poetry, perhaps 
because his philosophical ideas arrived via suggestion or intuition to the tune of poetry’s 
music, rather than through thought’s argument. Walt Whitman (1983) expresses a similar 
idea: he found “the night air, the large few stars, far more convincing than mere 
arguments”. You can imagine rationality’s rebuttal. Reason might ask, “But to what 
questions do the stars and sky respond?” That is, not the ontic questions that Heidegger 
argues terminate in a simple answer, nor questions of a determinate physics, but rather 
questions that do not bottom out in facts—ceaselessly fecund questions. So perhaps it is 
better to conceive literature’s take on these questions as a comment, rather than a response; 
an addendum or better yet a flourish.      
Akin to Heidegger, Perloff demonstrates how the questions Wittgenstein poses on 
language’s relation to thought are often questions which lack any single correct ‘answer’ 
but serve instead to open us onto new spaces, spaces “in which to take a deep breath”, 
spaces as “poetic” as they are “philosophical” (23). This Heideggerian approach to 
Wittgenstein’s questioning in language emerges from reflection on Wittgenstein’s mode of 
investigation: its contradictoriness yes, its aphoristic formulations also, but most essentially 
his claim that “Language is not contiguous to anything else” (112).  
Given the distinction Heidegger draws between ontic and ontological questions, we could 
draw a parallel Heideggerian approach to questions that are not stated so much with the 
ambition to find answers, but in order to prompt states of amazement or awe in the 
questioner. As argued, this ‘prompting’ or provoking of different perspectival states is very 
much what Wittgenstein is describing with his notion of Showing. As Coleridge put it, “in 
Wonder all Philosophy began”.64 That is, at times we become aware of the miraculousness 
that is existence, questions that arise are akin to the form ‘Why is there something, rather 
than nothing?’ Such questions approximate a realisation arising through the unfamiliar. 
‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ is not actually a question that is asking for 
an answer, but rather an expression of sheer astonishment and wonder over the fact of 
existence. In contrast Heidegger identified the ontic question he has in mind; questions 
 




such as ‘How far is the earth from the moon’?; a type of question that terminates in an 
answer and that in settling for an answer renders itself inert, trivial. 
For Heidegger a question that is allowing of an answer is exhaustible. To answer it is to 
render it inert, as having a terminal destination. How could you love these questions, and 
what good is your love if it makes its object redundant? In contrast, what is unanswerable 
is therefore inexhaustible. Here we come to what is shown, beyond answerable; a type of 
silence, but productive; and when we talk about productive silence, are we really meaning 
boundless questions, questioning that doesn’t bottom out in a fact? Borges wrote that 
everything he had written had been a mere metaphor, or variation on the central theme of 
being puzzled by things, puzzled by the fact of existing, of existing in a human body, of 
looking through eyes, hearing through ears, etc. In which case he was of the opinion that 
no essential difference existed between poetry and philosophy. Both stood for, and 
answered in relation to, the same kind of puzzlement. Except that in the case of philosophy 
the answer is given in a logical way, and in the case of poetry you use metaphor. I don’t 
think Borges is wrong, but I believe we can nuance his answer. 
4.5 Davidson: what metaphors mean 
A similar means of explicating this perceptual shift is expressed in Donald Davidson’s 
‘Brute Force’ elucidation of ‘what metaphors mean’. Davidson claims that a metaphoric 
utterance, which would otherwise be idle or pointless, produces a “framing effect” rather 
than communicating any particular propositional content. For Davidson the framing effect 
is a cognitive affair, it consists in having one’s attention drawn to real or putative likenesses: 
the hearer of a metaphor is induced to view, consider or experience the primary subject in 
a fresh and special light, a light afforded by juxtaposing the first subject with the secondary 
subject. In this way the metaphor enables us to view the whole situation in a new light; this 
reflects my account of the perspectival shift induced by showing via literature.65 For 
illustration, Ben Lerner in the novel 10:04 writes:  
Part of what I loved about poetry was how the distinction between fiction and 
nonfiction didn’t obtain, how the correspondence between text and world was less 
 




important than the intensities of the poem itself, what possibilities of feeling were 
opened up in the present tense of reading. 
The ‘possibilities of feeling’ Lerner refers to, opened onto like vistas of scale, describes the 
perspectival possibilities that metaphoric likening and language can effect. As Davidson 
puts it: when we try to say what a metaphor means, we soon realise there is no end to what 
we want to mention: “how many facts are conveyed by a photograph? None, an infinity, 
or one great unstateable fact? Bad question. A picture is not worth a thousand words, or 
any other number. Words are the wrong currency to exchange for a picture” (Davidson, 
46–7). A metaphor’s meaning on this account is subject to interpretation, in the way 
dreams are. While we may interpret a dream, that interpretation depends on the nature of 
the interpreter and their concerns regarding the nature of the dream and its origins. As 
Donaldson writes, “Metaphor is the dreamwork of language, and, like all dreamwork, its 
interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter as on the originator” (31). This will recur 
later in section VI—where I examine the connection between exegesis and creative 
artefact—as a number of techniques I draw upon in my creative work arise from a desire 
to produce in the reader an awareness of their role in the meaning construction that occurs 
in literary works.66 On this ‘brute force’ account, the metaphor works as a causal device, 
not through any representational transaction, but by effecting this ‘framing’ shift. But how? 
To think of literary works leading to perspectival shifts in the audience, without 
explanation, is to assimilate metaphors to ‘pills’ or black boxes leading to change in belief, 
a parallel to blows on the head leading to insight à la koans. No account is given of how 
the insight is induced. Its being a Brute Force Account is thus a question begging, which 
is why we require the elucidation I have provided in the preceding section. 
In conclusion, as should now be evident, Heidegger and Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
situatedness, and phronesis, provide valuable models for examining how self-knowledge, 
insight and perspectival shifts can be wrought via art, without dependence on a 
‘representational’ truth function, but through an ‘unconcealing’ or by intentionally ‘failing’ 
in language, thus defamiliarising the world, and thereby allowing new configurations to be 
seen. Davidson’s notion of ‘framing conditions’ speaks to the similar perspectival 
possibilities that metaphoric likening and language can effect. As to the writers: Borges 
points to the fact that definition is often mistaken for mastery, yet this mastery is actually 
 




a form of ignorance—those things we know most deeply we can never fully put words to, 
consequently literary insight is uniquely responsive to this puzzlement. Lerner, too, 
provides an exploration of how the discourse of failure is constitutive of the art of poetry, in 
its unrealisable desire to get beyond the finite and historical to achieve the transcendent. The 
poet desires to sing an alternative world, yet meets insurmountable resistance to alternative 
world making, inherent both in the materials of the language and the structure of the art 
form. Poetry, for Lerner, sings up against the inexpressible, which Wittgenstein gestures 
towards, a necessary limitation. In the following chapter, I will outline how these have 





CHAPTER V: Radical contextualising  
As a caveat: the discussions in this chapter may appear, to some extent, provisional. This 
is because the discussions formed as seriatim responses to criticisms raised by my 
dissertation markers. Thanks to my markers well-motivated and insightful reflections, I 
believe this dissertation is both a more well-rounded examination of its topic and, a better 
situated thesis. To begin with, in engaging with the authors in Chapter IV, the reasonable 
critique can be made that the thought of these authors is engaged with outside of their 
cultural contexts and in an ahistorical manner. It is reasonable to wonder whether these 
authors in fact fail to offer ‘alternate’ pathways to the insights gleaned by Wittgenstein, as 
argued, but perhaps the ‘insights’ gleaned arrive at the same destination only due to the 
social location of the authors: as middle-class, middle-aged, and heterosexual males. More 
broadly it can be argued that our encounter with ‘truth’ or insight is predetermined, always 
already a matter of canon and the constitutionalising forces which privilege some thinkers 
over others. This is an important concern to speak to, as it amounts to the possibility that 
the status of ‘truth’ is relative not only to genre (i.e. philosophy versus literature) but is 
subject also to canonical parochialism.  
Undeniably the canon is anything but a natural, or inevitable, assemblage of preordained 
thinkers, whose words have been righteously weighted with posterity. The canon is rather 
a massed nexus of unannounced ideological forces, which selectively work towards 
empowering some performances of truth while disempowering others. This chapter will 
examine the influence of canon, and canonical parochialism, on our conception of truth; 
it will explore the implications of this thesis for the current ‘post-truth’ political moment, 
and examine the importance of viewing the insights gleaned, when applying Wittgenstein’s 
conception of ‘seeing the world aright’, as culturally and historically embedded and 
contingent. This chapter will therefore contextualise the quarrel and consider its relevance 
today; it will do so by questioning the frame in which we make sense of the quarrel as 
posing questions worthy of address. 
5.1 Influence of canon on our conception of truth and showing 
Some of the most poignant critiques of the philosophical canon are the synoptic 
interpretations raised by feminist philosophers, so I will start there.67 Feminist synoptic 
 




interpretations have urged that the canon’s central philosophical norms and values, i.e. 
reason and objectivity, are notions that are deeply gendered male. Accordingly, defenders of 
this approach view the Western philosophical traditions, and the central concepts we have 
inherited, as requiring critical scrutiny. Philosophy’s self-image as posing universal and 
objective truths, rather than biased and particular interpretations, is called into question. 
As such, it is evident that this general critique bears on the topic of ‘seeing the world aright’, 
and how ‘aright-seeing’ has been identified as the purpose or core of literary inquiry by the 
male, middle-class, literary figures examined above.  
Genevieve Lloyd in her text Man of Reason makes the case that our understanding of 
objectivity and reason across historical periods has varied, yet the concepts themselves 
have remained consistently associated with maleness, in which case the notion of reason 
we have inherited, whether as empiricists or existentialists, requires critical scrutiny. In 
contrast some, such as Bordo in The Flight to Objectivity, map this gendering of reason to the 
modern period of philosophy in which the adoption of specific ideals of reason has been 
generated by modern scientific values which are antagonistic to women (28–32). In either 
instance these thinkers identify the manner in which canonical thought, bound to cultural 
context and social location, informs the methodological toolkit, epistemic beliefs and 
metaphysical conclusions that shape disciplinary knowledge. 
Lloyd’s case is clearly elucidating—I have no doubt that the male thinkers identified in the 
preceding section are informed in their values by patriarchal and traditional conceptions 
of the role of the philosopher and the method of intellectual inquiry. I believe, however 
that a strong case can be made that the literary, and the category of showing or ‘gestural’ 
knowledge more broadly, actually particularly describe forms of implicit, intuitional, 
metaphorical truth-seeking. These forms are feminised and consequently dismissed by the 
philosophical canon as lacking in rigour, as being too suggestive or insufficiently clear.68 If 
we consider, like Lloyd, the maleness of reason to be at root symbolic and metaphorical 
(85), then we can see too how femininity has been defined in opposition as metaphorically 
the ‘irrational’ or ‘supra-rational’. Furthermore, as is evident from the forgoing discussion, 
it is notions of rationality and objectivity that have held sway canonically, and, as is evident in 
 
68 We can turn, for example, to the gendered exclusion of particular metaphors evident in Frege's own 




the forgoing chapters, it was particularly in the endeavour to transgress the limits of this 
toolkit that the ‘mystical’, what cannot be said but only shown, was born. 
The synoptic critique of the philosophical canon is relevant to discerning Wittgenstein’s 
meaning in asserting that showing consists in ‘seeing the world aright’. It bears too on how 
‘aright-seeing’ has been identified by these male, middle-class, literary figures as the 
purpose or core of literary inquiry. It should be evident (and will be discussed in what 
follows) that if taken too narrowly, ‘aright’ thinking, via literary showing, is subject to the 
very criticism levelled at philosophy. In which case, as feminist theorist Irigaray argues, if 
these theorists are seeking to establish universal truths through ‘aright-seeing’ this is likely 
occurring through the repression of sexual difference—alongside the repression of myriad 
other forms of difference. 
Indeed, feminist epistemic-standpoint theorists, and intersectional theorists, have long 
argued for a recognition of the situatedness of knowledge relative to social location and 
positionality. And yet a strong case can be made that literary showing itself offers a 
powerful instrument in defending an epistemic-standpoint account and identifying 
knowledge as relative to social location. While at its inception ‘the novel’ was very much 
bound to a specific class echelon, art has since been utilised as an implement for sharing 
experience and for deepening empathetic capabilities. Bird, for instance, examines the 
relation between gender, knowledge and art in exploring how the documentation, 
representation and dissemination of women’s experiences of domestic violence becomes 
most effective when utilising an arts-based methodology (95). Art offers us the capacity to 
acquire and share expressions of lived experience, providing others access to our multi-
sensory and embodied knowledge, which may otherwise be impossible to articulate. The 
possibilities of using art to generate various kinds of knowledge align closely with what 
MacDougall refers to as the “stereoscopic imagination” (65–82). Imagination thus has a 
central place in these accounts of inquiry.  
Making this case, however, is not to deny that the preceding section is lacking diversity in 
terms of theorists’ social location. More on the perspectives of people of colour, diverse 
class backgrounds, female and queer theorists would be crucial to a thorough examination 
of this topic. The previous section offers only a sampling of a range of thinkers, who 
converge on this conception of the literary. I am cognisant that there is a much greater 




were to write this dissertation again, the sources drawn upon would reflect a more 
conscious engagement with a diversity of perspective and experience. This dissertation has 
been informed in large part by epistolary auto-theorists, poets and novelists: Maggie 
Nelson, Claudia Rankin, Anne Carson, Chris Kraus, Fred Moten, Brian Blanchfield and 
Eileen Myles. These thinkers represent a myriad of distinct social locations, and their work 
is to my mind crucial to inducing a perspectival shift that unseats the privilege of the white 
male gaze. While I do not have space to enter their work more fully here (though such 
exploration takes place in my novel Murmurations) what is evident to me is that—whether 
in Moten’s Under Commons critique of neoliberalism in the modern university, or Kraus’s 
problematisation of the patriarchal form of the lover’s discourse in I Love Dick, or Myles’s 
queering of the modes of the poet novel in Inferno, or Nelson’s meandering interrogation 
of the bounds of theory and biography in Argonauts—each of these authors demonstrate a 
porousness to our perceptual bounds. For instance, when Maggie Nelson, a major 
influence on my creative work, approaches Wittgenstein in The Argonauts, she writes: 
Before we met, I had spent a lifetime devoted to Wittgenstein’s idea that the 
inexpressible is contained—inexpressibly! —in the expressed. This idea gets less 
airtime than his more reverential Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be 
silent, but it is, I think, the deeper idea. Its paradox is, quite literally, why I write, 
or how I feel able to keep writing. (1) 
For it doesn’t feed or exalt any angst one may feel about the incapacity to express, 
in words, that which eludes them. It doesn’t punish what can be said for what, by 
definition, it cannot be. Nor does it ham it up by miming a constricted throat: Lo, 
what I would say, were words good enough. Words are good enough. It is idle to 
fault a net for having holes, my encyclopedia notes. (1–2) 
This is only one instantiation of a range of theorists who further nuance Wittgenstein’s 
notion of ‘seeing the world aright’ by pointing to the value of acquainting us with 
perspectival insight, in a piecemeal fashion. In different ways these thinkers demonstrate 
the value in conceiving truth as relative to context and embedded in social location. So, as 
suggested, the notion of ‘seeing the world ‘aright’ need not result in gaining insight into 
timeless, universal truth but may refer to rather a piecemeal process of experiencing 




to note, further, that these ‘truths’ need not also be morally positive and may indeed be 
deeply morally misleading, as evident in the following example. 
5.2 Merits of the ideas of a philosopher-fascist-sympathiser? 
As examined in the preceding chapter, Heidegger’s aesthetics and notion of ‘concealment’ 
offers an appealing parallel for enriching our conception of what showing may mean. 
Nonetheless, as Peter Trawny examines in Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy 
(2015), Heidegger himself in the pursuit of truth arrived at dogmatic, indeed fascistic, 
conclusions. It is of note that the work cited above, Heidegger’s Poetry, Language, Thought 
(1971), was written while Heidegger was exiled in Todtnauberg, after the philosopher was 
ousted from Freiburg University for supporting the NSDAP (Nazi Party). It is important 
to note, therefore, that the pursuit of truth, and the experience of ‘seeing the world 
aright’—as history demonstrates—may culminate in dogmatic, indeed fascistic, 
conclusions.  
It may be asked why Heidegger has been examined at all in this thesis: given his political 
orientations, should we be amplifying his voice? After all, there are clearly ethical issues in 
privileging the ideas of a fascist regime-supporting philosopher freed from their duties at 
the university, writing on the joys and truths within poetry during their term of exile. But 
including these ideas and contextualising them, I believe, provides the clearer moral lesson, 
that is: Heidegger’s insights into poetry’s relation to language and thought remain poignant. 
His aesthetic-reflections have radically impacted 20th century philosophy, and his 
sentiments are echoed by scholars across the political spectrum, from a range of social 
positionalities.69 Indeed as a philosopher his influence in the 20th century may be only 
behind that of Wittgenstein (Mulhall, 2013). This is not an argument for continuing to 
attend to a philosopher whose personal politics were ignored by a philosophical tradition 
that historically, and concerningly, treats ideas in isolation from the context in which they 
were sown.70 Rather Heidegger’s ideas are included here with an awareness of this dissonance: 
that is, Heidegger’s reflections are useful in and of themselves, whilst also being 
demonstrative of the way the form of literary-practice offers a capaciousness for instilling 
 
69 See Holland and Huntington’s feminist interpretations of Heidegger (2010) for instance. 
70 Many have indeed chosen to disavow Heidegger’s ‘truths’ upon the recent discovery of his so-called Black 
Notebooks. I am sympathetic to such a disavowal, given an important facet of truth-seeking involves 
determining whose ideas we advance and whose we are compelled to abandon, to whom we listen and afford 





insights across the political spectrum. Literature will produce and inflame its social justice 
warriors, just as it will feed the fervour of fascist-philosophers. The experience of art after 
all—as Heidegger himself might put it—reveals, not in-spite-of, but precisely because of the 
way it also conceals.  
It is probable that art played its part in providing the ‘illumination’ that blinded this 
philosopher to the truth. I would not go to Heidegger for a final description of reality—as 
I don’t fancy myself wearing a black armband with emblazed swastika—nonetheless he 
and I find agreement on this important facet of art: that what is shown sometimes is brought 
about through what is concealed. One could try and deny this claim on account of its source; 
however, firstly, the claim crops up elsewhere as discussed in the preceding chapter, and 
secondly, a redefining of ‘art’ such that only works which produce insights that are morally 
absolute rather than merely persuasive is an even more dangerous idea. Such an attitude would 
likely foster the zealotry which itself characterised the Nazi regime. However, a poignant 
preceding question, as yet unaddressed, shall be raised in the following section. That is, in 
this thesis I have argued that literature is able to show some part of what philosophy cannot 
say. Yet this immediately begs the question: for what reasons is literature supposed not to 
be philosophy in the first place? 
5.3 The origins of the literary and philosophical division 
A strong case could be made that it is only by nefarious means that we have culturally 
differentiated the materiality of literature as a language game (to borrow Wittgenstein’s 
notion) as somehow predetermined to be not-philosophy. After all, both ‘disciplines’ draw 
upon the same medium—language—and surely one could ask: shouldn’t the onus reside 
with philosophy to differentiate its toolkit if it is to prove itself distinct from literary 
methods? As examined in the introduction section to this dissertation, analytic philosophy 
today continues the endeavour to gain its bearings and self-situate via adopting 
methodological tools that exclude the literary. It is, however, deeply misleading to talk 
about a monolithic and singular ‘philosophical project’ given the variety of transgressive 
movements that endeavour to problematise the narrow scope of contemporary 
Anglophonic philosophy. The enterprise of analytic philosophy has consequently faced 
charges of epistemic, as well as political and institutional, conservatism. There are, for 




modernity, problems of recurrent sexism, and an inertial resistance to new ideas, whilst 
simultaneously genuflecting unduly to the sciences. 71 
While we can clearly point to various works of philosophy whose methods of inquiry 
perform in a ‘generic’ fashion,72 there are also those works which are disobedient and 
perform rather in a transgressive fashion. We may consider, for instance, Plato’s own 
allegorical figurations in his cave of the real; in this instance, the philosopher takes the form 
as prose poet. Or we could turn to Wittgenstein’s delightfully epigrammatic Tractatus, a title 
that turns on his conception of the philosopher as a transcendental aphorist. There are 
numerous instances of the philosopher violating today’s narrowly delineated role, and 
constraining toolkit. Historically these breaches of convention have been lauded; indeed, 
in order to make its case philosophical writing commonly mobilise devices generically 
deployed in literary texts—consider, for instance, the metaphysical novels by Sartre or 
Beauvoir. In this case the current disciplinary attitude may be more reflective of the ills of 
professionalism, over-specialisation, and technocracy. As such, it would be highly 
reductive to claim that philosophy only ever utilises ‘philosophical’ tools based in 
‘exposition’ rather than literary tools: engaging in saying, rather than showing.  
I agree strongly with this line of critique, in fact this whole dissertation is geared in-part 
towards justifying this claim. I wish to contribute to fostering a cultural recognition within 
the academy that the literary toolkit—that which shows in a whole range of ways—
constitutes a valid form of intellectual inquiry. In doing so the use in academic philosophy 
of an expanded range of instruments may take place. This being said there is of course a 
craft to various forms of inquiry, including the philosophical. This is no doubt, partially 
contingent, but also not accidental. Nonetheless, I look forward to the day when a short 
story or experimental poem may constitute a valid response to an essay question on 
Personal Identity, or Free Will and Incompatibilism. This ambition is founded in a deep-
seated belief that discovering truths is commonly a matter of transgressing genre-boundaries, 
in order to arrive at syncretic, hybridised and consequently novel modes of saying and 
showing. I am certain that an exploration of the history of science would demonstrate the 
ways inter-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary engagement has led to proliferation, growth 
and insight.73 It is unfortunate that, in order to guard themselves, many in philosophy 
 
71 For a fuller discussion of these criticisms, see Chase (2010) Analytic Philosophy and Dialogic Conservatism. 
72 See the analytic philosophical toolkit outlined in the Introduction (Beaney, 1998). 
73 Members of the self-proclaimed Stanford Disunity Mafia—Nancy Cartwright, John Dupré, Peter Galison 




departments entrench a methodological myopia that stymies such growth. This thesis is an 
attempt to coax the philosophers from their tent, as it must give way to the field eventually. 
5.4 On seeing the world ‘aright’ 
This dissertation has defended the claim that the point of the Tractatus is not that its readers 
should come to apprehend some set of truths, but rather that they should, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, come to ‘see the world aright’. Taken at face value I may be appearing to champion 
a prescribed or narrowly mono-perceptual mode of seeing. What does it mean to see the 
world aright? And what ‘is seen’ when the world is viewed either rightly or wrongly? In 
pursuing these questions, I continue the case made in 5.2. At present this thesis has 
engaged in much abstract exploration of universals; for instance, my consideration of the 
relationship between language, truth and the world has occurred in a very dis-embodied, 
armchair mode. As discussed in 5.2, I am consequently susceptible to charges of a very 
specific type of myopia. What does seeing the world aright imply for a world of contested 
power relations, contested truth-concept, a world of privilege, marginality and structural 
violence? 
There is a danger that even utilising the term ‘aright’ seeing implies a specific unyielding 
truth to which the ‘authentic seer’ has access, unavailable to the common masses, who 
remain ensnared in delusion. Were that the sense in which seeing the world aright was 
intended, then I, and Wittgenstein, would be unwittingly investing in a particularly mono-
valent notion of purity, accessible solely through transcendence; a terminus which, as one 
commentator has described to me aptly, may cause poets to be removed from an ideal city-
state and sent into exile, but which may also cause us to arrive at holocausts. These are 
very valid reservations. Caution is due whenever affirmations of ‘correct’ seeing are made. 
For these reasons I will outline in the following section the scope of ‘aright seeing’ that 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and its saying-showing distinction make possible. 
What is seen aright? The ‘rightness’ to which Wittgenstein refers is many and varied. Some 
of the means by which literary showing occurs have been outlined in much greater detail 
in Chapter III and Chapter IV, where I draw on specific authors to examine how their 
ideas on the perspectival shifts, that literature may induce, enrich our understanding. Just 
 
scientific fields (see Scerri, 2000). Their work points towards the dangers of assuming a unity of science, or 




what ‘rightness’ means must, nonetheless, be made clear, as it is a notion that has proven 
devastatingly problematic in the past. Believed ‘rightness’ in a ‘transcendent truth’ has 
justified war and genocide, it has been the basis for colonial dispossessions of land, for the 
radical Othering of different groups. This occurs in the persistent naturalising of unjust 
class-relations, policies of racial warfare that persist today in attempts, for instance, to 
entrench racial and class stratifications via supposed ethnic-biological differences. 
The unfortunate thing is that this thesis cannot disallow the possibility that some of the 
‘seeing the world aright’ that literature brings about will involve ‘revelations’ that 
disempower, oppress, entrench difference and motivate violence. In fact, there is a 
longstanding history of literature doing precisely that. Literature is not a morally neutral, 
or indeed morally pure, activity: it is an instrument very much in the hands of its users. As 
experienced in my own writing, certain narrative practices which entrench privilege are 
likely to be perpetuated unless you are sufficiently reflexive so as to catch yourself 
embodying oppressive norms. Indeed, if we look to the propaganda of Goebbels, we see 
a literary flare: a capacity to show an audience a means of seeing the world anew. The new 
world Goebbels saw was one with a clearly delineated enemy—the Jew, the homosexual, 
the gypsy—these groups were radically othered; they were reduced from human status and 
turned into objects of collective hysteria and hatred. Through scapegoating, the German 
people received a foundation of solidarity, of purpose and of power. As will be discussed, 
a case can be made that the contemporary post-structuralist tide threatens similar tribal 
othering, polarisation and cultural warfare. Literature or propaganda’s capacity to show is 
largely responsible for this occurrence. Showing has a lot of explaining to do. 
It may be responded that, should this be the case, then literature is indeed merely a form 
of rhetoric, a means of distorting perceptions (O’Neill, 205–225), it turns minds and deceives 
the populace, it is an instrument of evil—consequently it should be rightly rejected from 
the ‘just city’. I would retort that all this demonstrates is that literary showing may be as 
oppressive and convincing as philosophical ‘saying’ or logical reasoning, in the right (or 
wrong) hands. That is, it is one of the conceits of analytic philosophy that ‘reason is 
impartial’. I will not waste text here dissolving this notion, that is a case for another thesis, 
but the lack of sound epistemic foundations for abstract reason, deductive or inductive, 
has been proven time and again (Price, 157–76). Truth is not objective, it is relative to 
discourse, it pulls itself up by its own epistemic bootstraps, it is thoroughly, inescapably, 




can be made that ‘truth’ is contextual, informed by power relations, reliant on 
unquestionable hinge-propositions and foundational axioms.74 Reason consequently exists 
in relation to, and constrained by, a prevailing paradigm of cultural values and disciplinary 
suppositions.  
My conclusion is that both implements, saying and showing, have blood-soaked hands. 
The important thing is recognising that ‘seeing the world aright’ is always a contextually 
defined, relative notion, as the truth, as we understand it, remains forever truth-relative-to-
context.75 Being both culturally embedded and historically informed, we might as well call it 
(in a Heideggerian vein) truth-until we can see the world anew. Tractarian showing and 
seeing the world ‘aright’ resembles the hypotheses one ‘says’—that is, they exist 
dialogically, in a cycling dialectic of thesis, anti-thesis, and emergent synthesis (Fox, 186). 
Experienced rightness is consequently a contingent phenomenological experience: one that 
appears contradictory in that it is felt as a moment of insight, an intuition of truth, and yet 
also is recognised to be a historically constituted force. We can see how, for instance, the 
sense of rightness may be thoroughly de-naturalised by applying a post-structuralist or 
gender-based lens, which supports us in identifying how ‘truth’ is responsive to contingent 
internalised norms (Butler, 85–130). Alternately, if applying a contemporary evolutionary 
lens applied, for instance, to the workings of the human mind, we may view our intuitive 
capacities as mere adaptations—evolved to ensure survival or reproduction—rather than 
inimical guides to truth (Cosmides, 94–103). Furthermore, if we recognise that the 
interoceptively felt ‘truth-moment’ is one that, like all phenomena, arrives via 
approprioception—i.e. we are always necessarily making sense of new information via our 
pre-existing stock of information—this reveals the metaphoric nature of the experience of 
truth (Garfield, 15–30). Consequently, to view ‘rightness’ as something objectively ‘in-the-
world’ is to risk not only reduction but totalisation: in which case fascism is but one of the 
consequent dangers. There exists, too, the danger of a generalised myopia, a non-
responsiveness to new information, and a gaze clouded by too rigid a theoretical lens. I 
 
74 It should be noted that the status of truth, qua Quine, is more complicated, but for the purposes of this 
piece I shall not explore Quine’s own complex relationship of truth. 
75 Derrida’s work here is relevant, in particular his critique of our tacit belief in knowledge as such, truth as 





will particularise this discussion in the next section by considering what the question of 
seeing the world ‘aright’ may mean in the current political moment. 
5.5 Application to the current political moment 
While my thesis has attempted to tackle some unresolved questions, covering some rather 
well-trodden scholarly ground, a question close to my heart is the relation of literature to 
the political. Some have argued that literature reflects politics more so than it shapes it. 
This is an important distinction; however, this is too often utilised as an excuse to avoid 
tackling or engaging a more transformative, tendentious project. Post-structuralists and 
post-modernists critique the power embedded in the presiding meta-narratives, examining 
how these narratives operate to maintain unbalanced social relations by privileging those 
in specific social locations. While well motivated, these post-structuralist incredulities 
towards meta-narratives are failing today to offer the transformative critique they offered 
in the latter half of the 20th century. Today, incredulity towards meta-narratives seems to 
have been subsumed into an atomising free-for-all, indeed, there is evidence of clear 
appropriations of post-structuralism by the far right. Arguably this has occurred as a 
consequence of the neoliberal paradigm’s commodification of social identity, alongside the 
relativising just discussed, and the rise of various aggressively populist and nationalist 
identities. This could be understood as an aspect of Dabord’s Society of the Spectacle, arguably 
leading not only to a more inauthentic reification of specific social locations, but the 
emergence of an identity-based tribalism. It relates too, as discussed above, to the 
decentring and repurposing of ‘truth’ as a commodity, as a mode of infotainment. We may 
thus, see part of the new wave of ‘sincerity’, such as that ventured by David Foster Wallace, 
as an attempt by creative producers to shift back to originary sites of the discourse of 
‘truth’ with attention paid to how, in today’s fracturing context, we might show or describe 
this reality. Consequently, while I have, in this dissertation, endeavoured to ground and 
solidify the foundations of literary inquiry, the question remains: how to situate new, 
emerging modes of creative production as legitimately questing towards self-making This 
question arises because there is no single mechanism of truth showing. I will describe below 
one such Marxist vein of approach, recognising that there are many attempts presently to 
innovate, and examine the ramifications of this very question. 
This dissertation has explored themes of genre, materiality and the narrowly prescribed 




to chase ideas into generically-predefined discourses of truthfulness. Plato’s famed agon 
towards creative producers has been my starting point in asking: what is the nature of 
literary inquiry and how does it differ from philosophical inquiry? However, it is important, 
too, to ask: how do these questions, and the argument made to resolve them, bear on the 
contemporary political moment? 
We are living in an era of fake news, perception management, and what has been called 
post-truth politics or ‘truthiness’.76 In the contemporary political culture, debate is framed 
primarily by appeal to emotions, it occurs in disconnect from policy details and achieves 
its end through the repeated assertion of talking points and by strategically ignoring factual 
rebuttals. We might wish for the days where facts were traditionally contested or 
challenged, rather than merely viewed as irrelevant and secondary to the emotional appeal 
of ideas, but those days seem to be behind us. The driver of this new era, the ascendance 
of post-truth, seems to be related to the advent of the internet: algorithms that play a 
powerful role in circulating news and misinformation, in constructing virtual ‘gated-
communities’ sealing us hermetically off from alternative perspectives by constructing a 
‘filter bubble’. A decentralised social media has taken root which—alongside the 24-hour 
news cycle, the false balancing of news reports and ubiquitous fake-news websites—
provides the perfect conditions for the propagation of misinformation (Holone, 2016). 
The nature of inquiry, the power of modes of expression, rhetoric, the limits of reason: 
these are timely topics to be exploring. This dissertation is a timely one. However, so far I 
have addressed my questioning predominantly towards providing a critical focus on the 
extra-linguistic and the sublime. It is important, however, in reading this dissertation not 
to falter at the phrase ‘mystical’ and view ‘seeing the world aright’ as reducible to 
‘transcending worldly concerns’. This thesis bears too on politics. It addresses itself equally 
to politicised language, the power of discourse, and the possibilities for poetry and 
literature to impact the political moment. 
As in the discussion earlier concerning the philosopher Heidegger and his Nazi sympathies, 
literature is not always morally positive or even morally neutral. As also relates to the 
question of whether or not to give Heidegger airtime, in this current political moment, 
some would argue that what they call ‘truth’ is a matter of choosing to whom we listen and 
determining whose ideas we advance and whose we abandon. However the valid concern 
 




can be raised that this arguments reduces truth to a discussion of power dynamics alone, 
legitimating the claim of the forces I have just raised the above concerns about.77 
Nonetheless, this point of tension serves to emphasise that Truth has never been so 
politicised as at this juncture, and while the political implications of either saying or 
showing truths are not explicitly a dimension of this dissertation, it is useful to explore in 
what ways, and for what reasons, we might undertake a tendentious literature that amounts 
to a ‘politicisation of art’. Thus, to diverge briefly into this territory I will begin by 
considering the influence of Walter Benjamin. 
Benjamin’s efforts to develop a politically-oriented, materialist-aesthetic theory have 
significantly influenced the Frankfurt school of critical theory and have been informative 
for the likes of Derrida, Agamben and, Habermas among others. Benjamin explored the 
aestheticization of politics and how this aestheticization became a central tool of fascist 
regimes, by offering a spectacle in which the proletarian masses were able to express 
themselves without seeing their rights recognised. The logical result of fascism, for 
Benjamin, was the introduction of aesthetics into political life. By contrast communism, 
he held, would respond by politicising art, as examined in The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction. Of course, the politicisation of art, in association with the Soviet 
Union, has had an equally dark undercurrent. Art subordinate to political life, incorporated 
for political use, is closely connected to the fascist’s aestheticization of politics. Benjamin’s 
formulation of the politicisation of aesthetics, however, was intended to be associated with 
a revolutionary praxis, something redeeming, and a means to cope or resist for those living 
under a restrictive, censorship-enforcing society. 
To examine how these ideas have been taken up we can consider Debord’s Society of the 
Spectacle. In this influential work Debord examines the development of a modern society 
in which authentic social life has been replaced with its representation. Debord argues that 
the history of social life can in fact be understood as “the decline of being into having and 
having into merely appearing” (95). How may literature challenge this process; that is, 
 
77 Epistemological standpoint theorists Lukács, Hartsock, Haraway are all worth further pursuit in relation 
to this topic. Furthermore, Medina (2013) offers valuable reflections on the epistemology of resistance that 
are worth pursuing in regards to this topic. Medina weaves together elements of Aristotelean virtue ethics, 
communicative ethics and radical contextual pragmatism, in order to describe the epistemic vices of 
ignorance and insensitivity resulting from the social arrogance accompanying privilege. Medina refers to as 
not merely a 'double consciousness' but consciousness that is multiplicitous, kaleidoscopic and many-
perspective’d. He makes a strong case that in order to achieve such a perspective a networks of solidarity 




avoid participating in naturalising our current condition—an historical moment in which, 
as Debord argues, the commodity “completes its colonization of social life?” (84). 
As argued in this dissertation, texts which endeavour to show or gesture at subtle 
inversions that have taken place may be seen to enact truths Debord points to—after all, 
what is a more powerful way of demonstrating that relations between commodities have 
come to supplant relations between people than to enact and mirror this occurrence in a 
literary text? The arts, as have been argued, are often better able to Show what can 
sometimes be so hard to see or say. This includes the way that social relations among, and 
between, people have become mediated by images; or the way we passively identify with 
the ‘spectacle’ of living; and how this ‘appearing’ supplants genuine living. Clearly this 
theory describes an, at large, felt phenomenological shift in how we relate to the world and 
conceive ourselves. In the spectacular society impoverishment takes the form of a lack of 
authenticity, and the consequent distorting of human perceptions.  
So how can literature help people ‘see the world aright’, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, in the 
context we find ourselves in? The answer may be that, if we adopt Debord’s assertion, 
then the spectacle itself prevents individuals from recognising that the society of the 
spectacle is only a moment in history that may be overturned through revolution. 
Literature, then, may be arguably critical to recognising the society of the spectacle; as it is 
through Showing that literature possesses the capacity of ‘righting’ our distorted 
perceptions. Given it is the distortion of perceptions that results in the consequent 
degradation of knowledge, in turn hindering critical thought, literature can be crucial to 
revolutionary awareness and consciousness-raising, be it through class-consciousness 
concerning the economic mode we inhabit, or addressing itself, intersectionally, to the 
multitude of oppressive structures and power relations. 
As will be discussed, however, it would be naively optimistic to assume this to be 
literature’s usual mode of analysis, or indeed primary function. Reification, 
commodification, and depoliticised aestheticisation ensure that the majority of literature 
bows to convention, perpetuating discourse and thus propagating the hegemonic ideology 
of the ruling class—to utilise Gramsci’s notion of coerced consent (34–56). Often, where 
a work is truly critical, it remains in the margins or preaches to the converted from within 
its echo-chamber. There is also a tendency, of which I have been somewhat guilty, of 




Nonetheless, this is not to claim literature is completely powerless. It is worth considering 
John Berger, critic and novelist, who provides one such avenue for literature proving 
tendentious and challenging the establishment.  
In contrast to a depoliticised aestheticism, art for Berger is a crucial instrument to be used in 
advocating for one’s political and cultural convictions; literature offers us a means of 
resistance in the culture wars. This is evident, for instance, in his text Ways of Seeing, in 
which he attends to the politics of images, endeavouring to demystify the embedded 
conservatism in art. Berger demonstrates how art commonly functions as “a social practice 
to maintain illusions”; he does so by drawing attention to, for instance, the compulsive 
sexualising of the female body in sculpture, or the association between landscape painting 
and property ownership, and how these unsavoury traditions continued in modern 
advertising (Berger, 1992). 
As the literary theorist Lukács demonstrates, any sort of depoliticised aestheticism is prone 
to participate in forms of ‘reification’. Lukács conceived works of art as a ‘closed totality’ 
that, while structured by the laws of its medium, served to objectively reflect the 
development of humanity, in the mode of ‘mimetic evocation’ or suggesting by imitation or 
mirroring. Lukács’ class-cognisant analysis of literature offers a useful example of how 
literature may be put to a ‘purpose’ and in so doing serve as a measure of works, be they 
‘decadently’ avant-garde, or purely conventional and culturally dogmatic tracts. In so doing 
Lukács tacitly suggests there is no neutral ground: either you participate in literature in a 
self-conscious attempt at the counter-cultural transformation of society, or you participate 
in reification and implicitly foster the existing status quo.  
A work of art may contribute to the human capacity to become self-conscious of our 
universal character by reflecting the existing social totality in the artwork. In performing the 
social forms constituting modern society it may allow us to see ourselves. This was an 
endeavour I strived to enact in my epistolary novel Murmurations. It is important to note 
that there are challenges and working in this mode is an ongoing project, my work would 
have been difficult to reach for most readers, for some it would have remained surface-
level, excessive intellectualisation may have reduced its accessibility. However, as the self-
soothing saying goes, ‘writing is a process’ and I hope in later works to address the issues 
of my first novel—nonetheless it was an experimental work towards a goal that I am glad 




In conclusion, I have here attempted to contextualise the ‘ancient quarrel’ and examine its 
relevance today. As evidenced, the literary and philosophical ‘canon’ is anything but natural 
or inevitable. We live informed and influenced by ideological forces, propagated by 
systems and power-relations that undermine some while empowering others. This chapter 
has been offered in an attempt to recognise the real-world applications of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy, to demonstrate the potential capacity it has to make sense of the current ‘post-
truth’ political moment. Only in recognising and owning the canonical parochialism we are 
all subject to, can the contingency embedded in our philosophical conclusions be 
identified. If we are to understand Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘seeing the world aright’ 
through Showing, it is necessary that we attend to the piecemeal, contextual and situated 








CHAPTER VI: Connecting exegesis and creative artefact 
The ‘ancient quarrel’ and the ejection of the poets from Plato’s ideal society may appear a 
quixotic problem: who cares if novels or poetry can or cannot be philosophically justified? 
Creative writers aren’t petitioning any philosopher for permission to exist. But this 
question of the standing of literature, and more importantly how to do it properly, has 
bothered me ever since I first found myself, to the detriment of a nascent career in 
philosophy, toiling away on a novel. 
My particular interest in David Foster Wallace arose from an appreciation of his work and 
his particular way of rendering philosophy in narrative. I have received from Wallace what 
could be called ‘stylistic influences’, however it is more apt to say these arise from a shard 
conception of literary inquiry. For instance, the sense of ‘roughness’ in my novel, the lack 
of neat resolutions, the fragmented vignettes and experimental methods, all arise from a 
desire to explore new ways to express and inquire. My novel is composed of a series of 
vignettes, loosely connected in terms of character and storyline. It is, however, connected 
by an overarching desire to serve as philosophically illuminating, to explore matters and 
get to the depths of them. Yet not merely by allusion to, or illustration of, existing 
philosophical work. I seek to avoid doing, in Wallace’s terms, ‘decocted’ philosophy—but 
rather to show what philosophy cannot say. 
Wittgenstein has been a philosophical inspiration for a long time, and his saying-showing 
distinction, and broader mystical project, has long fascinated me as it is a distinction 
situated at the contours of analytic philosophy and alternate methodologies for inquiry.  
I began initially to work in straight-up fiction. And in this writing the inquiry into the age-
old quarrel between the poet and philosopher has supplemented my thinking about how 
the novel can function in this way, non-derivatively of philosophy. This is largely as my 
novel originated from a desire to explore a sort of counterpoint—ways to blend 
philosophy with narrative into a unified work. I began from the vague intuition that in 
exploring these topics through a novel I wasn’t merely doing some transposition of 
philosophy into fiction, but that, in itself, the exploration of these topics through this 
literary medium would inform my findings. In writing this exegesis I wanted to flesh out 
this intuition. A year in I shifted to poetry writing. The reason for my shift from novel to 
poetry, and the relationship between the novel I have offered and the poems that preceded 




And now, after living beside you all these years, and watching your wheel of a mind 
bring forth an art of pure wildness—as I labour grimly on these sentences, 
wondering all the while if prose is but the gravestone marking the forsaking of 
wildness (fidelity to sense-making, to argument, however loose)—I’m no longer 
sure which of us is more at home in the world, which of us more free. (65) 
Maggie Nelson echoes my reasons for a shift from prose to poetry. Another way to put it 
is that I was drawn by the fact of poetry’s capacity to draw out some of the less expected, 
or continually unanticipated connections that do exist between things but go unnoticed. 
As John Mure puts it, “when we try to pick anything out we find it hitched to everything 
else in the universe” (Limbaugh, 1984). This notion resembles the Tibetan Madhyamaka 
notion of the interdependence of all phenomena: this was part of what poetry could show 
for me. Interestingly, this poetic shift then fed into the creation of an epistolary novel that 
wedded together letter, essay, narrative, poem and prose, and this became my final creative 
artefact product, titled Murmurations. 
6.1 On Murmurations 
Straddling a threshold, I’ve learnt, is not the same thing as embodying a 
contradiction. 
 What we want? To broadcast the circles, we find inside ourselves. 
Why now? Because the solstice enables the narrative poem  
it seems we wake to. (Murmurations, 147). 
My epistolary novel Murmurations weds essay and poem to fiction and dream sequence. 
You, as reader, follow the correspondence between Juniper and Electra—as they weave 
strands of Ludwig Wittgenstein to Judith Butler, of Joseph Campbell to Roland Barthes. 
Written in a vein continuous with an emerging auto-theoretic tradition of poets Brian 
Blanchfield, Maggie Nelson, Chris Kraus and Eileen Myles, this queer love story provides 
an instantiation, and problematisation, of the lover’s discourse. Murmurations draws on 
Continental philosophers and German mystics, on Buddhist psychoanalysis and gender 




to wake up from, the discourses in which they were enmeshed. Indeed, much of the book 
concerns how to be in relation to the life-story we cannot own. It asks: 
When I tell others of my life, should I make of it a well-formed artefact?  
What good is your love if it makes its object redundant? 
How can we encounter the world not as a collection of objects, but as a 
communion of subjects? 
Is misrecognition, then, the enabling condition for desire? 
These murmurations, like starlings, cross Australia’s landscape, from admiring cheap-cut 
glad-wrapped meat in an RSL in rural Tasmania, to riding the lentil belt of Canberra’s Inner 
North. They travel to Tibetan monasteries in the foothills of the Himalayas, to the glacial 
lakes of British Columbia. A modern love story, a litany of questions and a manifesto of 
the inexpressible. As Juniper writes:  
Caught in the impossibility of accounting; I give you instead a questioning of what 
it is to narrate and its impossibility. Self-reflexivity traps me in the structure of 
‘story breaking down’—an old formalism. (Murmurations, 147) 
6.2 How does the exegesis relate to the creative product?  
In general, I wanted to find the point at which philosophy and fiction met, the fault line 
where these colliding masses produced what begins as friction, is felt as tremble, then 
experienced as shattering, destabilising. Something I imagined you could only properly 
know while it is happening, when you are in the midst of it, and only besides your trembling 
teacups, in the after-quake, measure the magnitude of. What I discovered in my reading in 
its stead? No fault line, but a seam, a particular lineage or vein in the face of the rock. The 
shape of which I could trace with a finger along the hardback spines, author to author: 
Calvino, Kundera, Coetzee, Foster-Wallace, Bolano, Simic, Carver, Dellilo, Lerner, 
Nelson, Ashberry, to name a few sedimentary layers.  
Meanwhile I set out to produce an exegesis that could function as an assembly manual, 
with each part of the machine labelled. Suffice to say I never found in the exegesis the 




gears, a viscous invisible fluid, the ghoulish spirit that makes the whole come alive and 
trundle. Perhaps in writing and dredging fiction I began to have non-describable 
intimations of what could only be shown, but never in the exegetical work. It was a 
different, though complementary, study. Below I will examine how the content of my 
creative artefact, and the devices drawn upon, relate to my exegetical inquiry. 
6.3 Literary techniques in murmurations 
As described in ‘The Meat of Literary Showing’ section, there exist a range of devices 
drawn on to show what cannot be said, techniques of which my own work demonstrates 
a range. My poetry and novel have also been influenced by a number of poets, and poetic 
postmodern techniques. Though I would like to wear that influence the way Lerner wears 
it in Licthenberg Figures: “I don’t deny the influence, but it’s less / A relation of father to son 
than a relation of / Moon to tide”.  
 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (Wittgenstein, TLP, 5.6) 
If the limits of my language mean the limits of my world, what techniques are available to 
push and pull the elastic language available to me, in ways that stretch and expand my 
world? I explore different ways to construct poems, from loose sonnet sequences that 
employ line breaks, to aphoristic, sometimes surreal paragraph poems. But the book is 
fundamentally an attempt to explore communication, its limits, and different ways of 
stretching language and ideas.  
While this novel is quite difficult formally, and reasonably experimental, it is largely in 
prose. Consequently, it could be conceived of as an unfolding in prose of preoccupations 
in my poetry, or the novel as a genre which absorbs other genres, able to contain my poetry. 
Or the novel as once preoccupied with the surface effects of language, a novel that doesn’t 
elaborate a program preceding the act of composition but rather unfolded outside my 
conscious control. This all arises in an attempt to suggest obliquely, to write experimentally 
and indirectly, yet to find and strike that balance where both the disruptions to, and the 
continuity of, language serve as communicative. To discover means of distressing the form 
in ways that challenge belief in the ‘seamless lyrical utterance’. To unpick the imagined 




In producing sequences of poems/letters/essays in Murmurations that ruminate on and play 
with language, sense and the world, I draw upon and try to develop my own forms of 
Oulipian-style constraints. These include experimenting with juxtaposition of imagery, 
conjoining failures of speech with repetition and recombination of sense, playing with 
malformed syntax or syntactical ambiguity, destabilising pronouns and deictics. I employ 
irony formally in my work. Yet I hope that irony in the work strikes the reader as far from 
the vernacular sense of ‘ironic’ as insincere. I seek to avoid the easy, self-congratulatory 
mode of detached cultural diagnosis that’s so common in purportedly innovative poetry. 
That said, I have concerns that at time my poetry can be either too dense or too cryptic, 
that it doesn’t repay careful attention but is rather a silly scamper across ideas and language. 
As Lerner writes, and as I read ironically, in San Francisco “We had thought that by 
arranging words at random we could avoid ideology. We were right. Then we were terribly 
wrong. Such is the nature of California”.  
To the detail: I explore collage, producing lines that collide and in collision produce new 
(sometimes interesting) monster hybrids, creating a sense of the poem as continuously 
discontinuous, like a series of thoughts interrupted. The work of bricolage is left to the 
reader who must choose their own adventure, in a collage that never fully assembles.  I 
construct found poems with borrowed language; that is, buzzwords, common inquiries 
and phrases, using quotations or citing theories, each of which is recycled and revised 
throughout individual poems and the novel at large. I also create mosaics collaging shards 
of broken images together in order to produce a linguistically oneiric dreamlike effect with 
the language, whether absurd or comical or sentimental. Related to this oneiric feeling, I 
want, in certain poems, to create the narrative sense of time passing, of things happening, 
of what could be described as a plot, though it remains difficult to say precisely what is 
going on. 
In my poetry I attempt to create affecting contrasts and types of cognitive dissonance by 
drawing upon juxtapositions. For instance, I juxtapose classical lyric images against 
language written at a certain distance; technical, ‘objectivist’ language, or rhetoric from 
various realms—whether political, administrative, academic or commercial. Using this 
juxtaposition, I set stark declarations and proclamations against failed or tentative speech. 
Some poems also oscillate violently between lyrical prose and trite, colloquialistic or 
idiomatic expressions, contrasting academic grandiloquence with blunt purely pragmatic 




or contort, into strange contexts, so they take on new meaning, and so a type of critical 
pressure on the words is maintained.    
These techniques are used to undermine easy decipherability, allowing for delayed meaning 
and inexactness in meaning so that the work’s sense remains subject to continual revision. 
By seeking to produce misprision in the reader, or what could be characterised as 
‘productive frustration’, the work introduces an ‘instability’ that elucidates the participatory 
nature of meaning construction between reader and author. In this way I emphasise 
process over product, or composing over end composition, to undermine or at least worry 
at the tendency in reading to seek decipherability as a critical aim; means, as Lerner puts it, 
of defeating or deferring actuality and thereby refusing closure. 
6.4 The anti-hero in Murmurations 
The anti-hero is a common trope. The main character who lacks conventional heroic 
qualities, while still sometimes performing actions that are morally correct if for the wrong 
reasons; motivated by self-interest or doing good but in a way that defies the conventional 
ethical code of their context. What I have employed in the stead of an antihero (who is 
commonly merely a foil to the traditional 'hero' archetype anyway) is a protagonist, Juniper, 
who does act as if informed by idealism, courage, morality—classic-heroic qualities—and 
yet, often makes mistakes. They fuck up.  
 
My protagonist, true to life, is both a work of auto-fiction and also akin to the anti-hero's 
of 19th century Russian fiction, seeking to live ‘authentically’ but subtly oblivious to their 
own social-situatedness, a disaffected young white man of privilege. This concern is typical: 
in recent decades post-modern contemporary authors from Sally Rooney to Ben Lerner 
have sort to write fiction driven by neurotic social self-presentation, have demonstrated a 
tendency towards offering stylized disbelief in lieu of serious intellectual commitment. 
Similarly, in Murmurations, Juniper could be accused of posturing, in tandem with an 
obliviousness to the historical moment he occupies, his social location, and how this 
informs the opinions he comes to hold. 
 
The difficulty in identifying with the author is not a difficulty at all, in terms of the capacity 
of the work to engage the reader’s imagination in critique. I think of John Coetzee's 




refuses to recognise his abuse of power, his use of violence over a young student. Accused 
of sexual assault, rape, and refusing to offer an apology. The protagonist continues 
oblivious to his situational privilege and consequent culpability, he narrates as if from 
within a cocoon of his own sense of morality, idealism, courage. Seeking simple 
‘identification’, in this work, would be a failing of the reader. There are major similarities 
to the project in Murmurations”. 
6.5 The content and the journey 
The content I have attempted to explore in Murmurations is varied. It explores place: the 
monastic environment, British Columbia, New York, Tasmania. I would begin writing 
poems as a way to amuse myself by trying to make something new, or surprise myself with 
unexpected conjunctions, but then this idle pursuit took on surprising weight, seriousness. 
To think of the porousness of certain borders, was the way I wrote poetry and letters 
pouring over into the way I lived? And the way I lived seeping into my poems? And then 
the difficulty of determining how it was I wanted to live, trying to discern how in fact I did 
live (a difficult task), what was reality, what was fantasy, what was a heroic subversion, 
what was a childish tantrum; the internal and external conflicts that perhaps mark youth in 
transition to adulthood.  
What did it mean to abandon place in the traditional structure of class? Was this a 
permissible wandering for someone in his 20s, the equivalent of an extended ‘gap-year’ 
from which they would return ready to assume their place in that structure? And what 
about leaving the cultural centre for the periphery, both geographically and intellectually? 
Living amongst provincial farmers in Larina Valley, among idlers in collapsing share 
houses, in the mountains in northern India among Tibetan monks, in anti-nuclear 
communes in Hamburg, or anarchist squats in Vienna? Was it a choice to live as a perpetual 
vagrant, a wanderer and outsider—living out of a suitcase in subletted rooms, vans, tents? 
And if so, did this arise from a desire to choose the open to the known, a pilgrimage over 
stagnancy? Or was it the result of a trauma—the loss of my lover whom I’d projected a 
stable life with children, a home, hearth, and garden. All auto-theorising aside, perhaps this 





6.5 Buddhist emptiness, Wittgenstein and poetry 
In examining content, I should outline the relationship between Wittgenstein and Buddhist 
philosophy, and how my novel Murmurations’ examination of lived Buddhist philosophy 
relates to my exegetical work. My research led me from Wallace and Wittgenstein to 
Tibetan Buddhism, in particular as relating to metaphysical paradox. As Lerner wrote in 
the Lichtenberg Figures, “There is nothing more metaphysical than the claim to break with 
metaphysics” (36). This plays out in Buddhist philosophy as it does Wittgenstein. The 
Buddhist conception of emptiness I found echoed Wittgenstein’s Tractarian project, in 
that Chandrakirti develops a metaphysical theory, that, in virtue of rejecting the idea of a 
fundamental nature of reality, is deeply paradoxical—seeming on the one hand to provide 
an account of the fundamental nature of reality while rejecting the coherence of any such 
account. Yet as I have argued in the preceding, this need not render a theory incoherent, 
if the Buddhist tradition, like Wittgenstein, takes seriously the possibility that metaphysics 
is directed “not at a deeper analysis of reality, but at extirpating the need for such a deeper 
analysis” (Garfield, 68). According to the Madhyamaka, to exist is to be empty, and 
emptiness—the lack of any intrinsic nature—is the intrinsic nature of all things. Put 
differently: to attack the enterprise of fundamental ontology where that is taken to be the 
project of finding the ultimate nature of reality is still to do fundamental ontology, as 
indeed Wittgenstein notes in his famous ladder analogy (TLP, 6.54). 
Eerily akin to Wittgenstein, Nagarjuna states that even the statement that phenomena are 
empty of intrinsic nature is itself merely a conventional truth, which, by virtue of the 
necessary involvement of language with conceptualisation, cannot capture the non-
conceptualisable nature of reality. Nonetheless language (designation) is indispensable for 
expressing that inexpressible truth. As Garfield puts it, “this is not an irrational mysticism, 
but rather a rational, analytically grounded embrace of inconsistency” (2014, 68). On the 
Madhyamaka account then, the drive for consistency which in philosophy is often taken 
as mandatory is simply one further aspect of ignorance involving the superposition of a 
property onto reality that reality in fact lacks. 
This connection between poetry and the Buddhist notion of emptiness informs to a large 
degree my creative explorations. This arose because I was curious about the possibilities 
for creating poetic content not absorbed by a sense of self as ‘interiority’ but engaged with 




in-depth exploration of various mindfulness practices and introspective meditative states, 
and the sense of ‘selflessness’ described in Mahayana Buddhism. This is a familiar ‘no self’ 
that seeks to un-weave the ‘exaggerated-self’ whose spell we commonly operate under, and 
which dictates the course of so much written poetry. My objections to this self-driven work 
began after reflecting on the degree of absorption in childish delusion obvious from my 
first three collections of poetry. Since breaking, to some extent, away from this model, I 
believe my poetry has become more expansive, less repetitive and certainly less morose. 
I studied the Prasangika Tennet system within Buddhist philosophy, a system that ascribes 
to the ‘selflessness’ of all phenomena, referred to as Shunyata or ‘emptiness’. To give a very 
limited explanation: all phenomena we know and interact with lack inherent existence, in 
the sense that they are not the independent, unitary, self-sufficient objects we imagine them 
to be, but rather are dependently arisen, interdependently existent, impermanent objects 
that exist by means of conceptual-imputation. Aspects of this philosophy have been 
pointed towards by a number of Western philosophers, among them Wittgenstein, 
Heidegger, Kant, Hegel and Hume. 
Importantly, a conceptual understanding of this emptiness as spelt out by philosophers is 
only the first step according to Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. The ultimate goal is ‘direct 
realisation’ of emptiness, and this is achieved via numerous means, including ethical action, 
the cultivation of altruistic compassion, study and meditation. The contention, explored in 
my creative work, is that poetry, in a manner distinct from philosophy, provides a further 
method, given poetry involves exercising creative critical faculties that allow us to think 
beyond governing concepts. In my poetic exploration a central governing concept I have 
approached has been the self. In my writing I was inspired by Basho’s use of and approach 
to haiku. Haiku can be understood as pointing both towards the world and towards the 
self. Read in this way, haiku serves as a reminder that the reader should not become too 
fixed in a singular sense of what the self consists in and of, where it resides, and how it can 
be set against, and considered distinct from, the world. This has been referred to as the 
haiku “bow[ing] to what lies on both sides of the skin’s millimeter-thick boundary”. This 
is another way of expressing this sense of unshackling the mind from any singular and 
absolute story, any un-nuanced and reductive dividing of world into subject and object, 
self and other, illness and blossom, freedom and capture. We could conceive, then, of a 
core goal of this form of poetry as the recognition of the necessary permeability of these 




I have not been writing a lot of Haiku, but my project runs on similar lines; that is, 
involving the attempted dissolution of categories, and the recognition of an expansive 
sense of self, that we indeed feel within ourselves the lives of others: people, creatures, 
plants. An interesting parallel here exists with Wittgenstein’s case against private meaning: 
that words have their meaning because we share a common language and common forms 
of life—we speak as we do because of what we do, and this is all a properly public affair. 
This connects with the ideas I hoped to explore in poetry: that we could move away from 
the image of the poet or philosopher as a lonely self, brooding over private sensations, and 
move towards a focus on our culture, our shared practical life together, a characterisation 






You know how a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be 
represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry 
cannot? (Wittgenstein, TLP, 3.0321) 
The above quote is a further way of talking about the way literature may be able to do what 
philosophy cannot, because philosophy, narrowly construed, can’t get outside its own 
methods. To relate all this back to the framing question, then: how does this exploration 
bears on the ‘ancient quarrel’ between the poets and philosophers? Through my close 
reading of Wallace and “The Empty Plenum”, my case for Tractarian mysticism, and the 
value and relevance of the saying-showing distinction to literary inquiry, I hope to have 
shed some new light on the ‘ancient quarrel’, and importantly some light on where the 
worth in literature resides. 
Plato often refers to poets as divinely drunk, stirring us to the depths with their 
irresponsible profundity, unable to give us an account of how they arrived at these 
profundities or what they might even mean by them. How can such no-accounts be 
trusted? I have argued that by looking to the Saying–Showing distinction we can better see 
grounds for appreciating and perhaps trusting such non-accounts. 
This thesis has a number of tentacular limbs. These dexterous appendages creep in many 
directions. They toy with and test Plato’s city gates—perhaps forcibly separating a 
quarrelling philosopher and poetaster or two. They fumble about over Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, their pad-like, hydrostatic suckers getting tangled with a few aphorisms 
(particularly propositions 1, 7 and the preface). They feel their way about inside Wallace’s 
plenum, curious to see if it is indeed empty. Then they gather what they’ve found and paint 
a picture, something like one of those great colossal squid self-portraits on the ocean floor. 
In approaching Wittgenstein’s mystical project, I have shown that such a reading of the 
Tractatus provides a coherent response to the central paradox of the Tractatus. Further I 
have argued that the Tractatus’ notions on ethics, logic and metaphysics are characteristic 
of ‘genuine mystical experiences’ that support a mystical reading of the Tractatus. I have 
then connected this notion of Saying–Showing to the question of how literature can show. 
While the argument I put forward requires further development in order to further 




showing in literature, what I have endeavoured to accomplish in this thesis is a 
demonstration of the relevance of the distinction. This distinction should lay the 
groundwork for, and open up further avenues of, research concerning how this theory is 
to be understood in terms of literary practice—the different devices used, attitudes 
conveyed, the relation to different literary trends and what that these trends says about this 
distinction. As Plato writes:  
There is not, and there may never be, any treatise by me on these things, for the 
subject is not communicable in words, as other sciences are. Rather is it that, after 
long association in the business itself and a shared life, a light is lit in the soul, 
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And like most people in love, or maybe like most writers in love, 
I thought if I could keep formulating it correctly, if I could keep  
finding the right words to house it, maybe I could change it. 
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After the end of her relationship Rupi Kaur wrote In The Sun and Her Flowers: 
 
I can still see our construction hats lying  
Exactly where we left them 
Pylons unsure of what to guard 
 
As if what had been, remained as an abandoned construction site, girders, pylons, fencing – 
all forsaken, given up by their natural owner or guardian.  Of the space the relationship 
built and inhabited Kaur asks in mourning’s rhetoric: 
 
Do you think flowers will grow here? 
 
Fanciful but comforting, to think that love’s construction site, though forgotten, had been 
reclaimed by wild invaginate weeds; jimson or devil’s snare. Comforting to imagine 
Fleebane daisies swelling up through rusted train tracks. 
 
What we left I don’t see as construction yard, I see Edgelands, like a bombsite or canal 
bank, I see urban fringe, where planned city meets country. What Victor Hugo called 
‘bastard countryside... ugly but bizarre.’ Made up of two different natures part man, part 
‘natural’. 
 
This is an appeal to you, to join me in viewing what remains as a peripheral - safeguarded 
by its refusal to come into focus. An untapped, transgressive resource we could draw upon, 
for what we find lacking in our personal cities that remain. So to you once-upon- a-time 




At conceiving this book, I chose to conceive us as, though separated, inheriting the same 
project. A project that we could write up as Barthes’ Project. Looking back, we were part 
of a class who seemed to act as if solely charged with accounting for the mystification that 
transforms petite bourgeoisie culture into a universal nature. Barthes too, in his collection 
‘mythologies’ points repeatedly towards the ideological abuse undergirding a repeated 
confusion of the ‘natural’ with the ‘historical’. Sellars denounced the same ‘natural attitude’ 
within his seminal myth of the given. Sellars and Barthes would have gotten on like sardonic 
burning houses. 
 
commonalities in the form of our letters and Barthes’ existed, and our material prompts 
have been just as various: podcast, poem, astray expression (that ohrwurmed or yurked 
their ways into our ear canals). Further our subjects of reflection have been just as 
seemingly arbitrary. They must appear products of a Flanneur’s itinerant wanderings, or 
the minds dawdling, doodling discoveries.  
 
A mosaic up close better resembles a collection of discarded ceramic shrapnel than a 
cohering piece. Rhyme and Reason emerge together, when observed from a distance. So 
seen too a starling’s locomotion articulated, its different phases of flap when gliding abreast 
a current or submerging, may appear singular, responsive only to airflow, its lift and drag. 
 
But just see a murmur of starling on the wing, their preternatural coordination: as they 
cohere, separate, align in a synchronicity that pre-empts even the thought of movement let 
alone communication. In starling’s murmuration’s you intuit their grace. So it’s about 
clarity through vantage, through Point of View, as ever. The way I wrote that poem putting 
words in Lacan’s mouth: 
 




All relationships are about finding the right distance 
 
On a shooting range 
 
So do the subjects of these letters move in murmurations? I hope they do. I hope for a 
silver-shoaling of subjects, made to move as if gossamer netted, evincing a synchronicity 
of motion devoid of central coordination, that harmonises responsive to unseen laws.  As 
Barthes asks, do repeated things give pleasure? Whether or not they pleasure, we know 















With Ted in Manhattan 
 
An Australian in upper Manhattan, we meet Junip at Ted’s apartment, short steps from 
central park.  He is sitting and wondering: what brought him here, to New York, New 
York? Was it some subconscious imperative to amass currency in the economy of 
experience? Back home he’d imagined spending this time free-footed urban meandering, 
identity appropriating, dressed in a designer distressed sweater, and worn Chelsea boots, 
affecting the Brooklyn-Williamsburg aesthete. In reality he looks frumpy and ill-prepared 
for New York summer, here it’s sticky and hot, and he wears only thick Canberra-winter 
jeans and shirts.  
 
Unfortunately today was the kind of chaos which has him nearly breaking down trying to 
deliver sheets to a laundromat. Trying to find a laundromat, wondering the streets hugging 
a chest full of sweaty clothes, hunting for quarters, then more quarters, then laundry liquid 




Earlier today I felt, shunting down the Manhattan subway, past 76th heading 
downtown, Brooklyn way, that I understood why Ashberry called this ‘an anti-
place’ an ‘abstract-climate’. That once one was here, one no longer had to think 
about where one was.  
 
This didn’t feel like the result of the press of celebrated people. I know very few. 
Only one sick old man with tales of an older Manhattan, a different Manhattan. 
And as I write you, he is groaning in bed watching reruns of Kim Jong Un 
theatrically performing a hand shake with Donald Trump accompanied by sports-
like political commentators rhapsodising about the significations.  
 
No, the abstract-climate seems to arise from the sense of being a ghost in the 
urban-machine. Present to the cities filiations and shuttlings, a pure observer as we 
coast collectively silent, down the sub-way passing streets demarked not by name 
but numerics: 165West, 42nd Street, Uptown, Downtown. 
 
people entering the compartment, people Exiting. 
 
Pausing, Juniper uploads a photo from his iPhone, applies a black and white filter, which 
he senses reaccentuates the lines of the photograph, the foreshortening produces a golden 








I’ve been thinking on what you said about my Wittgenstein thesis, that reading it 
was like being subject to a poor-synthesis of Kafka and Cage – you didn’t mean 
that as praise. Never have we spoken so long of the sense of a staged silence. Like 
Cage’s 4’33, my thesis was composed of numerous smaller silences, silences I failed 
to describe. A moot attempt, you called it, to infinitely divide what was already still. 
 
What does it serve, you said, to love the ideas that refuse contact with our bodies? 
 
To which I responded, perhaps obliquely: 
  
“In the dream” she says, “Ludwig” she says, “Ludwig, there’s something terribly 
wrong with the ratio of the moon about our cuffs.” She says “something terribly 
wrong with the cuffs about our wrists. Our earth around our sons.”  He says “I 
said it appears that way.” Says “it appears to appear.” Says “is this our son? Shake 
me. Is this the sun? And how would it look if it were?” 
 
This was probably all rather hard to follow.   
 
Have you read Barthes’ A Lover’s discourse? In it he attempts to delineate the Lovers’ 
discourse – love’s form rendered with the materials of his situation. Here I have attempted 
the same, with the materials to my hand. Ignoring the fact that calling you my ‘lover’ is 
metonymic: a stand in or adjunct-part made to represent the whole of what we were to 
each other. 
 
For Butler, to give an account of myself I must produce a narrative disoriented by what is 
not mine alone. That is, the “I” must give way to the set of norms that reveal the 
universality of my story. Only in making myself substitutable, it seems, do I become 





This is one irony of any lovers’ discourse: that at the very moment I, the narrator, enter 
and express that internal place where I imagine irreducible singularity to reside, I find 
instead what is un-authored: what is definitionally substitutable. 
 
When I think about the intrinsic theatricality of writing you, I think about how it functions 
as a formalism, and a negative one at that. By formalism I mean an experience of structure 
revealing the contingency of content - these letters could have had any addressee. Any 
addressor. A demonstration that despite our particularity, we live and we love as 










(From Ted’s apartment) 
 
“Funny how we talk about the past and future. Looking behind and in front of. The 
Chinese have up and down. Is the north pole the top or the bottom? And then there’s our 
disproportionate maps, that they’re never to size.”  Ted talks as he heats a mushroom 
cuppa-soup in the microwave.  
 
“They didn’t stamp me in on entering the states. So, now maybe I’m nowhere. The 
machine recorded it, there’s a record somewhere in the machine that I entered the US, but 
not in my passport. I could be nowhere.” Juniper found a set of wooden chess pieces, and 
set to mechanically dusting them off with a tea towel. 
 
“I asked the guy why they won’t stamp it, they shrugged, said you’re a US citizen, you don’t 
need it. We can stamp it for you, but you don’t need it. I shrugged and they didn’t stamp 
it.” 
 
Leaving Ted, Juniper went out onto the deck. Ted had brought a pack of six stout for 
Juniper’s arrival, a hospitable sign, But he’d then drunk 5 of the 6 before Juniper arrived. 
They shared the final bottle, poured into two half-filled pint glasses. Juniper watched the 
oak’s swaying in the narrow corridor of open air between the apartment buildings of 
Manhattan west. then sat to write Electra again. 
 
 Dear E, 
 
So I’m staying with Ted, remember Ted? That old Jewish lawyer we met in Phnom 
Penh? He’s now nearly 88.  His apartment is a narrow corridor of piled books, 
Amos Oz, Wallace, Saul Bellow, Elie Wiesel, Art Speigelman, Kafka. Hardbacks 
on the invasion of Iraq, political texts on various shades of conspiracy to ugly fact. 
He hand painted every inch of his walls, you know, with these trembling flowers. 
He doesn’t have Parkinsons, though his son does, yet Tedd shakes and trembles 
continuously. 
 







He’s a grump, and we had a bit of a bicker last night, when I noticed his teapot 
was filled with green tea which had started to moulder. That morning he’d been 
complaining of stomach pains, and maybe having Chron’s Disease. When we met 
in Cambodia 6 years ago his intestine ruptured, he’d been airlifted to Thailand and 
then flown to Chicago, where foot after foot of small intestine was sliced away. 
 
Anyway, he hates being looked after, he’s the one who “takes care of people” he 
insists, grumbling. Then he gripes about my soft-spokenness, says I should walk 
about reciting “How Now Brown Cow, Grazing In the Green Green Grass”. 
Though he’s at least half deaf. Though yes I am soft spoken. 
 
But anyway, how are you? I have a story to relay. Yesterday, having left Ted for 
the day, I was sitting in a cafe eating a slice of greasy pizza, drinking some cold tea 
while flipping through a Foster-Wallace reader I found at Ted’s place. When a (to 
my mind) handsome man entered the café. He sat adjacent a (to my mind) beautiful 
young woman.   
 
“So do you want to sit in or out?”  
 
 I heard him ask from the neighbouring table – in or out – and perhaps, probably, I 
read too much into it, but I felt a vicarious thrill – like voyeurism on a subtle 
navigation of roles they were both unconsciously enacting. I could imagine them 
in bed in that moment. In the hot flow of union, of finding yourself in another, by 
finding them in you. I felt this moving through me. A syntax of impersonal syntax 
of desire “So do you want to sit in or out?”  Interpenetration. The suckling infant 
at the mother’s breast. All morning I’d had those thoughts about receptivity and 
plunging. And how it’s all a kind of receiving really.  Then I thought on that line: 





Do you know the word Anaphor? Where the meaning of a sign depends upon its 
preceding instantiations. The famous anaphor I have a dream, repeated at the 
beginning of each stanza, the meaning of Luther-King’s speech, being cumulative: 
gathered through repetition and emphasis. 
 
Our love—anaphor—it signifies only by referring back, and back. Was there some 
Greek goddess anaphora? There should have been I recall thinking in that cafe as 
I observed the couple... And if not, I thought in that café, inadvertently and 
perhaps ashamedly, undressing the couple with my eyes—I would invent it, I 
decided. 
 
I reflected on Eileen Myles talking about how for her there were always men, that 
Lesbianism was never really a thing, that there was just this sort of unbridled lust. 
Lust was anaphor, all we wrote was anaphor, referring back and back, but we’d lost 
the original source material. Now we’re just little nodes: filthy little stars, fucking. 
 
 
Ted In his favourite Diner; woofing down pancakes with cream, 
taking care of his sensitive stomach. 
 
P.S. I wanted to say that for whatever reason a lot of my capacity for 
expression is still bound up with you. That there is sadness and loss still, for me. It 
seems (in my mind at least) we’re still children and there’s this wood-chipped 
playground to graze our knees on, if we want to. But it’s also as if there aren’t 
boundaries, any constricted throat we mime is illusory. I’m writing a new project, 




So you’re staying with Ted! That’s great - how is he? He must be getting pretty 




friendships are quite rare I think. But very rich! I’ve really been appreciating 
spending occasional time with my boss outside of work, there are very few other 
opportunities I’ve had to interact with people a fair bit older. I still model 
occasionally for a group at M16 who are mostly above 60. It’s incredibly calming 
and affirming to have conversations with those guys. It makes me realize that my 
own parents were not very good at that! Especially my mother. Dad could do it 
when he was around, but he was just so often at work or in a torturous fugue.   
 
Junip, I am sorry to hear that you’ve been feeling inhibited, or impeded. On the 
other hand, I am excited for you, because I think honestly that you’ve been 
wrestling with self-concept and healthy boundaries since perhaps before we were 
together. Certainly while we were together it seemed that you simultaneously 
wanted incredible intimacy with others but you also would fly off skittishly, 
frustrated with the intrusions that others necessarily make. I think you could never 
resolve whether you wanted absolute control over your environment - your time, 
space, the kinds of interactions you would have - or whether you wanted to be 
surprised, radically altered by alterity (ridiculous phrase). Anyway, all I mean to say 
is that it doesn’t surprise me that you’re coming up against this stuff - but that I’m 
glad you’re looking into it - but also that I think while you might be feeling it more 
profoundly since our break-up, the seeds were in you long before. What do you 
think the process is for relieving that?  
 
On Sunday I felt I was going mad, getting pretty close to the edge of what was 
bearable. I felt so horrified by the inevitability of decay (again, ridiculous phrase) 
the irrevocability of loss,  fear of my own wretched meaninglessness, etc etc. Just 
a real clanger of an existential crisis. It was pretty hard, actually. It feels very good 
to read your thoughts about legible signs, binding and unbinding...  
 
Did I tell you about Anne Carson’s Decreation? I’m sure I would have. I really think 
you ought to read it. There’s a very fertile relationship between Carson’s idea of 
decreation (especially in the final ‘operetta’ of the text) and what I think Wallace 
was trying to get to grips with regards to suffering, transcendence, etc. Are you 
familiar with The Suffering Channel? It’s one of my favourite of his short stories. 
Although obviously as soon as you think of one the others all start leaping up as 
well.  
 
I feel so stuck at the moment, Ju. When I read I feel like I’m discovering all these 
beautiful paper scraps, incredibly patterned, and they’re for me to fold and play 
with. I like to fold them into different shapes and place them next to each other 
for new effects. I like to cut them up and trace them. But increasingly I am feeling 
cut off from my senses of delight and curiosity. I feel so ashamed of how little I 
can translate into something to show others. I feel that I can’t get up or dance and 





I am very glad to hear you felt witnessed by me ... Thank you for saying so. It 
means a lot - you don’t know - I felt I was a witness for you, when we were at our 
best. I felt we were doing something pretty wonderful with each other, for quite a 
while there. To hear that I was somewhat successful, that I did something 
wonderful - if I can claim any responsibility, I will feel so proud. And I miss it all 
too ... There is still sadness and loss for me. I am very interested in your new 
project.  
 
I think your poetry and other writing is, on the whole, quite good and luminous. It 
helps that you’re so prolific. That shows an ease of outpouring that’s pretty damn 
crucial.  Thank you also for saying you’d like to be a witness for me, too. It would 









I’ve just checked in, it’s ten o’clock and I’m bleary eyed and exhausted, to an 8 bed 
dorm I paid 66 USD to sleep in. Ted is sick, he’s been drinking this mouldy green 
tea and it has tied knots in his intestine. He alternates between grumpy and 
bellicose—floating in reminiscence, he will detail the dental histories of the 
Hasidim cousinsthat once filled the neighbourhood, before moving downtown. 
Now he’s stuck with neighbours who have insisted on taking tectonic drills to the 
back porch in the early AM, without end in sight. 
 
Well you were right about my struggles with self and other - they are certainly not 
delimited to since we were together, maybe the mind just likes to latch to certain 
loss for narrative festering...  
 
Walking the streets of Williamsburg; Junip envisioned the very different landscape of 
Hobart, her suburban rolling hills, the street cats sunning themselves in drive ways, the 
cackling kookaburra at the base of nocklofty. He wanted to fall in love with that city anew, 
but on his own terms, without Electra’s parallel gaze. Hobart with her rivulet, her Kunanyi 
pipes, the crescent sands of O’Possum Bay. How does one rediscover how to inhabit a 
city the way we might inhabit love? He wondered. And how is it, we inhabit love?  
 
In 10:04 Ben Lerner describes walking Brooklyn with his ambivalently platonic amour: “on 
our walks our gazes were parallel, directed in front of us, at canvas and not at each other, 
a condition of our most intimate exchanges… we would work out our views as we co-





There is a comfort in the parallel gaze, some abdication in it of the responsibility of being 
a separate self, takes place. Still when people speak dismissively, or scornfully of those 
relationships that are simply ‘comfortable’ I’m always keenly aware of how comfort is made 
to imply stagnation,  and also aware of my felt guilt, because for me it is that comfort which 
I seek – there is a coming home in it. It feels like that companionability offers an 
opportunity to have your sense of reality checked, validated. To construct a counter-culture 
consisting of only a few, providing a quiet form of resistance against consensus reality. We 
co-construct the literal view before us. 
 
Akin to Lerner, Junip had since come across an idea in Allan Grossman’s work Summa 
Lyrica, that; in the social realm of speech we face one another, we ask questions and offer 
answers, we exchange. But poetry offers a distinct realm of speech where we all face 
forward, we look on, we find ourselves positioned towards the world differently than a 
moment before.  
 
What would Electra make of it? Junip wondered. It led him to wonder: do we discover in 
poetry this same companionability, do we and the poem gaze in parallel, look on to the 
world together, face forward? In which case is the poem an act of speech, one that we 
receive, only in order to defer? 
 
 It is not meant for us exactly, this speech Blanchfield wrote, It points us elsewhere if we listen.  
 




Some days later Ted was ill. Junip had taken a walk in central park, hoping to find a spot 
undere a flowering tree, somewhere to loaf about, to sit and read. On opening his laptop 
however the first thing he noticed was a letter in his inbox, one accidentally ignored some 






“Why Bakhtin?” You used to ask, from the doorway, while I hunch 
scribbled, you to my back, over our desk, in a fury. Authorship, maybe 
 
I babbled. Dialogism. Heteroglossia. And the novel, Bakhtin, his cigarette paper, 
the Chronotype, Bakhtin the carnivalesque. 
 
Bakhtin, lover, has worn a hole right through my book case, through Canberra’s 
double brick back wall. 
 
“It all begins in memory, the middle game is place – it bottoms out in emotion,” I 
might have said. 
 
“Nothing fixed, everything approaching,” he might have meant. 
 
Did you ever read him? Another Summer and I’m determined my seedlings will 
sprout, will find their little holds in the earth. 
 
Does the meaning of the text inhere in the words on the page? Bakhtin asked – for 
him immanence was a self-containment, a Completeness on one’s own terms. 
 
It diverged from the imminence you glow about. Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit: 
awakening to context – context or containment? They felt like polarised forms of 
presence. 
 
You were an irony of both; ever attempting to read the text behind the text; 
wielding post-structuralism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, foremost against yourself. 
Then affirming a decontextual presentism; a ‘lets set aside the stories, live in the 
now’. You ground down on that Now, like a cigarette in an ashtray. Italics heavy 
enough the ember flickered out. Do you still see them as mutually exclusive? 
 
I think on Bakhtin starved of cigarette paper during the Nazi bombing, his 
bildungsroman manuscript, final copy, rolled up for smokes. I think on the words 
in their inky inhalation. And then I think on you  
 













That afternoon Juniper idled about Ted’s apartment. He could tell that he was outstaying 
his welcome. That the space was too small to accommodate both of them comfortably.  
He knew that before leaving New York he needed to respond to Electra’s last. What could 







I wanted to write you on Love and Repetition. 
 
To. Tell you that this time, despite Bakhtin, I’ve finally quit smoking. This time it’ll 
stick: assertion is how we make facts right? I’m sitting to write you but I’m 
distracted. I’m finally reading Tender Buttons, where Gertrude Stein tells me that 
repetition is never exact repetition, because the human registering it is different the 
second time round. She seemed to be riffing off Heraclitus, dipping her toes in his 
flowing stream. Butler said that for our signifiers to gain meaning they must be 
performed, yet each iteration performs a difference. While Maggie Nelson wrote 
lovers up as Argonauts at sea on a ship of Theseus with ever changing parts. love 
as upcycled, as repurposed. 
 
Each love that I know carries the imprint of the old, so each new lover indelibly 
arrives to me fully formed. And so the sense Plato expressed, of learning as a type 
of remembering finally makes a kind of intuitive sense. 
 
 When Winnicott wrote, “fear of breakdown is the fear of a breakdown that has 
already been experienced,” I’m sure he had this principle in mind. Nowhere is the 
iterative, circularity of experience as present as in love’s traumatic re-enactment. 
 
And so in my writing I’m heeding Barthes’ advice: that in a world where 
concentration is a dwindling resource, opportunities to pay attention — even going 
overboard and fastening monomaniacally to a single object — in this case the 
object: us, deserve advocacy. 
 
But then, repetition always entails a shift in context, some sign of difference. So 
now I’m watching my love for you continually finding new senses, morphing but 
with continuity. This love entails a type of theatre; to play with, and consciously 
lean into, obsessions. The way you might in the backseat of a car lean into the 
curves of the road, playfully crush the boy you find cute, or less playfully the sibling 
you find obnoxious. 
 
When Kierkegaard wrote of the artistic necessity of the third remove, he had in 




Crisis in the Life of the Actress, no actress can play 14 year old Juliette till she is at least 
32. So too with Eros, Carson notes, Erotic desire being always the bittersweet, 
requiring a reach across some distance. 
 
Here, then, I reach across two distances: the erotic distance necessary for love, and 
the artistic distance of performance.  Yet I feel now, looking back from some 
distance, that then I was a child Juliette playing a 32 year old woman. Or I would 
like that to be the case. “For the sake of the poem,” as you used to say, “and other 







The next day, in a friend Tom’s apartment in Brooklyn, while Tom busied himself making 
lunch, Juniper takes time over the magnets peppering his fridge. Back home he recalled 
similar magnets peopling his family fridge. like any good family of the 90s, Juniper’s 





Electra, important: what do you make of magnetic poetry? You remember when 
D wrote:  
 
My friend has a fridge you can walk up 
Words are like that. 
 
Magnets cylindrical and spheroid; a few three dimensional, textured and jangled –
imagery souvenerial or collectible –  pining the weekly shopping list, cleaning 
chores-table or childhood painting up to the fridge. 
 
I recall how some family fridge magnets served as a vacation chronology – the way 
matchbook strips once served to construct a jumbled history of hotels visited.  My 
family tended towards the minimal; but there would always be a portly supercilious 
cat looking regal declaring herself Queen of the house. To pass teenage time, its 
unappreciated abundance, my brother and I would quietly marvel as we drew two 
magnets along each other’s length, north to south poles, feeling them alternately 
attract and repel as they slid within millimetres of one another.  
 
The first time I encountered magnetic words on a friend’s fridge was an experience 
I recall intimately.  It was magnetic words informality, spontaneity that endeared 
them to me. That a limited vocabulary could be assorted into an infinite 
combination of senses. There was always a preponderance of nouns, doing words, 
never enough conjunctives, pronouns, articles... This meant syntax had to be 
abraded, mistreated in some way. For many children this was a little revolution of 
possibilities in itself, providing early intimations of poetry. 
 
Every deck of magnets had enough material prompts for a goodly quantity of 
sexual innuendo. My cousin’s fridge, for some unknown reason, sported New York 
specific words. Clearly intended to pre-empt or facilitate in-jokes to dwellers of 
Lower Manhattan, Long Island – not so useful in regional Tasmania. We became 
familiar with exotic Brooklyn, the Manhattan Bridge, 42nd street.  
 
In hindsight there seems something doubly disconcerting about receiving a 
vocabulary of humour. Maybe it’s the image of a public relations officer predicting 
your predilection to laugh. Writing up lists of word combinations for possible 




words selected felt almost algorithmically generated for mass appeal. As 
disconcerting as the emoji prompts Facebook messenger offers you. 
 
Thinking about it, I doubt that it is the intuition of ill-intentions behind these 
selections that unsettles, but rather the absence of intention, another realms of 
expression becomes slowly automated, devoid of conscious choice. 
 
I rearranged some words into a raunchy & childish sequence then left to join Tom 






The magnets we grew up with were the same laid out: the 
familiar chronology of regions visited: a Melbourne green 
and yellow tram, a great barrier reef, a boomerang shaped 
Sydney Harbour Bridge. Cylindrical or spheroid; I loved 
the hexagonal. 
 
I’m studying biology these days. Hexagonal shapes, I 
recently learnt, are the fastest growing found in nature. 
Honeycomb, Basalt columns, epithelial cells in the eye, 
Saturn’s north pole, The shape of the colony. The ants 
carry their diner plates in line. I’ve been thinking about 
polyamory, and the birds and the bees. 
 
Things change and I find new loves. And 
sometimes one of each set, and sometimes one of neither. 
 
 “What is the shape of divine cells?” You asked, “in this 
identical human soup?” Bodies divide into identical twins 
– while with three or more twister together on a bed is 
effected to minimise surface area. Natural patterns form as 
wind blows sand in the dunes. The ripples on their surfaces 
repeat wherever there are suitable conditions. A man nods 
at ‘Man’ kind on the street who returns a grim grin. We 
remain firm in the conviction that there are visible 
regularities of form that hold us – that triangles fracture 
into shards, we’re told: Love doesn’t tessellate. We force 
our relationships to conform to what society tells us love 
is, when we could force the image of love to conform to 
the realities of our relationships.  
 







That night Ted’s grumbling reached a peak. He was watching the news,  so Juniper settled 







Sometimes loves geometry is only readable in its after image.. what was left. After 
you left me I think I was distraught. I can’t remember. Perhaps I fled north? I 
know I wandered Europe with the contents of an old canvas Irish backpack. I 
spent my days in an idle narrative fog, fictional experience somehow never 
adjacent, but forever running in parallel to the colourful Austrian summer taking 
place about me. I was reading Roberto Bolaño, Sharon Olds. Who else? 
 
I recall Stag’s leap; a poem about making whole-cloth together, which conjured to 
mind our shoddy patching jobs; hand sewn tares in the knee, groin – reparations 
done by the fire on Hampden Road, Battery Point. What do I recall? The poem: 
What left? it might have been called:  
 
Then we/ grew, and grew, I grieved him, he grieved me,/ I completed with 
him, he completed with me, we/ made whole cloth together, we 
succeeded,/ we perfected what lay between him and me.” 
 
Then I left. I went to India. Events ensued. I returned to the island where I was 
born and was an aimless Dharma beach bum for a summer. For that season I 
embraced being  ‘that sun-kissed Italian boy’ as I heard over the shoulder once – 
perhaps I flushed a pink through the sunburn - buying linen shirts at Salamanca, 
carrying my root vegetables and leafy greens in a loose-weave sack. 
 
 “Stalin was not Russian he was Georgian.”  
 
Juniper stopped writing. Back in 165 West, Ted comes into the kitchen wearing only a 
loose knit singlet.  His words are mumbled, he’s 87. Juniper accepts this non-sequitur, 
demonstrates interest, with a nod, a raised brow.   
 
“And Napoleon was not French, but Corsican.” 
 
They had met working for the same organisation in Cambodia, nearly 10 years earlier in a 
hostel in Phnom Penh. Tedd liked to say he was a fairly acclaimed human rights lawyer 
who had mostly worked in Eastern Europe. Juniper was a do-gooder little squirt, with 




only to be ignored, mocked. To leave for home with a sense of the Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal’s futility, corruption. 
 
Ted’s singlet was transparent like his skin beneath, varicose veins on his thighs. His chest 
adorned with roses in neat lines as if trellised. He’d told Juniper in that hostel, while 
smoking a dry tailored cigarette and sweating, that each rose marked a depressive period 
in his life. Juniper never knew if they were signs of a renewed discipline or a tenderness he 
offered himself.  
 
“I’ll be 88 in a month. And for all of Germany, Hitler was an Austrian. Its gotta make you 
think, right?” 
 
But Juniper wasn’t thinking about dictators at the moment, he was pondering over 
Electra’s latest message, just received. It had read as something novellike, with dramatic 






This summer brings back all the preceding, book-ending summers. Being by the 
south coast today, conjures the last time we looked on the ocean together, that 
windy evening, with the moon, and your bottle, old friend. Lips already dark with 
wine. 
 
“Emotion fills the time with movement,” you said. 
 
“Time fills the space with emotion.” I replied 
 
“Still,” you replied  “what if feelings exists only in transit. When given away?” 
 
You’ve moved off and I stand and look out across that horizontal line that cuts 
the page of sky and sea, gradations of blue moving into different kinds of blue. 
 
The sand between my toes is baking, reflective, aglare. Eventually, it’s on my 
calloused pads that I hobble to join you; down by the water line. 
 
“Tell me?”  
 
Was what you said, speaking of your last book Shapeless Things, and its falling flat. 
“Tell me. how my failure to accomplish what I set out to represent - still 
communicates?”  
 





Would it have been comforting to remind you that Wittgenstein, speaking of your 
book, might have said it communicates because it fails? That it communicates failure. 
Am I being comforting in saying that the failure of communication, all that is 
outside the text, is the locus of what matters? 
 
Sometimes, failing matters. I could have told you.  
 
But you answered your own question. 
 
“I seem to always begin from a state of distraction, an unclarity. Then focalise. 
Allow that state of distraction to become my object of reflection, I gain clarity. 
Then move forward.”  
 
Neither of us noted that those same rules governed the cycling content of our 
relationship. A focalised-distraction. As Walter Benjamin admitted, the distracted 
person, too, can learn habits. 
 
In love, with repetition, we learnt, the rules governing the content come to 
supplant the content.  That repetition trained our viewing.  
 
In the silence that follows, the water breaks and spits up; drool on the shore, it 
draws back. From the receding water, the holes crabs make reveal themselves in 
the spume that rises.  
 
“Just another type of vacancy that makes itself visible only when filled,”  I asked. 
There’s sand in the wine bottle’s rim, it grits and grates as I screw on the lid. I pass 
you the dark bottle. 
 
“We only see what a blank page offers after we’ve colonized it with words.”  
 
I recall when you wrote me of your obsession with Lerner, how in In Hatred of 
Poetry, he wrote that one of poetry’s constitutive conditions is its inability to deliver 
on the possibility it promises. Perhaps like Maggie Nelson’s intentionally 
misleading examination of the colour blue in Bluets, my analysis of love for you, is 
just such an enabling fiction.  
 
The wind whips surface sand from the dunes, carries it in drifts across the beach.  
 
“What’s the word for the sand moving like that?”  You asked.  
 
“Maybe it doesn’t get a name. still, airs movement is made visible in what it carries.” 
 
“The Japanese have a name for the wind through high grass,” the sheaths stirring 









“That’s it.”  
  
“My point is, what about the colours of eucalypts after rain, where’s that name?” 
 
“Or what about the name given the perception of colour after rain.”  
 
Our cigarettes refuse to light in this wind. and when finally lit, huddled between 
our two frames,  
 










At some point in that conversation she said that If and When we fall in love it will be a 
rendition. That is, a means of displaying our sense of disconnection, the vacuum between 
us and other people.  She said like the Jesus bug, in love we walk on water with no prior 
knowledge of surface tension. 
 
Because the rain fell in sheets we drew Pythagorean laws in the sand with sticks. Watched 
them eroded by the rains then the waves. Bugs skimmed the surface. She said, If and When 
we too find ourselves weightless it will be a reprieve. To our advantage.  
 
To our advantage, we vomited blood in the sand, on our knees and elbows, as the waves 
depicted the intestine. 
 
Naked in the sand she strokes then backhands my cunt, as if to add emphasis to her 
kindness. She concludes that the world we are faced with is the totality of familiar gestures. 
Held a gooey finger up to her nose and sniffed for ovulation. Cervical thickening transmits 
the possibility of transmission.  
 
She said that If and When the collapse takes place it will be nobody’s fault. That moral 
accountability comes in waves that are currently in recession. That moral culpability has a 
high surface tension.  
 
In their ignorance a cricket’s wings and hind legs beat out a sharp staccato rhythm. 
Thinking the sentence complete we sealed off the event from further interpretation. Drew 
white red tape in quadrangles about our stanzas. Removed the bodies of our thoughts from 
where we found them. Left white chalk outlines for later inspection. 
 
Waves come in sets of three she said, and If and When the collapse takes place it will not 
be a rendition. There is an oncoming king wave. We find ourselves Jesus bugs, weightless, 








Emerging from the subway at 42nd Juniper finds himself between wall to wall reflective 
glass; huge posters of disembodied torsos, sparsely attired. 
 
In the first moments in New York, he was slid into the ranks of an encircling audience 
attendant to an acrobatic troop of street performers.  He watched as they drew members 
of the crowd into the circle, unsettling spectatorship, repurposing it, making it live. Only 
months earlier reading Teju Cole on the topic of the self-same street dancers, who – while 
readily dismissed in the newspapers and by the government – functioned as a bright spark 
in the day, a moment of unregulated beauty. 
 
This passing phrase caught his attention; beauty, unregulated stayed with him. Was that the 
condition for beauty? Unregulation? The streets of Canberra were in comparison often 
eerily silent; informal economy for the most part-quelled.  
 






Floriade, popped into my head while walking the streets today; you remember? 
that festival of flowers cemented away in planters; the single conveyor belt 
walkway, the tourists diligently shuffling along, single file. The effect of stifled 
exchange, Like racism or misogyny – it is obscured because it is atmospheric. You 
don’t see it till you’ve been outside of it; like Wallace’s infamous old fish asking the 
young fish, how’s the water? 
 
It seems ridiculous getting lost in New York, I mean the streets are literally 
numbered. But today I achieved it. It was okay, I had an Alice Notley reader on 
my kindle – Notley felt like the poet to be reading adrift in these streets, or on the 
subway passing exit after exit, proximate to diverging worlds. She was a self-
proclaimed city poet who claimed to love the city, but hated what the city had 
become; and that the world had become a city. Writing as if all she had left to 
protect herself from this world was her little poetry. 
 
At a bus interchange, I sped a green-tree’d corner that I hoped was Central Park 
from which I could orient myself. I stopped, and read her phrase: “I still love 
poetry for itself; it strengthens, protects, teaches me. Because it isn’t me.” I walked 
on, discovering it was not indeed central park and I was still lost. Notley’s poems 
seemed to be asking me where exactly the world was taking my voice, my life. 
 
Walking these streets, I can’t help thinking of our interleaven days, two books 
folded together, and the imprints left; like indents left by botanicals, once pressed 
between our pages. Notley caught, it seemed to me, the interstitial moments of our 




it was reverberant through the bathroom walls. Moments like that, without 
warning, slipped between my ribs.  
 











Reading Notley in central park; reading Blanchfield on the subway downtown, 
reading Kraus in Ted’s apartment; reading Myles on the plane on the way over: 
recently the kinship I feel upon reading these queer, offbeat authors describing 
their lives has begun to appear suspect to me.  Have you had these feelings? 
 
I can’t help asking myself: is the affinity I feel elective? Product of over-
identification, a wanting to resemble?  Queer tutelage, Queer world-making; these 
feel like projections of affinities, but valuable projections into a system that can 
hold you. 
 
What I wonder is if the kinship isn’t based in anything more than a shared 
trajectory? The sense of connection you might feel whilst clutching the hand of a 
co-passenger, formerly a stranger, vicelike as your airbus shudders in a stomach-
dropping high wind. As the audibly rattled pilot requests over intercom that the 
stewards return to their seats, insists sharply we all buckle in. 
 
Temporary adjunct teaching positions, tenuous writer’s residencies – 
underemployment we convince ourselves is not the undergirding precariousness 
of our existence showing through the skin like terrible blotted arteries, rather a 
blessing to relish, a chance to finish that latest book, that collection of essays. 
 
Some of our writerly friends sought supplementary incomes doing ‘gold shows’– 
online webcam porn – self-stimulating, usually with latex toy accompaniment (for 
extra coin). 15 minute intervals live-streamed before a dislocated and variegated 
audience of pure observers; a floating masculine gaze, goggling and lusting. 
Hooting their appreciation or requests on the chat feed. Sending coin. 
 
While others were always going back to school for yet another degree, another 
dash of limbo. Going back to those airless, social welfare offices; lines of the 
culture’s least affluent made to wait half the day, cause what else do they have to 
do? 
 
The privileged, university educated, treated social welfare as a rite of passage, a 
dependency which we would in our turn, feel beholden to repay, a national ‘pass it 
on’ system. But we found ourselves in uneasy relation to that rite of passage when 
it began to feel like a tunnel we were ever leaving only to re-enter, fittingly circular 
in this constructed city of roundabout geometries.  
 
I start to wonder: when will I next take Canberra’s bike routes, following paths of 




centenarian eucalypts dug out to make way for the emerging light rail. Union court 
excavated, old college residencies replaced with impersonal Uni Lodges. This is 
how to erase affinities, I thought, remove the systems that once held us. This is 








That morning Juniper awoke, noticed and was surprised to discover one of those old 
fashioned phonebooths. For the novelty of it he placed a call to Electra. He wondered 
how many coins were in his pocket, and speaking under the duress of time constraints. 
She picked up. This is the tail end of a conversation: 
 
Do you remember E., what Wittgenstein said about the pre-verbal? 
/ what he said? is that some kind of philosopher’s joke? / that bit 
about there being conversations made of glass bottles you send 
spinning? / seeking loves? / seeking something / You sure that 
was him. / It was him  
 
How did we come across one another amidst all the green bottles 
we sent spinning? Is what I’m wondering / Like at that party you 
mean / You remember? / I remember / the giggling and bumping 
in the dark / the bruising jaws in the closet / It lost its lustre, after 
a while  
 
And where do you fit amongst the iterations of my love / preceding 








Oulipo in the bedroom 
 
Dear E., In the early days of our relationship, we’d lie in a bed lit by soft lamp, heads 
propped up against a cloud of pillows, reading.  
 
Finding our works unpublishable we discussed the prospect of imposing some artificial 
but rudimentary restraints on our writing. Instead, penniless, we become Oulipo in the 
bedroom.  
 
We decide that refusal to kiss on the hips, lips or anus forms a lipogram in play. The only 
punctuation mark we allow is a slap.  Meanwhile I’m  bound to four posts; everything I 
want is harder than you’re willing to deliver. I tell you rough translation is a term referring 
to the varying grain of sandpaper. Constraints act as triggers, you say, fingering my trigger, 
my story-making machine. 
 
3 months in, and rhubarb’s burning on the stovetop. It’s the same bed that creaks, rocks, 
and shuffles free of the bedroom wall. An unconventional orgasm still leaves me 
untouchable, trembling, the way certain poems eschew formalism to the point of 
debilitation. 
 
6 months on and we invert the lipogram, insert vowel sounds between sighs. We find that 
a number of acts can be read as a palindrome, upside down or inside out. A mutual oral 
performance is a numerical palindrome of itself after the fact. The language of our 
movements breaks free of syntax, became illegible.  
 
We think on repetition not with boredom. Though we know every pleasant sensation 
becomes painful under repetition. Yet too much novelty fractures into endless streams of 
meaningless data. After a stringent star anise porridge, directives from above and below 
are muffled by a cock, cunt or other.  
 
Three years later, and by letter, we remain collagists with each other’s gestures. We slice 














We only do things for the first time once right? 
 
A true circle is without tale or head, 
 
but a tautology is tethered at both ends, 
 
A truth contained in its premises: 
 
Like that you’re trapped in a hopeless love affair with the past,  
that I’m going through a messy divorce 
 
The moment I fell in love with you? 
 
In the park; watching you observing the succulents 
 
The chord of that camera about your neck, 
 
Your little snap camera, a slug on a branch, caught in the act of using 
 
an intricate machine beyond your comprehension to capture the light 
 









The following day Juniper attended his second-cousin’s wedding. While his extended 
family gathered and danced in bravado’s self-conscious step - his sister Elaine, flew over 
as photographer for the event, flicked through images of the bride’s face in profile, then 
full frontal. 
 
As she flicks she teaches. Juniper learns that a photograph’s symmetry is dull without the 
tension present of the point that breaks it. 
 
“Like life,” she says. “I got that,” he replied. 
 
 “How to add balance, add interest to this picture?” she asks, pointing at the picture, but 
thinking about his book. 
 
“Place the main subject off-centre, to afford them visual weight.” 
 




“You know what I mean. For the tale. Not. You know.” 
 
“Or just superimpose narratives atop one another, literary representations of the depth, 
middle ground, foreground ... To draw attention let the subject recede into the distance.” 
 
The wedding proceeds and they slip into silence. Juniper finds himself frequenting the bar 
as much to have something to do with his feet, and later hands. He waits silently and gets 
more drinks. His brother is bored, and takes calls and loiters in the seemingly ornamental 
Japanese garden out front. Juniper watches him making turns through the glass. His father 
and uncle compete to laugh loudest by the sound system. Younger cousins and their 
partners slump in their seats, absorbed by the screens of their phones. One cousin is 
offering his thoughts to another, recently heart broken and downcast younger sibling. For 
moving on, for growth, he gestures at his bicep, life’s just like the gym: tear yourself and 
regenerate. Tear yourself, then regenerate. 
 
Meanwhile Elaine continues snapping pictures, finding the best angles, creating a narrative 
of the wedding that later via Facebook would supplant for many attendees the memory of 
the wedding itself. They experience a kind of double exposure, projected forward. The 
photos his sister takes, which he will see, overlay the wedding he is experiencing. A 
projected future supplants the present. 
 
Electra had once said she found herself unphotogenic, that she had a face made beautiful 




anxious expressions. Whilst Juniper felt this was not true, he had always appreciated the 
way she moved. In dance, she was animated, all disinhibition, all spontaneous gesture. 
 
He was at the time interested in Winnicot’s notion that it’s essential for a child’s 
spontaneous gesture to be recognised in youth by their primary carer. We who have 
pathologized ourselves and carried the idea that our identity is defective throughout the 
years. What if we conceived instead the pathologizing of self as a type of misnomic self-
labelling – in fact naming as a failure to interpret?  And what if this failure were at root a 
matter of spontaneous gesture going unrecognised? 
 
After the eternity which was the dismal wedding finished they drove home. Juniper had 
drunk too much sweet liquor and felt the hangover’s sickly precursor in his throat. To 
distract him, Elaine held up the camera’s image viewer, and described the concept of 
stereoscopy. The same object, Juniper learns, photographed from several slightly different 
angles – when viewed together, create the impression of depth, solidity. 
 
He thought on the book he would write Electra, a book conceived of letters, poems, diary 
entries – where multiple points of view were introduced, effecting a stereoscopic illusion; 
diary entries or letters between friends, passing mention of the narrator only; all would 
serve to reveal the author’s subjectivity, a definitional depth into which we peer showing 
itself to be to others an object - all over surface. 
 
At home he collapsed into the couch, head still swimming and typed into his phone a long 




I’ve been thinking on why writing you feels so much like therapy.  
 
I’ve concluded it’s because of how we write: a form of psychoanalysis, we allow 
each other to put together an account of ourselves; to make narrative sense of what 
life has been; the recurrent impasses; the potential for what it may become. Like 
tehrapy, this letter making offers narrative reconstruction, gainful in giving sense 
to the last five years’ otherwise fragmentary and discontinuous passage. 
 
Why must we write – is it to account for ourselves? In giving an account of 
ourselves we need receptacles; someone we can presume to receive our words. I’m 
not saying you’re a receptacle, I mean. How or whether you receive them at all, is 
not known to me, not knowable. Nonetheless you as receptacle (okay you kind of 
are) are the locus, established site where ‘reception’ is articulable. So whether or not 
reception takes place is in some sense beside the point – it’s the perception of 
‘reception’ that matters. 
 
Deflationary as this might sound: I am my relation to you, given over for my 




all of us. It has meant alongside embrace, acceptance, joy, also misunderstanding, 
judgement, refusal. 
 
Even this act of transference, words to paper, is filtered through the past, priors 
anticipating receptions to come. That’s why I project you on the other end of the 










The next day I visited the MET. Ted was feeling wretched and decided to stay in. I didn’t 
mind, I preferred it. I could flow through the chattering halls, present without distraction 
to the gold inlaid, spandrelled ceilings. I took a tributary pause before a Monet; the 
waterlilies; golden disks floating or encased in a purple murky depth; oil on canvas made 
me think curiously of blood on snow. Though I don’t know why, no one else would make 
the association. From looking you couldn’t tell he had this pond dug and planted – not a 
subject found, drawn forth it seemed – but one grown.  Beneath each installation was a 
small placard, black on silver backed – I found myself as curious by the way the pieces 
were titled as I was by the pieces. How we name things, I thought, mattered. 
 
Then I wondering whether I should really call the parts of my project ‘love’ letters - 
knowing that relation to be metonymic at best, a stand in, a poor man’s substitute for a 
fuller relation? Was I writing these letters the way Monet painted in Bordighera by the 
Riviera? That is, labouring under the realisation that he enjoyed painting that town more 
than he loved the town itself – because what he loved was more in himself than in the 
town, yet the town was needed to draw it out of him? And did that constitute an 
objectifying relation? And were all objectifications oppressive? 
 




I stopped into one of the public toilets and was surprised to see the infinity mirrors, mirrors 
slightly off kilter so as produce an infinite relay of your image, standing and pissing, 
washing your hands. Usually my image captivated me in ways I was self-conscious about, 
but this provided further layers of fascination. I left the toilet, passed back through the 
gallery then sat in the museum cafeteria. I ordered a long black that came out burnt and 
watery, and decided to write Electra, something she couldn’t understand, but could 






“I looked at myself, like my family would see me,” you said. 
 
And 
“I felt distressed,” I thought. Distressed in a wrought way; to induce affect, 
distressed denim jeans we pass on mannequins, ample of hip, shapely of thigh. 
 
And 
“No, I’m fine,” you said fine, meaning glass, translucent, no like craquelure on the 
paintings we keep behind the glass. Not even breath touches that glass, mists it like 
Christmas, messages incised but only backwards in its surface. Like the ether we 
long to breath, behind the black tape. To touch the paintings, with our bodies 
moisture. Our bodied water. 
 
And 
“You can keep walking,” says the invigilator, finally to our gawking, hold a moment 
we’re having a profound experience of art? Or at least an experience of something.  
 
“Move along,” say the invigilator, black dressed in the black, implacable, we’re 
moved along from our delights, pleasure answers in a scurrying way. Nothing could 
be more, not even less. Unless…  
 
 “It’s over,” we’re receding now & grateful, in a contained way. We follow paths 
of desire to the trafficked exits, carrying us over on our own legs, black into black 
and out into this light. 
 
I looked at myself like my family would see me and I thought the words but: 
 
“The light of duration,” was what you said.  
“Screw tap of spine,” I replied sagely.  
A light that transports without moving –  
in the silence I heard John Cage singing.  
The silence of gathering, of bodies watching in passing.  




Fasten belt, gather around your hip. Like gathering alms.  
Like arms, saying: “hold me.” 
 
I was looking at myself in the porthole, looking out and down and all the while at 
my faint reflection, looking at myself like my family would see me. 
 
The click of a metallic snick finding its metallic mouth around my hip. “I thank 
you for choosing,” the telecom says. 
But we never chose. And this is receding. 
 
If you think real close you can catch yourself thinking. And leave, disgusted or just 
leave 
and still find the sky has fewer answers  
and more stars, turn to it – turn away – while she changes 
Out of respect.  
Look at yourself;  







Primal taboos and other plants: 
 
The early bees assault and fumble the flowers  
The stamen is slick with pre-cum  
As Roland Barthes flips over the body of his mother,  
Just curious like  
 
And like Sylvia’s mirror   
I am silver and exact,  
On my knees, everything I see  
I swallow immediately. 
 
For these are the parts of the flower:  
Milky-eyed dew dapples the sepal,  
enclosing your deliberating bud  
the eyes of the little gods,  
 
four cornered pry at 
The parts of the pistil where pollen germinates  
We read voyeuristically  
 
-mum makes Barthes a man-  










Roland Barthes famously conceived writing as a primordial taboo; an ignominious 
form of playing with the mother’s body.  
 
Fetching as the proclamation seems – both in its irreverence, its transgressively 
sexual overtones, and the sense of poesis, as an act of making, the process of 
creation or decreation it implies – I can’t help but see the intimations of ‘master and 
muse’ asserting themselves in it. 
 
Once a Butlerian frame is internalised it seems difficult not to view this statement 
as a further iteration of a masculine tradition that predates Plato, of conceiving the 
mother as receptacle; the matter into which sense is projected by the masculine 
element. 
 
And as Butler puts it, for a signification to denote it must be performed, but 
performance is never a singular act but a ritualised re-production. Performativity 
then requires an ongoing process of iteration, that is, a regularized repetition of the 
norm. To un-do meanings, to decreate, then requires breaking with the performance. 
No longer allowing the implicit receptacle notion to go un-noted. Calling Barthes 
to order. 
 
Yet in writing you: itself an act ritualised, a reproduction. Is it your body I’m at 







Dear J.,  
 
I’m thinking on the time we shared in Hobart, the 
familiarity of Preacher’s Pub, how we would often stay 
after they’d closed, stay late. That pub with the wall with 
ivy running down the wooden slats. The paint cracked off, 
the bus decked out with chairs facing onto one another, 
various succulents laid out on the tables rising from pint 
mugs and in the windows. One woman with a mop slaps it 
side to side, suds getting about - wears a fluro-elastic bright 
blue shirt, Aaman in a red cap, solid barrel at waste and 
shoulders, wearing cheap knock off lenses, non-refractory. 




How the orange slug butt-end of tailored cigarettes lay 
scattered in unrecognizable configurations, around the foot 











How could I forget Preachers?  But, of course, I try to forget. You see I’m told I 
should live in the present. That writing this imaginary you, feeds a Walter-Mitty 
like fantasy life that eventually will bite me, that will shatter into shards and with it 
my fragile sense of reality. That I will not deal. I think of the home we occupied, I 
think on lying in your bed, and the window open, and the wind tunnel between the 
neighbouring tenement houses, the breeze over the seedlings on your sill. And how 
you woke to tend those seedlings, a gesture which to me was asking: is every act of 
creation a recreation? I’m told I should live in the present. 
 
But what is that present? Queer futurity is sometimes described in terms of a future 
tense; an other than now – something delayed or deferred. I thought, in turning the 
pages of Lee Edelman’s Cruising Utopia, that he may have enjoyed Heidegger’s 
orientation towards being. Against the contemporary Buddhistic trend of asserting 
that only the present exists or really matters, Heidegger emphasises being’s other 
temporal coordinates – our past, our futurity – as necessarily involved in that 
present. 
 
The ability to interpret our past is required to fashion our understanding of the 
present (for any counter stream; seeking its own redefinition; needs to re-meet the 
objects of its life on its own terms). While the choices I make for my future 
determine who I am now and, paradoxically, the future I seek to create is also the 
source of the past I project. 
 
The significance existence has for us can only be understood within the context of 
the totality of the unfolding process of our life, in terms of where we are coming 
from, of where we are going to. 
 
Thrownness describes then, how the past and future come together in the present: 
I am thrown out of the past and into the present whilst projecting from within my 
thrownness towards the future. Thrownness is central; the past is not inert, 
completed, over or done with. The momentum of the past never diminishes; the 
past is not dead, it is prologue. And I wonder; how can I occupy this present, projecting 
futures that shape my past with a mind fashioned by that past? 
 
The double adverbial always already, points to how I can never get behind or break 
free from my thrownness.  So I can never create myself anew, as I have to work 
with what I have been and what I am now, in order to become what I want to be 
in the future. 
 
We weren’t trying to create ourselves anew; we struggled every day. But we woke 




sill, I woke to watching you, the breeze and your attentive hand; a gesture asking: 








 On Anxiety: A Useful Surface that Resists 
 
Are there other ways we could approach the anxiety in ourselves we so readily pathologise? 
I know the inauthentic meant for Heidegger the possession of a self-concept absorbed in 
contingent preoccupations, oblivious to its thrownness into the world & defined by a 
current situation without reference to future possibilities.  
 
I’ve been thinking on what Heidegger termed the philosophical mood; in the absence of which 
my thoughts are merely word husks, experienced as a tiresome jumble of forced concepts. 
Heidegger repurposed moods; for instance the primordial meaning of anxiety, he points 
to, is to feel not-at-home in this world. Under his hand you could reconceive anxiety as 
‘revealing a task’ to make meaningful lives outside the motivations of the inauthentic they-




To understand the meaning of a thing, we’re told, is to understand its functioning and 
simultaneously its network of purposive relations with other things. But the work is a 
relation you purpose together. It functions solely to busy the mind’s fingers. We connect 
the stanzas; just as the tallyhoes you smoke with, features cut corners for a smoother rolling 




Because it creates gaps of meaning. Gaps are things meaning moves into and out of. The 
work seen, is a simple machine without pistons & cogs: no moving parts. The cigarette 
functions to lubricate joints and sometimes, to create pure friction: an anxietal – breathing 




Anxiety, we learn, is a useful surface that resists. It functions as a moment that gives on to 
a re-evaluation of your possibilities; anxiety strips back meaning, there being no stable 
universe in the work. Being dis-habituated by impermanence, reason for action is revealed 




Anxiety removes the polarised shades from the panopticon’s eyes, so you see; you are 
those eyes. The work seeing through you, asks that you smoke. The panopticon is founded 







But the background is just that total art of what is not currently foregrounded. Bill Callahan 
singing a careless mind. The Ute reversing with a scrape into your bicycle. Capital breathing 
in. Neighbours emptying the trash – though to name these things is to foreground them. 
 
Deleuze & Gutarri: 
 
Indelibly linked, thought if the world were a rhizome, then it wouldn’t matter what way 
you cut it; that change could start from everywhere at once. This, optimism declares, 
heralds the end of capitalism – take out the trash; walk the-dog-in-the-tall-grass roots-
approach. 
 




Did I ever tell you that in primary school I mumbled and I lisped?  I had my 
frenulum snicked in year five, not the foreskin binding frenulum en circumcisio, but 
the frenulum tract of translucent veined skin, binding the tongue to the mouth’s 
floor - mine was too long, it bound too well: I could only poke the tongue’s tip 
free of my lips, a tentative turtle’s emergent head - whist certain showy friends 
could titillate their nostrils with their tongues. 
 
A frenulum, I read, both supports and checks the motion of that to which it is 
attached - like the iconic helicoptering parental figure. My frenulum was an 
overbearing parent whose excessive attentions debilitated the infant.  
 
The frenulum snicking was an event from which I only recall the descent of a gas 
mask over my face and the slow numerical back pedalling from 10 till 7 before 
dark. After the snicking there followed some rudimentary coaching. I recall the 
holding up of specialised cardboard squares with visual depictions of farm animals, 
large looped letters of the accompanying nouns, and the overly elaborated 
mouthed shapes of the handsome speech therapist who taught me how to 
articulate.  
 
Consequently my speech impediment certainly diminished, but I still spoke as 
softly as ever. They couldn’t seem to coax my bird to trill. A sensitive, inward 
boy… My parents friends might describe me to one another. Easy to break gazes, 
quick to blush – I still recall the furious colour rushing to my cheeks, attempts to 
prevent it ever catalysing the reaction. My lowered gaze found most frequently the 
pavement, its cracks my object of attention. I learnt the subtle distinctions in tread, 
lace and foot placement of my parents guests. 
 
Deborah Levy describes how in youth, whenever asked to speak up, to speak 




conviction, however, that it was in the struggle to find language that we knew it be 
alive, to be vital, to matter. 
 
I was convinced language was vital, it mattered, still all my teenage life I was 
chastised for mumbling. A mumbled idea trails off, is lost in the sand. Murmurs 
are equally chaste, but are meant to be leant into – a murmur elicits attention in its 
subtlety – only for the few, it declares. A Murmur is erotically charged too; lovers do 
it in tragedy, the audience looking in on their whispered small talk, but not granted 









Juniper was in an airport; leaving Ted and Manhattan and the states; awaiting a flight NYC 
to Sydney thence to Canberra. He was musing quietly to himself when the once familiar 
word arrives unbidden to his mind: Incommensurable – perhaps, he thought, a reflection on 




I’ve always loved that word. I love its sound. Its syllables. In 
commens…ura..ble - To be without common standard of 
measurement. 
 
Maybe I loved it in in the way we love our limits; few words or 
ideas refuse comparison; but this one does. It is the notion 
of running up against a genuine ‘whereof once cannot speak’ – 
and so seems enthralling. In naïve faith in metaphor’s power, I 
imagined qualities of objects could be transported anywhere, 
anyhow. No context seemed beyond transposition. 
 
The idea of incommensurablity – incomparability but with a 
flourish – was intoxicating. It carried a sense of constructed 
boundaries; perhaps too, the religious impulse – a threshold you 
cannot cross – even as a child Gerald Murnane desired, but never 
dared, to part by hand the Tabernacle’s inner hangings and reveal 
the cloths internal arrangements; its velvet folds and dark 
interstice.  
 
This sense entire seemed contained (or released) in the concrete 
– sher – sound, preceding the – urable – which sounded 
cuttingly, with finality: a foghorn through fog. 
 
It was the incommensurability of the world and its objects that 
led to a condition my hypochondria found a medical diagnosis 
for: abolomania. More colloquially; chronic indecisiveness. 
There was just no common standard of measurement for any 
two paths in a forked decision. Too many immeasurables. To 
much open-endedness.  
 
I think theories sharing starkly contrasting conceptual 
frameworks suffer this same incommensurability;  a lack of 
shared nomenclature disallows direct comparison. Conversation 
leads only to muddle, as the scientists are strictly speaking past 





You followed my erratic passage around the globe; seeking a 
resting place, somewhere to land that never seemed 
forthcoming.  Carrying only our backpacks that practice paired 
back to necessities. Sharehouse strangers became family 
in each town, city; by the surf coasts up east, in the gullies and  
temperate rainforest down south.  
 
Having suffered at the hands of indecisiveness, you 
knew and shared my condition, the enabling doubt of our chosen 
professions (vocations?) – a functional fiction of paralysis. 
We both knew the incommensurability as limit that gave 









A note on Constitutive Failure 
 
Brian Blanchfield writes in the opening passage of Proxies: Twenty-Four Attempts Towards a 
Memoir, “in sciences I think proxy additionally expresses a kind of concession to 
imprecision, a failure.” 
 
That is, what Ben Lerner put as the open question: how is a discourse of failure constitutive 
of the art of poetry, and not just a reason to turn away from it?  A question that, in what 
follows I’ll leave hovering. 
 
These correspondences have become failed correspondences by virtue of your 
nonresponse. Perhaps your not having even read them; are they piled up at this moment, 
yellowing at the bottom of your letter box? Unclicked in your Facebook messenger inbox?  
Maybe this failure too, is constitutive of this work’s success. 
 
A note on Quotation 
 
Borges, quoting Emerson, said “let us take care. Life itself may become a long quotation.” 
While Arendt claimed that Walter Benjamin’s greatest ambition was to produce a work 
consisting entirely of quotations; “the craziest mosaic technique imagineable.” His work 
attempted to capture the portrait of history in its most insignificant representations, its 
scraps, as it were. Which brings to mind a Wittgenstein bemoaning the fact that he never 
had time, or perhaps sense of humour enough, to write a philosophical treatise consisting 





Why is this such a temptation: why do we love quotation? Carson suggests it is the sense 
of banditry: “to loot someone else’s life or sentences and make off with a point of view.” 
This P.O.V. can be called objective because anything becomes an object if treated in this 
way; that is, if observed from beneath a microscopes refracting mirrors; words become a 
live specimen pressed between quotation marks, two slides of clear glass. 
 
So perhaps what I’ve produced here is about the security in vantage that emerges from an 
aggregation of quotations, where a muddle of arguments without pre-hoc organisation, 
surface from a type of analogical fortuitous flow. It’s a collage with sense, but that sense 
can’t be paraphrased afterwards, and no abstract can be written to reveal an underlying 
strata; the work’s skeleton. 
 
A Note On Arrangement  
 
The amorous is always already endowed with meaning; any love story already made to 
adhere to the form ‘love story’.  At this point, post romance, the subject is encouraged to 
conceive the love as something to ‘get over’ which having done so, they’ll be better for.  
The remnants are then pathologised; like a lingering tumor that having developed, has 
grown and remains to cause suffering – the final stage is expressing the love story; a kind 
of talk therapy, which functions as a curative from which the lover can then allow the 
growth to ‘pass away’. 
 
The love story then, is the tribute the lover must pay the world in order to be reconciled with 
that world.  Yet what does that reconciliation consist in? In thinking on the varying figures 
gathered here, it seems they must necessarily fail at classification; how to arrange the 
fragments? Via hierarchy? Temporality? How to avoid the temptation to ascribe an easy 
meaning, to impute a higher coherence? Barthes surmounts this difficulty by ascribing an 
arbitrary order to his own lover’s discourse: alphabetical. 
 
How should I respond I wondered?  Right or wrong, I maintained the chronological 
ordering of events and correspondence; in the hope that a narrative arc emerges. What 
does the reader gain from a chronological ordering, as opposed to the familiar, themed 
collection? You see the mind at work, all that is trivial, the distinctly human. 
 
You see the process of foment and growth to which we were not privy, the buried strata, 
before ideas crystalize. The mind at work, is always durational; within the process of time. 
In chronology we witness the way these ideas clustered about a given place in time, and 
how they fell among and in relation to what is otherwise dismissed as topical, personal – 
an ephemera of letters, obituaries, reviews, other short doodles and jottings. 
 
This mosaicking and temporal arc shouldn’t be understood to impart a higher sense; a 
gestalt of parts; that would imply more coherence than could be fairly said to exist. Instead, 
I take Barthes’ approach to the lovers “discourse” – Discursus; a term deriving from the 






 Barthes concludes these figures must be distributional but non-integrative – always 
remaining on the same level; it fails to integrate at a remove. We must be content with no 
transcendence, no deliverance – “no novel,” as Barthe’s writes - yet “(a great deal of the 
fictive).”  
 
So the goal is not to impart a higher sense, but to describe the figures or movements of a 
relationship - figures here used not in a rhetorical but choreographic sense - The bodies 
gesture as caught in action, not contemplated in repose. 
 
Like a face made beautiful only in movement 
 
A dance indistinguishable from the act of dancing  
 























No answer  
 
The amorous subject suffers anxiety because the loved object replies scantily or 
not at all to his language. Desperately trying to divert, to seduce, the lover imagines 
that by writing they are lavishing treasures of ingenuity, but these treasures have 





The fault is that the lover’s discourse is stifling to the other, who finds no place for her 
own language beneath this massive utterance. 
 
The subject realises belatedly, that they have imprisoned the loved object in a net of 
tyrannies; while he was once pitiable, now it seems he has become monstrous. As Barthes 
notes, “it is not that I keep the other from speaking; but I know how to make the pronouns 
shine.” 
 
Barthes ends his lover’s discourse with a terrible dream image – the other is disfigured by 
persistent silence and I, the one who speak, I too am disfigured; soliloquy makes me into 









The last letter concerned the way soliloquy culminates in silence. And isn’t that the most 
sensitive point of mourning: the fact that it means I must lose a language – the amorous 
language? No more “I love you’s” as Annie Lennox sings: “the language is leaving me.” 
Lennox picked up Barthes theme; the silencing.  
 










Electra is sitting on her neighbour’s porch under a shade cloth that dapples the light before 
it arrives. She has taken on the task of watering their plants. While she sits she enjoys how 
the light plays across her legs, her toes, how the cloth lifted by winds sets the light’s bands 
dancing across her whole body, a body that through shadow’s chiaroscuro play, is made 
continuous with the couch. Continuous with the deck, with the whole surrounds. She 
writes: 
 
Dear Junip.,  
 
“Light doesn’t fall, it lands, doesn’t even land 
Alights. 
It’s a more delicate thing. 
 
When I heard you were coming home to Canberra 
I thought of our bouncing bodies 
How they were forever, playing off one another. 
 
I was recently sober, and your return heralded a past 
That I wanted to make sleep 
If not nail down, at least anaesthetise 
 
If you can’t lobotomise the past 
It arrives all cortex,  
All explosive interconnected tissue, 
To muck up your latest creation; your  finely layered  
Baklava present. 
 
No pastry not even a Millefeuile 
Has enough buttered sheets  
To resist that pasts eruption. 
 
Ju, when we meet in the street of this  











Dear Electra,  
 
I’ve been thinking about the novel you might write: indulge me. 
 
“At home that night Electra dreams a piano too many octaves wide. She has the curious 
sensation that it is not her dream, but dream pressed on her perhaps. 
 
That day, at her favourite cafe: though unfinished her coffee cup is swept up by the owner, 




On paper jotting in blue, she writes: my character will enter the world, given over to a series of 
unheeded signs. 
 
She orders a blueberry muffin and choc-chip Friand, nibbles at the muffin in-between 




Given a limited vocabulary of gestures, she writes, my character will be made to repeat herself to no affect. 
 
Friends drop in to visit, they sit across from her, order coffee, talk of little things; 
continuations, and past occasions. All seems to exist in relation to her. She feels centered: 
in the arms of an attentive world.  
 
It is not her but the café that heralds the migration, she later realises. A Copernican 
revolution takes place – she is not the centre of anything. 
 
She will experience a disappointing gravitational dip around her navel at this thought. She 
writes: My character shall not narrate experience propositionally; she won’t know how. To transcribe 
feelings in words, the base ekphrastic act – will be beyond her. 
 
My character would ever be recreating a sequence of sensations as felt from the inside, instant by instant.   
 
the last to leave her table is a male acquaintance from a Bakhtin tutorial. After slowly and 
uninvitedly attempting to explain heteroglosia to Electra, he insists against protest on 
paying for her muffin and coffee. He glows at her proprietorially before too leaving.  
 
My character, she decides, will be made to author the actions of a world in which she cannot find herself 





Her primary characteristic will be impressionability, she will be always already constituted – in relation. 
 
She will have an insatiable desire to explain. Yet continue to refer to boundaries that are inexplicable.  
 
Her attempted explanations will serve only to enact an impotence, that then becomes self-perpetuating.  
Uncontained she shall bleed over her own edges.  
 












“The important thing is the love” 
Electra wrote, 







On the subway shunting to southern cross station, Juniper is late for a conference. He 
looks down and checks his phone. A message has been received, but Electra hasn’t written 
him, the computer in his pocket tells him when messages are read, there’s no longer any 
assumption of ignorance, of innocence. 
 
Earlier that morning he’d found a psychoanalytic term; that encapsulated his project, 
Abreactive. OED tells him the term refers to the expression and thereby release of an 
emotion previously repressed – that to express humiliation, is to re-live it, and that reliving 
is essential to releasing. 
 
What does reliving demonstrate? That it wasn’t as bad as it appeared. That it could be 
looked at directly. Even shared.  To sit down to write Electra was abreactive, he concluded. 
A slow release valve. But what if it takes her reception for the sense of release to wash? 
 
He put on headphones and tuned in to a podcast in which Wayne Koestenbaum extols 
upon Maggie Nelson’s virtues. This led to reflection on the orchestrated clutter of the 
bedroom of her bluets...  
 
Looking back, the subject Blue in that book now appeared a phantasma, but if that’s true, 
he wonder, how does so much meaning gravitate about a weightless body? Did some spirit 
pull those fragments together, limn an emergent sense?  
 
He thought on Hegel, telling how he never wrote ‘reason is spirit’ to assert some fact, but 
to lay reason side by side with spirit and allow their meanings to pleasantly intermingle in 




Opening a book at random is never a random act  
Don’t you think?  
Not if you’ve read the book.  
 
Check your phone, look at your messages: you’ve read the book. 
 
You know that the intensity with which you’ve read a passage 
will bore a furrow between its pages, indent the loved lines  
 
What we pretend to ourselves is random is precognizant: actual 
attention, indented.  
 
Accident is here no accident. 
 











The café terrace filled with men, idling, loafing. They wore straw hats, kempt beards, 
comfortably baggy pants. Leisurely passtime accoutrements lay besides their coffees; 
newspapers, Sudoku, a novel. When young women enter and sit on the terrace, the men 
gaze intently. The idle men peer over the young women’s shoulders, admire their bare 
clavicles. Not even attempting to veil their interest.  
 
Juniper sat awaiting his coffee and Electra’s long overdue response.  Wondering if there 
were some resemblance between himself and these lecherous men. He wrote down some 
thoughts: 
 
“Perhaps you are wise to refuse reply. Perhaps innately you possess the knowledge 
that Eros denotes a want for what is necessarily lacking. That should you reply 
with your attentions, loving rejoinders, that would only serve to immediately 
deflate my desire for what is absent. As Simone Weil claims, and experience 
demonstrates, our desires are contradictory: “I want the person I love to love me. 
If he is, however, totally devoted to me, he does not exist any longer and I cease 
to love him.” 
 
I could adopt Jane Austen’s ridiculous character of a Mr Collins, who perseveres 
in wilful self-deception, denying the possibility of Elizabeth’s refusal to his 
proposition, ‘You are uniformly charming!” he insists, assuming it the established 
custom of her sex, indicative of her feminine elegance, to reject a man on first 
application, in a wish to increase his love by suspense. 
 
Fun to indulge wishful thinking, to read into your refutation an implicit, if secret, 
impulse to remain the object of my longing. It is to once more subsume your 
actions under the rubric of Eros’s logic – a refusal to admit to the possibility of 
your mere disinterest. 
 
Still, it’s an entertaining idea, and intended or not, it feels creepy though true to 









“If Jealousy were a dance, it would be a pattern of 




I recall that I wrote my first aubade, for lovers separated at dawn stealing away with the 
new day’s light under the alert guard of their valiant and true watchmen. I wrote it after 
falling in love with Erik Satie’s triad Avant-dernières pensées the centrepiece of which takes 
the Aubade as its theme. I wrote it in an overheating apartment in Weberg, while you were 
elsewhere in the early throes of new love. 
 
The notion of the Aubade, or Alba, struck me as fantastical, purely literary device of 
narrative not found in the world for one reason – the character of the Watchman. The 
Watchman seemed unreal to me: who would stand vigil, awake throughout the night simply 
to alert the lovers, lost to time, of the approaching dawn? Such a sacrifice for another’s 
bliss seemed credible only in fiction.  
 
But then, courtly love existed in a time preceding the depreciation of sex’s currency; and 
further a time where nobility and chivalry found their vertex in literary fiction, where 
spiritual attainment posed as erotic-desire sublimated.  
 
The elicit seems always to have been morally elevating – the humiliating entwined with the 
exalting, even as Flaubert’s Emma finds in infidelity’s futility some form of transcendent 
yearning. Transcendent yearning is what transgressive sexuality has come to mean quietly 
to some amongst the queer community, myself (perhaps) included. I felt it illustrated in 
the opening pages of Maggie Nelson’s Argonauts, by the way being fucked in the ass with 
a dildo is made to convey a kind of irreverent spiritual attainment. It’s a conceit I have 
time for. 
 
I wrote the aubade from the standpoint of the displaced; I was the jealous lover on the 
outside. Looking back now, jealously I discover is not what the poem is about. The poem 
sets the scene of jealousy, jealousy is a figure the reader is intended to identify with the 
narratorial voice. But the poem’s intention is antithetical to jealousy; the poem is 
explorative, via Ekstasis – the narrator consciously inhabiting the position of jilted lover 
in order to stand outside of it… 
 
But what I want to write you is of a different Aubade, Larkin’s Aubade, and the Special Fear 
he captures in it. Larkin doesn’t speak of a jealous observer or separated lovers. His aubade 
seems ultimately about loneliness. 
 
I work all day, and get half-drunk at night.  
Waking at four to soundless dark, I stare.  
In time the curtain-edges will grow light.  




Unresting death, a whole day nearer now,  
Making all thought impossible but how  
And where and when I shall myself die.  
 
He writes that the curtain-edge grown light at dawn’s approach, chasing away what’s really 
always there – unresting death. Larkin lacked the love throughout the night, prior to the 
curtain’s-edge grown light, that served as a means to forget, or postpone knowledge of the 
sure-extinction that we travel towards, to be lost in always. 
 
The mind blanks at the glare. Not in remorse — 
The good not done, the love not given, time  
Torn off unused— 
 
What is this glare that the mind blanks at, the conceptual-sun we may never look at directly; 
but can steal only oblique glances of? Larkin was right, this is a special way of being afraid, 
a way that: No trick dispels.  And what if the lover’s Aubade was a means of staying that 
Special Fear till dawn?  
 
The walls of our room were red brick, burls of blue and white granite roughed its surface. 
The dawn met us, not at a curtain’s edge, but in strips, through the blind’s horizontal slats. 
The light fallen unevenly on the walls, leaving chiaroscuro impression along your spine 
and back. The dawn met us bodies entwined, limb’s movement’s whispering incantations 
that sped away that special fear. Slowly the light would strengthen, the room take shape. It 
would depict the contours of two bodies, a single white sheet, a dark mahogany wardrobe. 






Through seven windows 
 
“This is an Aubade  
Through seven windows 
Between lovers  
Separated at dawn”  
 
“This is courtly love, 
 The human parting at day’s peeking”  
“This is a serenade  
A serenata, A cantata 
Eulogistic, in the open air,  
An evening piece plucked on a lute” 
 
What was mine? 
“Was it a dirge,  
A somber song.  
Dirige. Domine. Deus.  
A lament  
For the dead.” 
 
What Alba did I interrupt when I knocked and cried out,  
What final words between clandestine lovers? 
Poetry or prose? 
I the encroaching spouse? 
 
And where was the silent sentry? 
Whilst I, busy writing them into a personal mythology 
Asked lips pursed, pen drumming the table top,  
“How do you compose a parting at dawn?” 













As homage?  
“Implication” 
As in a murder? 
 
Sentences expatriated from their context  
made to live in a foreign poem 
 
A form of lifting & forgetting 
 








Dear J.,  
 
Books a friend told me, and by extension libraries, 
were infinite giving. 
 
She said: every book in the world is out there 
waiting to be read by me. But maybe here’s a lesson 
for you: 
 
The gift, you see, to be marked truly as a gift must 
be offered without the expectation of reciprocity. 
 
Otherwise, the gift  









I’ve learned it’s a graceful thing when someone makes space to hear you.  
Even a full stop can feel too pointed, too blunt, 
for you to speak into them.  
‘Them’ feels too plural; the relation of  
opening one window onto another window calls for respect. 
 
It’s an opening that can only be done gracefully.  
Ultimately it’s you opening onto you. 
 
Pronouns fail us 
 
If you can add to this conversation 
That would be appreciated 







The Part on Returning 
 
 “How painful to be recalled, to be mitigated, to have one’s self adulterated, 
mixed up, become part of another.”  
       Virginia Woolf 
 
Do you recall Virginia Woolf’s character Neville musing in The Waves? She gives the above, 
hygienic description of friendship, of love. As if love were a form of adulteration, a sullying 
that rendered your substance impure. 
 
I’m back in your town, amidst all the familiar qualities. I’m eating a cantaloupe and drinking 
from a pot of Clair’s. The pot is festooned with quibbling, squabbling, canoodling geese. I 
strain loose dandelion through it. The tea is nearly black.  It’s spring and the scent is thick 
and inebriant. Why don’t we name smells? I think. At best they’re described as properties, 
relata of other, named objects.  
 
The table is littered with wilting flower petals, scattered filters. Interwoven geometries 
catch the corner of the eye from a rug slung over a coniferous branch for airing, or possibly 
affect. 
 
Chloe describes her latest project, photo’d nudes whose pigments have been averaged out, 
reduced to blocks, like a colour palate in a paint store but of human flesh, anatomy. Chris’ 
lip pink, Juniper’s nipple brown. 
 
“We’ve just got to survive,” R. says. He prints high-adhesive logos that read ‘capitalism 
kills’ in black block on white – identical to the warnings on Tobacco’s plain packaging – 
tacks them to ATMs, to 50 dollar bills. C. is in matching floral patterns – shorts, jacket, 
cap; upholstery-attired. Vic is in warm tones. Pirate the one-eyed king parrot chatters away, 
nibbles wisteria off the fence. 
 
I watch it all from behind the window, hands sunk in the sink, warm and wet. Good to be 
back soaping dishes, I thought. Replacing vegetable matter with suds. Old friends to meet 
eyes with, meet smiles, familiar embraces.  Good to meet the casual work you do all your 
life, cleaning, washing; work that Khalil Gibran claimed kept you in pace with the earth 
and its turning. A means not to forget that there are so many hands, scraping dahl off so 
many pots in each moment.  
 
Hearing movement I look up, the same vague smile I’d had at those thoughts plastered in 
a silly way across my face. There’s a pair I don’t know, but have seen about. One is short 
and bearded with a black witchy hat. The other is bald, and emaciate, I can feel the outlines 
of his skull. They both nod to me pleasantly through the window. I raise a soapy hand. 
They settle onto the couch and continue their conversation. The skull-face is talking about 





From what I catch he says something to the effect that Heisenberg, as many physicists of 
the time, was nearly as famous for aphorism as for his physical discoveries. One thing he 
said, echoing Eastern mystics and German pedants, is that we observe: “not nature itself 
but nature exposed to our method of questioning.” 
 
Jack Kerouac, I thought, creatively misinterpreted Buddhist philosophy, making of it a 
private stylized mythology that served his own particular interests. The same could well 
said of queer auto-theorist Maggie Nelson, for whom ideas took on mildly distorted forms 
when thrown into the kiln of her memoir, they droop away from the wheel of their original 
character, though consequently all carry a little of Nelson, and cohere or at least appear to. 
 
My hope, I reflect, is that in what follows I can  carry on this project without it dissolving 
into a poshlost – a Russian term for fake emotion- implying an unearned nostalgia. As 
Nabokov characterises the term, it is: “not only the obviously trashy but mainly the falsely 
important, the falsely beautiful, the falsely clever, the falsely attractive.” 
 















In Canberra we rode the circuit loops connecting the Inner-North; swam in Dickson pool, 
bought our coconut ice-creams takeaway from rainbow dreams. Last time I saw you, you 
reached across and dropped a marshmallow squarely in my tonic.  I watched the icing 
dissolve amongst the bubbles. When you got home, I probably wanted to know what you 
did all night.  
 
Listening to David Attenborough later – at the forefront of my mind was how dust made 
its way to being snow flaked ... Afterwards: One of us said “there is a partisan nature to 
remembering”  I forget who. That forgetting, too, is probably partisan.  
 
Last time we met the familiar songs we played by the lake were picked up threads of older 
conversations; but if they’re threads it’s to clothes we wore some years back; there’s a Shab 
& Spent quality now - we both know the fits off.  
 
A lot of life abuts itself here, in this familiar radius. A university town always feels teeming; 
the co-op a hotpot for idealism, self-seeking. Ideas here are endemic: their transmission 
rapid-acting, allowing for change, steady growth – but balanced by the fact that the groups 
we circulate between form closed systems; not unlike the adjacent ivory towers hemmed 
by papery moat. 
 
Chris in the tiny home they built on the corner of Miller; Stacey’s bell tent in our backyard, 
pecked at by chooks. Michael was ever building onto his makeshift-gazebo dwelling, 
adding fodder-insulation by the sheet, materials for a few-dollars from the green shed. Carl, 
resident Beatle, just lived in his van; face pressed into the roof. You’d wake to his song; 
strawberry fields, Rubber Soul’s fuzz bass $ harmonium through the window in the early 
AM. 
 
9 of us and lovers, made good in that tiny space, the square-meter kitchen, single outside 
composting toilet - the shower with shattered roller door. Sex was a negotiation; alternating 
between speech and silence; sometimes muffled behind thin plaster walls. ‘Close’ 
community, we might come to call it - a metonymy - resisting poly, and its implications of; 
a scene, a be-in - was there something impersonal in that?  
 
Back of the toilet door, Emergent Strategy quotes pinned like biblical injunctions. The 








The next day Juniper dug up an excerpt from an old journal entry Electra had written 
many years ago, when they were still and only housemates. She was seeing a guy Lenny at 
the time. Juniper read back through it, several times. 
 
Electra’s journal, 27 November, 2014 
 
“The next day I saw Juniper and we had some breakfast. I decided that it would 
be prudent to begin cleaning out my room, so I packed up all my books, took 
down the posters, cleaned off my desk, emptied my draws and moved my furniture 
into the shed. Lenny and I spent a long time getting ready again, taking showers. 
Juniper was generous with his milk. The last I saw of him he was running to a 
dentist appointment. He told me, before he departed, that the night before he had 
had a particularly revelatory dream. He was climbing Mount Everest, hobbling up 
the sheer ice-face, dressed only in his big, navy-blue bathrobe. I had seen him in 
the robe a lot. He was one of those people who liked to walk with it loosely 
fastened when he passed from the shower to his room. I often imagined that his 
children--should he have children--would find this display of sexuality, the chest 
hairs matted by the shower, the muscles not taut from the diverging direction of 
any garment, rather threatening. Following the dream--a dream heightened by the 
afterglow of hallucinogenic mushrooms, he carefully removed his bathrobe from 






He decided to send it on to her, not knowing if she would receive or even read it. He 






I always found an odd reassurance in appreciating old writers, their foibles, reading 
my own predicaments into their situations. I’d seek tell-tale signs of kinship. 
Thinking of Ron Padgett wrapped in his scruffy old pea jacket, uncaring, or 
oblivious to, what others might make of it – collar turned up in the New York 
winter, hands snug in deep pockets, absently fingering lint. 
 
I don’t have anything monumental or metaphoric to say about my jacket  
It’s just a pleasure to remember it and how good it felt on me  
Then one day I started wearing something else  
and a few years later I gave the jacket to someone I liked I don’t recall who 
 
The idea of Padgett, penniless yet feeling abundant as he ran a hand through racks 
in an old second-hand store at the corner of Bowery and Bleecher. A thrifty man, 
who cared for his jacket – which he makes a point of noting that while scruffy, was 
not un-clean. 
 
This recalls Diderot’s dressing gown, how it served as a companion; brushing the 
dust from his books, wiping dried ink from his quill. How it wore the service it had 
given, as transparent and unabashed history. The opening words to Diderot’s 
famous essay on the topic bemoan the loss: why didn’t I keep it? It was used to me, and 
I to it. 
 
It should be admitted that he liked the affect it wrought aesthetically; it announced 
the litterateur; pointed to the writer at his craft. By contrast, his regretted 
replacement garment described only opulence; in it he proclaims: No one knows who 
I am. 
 
Diderot’s storm crow: My friends, fear the touch of wealth! Is a cry taken to heart by 
generations of future would-be indigent writers, wearing the trappings of the 
penniless, dressed in comfortable rags of common cloth, the writer surrounded in 
their desky-tombs, wholeheartedly seeking to embody the mendicant life of the 
scholarly aesthete-ascetic. As a friend once wrote: 
 
an unbuttoned shirt, the shiver,  
over several pages left blank, possibly for effect.  










From their separate vantages, Juniper and Electra had reflected on the last event they had 




He was attached to sounds and because of his attachment 
could not let sounds be just sounds. He needed to attach 
himself to the emptiness, to the silence. 
 
 John Cage  
 
The band were tooting and pulling their instruments, making thrusts antagonistic to the 
audience. Electra watched with her hands. 
 
That’s just the trouble, she thought. A musician can train herself out of the habit of 
organising sound. Can see watts, some sort of meter. Can reduce sound to its constituent 
Hertz, decibels, its frequency. 
 
The piano and the octave can decomposed into its circle of fifths, she thought. But what 
are life’s units? A painter can pick up on colours that reflect every wavelength, given the 
fact that the colours we perceive are relational, dependent on context. A painter can 
conceive of a world without colour. She thought. A chromatic blank slate. But can I 
imagine the inability to imagine? 
 






A theory I heard, has it that at the first thought of leaving a party 
you should gather your coat and leave. And that the same applies 
in reading a poem. Call it: the Irish exit. Does the same apply to 
leaving a relationship? 
 
After our parting I was Plato’s half-formed lover, a being in search 
of a whole. Originated in pairs, bound in one body, the lovers were 
cleaved for some offence the gods had forgotten. The halves, newly 
separated, were then forced to wander, seeking to reunite. 
 
After our severance I faced the elements, open predation, 
exposure. Attachment is probably a primate’s innate response to 
evolutionary pressure – probably – I misplaced my attachment. 
You had left, you were the source of my vulnerability. Still you were 









THE NATIONAL LIBRARY  was all sharp geometries, clean marble. They met on the 
steps, he walking jauntily perhaps unsure whether to spring was appropriate. 
 
She rose to take him in. She comments on a copper earing in his left, he fiddles with it, 
almost shields it. It seems like a shared-memory worn for the occasion, a laboured 
remembrance. 
 
They sit on a field of grass, a buttered moon rises to face them. They talk differentially. 
Aim for satellites, away from the planet’s body. Only later ready to leave do they broach 
it. 
 
“It’s okay you stopped replying,” he said. Though it sounded like concession, with the 
subtext: it’s okay because it has to be okay, because it’s done. And her choice.  
 
Why did I stop? She didn’t say this aloud. 
 
They left and made for the vehicle. The van was hollow, panels removed, innards a jumble 
of repurposed steel, welding appliances, off-white spray paint. She climbed in the 
passenger seat.  
 
“Silence can articulate a resistance to the question, a narrative withheld.” He said this with 
too much conviction. 
 
Facing away from her, he doesn’t see the stink-eye she sends him. He turns the key in the 
ignition, the engine kicks up, chokes then is satiated. They pull out of the park. 
 
She thought: Or maybe it’s that silence can circumscribe a domain of authority not to intrude upon. 
Or be intruded upon. 
 
The dash was peopled with dried plants, familiar gathered objects some of which she 
remembered, she thought, that evoked quietly. She poked amongst them for 
conversations, but nothing stuck. 
 
“But refusal remains in relation to the scene of address,” Juniper doesn’t let up. “Will 
flowers grow here? You never did say.” 
 
And she doesn’t, and needn’t. Sun setting behind them they cross the bridge. Stripped light 
peels off the hot dash as they drive. Then works across his face. 
 
Golden Hour, she thinks. Thinks on her camera on her desk at home,  in dusty-disrepair. A 
mirror or lens in need of adjustment. She thinks of the wheeled film black in the camera’s 






THE NATIONAL LIBRARY  was all sharp geometries, clean marble. We met on the 
steps, then found a cement ledge overlooking the lake. We sat. 
The fountain spuming over your shoulder. 
 
I handed you the draft manuscript, name and title printed neatly on the cover. Your 
eyebrows rose at the thickness; well, now that’s a lot of murmuring. We both laughed. 
 
So is the principle, the awaited modus ponens moment: if I hand you the book, a weight 
is removed? something inside me gets satisfied? Legs crossed on the ledge, you comment on 
my funny shoes; their five fingers. We share avocado and rice crackers. You’re still trying 
to gain weight, but will only eat healthy fats. 
 
We discuss our tentative romantic efforts with the same sex, the new scripts we’ve both 
encountered, the difficult navigations. We laugh and talk together, and it feels like old 
times, but we’re aware that it’s not. Still. 
 
The mosquitoes are coming out. We decide to go somewhere; there are things you didn’t 
say years ago, that need saying, and I want to hear them. 
 On a log by the wetlands the full moon is up. We sit in the woodchips with a gin and 
tonic, some beet-juice in it. I’ve asked you to unburden yourself, offered myself up to it. 
But you’re hesitant to land a blow. 
 
Can you say the things now that couldn’t be said then? Eventually you can, and you do. 
We sit and it reverberates afterwards.  You pass me the lighter. We share a cigarette. Are 
we lighter? Is anything relieved? Maybe that’s been my mistake all these years, maybe relief 






Dear Electra,  
 
I have had some thoughts on accountability since last we spoke ... Forgive me if I need to 
filter those thoughts through others ideas. 
 
Nietzsche claims in Zur Genealogie der Moral that we become reflective about our actions 
only after injuries have been inflicted - accusations have been levelled, and the subject is 
made to consider whether they are indeed the perpetrator. We are asked to avow the causal 
link between our actions and the suffering that follows, to take responsibility for that link. 
In short we are made to give an account of ourselves.  
 
While Butler wrote that in the face of an accusation from another (“was it you?”) we must 
self-narrate. In the same vein punishment, Nietzsche asserted, is the making of a memory 
- accusation asks: what relation do I bear to that preceding self?  
 
So I reconstruct my deeds - either owning the action and qualifying it, or defending against 
the charge - locating the cause elsewhere: gender norms made me do it, it was the 
internalized misogyny, the Bildungsroman narrative, the alcohol as placeholder for my 
autonomy.  
 
Yet Nietzsche’s take on accountability relies upon an accusation being made by one 
desiring to induce fear, to metre out punishment - but I believe, or hope, your address had 
a different valence? If a question stems from a desire to know and understand, if it is not 
fuelled by a desire to cut off, then the responding attempt to explain and narrate is not 
prompted by a fear of punishment. It asks: can we really hear each other over the 
disconsolate jangle of our shattered relation- in violence’s aftermath?  
 
When you spoke, I wanted your accusations to fall freely, I didn’t raise a doubt against 
your narrative. I didn’t want you to feel inhibited, I planned to be a witness for the truth 
in what you said. But in hindsight I wonder if you hoped for a different take on events… 
were you asking me to give an account of myself? One which I failed to provide, by  
responding as mute listener, acting as only witness.  
 
If giving an account of oneself is a narrative practice – and it is – then it requires delineating 
a set of sequential events, offering plausible transition phases, adopting a narratorial voice 
and authority - it asks: can I sing my own song?  
 
Even a narrative of humiliation, the song I might sing, if sung with authority, implies 
redemption - the prior transition is implicit in the singing. You can see it in Camus’ 
narrative self-description In The Fall - lo, he all but narrates, bear witness: I am changed.  
 
Is there almost something indecent in this - to find yourself on the other side of disgrace 




extensive with human will. Systematic prosecution turns that aggression inwards - we 
construct an internal world of guilty conscience. It’s a type of madness: to see oneself as 
sinning, as reprehensible, without possibility of atonement. Yet self-beratement allows us 
to live a second life, to generate reflexivity by constructing oneself as an object of 
reflection. Therein lies freedom in falling - when you parted, I began looking.  
 
I don’t want to explain away, I don’t want to embody a narrative of redemption that leaves 
me on the other side, clean whiskered. But if you ask me to give an account of myself - if 
you say, “was it you?” I have to ask what relation do I bear to that preceding self?  
 
That’s a relation I’m still trying to figure.  No less ambivalent than the unfigured relation 












But then if you are tacitly asking for an explanation… to attempt to explain myself I must 
pretend that a narrative coherence is achievable; a belief that presumes unlimited 
knowability of oneself, and of others. No exhaustive account of our actions can exist 
without a form of violence, without plastering over an inaccessible truth.  That’s difficult 
to sit with. 
 
It doesn’t mean however that we should cease in our efforts to articulate what has been 
inarticulate – what the psychoanalyst Bollas refers to as the unthought known. We can engage 
in this partial project, recognising translation will never be exhaustive.  
 
Recognising that we are constituted by things long ago inaugurated, now patterned – 
inaccessible dependencies and impressionability – preceding conscious awareness. To this 
unconscious material we will never possess full access, full mastery.  Butler put it: the “I” 
cannot knowingly recover what impels it, since its formation: “remains prior to its 
elaboration as reflexive, as self-knowing.” 
 
It’s easy to forget all this.  
 
Time and again I’ve found myself taken in by the seamlessness of a good story, in lieu of 
the inaccessible truth of the person. The truth of a relation. I don’t know your narrative 
construction of our relationship, but I know, like mine, it is partial. And I understand 
something of how colouration works. 
 
I’ve been reading Coetzee’s latest book, the ‘good story’. When I tell other’s my life, Coetzee 
asks, should I make of it a well-formed artefact? He points to the compulsion we feel to produce 
a well-shaped story, rather than narrating the true story, because true stories are incoherent, 
inconsistent, their meaning overdetermined.  
 
Thinking of Coetzee’s predicament I realise my last letter was such a failure to narrate. 
This happens, it feels, because the chronology of occurrences comes to feel irrelevant, 
arbitrary: how to put facts and events together? What order? What relation?  
 
Caught in the impossibility of accounting, what I give you instead is a narrative of 
questioning, what it is to narrate and its impossibility. Self-reflexivity traps me in the 
structure of ‘story breaking down’ - an old formalism. 
 
I cannot give an account of myself, because my selfhood is irremediably fractured; the 
narrative thread irretrievable.  So the letter I give you is no narrative, but the staging of a 
scene; I recruit you as witness to the scene of my own opacity to myself. As Butler might 





This wouldn’t be so powerful a strategy if you stood as just one particular ‘other’ – but 
rather, in my addressing you, you are made universal; you as receiver, become allegory for 
reception itself. A further crime to add to my list of sins: you have become universalised, 







The enabling condition for desire 
 
The condition of possibility for giving a lover’s discourse 
for a narrative account 
– is the inaccessibility of any genuine source story – 
it’s irrecoverability:  
foreclosure. 
 
Does this entail the failure of fiction? 
Or is the absence of a source story what situates fiction 
as the only means of accessing the thing? 
There being no original 
 
Hence Proxies, 
the object science takes as stand in for what is unavailable. 
Is misrecognition, then, 











That’s just the trouble, she mutters 
You try  
And situate-me. 
find an object’s place in a common classificatory scheme... 
But soon its shape is all blurs and fades.  








In the days that followed Juniper walked the familiar streets of Canberra. His experience 
of the city mapped onto the ghostly impressions of the time they had shared together there. 
Buying red-bean ice-cream together in Dickson,  cycling the bike-routes of O’Connor, he 
found himself questioning the reality of their relation which, at the time, had felt so 
transparent, simple and knowable. Now he found hiself questioning its substance, its 
colour, its taste. Nothing meant what he thought it meant.  All conviction, he concluded, 
dissolves in the light & turbulence of a more original questioning. 
 
Years earlier he had read Heidegger on learning to identify the ontic question, questions 
such as – how far is the earth from the moon? What is the size of that crater? Questions which 
terminates in an answer – and that, he claimed, in settling on an answer, renders itself 
trivial. At the time Juniper had puzzled over the meaning of Heidegger’s work. Assumed 
it a poetic, Germanic mysticism more than a reasonable depiction of things as they were. 
 
Electra, however, never understood how to love a question that was allowing of an answer, 
and so was exhaustible. To answer it was to render it inert, as having a terminal destination. 
How could someone love these questions, and what good is your love if it makes its object 
redundant? 
 
To stay with the questions, to learn to love the questions like Rilke’s rooms behind locked 
doors was what was sought. Naïve perhaps, the notion of one day living into the answers. 
 
When they talked about productive silence; did they really mean boundless questions, 
questioning that doesn’t bottom out in a fact?  What is unanswerable is inexhaustible. Why, 
Juniper wondered, did they treat the question of their relation as ontic, as knowable? It 
was conviction that exhausted them. 
 
Heidegger described following these questions as stepping onto the path to homecoming. Perhaps 
homecoming is apt. Like Eliot, you began with the questions that set you adrift took you 
travelling, and your homecoming will be to look upon the questions as a home and know 
them for the first time. 
 
What we are to each other, he thought, is a question that’s not looking for an answer, that 










We said don’t stop on a set of facts 
Don’t stop at a question 
They’re not red lights,  
And I thought: don’t stop. Okay fair enough,  
a conversation that stops is done,  
dull.  
But stops are important. Still. Knowing how to pace the flow, to pause,  
To see the end, when it’s there. 
 
I’ve been thinking about family  
Dad was always safe really healthy. 
My model for it, for well-regulated good health 
But I felt 
Like I was going to die most of the time 
So figured I  
Must be living closer to something. 
 
Dad wanted out too.  
Is transitioning our coming of age tale?  
Or Transitioning is a question you can live? 
 
I never did like the rest of the world in around me 
It all felt too close 
Now I’m campy and horny 
the marsh flies up about my throat 
And desire’s in my belly 
How to desire honestly? To unlearn my Ps and Qs  
 
Are we moving out of what’s polite? 
Or is that a stage, back into politeness  
The way we learnt to make for the door like we meant it 
I’m leaving 
Just to come back in  






Days later strolling down alongside Lake Burley Griffin, reflecting on Electra’s message 
Juniper considered diving in to cleanse himself. Then recalled the warnings of blue-green 
algae blooms, and the inflatable dingy he and Electra had once taken out to an island in 
the middle of the manmade lake. He imagined the jellyfish that could not live in the 






Tomas Tranströmer’s poem ‘Baltics’ concerns a sudden inundation of jellyfish in a harbour 
channel. He describes them pumping themselves along, as flowers after a sea burial. And 
like flowers at sea he writes of the jellyfish: 
 
If you lift them out of the water 
All of their shape disappears 
As when an indescribable truth is lifted out 
Of the silence 
And formulated into a lifeless Mass – yes 
They are untranslatable 
 
It seems a patent frustration perhaps universal in writing to continually butt up against the 
ineptitude of language. But then, Rilke might add, that silence is all for the good. That it is 
best we let each impression and each germ of a feeling come to completion wholly in itself, 
in the dark, in the inexpressible beyond the reach of one’s own Intelligence. 
 
Of Tranströmer, I echo Teju Cole, who wrote: “I turn to him when I wish to come as 
close as possible to what cannot be said.” In Preludes Tranströmer talks of two truths 
approaching each other, one from inside, the other from outside, and it’s where they meet 
that we have a chance to catch sight of ourselves. 
 
It’s not as if the incommensurability of language and experience is something new, it’s not. 
Isn’t that what poems are? Little machines that make things happen, with a mechanism of 
action that, whilst unknown, doesn’t fail to affect the body and its sensorium? To disorient 
in a way familiar yet reliably foreign? Joseph Campbell wrote: 
 
 Wherefrom words turn back, 
 Together with the mind, not having attained 
 
Not having attained, describes that self-same mystery both beyond and within all things. 
Concepts retreat. 
 
Recall when we would kayak down the Tamar estuary when my parents lived out whoop 




buried beneath the mud? We would wade out, return with foot soles beautifully shredded, 
too cold to bleed.  
 
The summer after we parted, I headed off and swam beneath the warm rain, and around 
me hundreds of jellyfish rose to the surface. How did they intuit an impulse to rise at that 
time, do you think, vibrations from the surface? 
 
I recall treading water, watching their delicate, seemingly effortless pull through the liquid 
atmosphere; a synchronic ballet set, psychedelic undulations, like bellows or the heart’s 
pumping. Thing change, however, as soon as they’re drawn from the river (as I discovered 
when emerging moments later gasping to the surface, stinging tentacles wrapped about my 
arms). What changes?  
 
They leave their element immobile. Sodden rubber rags. All lustre in movement, 






Can you still forget yourself in Chifley Library? 
 
“The idea of “logic” itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a  
more original questioning.” 
    Heidegger 
 
I first met Electra when she went by Tom, and the pronoun ‘He’, years ago on the 
basement floor of Chifley library. – I could say ‘He/Him’, but the additional ‘Him’ feels 
like a superfluous convention, as if one’s pronouns might change should they take the 
direct or indirect object. 
 
But on the basement of Chifley, all the oldest manuscripts lay untouched between 
‘compactors’ moveable steel shelves which you’d part with a twist of the wrench, opening 
them enough to slip between. I once nearly crushed an elderly gentleman with a cane 
between those sliding shelves. 
 
On seeing me Electra dropped some sheaths of paper, I helped her gather them up, to add 
to the stack of books in her backpack. In the months that followed she would develop 
severe back pain from hauling a foot of fine print hardbacks, on her daily bike ride up 
Dryandra hill. I remember we had greeted each other amiably, if startled to be encountered 
in such an out of the way catacombed corner of the university. I invited her round for 
dinner that night. We hugged in parting. 
 
Two years later I recall visiting Electra in Sydney, how we had changed. We ate eggplant 
pizza, shared some vaped THC, the strength of which I was unaccustomed to. We went 
out.  
 
Electra, not Tom – I was filtering out her dead name, treading cautiously in pronouns, 
retraining my tongue – was going to treat me to an ice-cream. Locking the door she paused, 
then unlocked it, returned inside. I think I heard the refrigerator door vacuum-sealing, the 
cool rush of air and the motor fan rumbling. Then she was back out and we were walking, 
a tight role of icy 20 dollar bills moist in her palm.  
 
When we were out, café staff asked how her cash got so cold. Whoring has its 
idiosyncrasies, she laughed.  Her cash in-flow came from the sugar daddying of dodgy 
money-funnelling funereal directors & substance dealers. Mine from a grudgingly tight-
fisted allocation by the state. 
 
I envied Electra’s career moves in many ways; she was quicksilver brilliant, subtle and 
sensitive, as an 11-year-old she’d been on gifted-child talk shows, been awarded the 
Premier’s prize in her state. Her parent’s expectant academic shoe-in. Boy were they 
disappointed by ‘his’ then ‘her’ change in career path. But she saw in advance the 





In the Under Commons Fred Moten captures the furtive sincerity, the contradictory impulses 
that as university dwellers we’re made to live under: the only legitimate relation to the academy 
today is a criminal one.  
 
Fighting for grants, struggling below minimum wage, while we ground out unread papers. 
How to stand with integrity, in authentic relation, to an institution which won’t let you 
live? Which circumscribed your teaching, Which reduced you to an input-output machine 
for 6000 word articles. I thought on our old library, on Chifley, on the paths we had taken. 
We turned back to our books. We kept churning – It was all we thought we had. 
 
Another two years later and we walk together around our old campus. She is confident, 
her spine straight, she passes, and can walk these streets with little fear of violence. Inside 
this security, we have space enough to both observe the union hub reduced to a 
construction site, so too the remains of the college I attended. Only days after the same 
Chifley basement suffered a flooding. Librarians would in the months that followed 
catalogue the absences, texts that had in these floods, all but gone out of existence. 
 
AD Hope, too, flooded next door, the archaeological collections,  
the 50+ years of personal detritus - the books. 
 
Now standing in what remained of Chifley, while Electra spoke about memories, my eyes 
traced the shape of what had once been Sullivan’s Creek, leading into Lake Burley Griffin. 
Sullivan’s Creek rerouted to its old path, filled the remembered billabong which stood 
there before the 1950s. 
 
I imagined it as a being that, in the twilight of its life, was now remembering itself as Kambri, 
the billabong that had stood in its place, years before it was filled, colonized, claimed. This 
brought to mind Toni Morrison’s essay The Site of Memory, and the passage: 
 
…[T]he act of imagination is bound up with memory. You know, they 
straightened out the Mississippi River in places, to make room for houses and 
livable acreage. Occasionally the river floods these places. ‘Floods’ is the word 
they use, but in fact it is not flooding; it is remembering. Remembering where it 
used to be. All water has a perfect memory and is forever trying to get back to 




ran through, what the banks were like, the light that was there and the route back 
to our original place. It is emotional memory—what the nerves and the skin 
remember as well as how it appeared. And a rush of imagination is our 
‘flooding’.”  
 
We continued our stroll around the grounds. Something between a summer meander and 
the scene of a carnage. We stood before the library where we had met years before. What 
did remain of Chifley? I mean the walls remained, the building was as ever; but after the 
flood and the loss of so many books, it felt like the remnants - resembled a Dresden squat 
we had once sheltered in. Still, nothing seemed to have changed physically; the same kiosks, 
the same scanners and trundling stacks. Had some invisible weight been lifted? Like the 
soul’s 27 grams on departure? How much soul gets spent on books anyway?  
 
I was reading Heidegger, confronting his ponderous collection, but also knowing how 
many were now absent, since the flooding of the basement. Would Heidegger be glad at 
the loss of his words, as he put it: the silencing of theory?  
 
I thought on his sense of Aletheia - To give up the attempt to ‘know’ life via theories; no 
longer to conceive truth as static fact; but to view it as an occurrence, this thing unfolding. 
To turn to what actually happens in situations where truth occurs.  Alongside a Nazi-
sympathiser Heidegger might easily be mistaken for a hippie: spruiking truth as a happening; 
a ‘be-in’.  
 
What would it mean to no longer conceive truth as a relation between a knower and the 
known, subject & object - but to conceive it instead as a revelation, or disclosure of the 
meaning of an event? Aletheia contains this sense of unconcealment.  When Heidegger 
wrote on Aletheia; and the need for an open space into which truth can disclose itself, I 
thought on the little clearing love is. How Ben Lerner wrote: 
 
Maybe if you let  
The false starts stand, stand in for symbols  
Near collapse, or let collapsing symbolize  
The little clearing loving is. 
 
And how Aletheia – unconcealment – necessarily involves an act of concealment. Choosing 
one possibility necessarily sacrifices all the others. A fact that, in the grips of conviction, 
we all too quickly forget. This idea is hinted at, contained in Aletheia’s ‘letheia’ – the Greek, 
for forgetfulness. This added sense for me to forgetting yourself in a library.  
 
I liked Heidegger’s idea that entities needed some place where unconcealment could occur 
- was that place, sometimes, a poem? And what are the nooks we as a species carve out for 
disclosing?  At these moments I felt gratitude, an abundance at the generosity that was 
libraries, these quiet shelves containing multitudes of disclosure. So many silent 
happenings. As if everything here were in waiting, you had only to reach out, scan a 




if not by fact, then by sensation? - I thought on the New Age term ‘confirmation tingles’: 
a static-like tingling sensation on the scalp of the skin that supposedly points towards the 
unconscious intuited knowledge of the truth of a statement. 
 
The meaning of these familiar tingles was overdetermined and so suspect. How should we 
differentiate paranoia’s confirmation tingles from Heidegger’s Alethia moments? I thought 
on how Electra had disclosed the early days that she now conceived as the birthing of her 
transition. How she carried a sense of occupying signs that didn’t rightly belong to her. 
How we would together read in those stacks late into the night - and on when she was 
diagnosed with schizophrenia; then thought on Deleuze and Gutarri Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, and I felt this heat rising (confirmation tingles? ASMR?) – then Foucault 
History of Sexuality – and the pathologisation of deviance; pathologisation of thought that 
transgressed, that rejected tethers.  
 
Electra was harmless. I thought on the two gloved figures who entered her room, and the 
injection, then Electra in the cell- numb on vivans and trancs, and how she described it as 
‘lobotomal’ afterwards, how that pair with the gloves and needles and power to take away 
her life - followed her into every room thereafter: nowhere was safe because everywhere 
was now her head, and those figures and the powerlessness. And I thought on fearing 
conviction, and how governance was always necessarily a violence.  
 
How are you feeling about conviction now, Electra? You once told me there was no state 
more authentic & resolute than living in doubt. 
 
 
The outlines still retained in the glass filing cabinets; the 









Hello? /  
Hello, listen, it’s me /  
Um not the best time, I’m in the Garden/ 
Just calling to ask 
When did we become two people  
with an edge between them? /  
Oh God. I’ve got to go /  
Hold on / 
I’m covered in dirt 
& the neighbours are shouting / 
It won’t take a minute / 
I’m fertilizing seedlings and  
What? You’re saying 
Our individuating wont take a minute? / 
I’m calling more about reflexivity / 
I’ve got a Yoga thing in half an hour, I’ve gotta think about flexibility. 
We’ve done reflexivity enough I think / 
But I’ve got new material, you’ll like it! 
 I’ve been wondering why Coetzee,  
being all about character as experimental self,  
why he never portrays the perspective of non-Afrikaans? / 
Taste perhaps / 
But this is Coetzee right? 
All about the ‘going into their illusions’  
The think the unthinkable in that moment.  
The be radically defamiliarised by the new vantage. 
To lose ourselves then become now, again,  
two people. 
Where is the line for those we can and cannot inhabit. I mean?/ 
Search me / 
That’s my point – in these letters I’m trying to search you/ 
But asking whether it’s right too? / 
Correct / 
Por supuesto. Have you ever known me false?/ 
Have I ever known you, is my point? /  
Sorry I really must go, the brassica in the garden’s looking tremulous, 
Unwieldy on its long stalk / 








To Juniper’s surprise in the days that followed he received a message in response, though 






Anyone who has returned as an adult, to live with their parents - or even for an 
extended stay - knows how hospitality can quickly shade into erasure. They know 
how reconnection can be seamless, tensions made invisible, only because it is 
more comfortable to witness you out of your context- in their context - where 
you are harder to see... 
 
Do you remember Philip Salom? “The ancient weight of sun upon your eyelids,” 
was how he called living. I think of that time we nearly crashed the van, I imagine 
the sun’s warmth on the eyelids thin skin, that micro-sleep, lazy lids, in the old 
ford - wheels in the corrugated ruts, back spinning out as we risked that bridge. A 








On Effigy, Butterflies & Missed Parties 
 
“Now I do not know whether it was then I dreamt I was a 
butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly dreaming I am a 
man.” 
    Zhuangzi. 
“This is the way we broadcast what we want.” 
 
Zhuangzi brought up a butterfly battalion of probable dreamers convinced of convincing, 
its narrative function. And when they awake to the enabling fiction of being a man, or a 
just-every man they submarine, to emerge from Chrysalis again, a they-some gang, playing 
“queer it, if you can”. 
 
We learn this how to go home slide door of van, slam, gather boots up by back tire thread, 
and find Google Mapped meters measuring out the cigarettes/per serve & Spotify 
proffering up  
Rations to drive us into that moon/ 
 
By when we arrive, the effigies’ reduced to carbon, a mound. Atop is the goat skull, biggest 
Christmas star; to festoon the town tree’s crown. It crumpled last. 
 
While you stomped your feet I was asleep. Yet met the eye of the moon through the 
window, waking to phases of its pendulum arc. Tables of crumpled serviettes and drinks 
now in the dark. While inside the fire light circle, the questions of song are answered by 
feet. 
 
What to say, about the gathering missed? It was good to be there, knowing it happened, 
like tinkled laughter, heard through Canberra’s double-brick-walls. Amidst the high grass 
in the morning dew, from neighbouring field, the ungulates’ refrain. crickets and moths 
recede from our tread. 
 
I watch now the straight silvered poplars, the pupae slinking their measure, as if to say: 
from the burnt remains of effigy, another effigy will arise from chrysalis, a chrysalis, a 
chrysalis again. The text loops, behind sliding doors, ejects, feeds tape back into itself. 
 
What we want? To broadcast the circles we found inside ourselves. Why now? Because 
















You’re back in Canberra and  I remember these casuarina  
needles how they prickled my freshly shaven legs, 
The view of the cement rim, and the waters beyond that 
And the green hills beyond that. 
I remember, the rumble as the van choked to life 
And our shooting off along arcing highways. 
 
Then arriving home, the stove and the pot and 
 the little white tails of the swelling quinoa  
Which I learnt are not grains but the seed  
of some flowering relative of broccoli. Some Brassica. 
 
I recall the way you fondly patted the rims of the tires, 
 Squeezed the breaks to demonstrate their gripping. 
I recall the care taken lifting  the bike on 
Its seemingly fragile frame up and into the backseat 
 
I recall texting you, a little picture 
In a few sentences of a day or a thought, 
Or a person I saw walking and wondered about. 
 
About this time, of day, this years ago. 
The red wheelbarrow’s still overturned in the yard, 
The chickens not white, but ginger,  
And huddled beneath pallets, in the rain. 
I remember Everything, busy depending on 
Everything else. 
 
Like that summer we froze the plumbs 
Pulsed them in the magi mix, made ice-cream. 










When we met up, you said  
 
“Let’s Talk about Hope” 
 
pronouncing all the capitals, and it was a rounding down on me 
kind of statement. 
 
I shouldered it nodding, we found a patch of grass, 
tufty but ant-free 
 
Hope,  
you described, as passion of the uneducated  
easily exploited. 
 
I pick at grass blades, think of those ants, 
parasitically infected 
 
The way they climb these tufts, only to 
cling rigid-mandibled to the tops 
await predators till dawn. 
 
“Pretty sure they’re not the only ones to sacrifice themselves  
for the thing inside them.” 
 
You had once said. But then it was about 
other people. 
 
“An impulse, doesn’t tell you in advance 
Who it’s serving.” 
 
Years later, I’m lain out on the same grass 
 
you write me of your latest paintings: it’s colour, you say 
on top of more colour,  
that creates perception of depth. 
 
As if a flower, were just a flower, and also 
the mental contents of a flower. 
 
As if you are you, to me, with the addition  





Players only love you when they’re playing, 
sounds from a distant café’s speakers. 
 
I am waiting to scare you away with my weirdness,  
you told me. 
 
It seems that, convincingly,  






I wrote you a poem 
To find recorded like a cancelled joy 
Derivative of the best next thing: to imagine  
beholding Sullivan’s Creek in swift concord, like 
The wrens fallen out of the sky. 
 
I wake. You’d left for work or just left, 
the possibilities are numinous. 
Would you return? Re-volver? Like a cylinder 
Lock Stock and Never come back? 
 
We’re back. And there’s nothing derivative about 
Falling out of the sky  
Or waking 
However many gloved palms catch you. 
 
“I never stood up to write the way you sit down 
To live,” you wrote me, while standing. 
The glowing screen you read me on  
Heralds a kind of lobotomy 
That is age, that is waking 
 
The tiny pixels describe our colourised fixation with 
Saturation. The saturation and the blood 
So blue behind 
Glass. 
 
Yes. That was glass. 
Tiny micro filaments of glass that flex  
in the blood as we pump downstream  
Like squid bodies in concord 
A simple pleasure, trafficked arteries 
Newspaper outlets with the power to cancel  
Joy. 
 
Joy: A numinous cylinder finds me 
Derivative: In all the wrong places, like 
A glowing screen – saturated  
Directing our gaze 
The eyeballs listing in their orbits; 
Sockets strain to see the blood. 
 
Yes, blue, but with glass and yes 











It was a window she was looking into, not a mirror, but windows could be mirrors, and 
mirrors a kind of window. 
 
Surely Heidegger had a verb for this, she wanted to ask Junip, this sense of uncanny amidst the 
dissonance. When peering into the silvered glass at a reflection and asking yourself why it 
inverts right to left; never top to bottom. Never back to front.  
 
She’d heard of high class restaurants with mirrored walls on all sides, the refracted image 
of you stood or squat over a bowl, peeing into almost infinity. Relieving yourself into a 
multiverse in microcosm. 
 
Right now she was peering not at her reflection but at the translucence close enough to 
almost feel the cool moist against her nose. Close enough to fog up the mediated outside. 
She sat to write: 
 




I’ve been thinking on those Russian plays, Chekhov perhaps, Chekhov and the 
women and the long dreamy monologues. The women like me, dreaming staring 
through those windows onto snow, musing on snow, on inextricable duties, 
filiations and foibles, love. 
 
But I’m staring not through the window but at the living glass. Glass makes me 
think of the spineless coral that crumbled off the reef, made molten by heat, and 
now the slow moving liquid I look through. 
 
I’m thinking how like those invertebrates we will each of us have to remake 
ourselves in this lifetime; in a precariat economy, under the tyrannies of ‘labour-
saving’ AI - displacing the retail cashiers, alongside the artisanal weavers. 
 
Looking through this window I’m thinking on the quartered eye windows of the 
homes drawn by children, thinking on the crayon; which colours? Or how, 
watching the steam spiral above my take-away cup I’m thinking on decomposition 
accelerated by the grind pressure makes. Turning marine lives into the plastics of 
the Styrofoam cups we chuck. And how the dead keep being sacrificed for the 










Like good therapy I hope this is more than an out pouring; an evacuation – I hope it’s also 
a way to contain experience, to give it form and meaning. Time takes. I learn that learning 
from experience is dependent first on being able to take it in. What did I see? The question 
takes on, at times, a desperate tone.  So: what did I see? 
 
The kittens were looping Sam’s ankles, named Neat and Skim, like ways of drinking whisky 
and milk respectively. The faces in Sam’s paintings are not hidden, I note, but waiting to 
emerge when you are ready to see them. 
 
Some serious aluminium venting system overhead was drawing fumes from the room, 
Neat kicked up some meat that went down the wrong way. Sam left to get a dustpan, some 
TP. Time felt like the flights of stairs leading up, leading down, but always – leading here: 
where you arrive. On a ledge leaning onto the next. 
 
Next we’re out front; Kohl Rabi bulbous little UFOs sprouting from the planter I admire, 
while Sam tussles with a wooden mannequin, performs a dance of locked limbs; one part 
embrace, one part struggle. 
 
Stir shake and distribute evenly across the page… With the flat of a palate knife in a 
schmear that erases all difference. How it should be, a blur of colour that the dazzled eye 
mistakes for movement. 
 
Foreception: was the word I was thinking on in all this, a word as a way of recalling the fact 
that we can only ever make sense of things in terms of the concepts of which we are aware, 
the tools to hand.  
 
I’d open the day by glugging a litre schlep of warm water with lemon, then stretch out my 
body, invert… Then maybe down a mushroom or just a stem and sit to meditate. Releasing 
tension in my face, throat, abdomen. I’d with care catch the rhythm of my breathing, not 
pressing but watching: the way you receive in conversation, unconsciously mimic the body 
language, meet the tone, pause and little talk till you’re resonating. 
 




To ring, to role  
– not resignated from – but reverberating with; I echo that  
A clear sound that carries 
To harmonise or otherwise 






Resonating as a verb is transitive, it has 
And contains its object 
In transitive logic if the relation holds between A and B, and between 
B and C  
Then it holds between A and C 
This is how we transition; resonating 
 
A subject, in conversation, is set to vibrate at a frequency  
To the prompt of another’s vibration. 
A comparatively weak vibration in one can cause a strong vibration in another. 
 
This was the practice: 
to meet the natural resonance in my body; as if it were another.  
To set it thrumming.” 
 
But returning to Heidegger’s’ foreception: meditating my spine went ramrod stiff, and 
sometimes words would climb up it. I kept seeing myself as a mushroom emerging from 











ON THE TOPIC OF walking, you know there are 
those people who walk backwards? Staring at some 
point in the far distance, but unable to see what’s 
to come, gazing forwards, yet walking heels first 
into the unknown? And then of course there are 
those who stare only at their feet. Who trace the 
lines that the pavement creates. Who create internal 
catalogues of the shoes and laces of strangers. Who 
avoid each and every crack in the pavement. 
 
The People are playing Pink Floyd acoustically out 
front the supermarkets. Woolworths, where I buy 
my plastic bagged Bok Choy for dinner. You used 
to say: think about the abyss separating 
performance from audience. Think about the girl 
in front of you, how she stood, she didn’t move or 
nod, she stood. She was wearing a black sweater. 
Think about the black sweater. Think about the 
absence of colour that is saturation with colour. 
How it fit your mood.  Coincidence?  Think about 
how she took your arm later, leading you in a half 
step. That could as well have been a jape. That she 
brushed that rib just beneath your chest that always 














In your last there were some words, you wrote, which set together, capture the 
pace of your walking. But you always found it easy to walk at pace with my 
thinking. So when this clicks over, those sets of words take on new inflections. 
Repetition on a poem. Meanings compound, as meaning compounds. 
 
I recall you asking: Is love’s nature self-concealing? There are words my hand goes 
to write because they are self-presenting. But something in me struggles to set them 
down; grandiloquent words, that fail to express what they reach towards. 
 
Should I take Heidegger’s approach; in frustration with the limitations of language, 
include the offending yet inescapable word but crossed out? Lined through? Saying 
I am obliged, but don’t like it? Heidegger let his marks shine metaphysically. 
Applying a hyphen implied an indivisible unity (being-in-the-world) while a line 
through a word bespoke the insurmountable; an ontological failure of reference.  
As though love, and its relata, could only be spoken of tautologically, in cliché, or 
ponderously, as the self-concealing phenomena that stops the words in the mouth. 
Stops. 
 
Why do all writers I know live with some hint of shame, guilt? Is it because the 
verbal representation always offends the actual state? (Of something, of anything). 
But Heidegger was concerned with the confusion of what was signed and the 
signifier - because he was still convinced of the existence of a wordless dimension, 
somewhere out there, to which signs referred. Presuming a naïve form of 
reference, we’ve since been disabused of hopefully. As if a black line through text 
were enough to bring an extra-textual world into being. 
 
Eileen Myles in Inferno, uses the line through text to different effect; conjuring an 
era of writing – where the clack of a typewriter’s inked keys punctuated by the rip 
of the holster sliding back to reset the ribbon, and the line with a satisfied ‘ting’ & 
providing a counter stream of thought, letting you in on a possible hidden subject 
in the writing: an aside to the audience, stage-whispered–  
 
But is there a place where Heidegger & Eileen can meet: does the strike-through 











Dear El.,  
 
What a strange world it is that insists upon rearranging itself. 
 
Lately I’ve been thinking about our borders, and what relationship means. To relate 
things, to forge a connection or reveal a connection already present. To liken, to 
analogise. When we relate we exchange, but with what? Surely not just with each 
other.  
 
I want to speak to this idea Jean-Luc Nancy expresses, that: I can only recognize 
myself recognized by the other to the extent that this recognition of the other alters 
me. 
 
It is desire, he wrote, it is what trembles in desire. 
 
This idea holds me - that we are altered by our perception in the eyes of others. 
And, in fact, that we can only see how others perceive us by feeling the difference. 
Feeling that alteration. There seems no evading it. Our range of being in the world 
is fundamentally set, determined by what others allow us to be.  
 
I’ve been thinking on where to place myself in life, in the world. It’s an old snare 
my mind finds itself in: I know I don’t have to choose, but my mind presents it as 
a choice. Which comes with the itinerant wonderer’s territory I suppose. A 






On Necessary Grief (an authorial intrusion) 
 
The necessary grief emerges in recognising that each of us is a subject who can never 
recuperate the conditions of its own emergence. This constitutes a death, Butler writes, 
but the death of a certain kind of subject that was never possible to begin with – the death 
indeed of a fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had.  
 
In other words, a necessary grief: eponymous in this letter, though I could as well have 
called it ‘a fall without ground in sight’ from the Japanese Zen monk Dogen, who wrote: 
 
Understanding emptiness is like falling from a great height. But that’s okay, because 
no one was ever hurt by falling. You’re only hurt if you hit the ground, and there 
is no ground. 
 
The fall is ultimately necessary, according to both Prasangika metaphysics and Butler’s 
constructivism, in that without it you never realise there was no ground to begin with. So 
too, the necessity of the grieving.  
 
Both call for a reconciliation; between us, and the limited scope of our knowing. This 
entails an ethics; and may transform our way of relationality. In the same way for Foucault, 
moral action involved self-formation as an ethical subject. The embrace of a mode of being 
– to then monitor, improve, transform. But self-formation, is a relational, other-directed 
activity. Self-formation requires an account of desire – and desire is never our own… 
 








Stays with me 
But it is not 





In Decreation, Anne Carson gives the above words to Hephaistos; words which illustrate a 
paradoxical self-division that is nonetheless the condition we embody: 
 
Our hunger, our desire, is never original, yet it is ours. 
 
Who desires when “I” desire? The psychoanalyst Laplanche asked. It seems, inescapably, a 
foreign desire always pre-conditions our own. 
 
Gender essentialism aside, there feels like something to it, when Jung writes of a type of 
mother-complex possessed by certain women; so identified with their mother that their 
own instincts are paralysed through projection.  Theory goes: this woman often finds a 
male partner whose existence turns on their identification with a profession or a talent – 
the woman who possesses valuable gifts which remain undeveloped may project the gift 
or talent upon the partner who lacks it in themselves – then the consequent spectacle 
occurs: a totally insignificant man seems to suddenly soar to achievement. The secret of 
success: the lover’s projected capacities. 
 
Prehistory is never over and done, chronologically. It remains to erupt; leaves every self-
account partial, failed.  
 
Who desires when “I” desire?  
 
You desired. Your desire to write was the pre-conditioning desire that drove me to it, this 
is my current theory at any rate. And I wonder; is that why you feel usurped - and ultimately 




























“How does distance look?” It is a simple direct question 
It extends from a spaceless 
Within to the edge 
Of what can be loved. 
 








Singing Hobart  
 
I never understood retrograde motion till we had that conversation. It was a conversation, 
we bifurcated, then followed parallel lines until deaf we nodded our approval. Continued 
to meet for Salamanca pub luncheons. Continued our weary strolls along the waterfront.    
 
“Can still life have a meaning beyond its composition?” The booming of oversized cruise 
ships shook old kunanyi mountain, announced our presence. Our smallness, our humdrum 
existence.  
 
You asked me once: “If a fragment stands for the whole then how does a gestalt overpower 
its parts?” More generally we discussed the weather. The gray rain sheet drew back and we 
were all over smiles. Walking we’re still captivated by what’s now a mediocre sunset. I sit 
on the hill beneath my tree. In Battery Point plums fell from the sky. Without a sense of 
smell I no longer recoil at morning dog shit. 
 
In a Sandy Bay apartment all my questions remain as variations on a singular theme. You 
undress with your back to me. Your wing-scapula pinch together as you stare into the 
mirror. I’m somewhere over your left or right shoulder. You have a new lover. That’s all 
right. I have a new lover. I wonder about his chest, his Hare Krishna haircut, his turtleneck. 
You her bosom, her thigh the shape of all our four mouths locked in a capital O, as if 
suffering, as if blissfully suffering. 
 
Lulled by theism I find myself in retrograde motion. You’ve embraced a surrogate and 
explain the neuro-plastic effects of Kingston beach-front living. I set ceramics in a kiln. 
Achieve high temperatures with my grandfather’s bellows. 
 
There remains a challenge we’re all too eager to dismiss: we were told in infancy to “love 
one another or die.”  
 
Instead we developed calloused palms from dumbbells that recall playgrounds. Everything 
rests in retrograde motion, and we hope we’re turning epicycles not visible from inside. 
Yet at nightfall down Old Farm Road, we look up and meet the moon in eclipse, and 
wonder what has come between us and the moon. We stopped looking when we concluded 










Behind the bequeathed Oura Oura sanctuary walking up Dry’s Bluff, listening to the 
scraggly sounds, the harsh light– I told you I felt my mum inside me (not how you mean 
that) and how her magenta tipped fingers, nails polished to unfathomable sheen, closed 
around my vocal folds and squeezed, silenced herself with a gasp. 
 
Now in Hobart’s CBD I think on the smell of acetone, applied in that shop, and how it 
must have been everywhere, but the shopkeep lady was polite, good natured enough to 
pretend not to notice. I recall the careful gallantry in how she took my palm between her 
soft practiced hands, the tender application, like brushstrokes by an artist cautious of 
startling a branched bird whose complex motion accident had reproduced on the canvas. 
I’m probably overstating matters, but.. 
 
“You look gorgeous. You could pull of all those colours.” How a little flush crept up my 
neck, why so scarcely have I been afforded this affirmation? Who wrote down that I didn’t 
need it, or outside the logic of need, of deserve – who wrote that it did not belong to my 
desires proper, who closed that door? 
 
No use in accusation. I held the back of my hands to the light, as if they really were some 
easel, a composition best seen at range. 
 
Now, back on the island, I pass a few days with my family, then out to the east coast; past 
Snt Marys purple possum café, past Snt Helen’s empty opp-shops and emporiums. On the 
coast I spent some days admiring the endless plains of saltbush, the spinifex, then pack a 
shoulder satchel and head into the Meander Valley.  
 
Behind Oura Oura I shed my vehicle, then garments, a  pointed disrobing of the civilizing 
world takes place. I begin my walk up Dry’s Bluff, towards that scraggly peak, that hidden 
dripping vulvic crevasse, your reward in the heart of the mountain.  
 
Was it coincidence that I happened, this summer return, to finally pick up a reader on 
Heidegger’s Being and Time; that I opened it yesterday and today found myself in a straw 
hat and big petrol-coloured glasses walking into the bequeathed Oura Oura sanctuary set 
up by Bobby Brown, containing Dry’s Bluff. 
 
I could imagine Heidegger before he affected the garb of an SA trooper – imagine him in 
a small Bavarian town taking outings to trek through the Black Forest,  marvelling at his 
surrounds, asking questions that refused answers.  
 
The ‘they’, Heidegger insisted, instils in us the sense we have of ourselves, and the world 
around us. He described the they-self as that which lives always in relation to what others 
allow it to be. For him absorption only in the ways of living that others provide us means 





Walking through the Black Forest, feeling in harmony with the big Douglas firs, I see 
Heidegger caressing there trunks eco-sexually – then I can’t help but imagine that same 
Heidegger existentially outfitted as an SA trooper. And I thought: maybe we’re all capable 






Food Store Café (memories of) 
 
I’m out front Food Store cafe, busy strip of SoHo, drinking chai and my eyes are maybe a 
little red; it could be the dust, or could be inappropriate affective content for this hour of 
the morning, but all I’ve done is order tea & gnaw on secreted liquorice.  
 
Electra was going to meet me – but now she’s not coming; two codeine dissolving in one 
of her stomachs, her brow a collection of hungover furrows / so I chai for two in 
mammoth sips from this single cup.  
 
Lerner called it a lacrimal event - crying, like a woman -someone said: as if to give me 
strength. The strength to cry, to forgo crying & still cry. But on the inside, Electra - it’s all 
happening inside.  
 
“It’s all happening inside,” said last night, bracing darkly clad figure with shiny teeth, “come 
on in. The lights are jumping & mingling their tones.” 
  
Vulnerable to be in the dark, vulnerable to move your body, particles amidst foreign 
particles but out here in the morning street is a different kind of being vulnerable: an order 
of exposé no one gives a fuck about.  
 
Meanwhile Dana Ward takes me on a linear journey through various species of nowhere, 
in their crisis of infinite worlds - I’m just writing book synopses now, just rhapsodizing about 
what you could have were you here. I’m out front Food Store cafe sipping chai & 
meanwhile my favourite waiter’s glowering at me for expecting soy, within but not 









So many days left since the landing moon rock still 
in my pockets nothings different sea-wash in my ears I 
haven’t wept enough. Since the landing moon rock still in 
my pockets everything’s changed I sit and polish dolerite 
these days, round my neck on a string I wear it.  
 
We all have to die a bit every now and again, you said, and 
usually it’s so gradual that we end up more alive than ever  
- it happens in gradations, immediately replaced with new 
life till we’re infinitely old and infinitely alive. 
 
I’ve been thinking on kunanyi, and the portion of the story 
that remains to be told: 
 
IN THE PORTION OF THE STORY THAT REMAINS 
the mountain smiled her pipes. The sky displays his 
temperament. His rash convictions. We keep claiming a 
predictability, it outdoes us. I got used to you a time. I was 
polyglot to your phases, your different aspects of speech. 
Fought the hegemonies on your behalf. Yet they never 
stopped encroaching. Settling Shifting spreading vapor thin 
smog. The mountain smiled its pipes shattered. The lights 
were closer than predicted. Mountain says: I grow weary of 
the portion of story that remains. Each night a blink, 
movement strobe lit displayed. I haven’t put this well, he 
goes. The end in sight. Stay put a moment kiss me, she stays 












I’ve found work on a blueberry farm in Lillydale. 
 
Glory be to God for Dappled things! 
 
For awaking on a futon between blueberry vines as dawn rises with me. As light pierces 
the couple-coloured skies. As its highlights settle upon the brindled cows, attentive in their 
grazing. Not far off, the burble of a creek is punctured by the stippled trout’s plops, its 
breaks of surface, its submarining. 
Glory be to God for all that’s unabridged!  
For the hedged berries and I, each carrying morning dew, glistening as a flower’s sepal. 
For the long rows, lines trellised, shortening as they recede over hills. I wake stiff-shafted, 
grind and pummel my leaky glands into the sheets.  
Glory be to God for all things unexpurgated! 
And to abridge this scene, I rise, prepare Cowboy-Coffee on a Bunsen burner; its 
aluminium wings open, shelter the blue flame from frail wind. You are still asleep, fingers 
twitching, your expressions, variegated, as you move in pied dreams.  Mottled crema breaks 
into drifts as I filter the coffee into cups, leave sediments granules to find at the bottom. 
It is sentiment, or melancholy that foreshorten these fictional lines? Creates the illusion of 
depth, of things receding into the distance? Our fields are divoted. For you and me both, 
I slip memories like seeds beneath earthen sods. We offer up sentences to the page,   






The Part on Linn 
 
Pudenda: the parts to be ashamed of 
 
Dear El.,  
 
After you, my next first love was Linn. 
 
“53 just keeps coming up for me.” He pulls at his hair, his eyes affectedly rolling. “I move 
into a house, guess what number?” I’m paring my nails with my other nails and teeth. “ I 
wake up and check my phone for the time. What number?” I notice that my left thumb 
cuticle is bleeding from overzealous paring. “I ring my Dad to say Happy Birthday, my 
mum reminds me how old he is again. How old do you guess he is?” 
 
This was a conversation representative of the many we would pass on afternoons in ‘the 
chalet,’ a grandiose title fondly applied to a ramshackle little green bungalow out the back 
of a unit. It had a terrace enclosed with a roof of corrugated tin sheeting. We’d picked up 
a red sofa from the tip, a number of milk crates with potted seedlings and pallets which 
served as bed base for the futon. 
 
In the evening we’d meditate on stacks of yellowing National Geographics. We would 
munch sticks of celery prodigiously laden with pressed peanut butter from the overpriced 
co-op down the hill in South Hobart. We were happy. Though it was a funny kind of 
happiness.  Entailing a lot of discontent and anxiety. “Perhaps all happiness is kind of 
funny,” Linn says, taking the clippers from me. 
 
In the mornings I’d sit on the red couch admiring the shadowy lattice of the netting that 
kept the birds off the veg patch. I loved the fishing net material. The patterns it formed. 
Years ago, do you recall Jorgen dropping that huge net off the Commonwealth Building, 
recording it from a distance? It looked like a great silver sail, ethereal set against the stolid 
red-brick bank. A shield held proudly, its logic invisible, or absent, and so invincible. Like 
something you might read in a Bolaño novel, the action of a visceral realist poet, part 
subversive, the eternal revolutionary – part incomprehensible statement, revelling in 
childhood’s secret meanings illegible to adults.  
 
My relationship to sex is difficult to write about. Brian Blanchfield in Proxies speaks to the 
under examined notion of frottage; a category of consensual, hands-free, non-penetrative 
sex favoured by gay men - to rub surfaces, to climb and slide with a lover, to displace in-
out horizontality with up-down verticality.  
 
The personal discovery that frottage, for many men, was not a practice derivative of 
intercourse, a simulation, but rather an end in itself, served as a kind of liberating 
contrariety. Which, in ditching the often anxiety fuelling scripts, for me did solve a phobia, 





“Catching our breath or resetting to attune to the ambient moment and our wants: 
one of us might say ‘we don’t have to do anything’ the opening for disinclination 
was the space of intimacy.”  
 
Thinking  on frottage, the act, led me to understand the general category of how making 
space for disinclination can open on to deeper intimacy. This feels like a significant layer to 
the idea of consent – a recognition that consent culture’s full force resides not solely in the 
surety of mutuality – but also the pause it offers. One of Heidegger’s Befindlickheit 




The procession halts, and we can all breathe sighs of relief.  No wonder sex, as it’s sold to 
us, is so anxiety inducing, so otherwise deadening.  Consciously choosing with a lover to 
forgo sex, we found this, counter intuitively, to be the unexpected formulae for deepening 
intimacy.  A meeting place there, with a new found intentionality, an accompanying ethic 




Outside, from the couch I would hear Linn snoring, sleeping his familiar siesta. While we 
lived together, I always spent this time writing or pretending to write, playing at being a 
consummate collector. Placing full stops sometimes where you expected them, otherwise 
listening to the cicadas through the black netting. I thought: I can’t help but imagine them 
making that high frequency buzz from the throat… The idea that it’s their legs rubbing 
together seemed too distant.  
 
Some days, when Linn was conscious, those long summer afternoons would be absorbed 
in talk. Having a conversation with Linn felt always novel length; or if not novel, a sturdy 
installation. He used language in a way that says it must. That suggests he meant it. But 
then his expressions would change under the shifting light, later you couldn’t be sure what 
was seen.  
 
There was a time I felt sure I knew what he meant, but now, looking back it’s all just 
frazzled ends. Nowhere to sit amongst them. Just blocks of light and this sense of not 
belonging on the page, in the scene. Sometimes my own writing too felt alien, foreign to 
me on re-entry – so instead I’d just pick it up and stare at it. What inspired This? Retrospect 
would ask, or say: moved in That? And if it were responsive to a formulae where had that 







Linn at Source Co-op, in the gardens 
 
We would read what I fondly labelled the Queer-Literary-CircleJerk, on those long 
afternoons, and think at the time of how Chris Kraus wrote I’ve become my sexuality - female, 
straight, wanting to love men, be fucked. 
 
Is there a way, she asked, of living with this like a gay person, proudly? She hits a nail on 
the head – though it bends awkwardly off a warp in the wood. Freedom is conceived as 
youth, transgression, possibility; aging as imprisonment, sediment, inaction. 
 
I know so many who embody this form of cis-het shame – felt for inhabiting an oppressive 
orthodoxy. Don’t we all want to run with the wolves? Or as Carson asks: don’t we all end up 
female impersonators?  Is transitioning today’s coming of age story? 
Looking back through old journals these past days, I notice that I used to write as if I were 
chronicling the degeneration of some faulty human machine. As forewarning to others 
perhaps? Mostly it was just all I knew to do. And how I saw it all. I turned back to my 
book, squinting in the dying light.  
 
I reach indoors and tug on Linn’s toe. He grunts and the foot withdrew beneath the sheet. 
I rock back on the milk crate, my head resting against the shed’s glass window. For want 
of occupation I decide next to head up Lansdowne Crescent for some papers and 
cigarettes. First I scribble some thoughts, to send Electra: 
 
“My relationship to sex was difficult to write about. But, quoting Rilke, it is with 





“What two consenting adults do...” the adage begins; in the privacy of their own 
bedroom, or others bedrooms, swimming pools, unlocked cubicles in a public 
toilet (locked cubicle on an international aircraft once), on the private lawns of an 
opulent golf course, on rooftops, on acid, on webcams: 
 
“Should be none of our concern.” It ends. Or the state’s concern. Leave well 
enough alone, it goes without saying. That is, baring voyeuristic, prurient interest 
– we can never totally avoid the gaze of the peeping Thomas or Lizzy. 
 
Be they consenting adults, flight attendants, restaurateurs, politicians – may 
everybody be a body unto itself, governing its own jurisdiction. May every orifice 
be an orifice unto… 
 
But it isn’t quite so simple unfortunately. The rejection of Paternalism and the 
Nanny State makes sense only ceteris paribus – all else being equal – a state which is 
never in fact the case – all things are never equal. 
 
Our tides are pulled by more than just the moon. We have to contend with society 
in its many shapes, and the gravitation pull of its every inhalation – even the short 
and rapid breathing as we culturally approach orgasm. 
 
How now are you conceiving sex?  – man or woman, or neither the same question 
arises from me: when is it a carnal act of consumption? When a way to enter into 
the conception of the world as not merely ‘a collection of things’ but a ‘communion 
of subjects’?  
 
Years on and I find I’m still asking, as Rilke asked: how to achieve a relationship 
to sex wholly my own, free from convention, free from custom. How to be worthy 
of our best possession? 
 
When I return lighter in wallet, heavier in lung, there are traces of what had been a vivid 
pink sunset,  the dark was setting in and the moon was approaching. I pick up my book, 
but suddenly feel my bladder beckoning, so read, stand and piss all at once. 
 
In the fading light I read  – Night is a doing word –  I piss straight and drenched the deep 
green ivy bunched up about the base of the tree. I am proud of my successful aim, but 
turning away too abruptly and tucking myself back in, a sizeable quantity of wee still falls 
in warm droplets down my thigh. 
 
“Get your Pudenda over here,” Linn shouts from inside. His new favourite word, Pudenda 
– genitalia – etymology: from ‘Pudere’ the parts to be ashamed of. 
 
Linn was laboriously carving out the centre of a wooden spoon. I took a milk crate to his 
left. Without looking up from his filing he offers me a steaming cup of something, a herbal 











In the early days cartographers would draw maps by hand. When doing so they 
would add towns. These towns did not exist in reality, but existed only on these 
maps. In this way they could identify fraudulent copies of their maps. These non-
existent towns came to be known as paper towns.” 
 
Linn upsets my milk carton with a dirty foot. “Look at my hang nail,” he says. I knock off 
his foot and return to your letter. 
 
“Do you remember reading the Christian mystic Simone Weil? She was terrified 
by the prospect of God wanting her to, intending for her to, love another as much 
as she loved God. She simply wouldn’t know how to stand were that God’s wish. 
She shied away from it. But equally difficult seems the problem of how she could 
distinguish the Genuine loves God intended from the inferior copies, the 
simulacra. That was the greater ask: would God mark their bodies with paper 
towns? 
 
Haven’t we both wondered at times, was our relationship governed by such a 
creative misreading? Did the eye’s tint obscure the paper towns? Did we construe 
as fate what was just a biological clock for when it feels timely to love as if for 
life?” 
 






In Hobart, Juniper stops into the Winston for a pricey beer, he waits at the bar behind a 
line to be served. Next door people file into the State Cinema. Earlier that day Juniper had 
entered that cinema on the arm of a different lover, Linn. to watch the latest Jim Jarmush 
film, Paterson. Linn was tall, ethereal; he liked to shred National Geographics, fart in bed. 
When Juniper’s beer arrives, he weaves through the bar, heads out front, and finds as seat 
watching the sunset. Gets out his journal to write Electra. 
 
 Electra.,  
 
Matinee. We found our way to the back, and snuggled in, loungey and wined in 




and sunset silhouetted behind the projector. In the film Paterson, in the city 
Paterson, the protagonist Paterson, suffers the loss of his entire collected works of 
poems, when his journal is eaten by his lover’s hateful bulldog. 
 
Numb he says it’s okay. They’re just words. Just words written on water. 
 
After the film, pulling out of the carpark I asked Linn how he understood ‘written 
on water.’ She thought it referred to words’ transitory nature; like ripples, 
impressions in a solution that as soon as it accepts the words dissolves them, recalls 
its originary shape. 
 
“That’s what water’s mobility, its flux, brings to my mind,” he says. As if water 
were the world, as we found it, and words fleeting impressions - attempting to 
conceptualise that world -  retained their shape only a moment before being 
rejected. A very Lacanian Real asserting itself over our theories. 
 
I had been more literal in my reading; Just words written on water.  
 
I thought of the material. What do we usually think? We write our words on paper 
– but what if we write our words first on ink, the material precedent; and paper is 






The Tasmanian summer passed after that with rapidity, and I hardly heard from Electra. I 
was reading Heidegger again, a primer & developing toned shiny carves rubbed hairless & 
piston quads from surmounting by bike this Hobart terrain. Trrrrrain. I’d missed suburbs 
that rolled; how everything felt aslant; but for the book, which was all up and down, a  
sheer verticality, just a climb and a vertigo that hooked you.  
 
When I walked my jaw was set like I might think on Heidegger’s; imagine his firm & 
composed Germanic body, insurmountable beneath his lederhosen, rambling through 
black Bavarian forests. I found myself imitating, borrowing from every writer I read; I 
sponged, unwittingly, and began to feel like it only worked because I lacked a distinct 
personality.  
 
Eileen Myles once wrote that the problem with imitating a poet is you don’t really know 
what they mean. Hopefully. So in your confusion you start to imitate their style, then you’re 
parodying. I felt something of that parody, too, the first few times Linn and I had sex. Like 
I was play-acting being a gay lover. I recall us, unsure of how far to take things, so we 
scissored our legs, in an aimless sort of misdirecting sense. Like enough motion would 





It felt like a dance of mirroring body parts, and made me appreciate the dual nature of 
straight sex, all those different genitals in play, or at least one of each set. Not that being 
with another man didn’t afford novelties; it was its own kind of variety show. But there 
was the auto-erotic to it, no doubt about that.  Holding an alien cock in my hand for one: 
what was this spongy pulsing organ, newly unfamiliar – did it have its own heart beat? It 
felt racey too, like it was salivating for something. Furtive then attentive, this cylinder 
frotting against my inner thigh. The most unintelligible thing about this alien cock was that 
I felt nothing when I held it. I mean, curiosity, maybe, but the hyper-tensile, responsive 
nerve nexus that it carried – that carried it – wasn’t mine to feel. So used to my own cock 
in hand, was I. 
 
But that’s just it, I would have liked to tell Eileen. It’s not intentional: you don’t even have 
to think it. One minute you’re fucking, the next it’s a parody of something you read 
somewhere once. We learn don’t we? There are no ‘productive’ thinkers, only re-
productive, and we, from our fruitless branch, in what ways we thought we could – 
reproduced. Walter Benjamin described the condition when he wrote; the distracted, too, 
can form habits. At the time I remember saying, inferior DNA can still replicate. Sometimes 
that’s all it can do. 
 
Thinking on habits, brought to mind discussions of Jung and archetypes with my friend 
Dan. And how Dan unlike near everyone I knew didn’t give a shit about Jung, and never 
brought him up in conversation, but just laughed that high fidelity laugh he had and read 
me poems in the grass. Or had me read them. It was worrying. What were we all trying to 
see? And if he wasn’t trying to see it, and I trusted him to know, were we totally missing 
some point?  
 
D. was recently published in an LGTBQ journal called Rabbit; neatly I thought. I was 
always honking on about Ludwig’s rabbit, duck - and their interchangeability; substitutable 
like pronouns. That you could see one and then the other, but not simultaneously.  
 
I mean; what did it mean for gender? When Linn and I were on a futon, I thought of that 
- how one moment, legs up around his waist, arcing my pelvis to meet him - I was one sex, 
one lover - then the next biting his ear, holding him down I was the other, hermaphroditic. 
A composite of both parts that couldn’t both be seen at once. Its own whole. 
 
On Inversions  
 
The next day Linn is off work at the Pollen Tea Room; I’m lying in bed watching him 
stretch. He starts the morning on his shoulders, legs vertical, blood probably beating in his 
eardrums. I like to see the way his tummy tumbles forward, a bead of sweat from his navel 
down to his chin. 
 
An inversion, I learn, is any yoga position which sends your blood pooling the other way, 
an anti-gravity manoeuvre; head stands or shoulder stands, the ‘king’ and ‘queen’ of yogic 





When I do a supported shoulder stand with a strap around my arms for stability, the blood 
drains from the arms, and my hands go numb. Usually, were I to touch my face there’s a 
unity – I have an experience of two sensations; sensation in the face and hand – but numb 
hands feel profoundly other to me; I might as well be caressing my face with a rake. 
 
This dissociation is familiar, as Electra once said: how could I ever love an idea that has never 
touched my body? Granted, I thought, some ideas touch your body, but without openness, or 
curiosity the way some hugs from strangers forget their purpose midway, then you’re just 
two bodies pressed together. 
 
As in these letters in which I, indirectly, ambulate about a topic by means of a stand in, a 
proxy. I begin to wonder: is writing Electra obliquely an attempt to touch back, to feel on 
my face as foreign the fingers of a familiar stranger?  
 
Langer writes that the art object is neither an expression of feeling, nor a description of 
feeling, but a certain kind of symbolic rendering of its form. In an always unique and 
individual way, it seems art abstracts the shapes embedded in experience and reveals what 
they are. 
 
Endowing things with form—perceiving the latent pattern in an experience—is itself an 
act of creation; it recreates the experience within a symbolic domain. My desire to write 
Electra: just another basic sense in which all creation was recreation. Where art and reality 
refused to touch. 
 
Later, Kris Kraus would write that to be female still meant to be trapped within the purely 
psychological…  
 
“No matter how dispassionate or large a vision of the world a woman formulates, 
whenever it includes her own experience and emotion, the telescope turns back on 
her.”  
 
But how could a philosopher turn away from experience once ideas have touched her 
body? Would she not rather peel off the latex gloves she never knew were there, cast them 
into a corner of the room – digits inverted. But then, what do you do with your hands? 
 
Auto-theory too, I start to think, is the tentative yet loving rediscovery of your own body. 
And as with sex, the greatest lovers know the riches of self-eroticism.  Auto-theory is you 
touching yourself, touching yourself. A double layered sensation, of your exploring digits 
and the scape they inquire across. 
 
“… because emotions just so terrifying, the world refuses to believe it can be 
pursued as a discipline. Dear Dick, I want to make the world more interesting than 





Epistemic stand-point theory? “Woman’s business” 
Phenomenology as inquiry? “Continental Waffle” 
Recognition of thought’s limitations? “Germanic Mysticism” 
 
Why is vulnerability still only acceptable when it’s neurotised and personal? The question, 
implicit in Kraus, as in my letters. From a shared origin arose my desire to explore auto-
theory - the desire to handle vulnerability, like philosophy: at a remove. 
 
In Winnicot’s psychoanalytic sessions he would introduce his own ideas and interpretation 
to the dialogue, not as final truth, but as objects to be kicked about, played with, taken 
apart. I offered up these letters for similar play.  The writer, like the analyst, must present 
themselves to be used by the patient, or the world. They must allow themselves to be 
impinged upon, then, in taking on the subject’s pain, they suffer a dispossession of self. 
Yet they are expected also to maintain a reflective distance and attitude. 
 
I’ve heard it said of Eileen Myles that it is impossible to separate the experience of reading 
her work from the mythology deriving from her career. East Village feminist icon, 
transgressive proponent of a queer futurity currently unimaginable. Reading her is to 
experience a several world, a double exposure, into which we’re hurl’d. 
 
If fame mediates our experience of the words of Myles or Blanchfield, Nelson or Kraus; 
it does so to purpose. The intentional alignment with the autobiographic takes place not 
as a vanity; the confessional candour, the disinhibition are about our relationality – laying it 
flat on the page – about the negotiations of identity we’re faced with in a time of 
marginalities fronting up, practicing boldness. 
 
State Cinema, North Hobart 
 
On Tuesdays Linn and I had counselling appointments; it wasn’t intended that way, it just 
fell out that our councillor happened to have two slots one after each other. The fact that 
we shared the same councillor, Dr Shwartz was a source of complex neurosis for me. I 
imagined Linn and I were reflective glass, and Shwartz somehow stood hesitant between 
the two mirrors; his body mediating the distance, either able to see us both the better or 
hardly at all. Afterwards we didn’t speak of our sessions. My discussions had concerned 
sex, what I conceived at times as my blockages, and had pathologized – while at other 
times viewed as a natural free expression to be celebrated. I imagined Linn sharing his 
frustrations, I imagined I was the pivot on which his counselling session hung. Then I 
pulled myself up for narcissism. 
 
After one such session, in the stewing silent afternoon that followed we decided to head 
to North Hobart, for our habitual visit to the Winston and the state cinema. What we 
watched was more of an art installation by Christian Marclay: The Clock. A montage of all 
the clocks recorded in cinematic history creating a collage with sense – relating us to our 





Moments in the protagonist says to his paramour: “we’ve got to stop meeting like this.” 
The cliché line is  un-ironically blurted, with rolling eyes and weight on got. 
 
A famous movie line, I reflected. Conjuring strange visitations in the night. Dark echoic 
halls. Teeth alit in ambient star light, describing the ambivalence which bared teeth 
describe: hunger, lust or aggression. Though to divide them seems to wilfully ignore their 
common origin. Passion and Anger are often treated as synonymous for good reason. Yet, 
a potent passage of Maggie Nelson’s Argonauts, for me, is when she describes watching a 
queer kink-film at a cinema: how her favourite aspect was the way a slap appeared tender. 
 
How can sex be violence, I wondered, and at the same time not at all violence? These 
thoughts recur with Linn given our co-predilections. How can mutual objectification be a 
means of communion with another’s subjectivity? 
 
Winnicot speaks to the value of creating a ‘facilitating environment’ for a child at play. This 
notion is generous – it resurfaces: how can we create a space secure enough for a child to 
creatively explore, construct a world? And for an adult: with sex as arena, as facilitating 
environment, is this how we can heal rather than re-enact traumas? 
 
That night I couldn’t sleep, I sat on the red vinyl couch out front to think on the 
installation. I produced, instead what felt to be a vaguely flat-lined prose poem. 
 
I’ve Got You Babe 
 
The clock Maclay produced 
Belongs to each of us.  
We’ve all marked our moments 
By the meditation of it 
 
In the looped 24-hour supercut, synced with real time 
Teeth are brushed, collectively 
The pistols cranked at duelling-dawn to  
Spaghetti western Ennio Morricone,  
The Good, the Bad and Just Fine. 
 
Sunny and Cher sing I got you babe as 
Another day begins. 
At 10:04 Doc Brown is eternally zapped  
at the weather vane 
 
The flash of blinking microwave LEDs 
Pendulum of grandfather 
Silver strung pocket time. 
“It’s some comment on,” someone begins 




Sundial’s shadow lifts 
Landscape flips 
 
We’re all arbitrarily linked by this measure. 
Synched with our presents 




If not visiting Linn at Pollen Tea Room, then in town my common place to read, write, 
idle, dissemble – was not a library but Salamanca market place. The university libraries, 
unfrequented, to me felt dreary, altogether too quiet, lifelessly sterile. 
 
Yet, I reflected, Emerson saw a library as a magic cavern, or a pharaoh’s tomb. Full of the 
dead buried in their sarcophagi, encircled by beloved possessions. With the reader’s 
presence they could be reanimated, brought to life as you removed the lid.  
 
I should be more precise: libraries are community hubs, and not at all obsolete - the 
function they serve is community outreach: a social service – the children’s section as day 
care, providing the books families can’t afford, computer access for the elderly, a skill-
sharing hub.  
 
But our university libraries assumed the sober air of the laboratory, home to diffuser, test-
tube; where to read a book felt always decontextualized, at some remove. There we were 
made to examine texts as if under the microscope and from behind plastic goggles; 
touchable only when separated with tweezers and held in hands gloved by latex.  
 
We are arriving everywhere  
the train taking places and places  
to get here, there  
must be something  
to be said of the white swan on the black  
lake at night like the black fire of letters  
that burns in our books… 
 
“like the black fire of letters that burns in our books,” Louis wrote, this was a fire, I felt, 
continuous with the chaos outside its covers, in continuous dialogue with that outside. I 
have done most all my writing and reading not in an airless artificially lit sarcophagus, a 
graveyard of books, but in a Babylonian bustle; the grips of agora – trying to embrace its 
hustle. 
 
Calvino imagined this continuous babble when he riffed off Borges asking his readers to 
conceive of a totalising library - a catalogue of all that is knowable. In this possible world we 
had lost the capacity to differentiate between the essential and the arbitrary. The reader 




provided a sprawl of its own, I felt. Though its weight was not vertiginous: as it didn’t 
deliver up other’s thoughts yet lent you the materials to work your own. 
 
I write you this from Retro Café in Salamanca Place. The morning is crisp and the markets 
are coming alive. A few yards off a ruddy cheeked couple are spruiking their apples from 
behind a wooden collapsible table. Down the way a Vietnamese family are selling radishes 
and beets recently wetted, beads still glistening, colour saturated. They send their youngest 
to make all the financial transactions, bum bag comically over-sized at hip, learning the 
count on the go. The smell of Mahogany and Celery-Top pine wafts from the neighbouring 
wood work stall. Small circles of friends come together then part laughing in a many-parted 
dance that peters out about the Tex-Mex burrito stand. 
 
The agora is a library, but one not fossilized through recording. And one generous in its 
abundance. Here I see the library finally, as Roberto Bolaño conceived it: as infinite 












Sitting in Pollen Tea Room reading, I was fond of watching Linn expertly handle a steamer, 
balance three plates, one in the crook of their arm as they made their way between tables, 
juggle spatial awareness with affect labor with a humbling fluidity; seamlessly transitioning 
between a several’ world. 
 
I thought on what it meant, if it meant anything, that both Electra and I worked – when 
we did work – not in hospitality, but in call centres, we justified as they were ‘ethical’ call 
centres. El worked at Fossil Free, I at the Greens. Each of us preferring to go without face 
to face interaction, capably learning to manipulate for a cause. It’s strange because, as I 
recall,  El was always uncomfortable with phone calls, the distance denied her need to 
articulate with expression, gesture.  
 
I imagine her counting silences, pauses of breath – learning to determine whose turn it was 
to speak – the way one might count the seconds between thunder claps, deciding if the 
storm was oncoming, imminent, in retreat. 
 
As Barthes noted: on the telephone the other is always in a state of departure; the other 
departs twice over, by voice and then by silence. Whose turn is it to speak? We fall silent 
in unison: crowding of two voids. I’m going to leave you, the voice on the telephone says, with 
each second. 
 
In Decreation Carson describes the conversations approaching final conversations, where 
interspersed with discussions of brunch, her mother speaks longingly of death. Miracles 
slip past while Carson neatens things; spines of books, paperclips in a china dish. 
Paperclips, that recollection will immortally align. The quotidian walks sombrely, hand-in-
hand with mortality, as if performing some time-worn, dissonant, promenade. 
 
The lines are falling / faster / now 
 Fate has put little weights on the end 
 (to speed us up) 
 
After his mother’s suicide, Josh Thomas in Australian drama Please Like Me wordlessly 
watches his father check the use-by dates on his mother’s milk and yogurt, rifle through 
her fridge condiments, not wanting to waste a thing. The quotidian: the surest way to relay 
silently something unfathomable. The mundane butts up against it. Miracles slip past. 
 
Her body is lain in a generic plastic gown, on a cold steel slab. Under harsh florescent light 
the least charitable photograph of her, which she’d never allow in life, is methodically 
snapped for a file, hospitable records. A plastic band around her wrist carries a serial 






Life going on will soon mean lawyers the son will have to hire to dispose of her estate. 
Funerals, where eulogistically her life must be duly performed and honoured before numb 
or breaking loved ones. 
 
I imagine Electra on the phone, head canted to the left, the phone is cradled between 
clavicle and ear. She flicks errant hair from her eyes. Meanwhile her hands scrub dishes 
with an Ajax cloth,  because life has to go on, but the lines are falling faster now, fate has 
put little weights on the ends, and all Carson could do was describe brunch, because what 






On Accelerated Grieving 
 
That summer Linn and I were offered to guinea pig sit a cottage in Coles Bay for an old 
friend and supervisor Jordan, and his partner Alex, who were off to a wedding in Perth. 
We stayed up late. The next day we lay out some lettuce, cucumber ends and hay to the 
appreciative meeps of the piggies, and went down by the water line (as it were) for the 
afternoon. 
 
While Linn frolicked at the water’s edge, kicking at the spume, I watched some kids not 
far off play, fashion castles from buckets, muck out dark sand moats. I thought about 
Bruce Beaver and how he described the Manly of his youth on the Mainland, not so far 
away; a few miles and a generation ago. 
 
I recall how he described watching a sand modeller painstakingly forming the figures of 
culturally familiar objects – what would they be, what icons depicted the 70s white 
Australian dream? Perhaps Don Bradman beneath the Southern Cross, maybe Malcolm 
Campbell with a tooth filled grin.  
 
The sand’s shapes would be diligently sealed by the model maker with salt-water brush 
strokes, a cloth or cap would catch coin from the appreciable, appreciating audience. Then 
the days end would see the artist ceremoniously destroy the structure; movements steady, 
unreluctant. Washing it away before the waves would. 
 
In Dharamshala, Northern India, a few years past, I lived in Tushita monastery; I would 
watch the monks bent over there work; attendant to the mandala as it emerged. They 
worked a familiar devotion into the structure; with attentive strokes of a silver tube’s length 
– single grains of coloured sand eased out in a steady flow. The Mandala should be 
imagined from above I learn; their geometries, few onlookers realise, are made to conjure 
idealised monasteries, as seen from a bird’s or God’s eye view, they formed early 
architectural sketches. 
 
That the culmination of these laborious creations is their destruction never ceases to evoke 
in the audience reactions notable because equivocal. How should you feel? Some measure of 
regret for the loss of a beautiful thing? But then, this sense is stymied when the intention 
is so clearly to belie that sense of loss; or evoke it, only in order to call it into question, to 
look at it anew. 
 
The meditative practice we were taught drew to the surface the ugly feelings otherwise 
suppressed, reacted to only unconsciously. In observation we were finally examining our 
reactions, the meaning of their content, the contingency. 
 
Accelerated grieving, Electra once called it. Or was it just causation I wonder, no longer 








Watching Linn frolic by the waterline with some families children, caught up in the play 
that the land offered, I wanted to tell him I loved him then, but the words stuck. What if 
I didn’t mean them? I wondered. What if I did mean them, but I was wrong to? If it were 
an error in judgement? 
 
Away from Linn and the children, an elderly fishing couple were beating two squids against 
the stones ... It sounded gruesome. The rhythmic thwack. The steady beat. Eerie that even 
slaughter can create a rhythm your body could move to, could dance to. I thought on 
Heidegger’s phrase – one of the many he felt called to invent, from a language failing to 
contain his reality – ‘it worlds’ he said. It is worlding, outside, simply doing what it must do, 
what it chooses to do.  
 
I settled back on the sand, shading my brow with a broad hat, and drew out the Deborah 
Levy novel I was reading. Reading Levy I had a renewed sense of the world & language. 
She wrote as if words had not already been worn out, emptied of meaning. As if their 
original unsullied form corresponded with the felt-experience today. For Heidegger too, 
there was a time when ‘I love you’ spoken, carried the weight of its sense; before the 
plethora of gift card-tee-shirt loves overrode its meaning.  
 
For him the task was to recognize and revisit the word’s sense at their birth place… To 
remember when they had authenticity, and so live back into that sense. I can recall the first 
time I told Electra “I love you.” Or was it “I think I love you” or “I love you maybe” – 
hesitant and breathy and tremulous as we were.  This was before the many loves to come 
may water the sense down; I never thought then that love would wind up being a repeatable 
performance. A dive into an already familiar deep.  
 
When the sunsets and the sky begins to darken,  I zip up my jacket, shiver once and seek 
out Linn on the beach. I begin to walk at pace back, I walk barefoot as is customary in 
sand, feeling the silicon scrunch between my toes. The sand is cold and wet now, I feel its 
numbing spread. I think on the fireplace in the cottage; imagine Linn stretched out on a 




‘The continuous work of our life,’ wrote Montaigne, ‘is to build our death.’ Or something 
to that effect.  Man knows and thinks this tragic ambivalence which the animal and the 
plant merely undergo. The “rational animal’s” destiny. In death he escapes from his natural 
situation without, however, freeing himself from it. Man is an ambivalent condition. 
 
I’m nestled into the red sofa on the porch of the cottage, before me I can hear the incessant 
digestion of the waves, behind me the shuffles through hay and Meeps of the guinea pigs. 
From the neighbouring fencepost a cat is staring curiously at me, a perfectly disinterested 




two friends reached out on the same day with similar messages. In our early twenties we 
had as a trio discovered the world together. The world we discovered was glorious, sun-
drenched, and deeply troubled. But that was acceptable because that delineated our 
purpose: to undo, to redefine. In youth’s naiveté we thought we would re-describe 
community, help a lost culture rediscover compassion. These friends seem now strung out, 
wary at the end of a day with no coming home in sight. They wrote me that they’re giving 
pills a try, another try.  
 
Tricyclics, SSRIs. One says she is seeking psychiatrists for ADHD diagnosis, Aderol, 
Ritalin dispensation. Pathologization of self feels the rage. 
 
We’re in a complex time, Linn said when I explained the situation, and judgement is what they need 
less than anything. The night preceding we had watched a stand-up comedy session Nannette, 
where the consolation was offered that this medication may boost creativity - that Van 
Gough popped pills by the dozen, powdered foxglove, that made colours vibrant, pills 
perhaps responsible for those extra vivid Sunflowers. 
 
I wasn’t meaning to offer judgement, I thought but didn’t tell him – what, I wondered, 
was whether this was just a price they must pay for failing to properly internalize the social 
contract, with its consoling ethics, its reasonable metaphysics in tow?   
 
And what, I wondered, if medicalizing discontent ultimately just accentuated the disorder? 
They suffer from thinking, and inhibiting questions creates an uneasy, fraught relation. 




The week by the coast passed slowly, I kept thinking on depression, on medication. I 
finished my Deborah Levy novel, then felt in her absence a familiar sense of listlessness. I 
decided to return with Linn to Hobart city for relief.  
 
Once home, I reclined beneath our red plum tree in Battery Point, reading. Beyond the 
page I could see a well-built man, Aussie-dad type, muscled, clean-cut – the kind with a 
torso you could climb up, and indeed upon him was a papoose and in the papoose a child. 
The man had a determined stride as he crossed the dog-filled park, heading uphill. The 
child was joggled with each step, his mouth drooping open, facing away, over already 
trodden ground.  
 
By mental habit formation: I am geared for analogy – I catch myself wondering: is the eros 
of my love for Linn, as with Electra, an infant papoose-borne by our need for 
companionship? The infant faces the opposite direction, watching the scenery recede, as 
the companionship staggers forward. I figured at first that backwards-facing love must be 
blind to what is coming.  Or was it, I then wondered, redundant to face forward when 





Facing backwards I think on the melancholia of that time, years ago, when Electra and I 
were here together. I remember telling myself that “melancholia” had inscribed itself in 
the days and months after she left.  
“Doldrums” in retrospect, would have been a better way to self-describe. No one can get 
that heavy and serious about “the doldrums”. 
 
Still, Melancholia was a term I happily romanticised. I approved its autumnal overtones, 
the seasonality indicative of its belonging to a natural order, while remaining sentimental; 
one of the four temperaments of premodern medicine. It had a symptomology of 
lugubriousness, morosity, the product of imbalanced humors. In particular an excess of 
black bile, a preponderance of which indeed poured forth in my fiction, poetry, 
discontented revelry.  Melancholia orbited beneath the influence of Saturn, hence the 
subject being, in temperament, saturnine. 
 
The term for me evoked the poet Thomas Hardy’s tangled bine-stems scoring the sky, his cloudy 
canopy as crypt, the wind a death lament. It felt like just one of those peculiarly personable 
medical terms of that era: melancholia, hysteria, conditions of the humours, like the poetics 
of miasma, a depression of the spirits resulting from “bad air”, to be treated with a daily 
constitutional. 
 
Electra and I used to take our daily constitutionals along the rivulet track. Plumbs engorged 
by the summer overhung the rickety fence bounding the path. A brood of baby ducklings, 
downy spheres, waddled their way upstream behind mother.  
 
I remember thinking that revisiting Tasmania was like revisiting an old tree, one which in 
youth I nestled in the bifurcating forked branches of, and there inscribed with pen knife, 
initials in a heart. Returning to witness the tree’s embossing, what will I find? Time has 
worked over the inscription - the cellulose has thickened, a ketosis knotted scar had settled 
about our initials, characters that now resemble only the suggestion of their original 
signifier - the way I imagine Mandarin characters, originally pictographic, slowly morphed 
into merely suggestive shapes. 
 






Do you recall South Hobart’s Water Works?  
The tree’d artery we piped down 
And found a bird’s body on our path.  
A breeze takes up the edges of her.  Broken wings 
Feebly enact fluttering, its impotence. 
 




- watches from neighboring eucalyptus –  
an uncomfortable branch. 
A dead bird denotes, you tell me. 
 
The kite scoops fairywrens from our cities stoops,  
and the years are lost now  
since you hung our artichoke hearts from  
the light switch above your bed –  
 
Our new words,  
a skin,  
finding each other –  
each leaf feebly enacts  fluttering, its impotence  
 
Ground bound now 
To cold crumpled sheets,  
Which hold the weight of our correspondence: 
Its remonstrances. 
 
The bird is gone now. 
I walk over rust-coloured stains,  
that might denote - trudged gravel grates. 
I walk over rust coloured stains - without seeing it, without 
 












You visited in a dream last night. Do you recall, Kant describing a dream’s content 
as ‘involuntary poetry’? In the dream you’re holding a chunk of quartzite, milky 
ancient stone cupped gently in your hands as if it were an eggshell, not product of 
a billion year metamorphic process,  pushed and pulled by tectonic compression. 
 
In the dream we’re on a plateau in the Western Tiers, Vandemonian Button grass 
growing up in tussocks about our knees, swaying. I reach down and pin a paper-
grass stalk flat between thumb and forefinger, I run my fingers up its razor edge. 
A thin fire severs the ridge lines of my thumb, the contours demarking me, run 
deep red. You proffer the quartz. I let the flow gather, bead and drop onto its milky 
surface. Blood in Milk. Some witchy omen in it. 
 
In the interpretive necessity of dreams I conceived this as a pact. Binding us to this 
land on which we parted. Or as well it could be you binding me to this land, a 
sentence to which I willingly acquiesce.  
 
Only later do I learn those ancient molten processes leeched the minerals from 
that quartz, left it empty, translucent – nutrient poor. The paper grass - at home in 
the inhospitable – claimed it, drew quartz’s silica to sharpen its blades. Then blood 
begotten by grass spread on quartz, felt full circle – implied necessity. Should I 
conclude, I wondered, that it’s the over-determination of dreams that allows for a 
Choose Your Own Adventure sense of closure? My bleeding thumb remains 








YOUR POEMS BEGIN by declaring that syntax shapes the human 
predicament.  That midway through youth’s stanza the line broke, a branch 
in a forest.  In the cave, the poet dealt in nonlinear psychology. Though 
the cave saw no sun, not even indirectly. You did not entertain 
philosophical questions, albeit technically. Admittedly, you admitted, the 
program generated concrete situations. We: Abstractions.  
 
I ask: how to avoid collisions along the path of morning to evening?  YOU 
answered: we must reconcile waking and dreaming. The hours cycled by 




You told me Carson felt that in aligning the realms of waking and dreaming our 
attention is drawn to a boundary active between them, active because it leaks. I can 
imagine Foster-Wallace writing Carson’s poetry up as yet another example of the 
porousness of certain borders. 
 
There’s a reason that ‘oneiric in tone’ has come to be a lazy literary description 
applicable to so much poetry, in the way ‘meaty’ is used to describe the texture of 
a plenitude of fungal varietals. 
 
“How do we rise above our days and nights?” 
 
I rhetorically asked you in this poem 
 
 We must reconcile waking and dreaming. 




I Invite you to Join Messenger 
OR 
Man Arrested for Putting Fake Arrow Decals on the Floor in Ikea 
 
Both are accused 
Of creating a labyrinth with no exit 
 
I fill the holes in the chassis before applying the chipboard 
 
Yet mi van es tu van - though not when I’m living in it. 





When night falls we shall snap the glowsticks’ inner 
chamber 
We may live the resultant light 
 










My stay in Hobart was coming to a close; the wisteria had fallen from the neighbouring 
tree and my sublet had run out. I couldn’t live on Linn’s couch forever. Three year earlier 
Electra and I had left our joint belongings beneath this house, and today I had decided to 
unearth them – decided, the way one might in morbid fascination, decide to peak beneath 
a wound’s bandage. 
 
Digging through the long garaged belongings, I unearth memories that are dusty or 
mouldering. Do you remember the old matchbooks we got at the Tip Shop? I took them 
out, tinkered with them, lit one and watched its sulphur sputtered into life then slowly burn 
down the ply stem. 
 
The matchbook, I had learned, is so named as the cardboard-covering folds over the thin 
sticks of ply in a “book”. The enclosed matches rest in a comb-like arrangement, neatly 
lined soldiers.  The soldiers must be torn away before use – as opposed to the jumbled, 
loosely packed sticks of the now common matchbox’s interior tray. The book sports a coarse 
striking surface on the back, fricative to the touch - while the front cover, bares imprinted 
the insignia Pabst Beer. 
 
I recall toying with this matchbook at Goulburn street – then putting it back in my pocket 
when I hear my name, spoken to my ears exasperatedly,  
 
“Juniper, I want you to meet someone. This is Jorgen.”  
 
In conversation with a partial acquaintance, I default to piecing together a path connecting 
the dim dots of a constellations of preceding conversations. these conversations have 
gerrymandered contours; they eschew troubling conversational electorates, that play where 
it pays. 
 
“So Jorgen…how do you fill your time?” 
 
Perhaps I meant: what do possibilities of togetherness look like?  
  
“How do I fill my time?” He seemed slightly puzzled then rallied. 
 
This question I had come to habitually ask at social gatherings, making a new acquaintance 
- it felt preferable to the prepossessing “so, what do you do?” which sounds off 
immediately as adversarial, a challenge.  
 
“What do you do?” seems to prompt a postured response as the interlocutor scrambles to 
self-situate. Who in their inner depths is not deeply uncomfortable with a question that 
pre-identifies one’s worth as residing in the role they occupy in a capitalist system of 





And coming to it, how would I answer, if I put the question to my earlier self? 
 
“…And you Juniper, how do you fill the time?” Jorgen asks. 
 
How did I fill my time?   
 
The months after you left would pass in a meandering passage, triangulated between 
rivulet,  IGA and home.  I subsisted off a renounciate saffron-orange diet back then. 
buying netted oranges in three-kilo sacks, butternut pumpkins, GMO carrots eerily 
identical and perpendicular. It’s a peculiarity of orange vegetables to be the cheapest. At 
that time 2 dollars per kilo veg was my budget. I had to horde my capital for pouch tobacco 
and black Gossip’s wine. 
 
My familiar passage through space became mentally well-trodden, ingrained as a neural 
pathway. A firing synapse would tell me a cigarette was called for, a rummaging hand in 
the compartment below my desk would find an baggy empty of filters. So I’d make my 
way down the hill, my body carting my absent mind to the IGA. Milk, eggs and filters later 
I’d be on the porch, flash forward to rolling and wetting the paper with my whistle.  
 
This was years before I would examine the nutritional patterns that left me sick every two 
weeks. The compulsivity and withdrawal my smoking fed. Years before I noticed how my 
ethics were eroding under my indulged tendency to rationalise impulsive consumption 
choices. Factory farming for one, even then sickened me, but I held the visceral discomfort 
at bay. 
 
The way I occupied space felt entirely natural. I moved through a scripting world, and was 
comforted by my unchanging social relations; served by the handsome Greek boy at the 
deli, the detached librarian, my absent housemate with his plaintive sticky notes. My 
relations were one level deep, enough to operate in meat space while my mind wondered 
across the virtual. 
 
How did I fill my time?  
 





As the sun was falling, approaching the end of my spring cleaning, I found some worried 
at manila folders, and dug out a stack of A5 slips of paper; biro-lined and re-articulated old 
poems.  Some were scraps of other people’s writings I’d transcribed. Most were many 
folded, worn-seamed from fondling and rereading. I sat and read through them.  
 
I came across in the folder, the words printed neatly, a typed-up letter you had pinned to 







To think you were once afraid of being a comet! 
Now you are becoming a planet, 
gathering its moons about it like skirts. 
 
I am diminishing and 
withdrawing further. 
Soon I will be a little dot. 
 
Then I might expand again, but 




It’s a strange process re-entering old poems, it feels uncanny to me. Is this because poetry 
is a durational art? Its experience is temporally bounded, but it is more than that. Reading 
a poem teaches you how to read it; draws on iteration, pattern recognition. The poem 
becomes a program you can learn to operate, to get inside. Blanchfield puts it, its sense of 
likenesses and equivalences build an interiority as you pass through it. 
 
Is part of a writer’s struggle between the fact that poetry is by nature durational, and that 
the passage of time is, on closer inspection, illusory? Illusory could be taken in two 
different directions: 
 
The Tibetan scholar Nagarjuna expounds on non-persistence: the notion that nothing is 
carried over from instant to instant, that change necessarily entails annihilation - in which 
case how could a non-persisting self experience duration? Is there, in fact, only now - as 
Eckhart Tolle may extol (a profound felt-insight, however possibly cheapened by the aisles 
of self-help). 
 
Alternately, illusory could refer to the image that General Relativity leaves us holding - that 
in the absence of an inertial frame of reference, we find that were there a Godly perspective 
time is a frozen river, in which there exists no movement, no transition: every moment – 
stretching into the past and indefinitely into the future --  exists simultaneously. Passage is 
merely an illusion that situated, finite beings like us are subject to. Sitting on the outer edge 
of an illusion, transitioning.  
 
I recall in youth, with more than a bit of shame, consoling an early lover who had lost a 
grandparent by claiming their loved one persisted in a parallel temporality we no longer 
had access to – as if merely stood in waiting, behind a sheet.  
 
Yet, in seemingly paradoxical contrast, we still experience a poem as durational, despite 




poem. The world has changed itself subtly around you, and yet – no trace of change 
remains. 
 
The Japanese Monk, Dogen, wrote of Buddha-nature that after your body and mind and 
the body and mind of others fall away: 
 
 Not even a trace of realisation remains 
 And that no trace,  
 Continues indefinitely 
 
It puts me in mind of the Arabic expression Maktub ‘it is written’ a notion I’ve always 
found encouraging. It suggests we view the events unfolding in life not as surprise or 
chance, but as uncovering. The parallel here is with the notion of learning as a kind of 
remembering. Discovery that feels like recognition. The way Rukeyser writes: 
 
You must choose your poet here… 
Or rather, do not choose, but recall 
 
As I pull up the late Manilla folder I come across this scrappy fragment of Auden: the ironic 
points of light / flash out wherever the just exchange their messages.  
 
I wished Electra were here to rediscover it with me. What is she rediscovering now, in a 
poet, new or old? The light from a poem, bound to a moment’s apogee, evokes not 











Dear Junip.,   
 
So you’re leafing through our belongings, brought back to the period after we 
parted. And how do you find it? Where we lived, squat of Soho, amongst the 
BoBos. Has the Magnolia been vibrant? The colour fallen away, the fatted-calf 
white leaves dropped? 
 
Remember when you said, “the revolution will make children of us all,” and I said 
let’s sit out on the veranda looking at that Magnolia, said, “it’s still cold enough for 
a dressing gown and blanket.” There’s a distinction we learn, between childhood 
temporality, that place of plenitude, and ‘developmental time’ - mapped to 
calendar, wrist watch, market.  
 
We were privileged enough to wonder; what does it mean to embody privilege - 
yet through life choices shuck off some of what capital conferred?  To retain the 
possibility of return: an afforded security, made it all feel like play acting. “A jester 
mistook for a king,” you wrote. “A pathos derive-able from being the perverted 
form of the privileged subject.”  I’m back then, just as bent, colour fallen away, as 
the Magnolia head-crooked over bramble fence. 
 
We Bourgeoisie bohemians of Soho, generationally shipped together: artists or 
scholars or vagabonds or gurus, activists of varying ilk’s. Who had care in 
abundance, but a shortfall in sense, or money though we thought they were the 
same.   
 
Eileen Myles spoke to her working class roots – the same felt true of the middle 
class – that we weren’t really supposed to be artists. Only the upper class had access 
to the beautiful, or like Baudelaire, the capacity to comprehend rejecting it. 
 
Reject it. I mean, the middle class meant, for us, an appreciation of features money 
could buy. Like time. It was a wedding: money could buy time. Could buy its better 
half, more than a plus one, the special other. When we left the university, without 
institutional support, a failure to sell our hours, to respect time’s transactional 
nature, meant a falling in-on-our-lives, a plunging. 
 
Suddenly all we had was time. Supported by the plump but tight-fisted hand of the 
state, security benefits afforded us a modest kingly existence. I mean we could 
survive; and laboured to, a little. We were a duration, a some-time of instances 





And it felt regal, our paper cheques, regal in the generosity we could offer one 
another – a couch or spare mattress always available; a shed ready to convert into 
temporary squat, should we find one we counted in our number, dumb of luck. 
 
And generous, we could always offer food. And if not food, tobacco, or a poem. 
Hugs and words. For playground we repurposed the suburbs, hard-rubbish 
furnishings, book exchange in refrigerators, markets with clothes, tapped out and 
traded along the bike path. 
 
For mid-class youth to get beyond a graduate know-how of the conceptual 
apparatus of art, for it to be usable, to experience it as true – we required a more 
profound transformation; so we affected a type of economic drag. We donned the 
clothes of the working class, queenly in our Blundstone boots, those gatherers of 
scuff, flannelette when it was in; then dungarees, paint spattered, high vis-tradie 
puffer jackets.  
 
And we narrated. None of this was anything without the stories we told and sold 
and staged. No one said any of this wasn’t true, you know. Still our precariat 
position felt in its character staged – maybe it was this quiet knowledge that we 
could probably always step back from it. That a comfortable middle class family 
could catch us.  So renunciation affected was never felt internally as legit, as long 










I set out along the rivulet to say goodbye. The Rivulet lead to the Cascade Brewery, and 
up to the base of kunanyi. In the preceding weeks I would stop at the burnt-out remains 
of the hoarder’s weatherboard home. Sat out like a piece of dark tourism, for years. Electra 
and I used to visit frequently. I vividly recalled the Ford Spectron with blue lichen patina’d 
across the dash, and the disdainful gaze of the wild cat that resided in the backseat. I noted 
the ugly fluorescent graffiti marked ‘Hoarder’ across the home’s exterior. We wondered 
on the man who had lived there: did he have a family? Was he mourned, or did he just 
evoke curiosity? You would sit in the midst of the rubble each morning, you said it was 
the only place to draw freely. That it felt peaceful there. 
 
Back in Tasmania now, I notice those remains are gone – as if they’d never been. 
Something beautiful and silent had taken their place, grown up there.  What had become 
of the shards of the hoarder’s life? Was someone there to remember? 
 
Looking over Murmurations is like rooting through the nest of a hoarder, this strange 
collection, collated for you. I recall when we fished through the remains of the house; half-
ashamedly, fascinating but taboo.  
 
I recall the wads and wads of age-tannin cut-outs from old tabloids – seemingly random, 






On Being Undone 
 
Dear Electra,  
 
I can’t help thinking our relationship is now one obsessed by its own syntax. We 
used to talk about auxiliary verbs, to be, to have – and how endlessly fecund they are, 
how they have served to point to our proverbial placedness, our ‘being’ in the 
world. The subjunctive, to remind us of our endless ontic-possibilities. You used to 
love its common description as a mood not a tense. The feeling-tone of grammar. 
 
I in turn was seduced by ‘to do’ the seminal verb, the definitive action word. Do 
you remember Lerner’s play poem? 
 
I did it for the children. I did it for the money. 
I did it for the depression of spirit and the cessation of hope. 
I did it because I could, because it was there. 
I’d do it again. Oops, I did it again. 
… 
That does it. Easy does it. That’ll do. 
 
My personal favourite usage of to do though, was one of its compounds – to undo. 
 
The notion of being undone, compound-adjective, like a zipper, suggests the subject 
is both free and naked at once, liberated yet vulnerable. The cracks in our 
composure that allow for a porousness of our borders, the world is let seeping in, 
and the truth we’d concealed from ourselves gushes out… 
 
It’s no accident that the sounds we make when we’re genuinely breaking are so 
undignified: the snuffles of a little animal, a pink blind-eyed gurgle, the honking – 
our faces flushed and swollen, our mucous membrane enflamed and flowing freely. 
It feels physically shameful, exposed because it carries the sense of the state it 
exhibits; the shame, vulnerability and accompanying release. 
 
Another reason I’m so drawn to undone is that it’s a compound adjective – like 
unnoticed, unsung, and consequently beautiful, albeit sadly so. Take for instance a 
relationship uncoffined, as in Hardy’s poem Drummer Hodge, where he writes of the 
young solider ‘uncoffined just as found’.   
 
Uncoffined. Unrejoicing. Unkissed. A sense, as Allan Bennet put it in the play 











1951, Cage in an anechoic chamber at Harvard - foam-padded,  








Before I met you I fell in love with a girl who performed John Cage’s 4’33” on 
flute with a Dachshund circling her heels, in an auditorium packed with 
undergraduates.  When I say perform; 4’33” you remember, is a performance of 
silence in three parts. Its 4’33” minute duration reflecting the length of the canned 
music that sells today. 
 
The professor was trying to prove some point about Feyerabend and 
epistemological anarchism: a kind of philosophical Dadaism. I wasn’t much 
interested. At the time I was reasonably convinced the girl I loved was in love with 
the professor, carrying on a quiet affair behind my, and his partner Alex’s, backs. 
Only later when I too fell in love with the professor did I properly understand her 
position.  
 
After her 4’33” performance we played with Zen inspired experimental silence, 
during sex and other conversations. Later we spoke about not the piece’s sense, 
but the sense in being able to compose a piece of uninterrupted silence and sell it.  
I projected myself into Cage’s head as she read over my flushed body: 
 
“I have no wish to be incomprehensible, perhaps only to productively 
discombobulate; to convey the temporary sense you get in turning a corner 
on a hike into an expansive and alien terrain...” 
 
4’33” was a performance of the impossibility of silence. Before I knew his point, I 
knew only that it was informed in some way by Cage’s Zen influence -  I enjoyed 
imagining it to be a meditation on perhaps the frames we operate rigidly within; 
music must be composed, not ambient – we’d conceive music definitionally as 
organized sound… As requiring the artist in the process of creation.  Cage 
demonstrates that such framed music only at best mimicked the uninhibited art 
nature produced.  
 
My friend Thomas had from his teens a near paralyzing fear of tinnitus. The notion 
of being followed everywhere by a dull ringing produced an auditory 
claustrophobia, which kept him carting ear plugs in his back pocket, avoiding 
musical venues throughout his university years.  
 
Meanwhile Cage, in a sound-proofed anechoic chamber, discovered he couldn’t 
escape the high note whine of his own nervous system in operation, nor the low 
bass rhythmic pump of his blood in circulation. Yet rather than claustrophobia, 
oddly he was consoled: “Until I die there will be sound,” he wrote “and sound will 





That the future of music is secured by the persistence of noise leads me to ask: 
when does noise shade into music? Cage’s play on frame was a defining point for 
noise music, a genre which played with the incidental and ambient. I’ve been 
thinking on how this marked tension applies as much to words & writing – what 
is worthy of recording in a life, of sharing? What is the difference between what is 











Here I go defaulting to separating my ideas with ellipsis… For as long as I’ve texted, 
myspaced, messengered, I’ve leant heavily into the ellipsis ... surface affects that produce a 
delay ... of gentling … of segueing ... of suggesting ... Leaving the door of a statement’s 
meaning open. Why? For fear of the conceit showing a full stop’s worth of conviction may 
denote?  Or because people prefer the pliable conversation partner;  firm belief can’t be 
negotiated, talked around, it dead-ends. I’ve since wondered, was I a conversational 
publican for whom the customer was always right? 
 
Whilst a period is a severance, an ellipsis refuses to break the connection. As Kraus asks;  
 
How do you continue when the connection to the other person is broken (when the connection is 
broken to yourself)?  
 
I refused to break the connection. Fear of being left alone was my motivator. This was 
symptomatic of my general condition; my writing pandered and was consequently a 
disappointment. I would pepper text messages with emoji’s, fluffing up the pillow of any 
half-way decent idea with adjectives of self-doubt, sanding my sentences own edges so 
they were never too sharp with conviction that could lead to conversational splinters ... 
Even when writing fiction for myself, I was always addressing you, Electra, or you unknown 
reader. I never escaped the awareness of your being in town, in the room, over my shoulder, 
and so you could never slip fully out of yourself. I was the overly attentive host whose 
excessive conscientiousness makes you ever the guest,  never welcome home.  
 
Forgetting that to be in love, and to demonstrate that love, requires believing that to be in 




Even if my use of ellipsis indicates a lack of conviction present in these letters, I don’t 
regret it. I only ever hoped to offer you considerations.  That we could lie flat on our backs, 
and be with the stars, make a horoscope together. I only ever hoped to offer you 
perplexities. 
 
And what is a history of philosophy, as Thomas de Quincey asks, if not a history of 
perplexities? The perplexities of the Hindus, of the Chinese, of the Greeks; of 
Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, Dogen. Is it enough for a writer to find their place in the 
world, by offering the world’s perplexities back to her? And are they the world’s 
perplexities or her own? If the world is perplexed, she is at least sure-footed in her 
perplexity. And wouldn’t deign to ask me for answers. In which case surely the most 






It’s as if we entered the world with this mouth that was born to drop in amazement, 
designed with an impressive range of motion; a dexterous tongue, this vocal folded 
orchestral organ – language presented itself as an instrument; we learnt to communicate 
ideas and most stopped there, expecting language’s function had been fulfilled. They 
overlook the oblique capacity – that we can in language inhabit ideas.  That this happens 
best when de-stressing the medium, in the way words can draw attention to and 
defamiliarise language, thereby rediscovering it. 
 
For Borges we make a mistake when we think we’re ignorant of something because we 
can’t define it. We define something only when we know nothing about it. This idea recurs 
in Buddhism – its most honest expression, expresses only incomprehension, but without 
consternation. And that incomprehension is no irrational mysticism but rather a rational, 
analytically grounded embrace of inconsistency.  
 
Honesty requires rather a Socratic shrug of perplexity; the humility of a Wittgenstein 





















In a virtual world: A pockmarked teenager 
enters flow-state  






















I’m very tired. I had a good conversation with Dan as we rode along Merri Creek 
Trail. I thought: if I had a kid, Id want to walk them by a creek or river like this 
every day possible. Recent flooding has washed a lot of detritus up onto the bank. 
Human detritus, plastic shreds, various species of trash.  
 
Walking the long riverbank, the grasses resemble eyelashes that catch debris. It was 
so green, though. The rubbish seemed to me like remnants of a losing battle. Green 
everywhere, birdcalls, many people walking dogs or children or ambling with arms 
about each other. Massive cement walls abutting the bank, above which were lines 
of staggered houses. I saw two men, industrious together adding some spray 
painted scene to one of the walls. The walls felt like a dam keeping all the 
infrastructure contained. I am glad they are painted by people, not as any 
commercial thing it seems, painted just because.  
 
Dan’s house is also overrun with plants. Looking at it I forget how dry Canberra 
is. I want to make some bee hotels for my backyard. It’s easy to do. I want to plant 
a heap of native bee-attracting plants. It will be good practice. I hate that my 
landlord will tear them out when he decides to knock the house down. He doesn’t 
care about bees or plants. How do you not care about plants? Maybe I’ll take 








Dear El.,  
 
I’ve moved into a house in Victoria City on Vancouver Island, Canada, occupied 
– it seemed – by 7 witches. Mushrooms grew from the hardwood floors, tree 
stumps protruded from the walls. Even elk horns were seen festooned with mala 
beads spreading eagle wings in the room’s corners.  
 
Behind me is Ted, Behind me is NYC, Canberra and You. It seems I’ve arrived in 
Canada. I have a return ticket which is rare for me - a decision I did not make out 
of caution, or pre-planning -  I purchased the ticket on a whim, for a date almost 
random. Perhaps I did it to bound the sense of boundlessness, to keep it from 
becoming threatening. 
 
Books titled Planetary Healing, the Lifted Veil: fantastic literature by women, the Open Veins 
of Latin America, Cosmic Serpent, Ecology of Hope, Back to Eden, and of course; the 
Artist’s Way. Any description of a collection of books, any statement ‘and, of 
course’ carries the intimation of cliché, implies a scriptedness to the readings: as if 
the books collected together were in themselves a rebuke to critical thought.  But 
I certainly don’t meant that. I know better than. We’ve both seen how the drive 
for heterodoxy ends dismally; all behaviour finding itself in some way iterative.  
 
I’ve been thinking on the silent stretches in our correspondences and how we can 
prevent them from feeling threatening. Have you heard of Boddhidarma from 
India? He was a mendicant monk who, when presented to emperor Wu Chin was 
confronted with the tyrant’s challenge:  
 
“Who is this person sitting before me?” 
 
To which, failing at witty rejoinder, he responds 
 
“I don’t know.” 
 
He could have given an answer. Quick responses dry fastest, but in leaving the 
uncertainty, in staying with a question simply and steadily held – something else 
opens up. But what is it? Can silences  be rich and productive – without threat? 
 
In the room in which I sit now, Chain o’ Hearts creeper vines descends from the 
ceiling, and all around me crystal: amethyst, quartz, more. Field guides to edible 
plants lie dog-eared beside draws with heady scents, herbs, rose petals, valerian 
root, cleaver. Glass vials filled with concoctions labelled sweet mercy, gentle support. In 




toilet roll beneath a plastic bag, and above; bunches of sage, dangling from the 
ceiling. Behind is a chart of the moon’s phases, a celestial map is tacked. 
 
The floor is lain with wolf pelts, the couch arrayed in Indian shawls. More books: 
North American Folk Healing, Eastern Body Western Mind, Hydroponics, Be Here Now. 
Outside the garden blooms. 
 
Rilke begged his young poet to be patient towards all that remained unresolved in his 
heart. To try and love the questions themselves like locked rooms, or books written in 
foreign tongues. He urges the writer, or perhaps youth generally, to not seek the 
answers that cannot yet be given,  as they would not be able to live them, and the 
point is to live everything. 
 
What does it mean to live the questions now that we may one day, without noticing it, 
live along into the answer? You wrote: “Maybe I’ll take everything with me when I 













“the region of soft skin at the back of the knee”   
 
It was, when I asked what part of the human body you found most attractive. 
Trust you to fall in love with a shallow depression. A hollow. Elastic, hairless, often 
a shade lighter, appearing a generation younger than the rest of the sun-exposed 
body. I learn this region has a name, as the flap of skin under the elbow is known 
anatomically as the Weenis – your erotic centre takes the Latin Popliteal fossa. Not 
as catchy as ‘Weenis’ but its colloquial name – the Knee Pit, I know you’ll appreciate.  
 
Years later and it’s as if I’ve only latently acquiesced to being your object of erotic 
desire, shaped myself in its likeness. That is to say: I now parade openly my knee 
pits – I wear short shorts; girl’s denim, tight with the tiny zip, the pockets so small 
as to make themselves redundant, fitting only a Chapstick. I wear my school boy’s 
knee pits exposed, slightly slick with sweat, and if I wear them not with pride, I 
wear them at least with fondness, a remembrance, like a grandfather’s pocket watch 
from the war. 
 
As I pass you made an approving comment years later, I rock on my heels, proudly 
flaring my knee pits. It was a Tasmanian Summer. We sat eating red-bean ice-cream 
on the porch. You taking the full sun I settling for shade; our eternal postures. 
 
It made me think on how Frank O’Hara wrote: if you’re going to buy a pair of 
pants, you want them to be tight enough that everyone will want to go to bed with 
you. 
 
That was the last time I saw you. It stuck. To comprehend the resonance in my 
mind of those fleeting final images, their eternality; I turn to Carson’s poem ‘lines’: 
 
I /want / to tell her—sign of God’s pity. She won’t keep me / she says, 
she won’t run up my bill. Miracles slip past us. The paperclips / are 
immortally aligned. God’s pity! How long / will / it feel like burning, said 
the child trying to be / kind. 
 
The way the position of paperclips in a dish, toyed with, become immortalised by 
their co-occurrence with a final conversation with her mother.  
 
Miracles slip past us/The Paperclips/Are immortally aligned. 
 
To add a further surety she and I write those moments into prose: the eternal is 
then shored up in literature as the sempiturnal (the always-everlasting) because even 





My writing spot now is a hillside outcropping above my house. The breadth of 
Vancouver Island stretches out below me, the Olympic mountain range of 
Washington state across the water. I’m nestled amidst interwoven golden grasses, 
creating a matted reedy bed. The deer flatten this spot: where I write they take their 











If only what was recorded were always everlasting 
I used to receive postcards, marked with a J.,  
Single sentence best wishes,  
exaggerated waves from a departing ship,  
they hung on a yellow string 
above the mantle. 
 
Binned now. Not so sempiturnal. Still 
One time you came back from travels, carrying  
nothing,  just a bottle of Mezcal tequila 
The bottom thick with sediment 
one with a worm saturated, 
dried and sunk. 
 
After you left again, I arranged the bottles  
spent my last dollars on a decanter  










I hunch on the Veranda 
Nursing my body, a warm mug. 
Breathing on it. 
I push its vapor back forth 
700 days at least since you left 
And then there’s me still watching 
The playground, that empty set 
 
At the theatre you played Tom Stoppard’s Jumpers 
Some kids have come 
Fucked with the corkboard cut out props 
Torn at the vellum curtain 
Tagged your mahogany stained stage 
Though we both knew  
It was ply – 1,1/4 inch below. 
 
Even 10,000 kilometres away 
In an all you can eat sushi bar 
Taking seaweed salad by the strand 
I’m thinking of you 
And that poem you recite 
The one about the bees fumbling the flowers 
And the distance measured in years 
 
I note the latest synchronicity 
Which abounds on the topic of you 
As I read Rupi Kaur ‘the sun and her flowers’ 
 
 Bees come for honey 
 Flowers giggled as they 
 Undressed themselves 
 For the taking 
 The sun smiled. 
 
The chopsticks are cheap  
The throw-away type 
You snap to separate. 
 
Mine snapped bodily at the base 
Unlucky in love, it signifies 
 
Unsure why I’m to blame 




For factory-made, shitty craftsmanship 
 
Is it consolation: that something of this 









This morning, outside the garden is in bloom, and I’m breakfasting, observing the 
saplings tied to their supportive stakes. The lyrics of Rufus Wainwright singing 
complainte de la butte drift through my mind. 
 
 A snow pea’s little limbs tremulously encircling the string of a bamboo trellis. Petite 
mandigote. Je sens ta menotte. Qui cherche ma main… My sweet little orphan child I can 
feel your hand searching for mine - an unsettling song, no doubt about it. I 
wouldn’t want my diminutive menotte in Wainwright’s calloused main.I have 
satisfying chores here. I would write Electra about it, I decided, I would begin:  
 
“Today I tend the sage, pairing off the dying leaves, beautiful in the autumnal way 
that purple bruises with a yellow centre are beautiful. Fall. I de-spider the grapes 
and coax the vines back towards their trellises with gentle encouragement. It’s 
soothingly quotidian work I tend to each morning, before propping myself up at 
the desk with a blank page. 
 
                  
 
 
For further distraction: I spray loose the aphids, some ceramic-pot inhabitants 
need new homes. Accomplished, I gather up the succulents and return inside. 
Background tinkle: wind through chimes by window. I think on what to write her, 
I begin some thoughts on domestication - Sword of Damocles, rings out behind. I sit 
at my desk to write, adjust it so the patch of sun fell on my hands but not my face. 




Looking after and caring for the plants, domesticating my own little patch 
with rich dark soil and baby seedlings, inevitably led my thoughts back to 





Reading Baedan on the struggle of the wildness of queer desire I find I 
enjoy the conceit of queerness as foremost a challenge to domestication, 
continuous with a political and epistemological anarchism, a form of 
decolonizing the self.  
 
You were always interested in how the heterosexual in common parlance 
is still conceived as the natural, the homosexual as some product of culture. 
Which struck you as ironic, this civilised notion. A deviant inheritance - 
incongruent with the picture of queer futurity as an originary atavism. A 
signal mischief. 
 
To seek the anti-domestic, is to refuse scripted encounters and their 
accompanying synoptic expectations, it is – as a friend Paul recently said – 
as if we should meet each experience with the expectation of a rupturing 
of the expected. Anticipating only frustrated anticipations.    
 
Perhaps there is nothing errant in the path of the untrellised-creeper vine, 
chain o’ hearts,  it merely follows the light, and thereby carries 











Remember the two bottles arranged 
(If you could say they were arranged) 
not a lot to arrange, but there they were 
on the mantle, the shag, the bottles 
after all a still life could be composed of as few as two.  
No? 
 
Firm fruit, a lacquered bowl, 
a naked body 
Arranged: The bottles, the 
bodies, the shag carpet.  
 











The next day, besides my housemate Laurel, we drove her grandfather’s lichen flecked Ute 
and made again for the lake.  As we ground up the dust dirt roads, clouds of dust in our 
wake, I thought on Borges, the piffle he had to say about islands. 
 
Islands. I’ve spoken of Iceland, I’ve spoken of Japan—I know I’ll keep thinking 
back on Japan all my life—England, and New York. But why should we keep 
talking about islands? Let us expect a different question and I hope a quite different 
answer, though I keep saying the same things over and over. I’m an old man, 
forgive me. 
 
But why stop talking about Islands, Borges? Heading out towards the lake, bumping along 
rutted country lanes, past honesty stands and farmsteads –  yards where elderly vehicles go 
to retire and dissemble – everything evoked Tasmania. Laurel describes the Vancouver 
Island to Vancouver City relation, like squabbling siblings. Little different from the relation 
between Tasmania and mainland Australia. 
 
I’ve lived a short parochial life, so find my instinctive ease amongst a people casually self-
identifying as peripheral, a shared jargon. Amongst people gesturing yonder and talking 
about the ‘mainland’ I find comfort, find I can ‘take my ease beneath a flowering tree’ as 
Whitman put it, and not consider it loafing in any sort of objectionable way. I’m a young 
man, forgive me. 
 
Once at the lake with Laurel, new lover, everything between Electra and me feels very 
distant, held a lighter grip. An eagle circled above in slow lazy drifts, every movement of 
her wings felt, articulated. Nearer to hand a pair of hummingbird’s wings vibrate at insectile 
frequency. Their pear-shaped bodies hang in the air like drops as they hoover the nectar 
from flowers’ flutes with darting bill. 
 
Birds of Prey, I think, apex predators, we find beautiful because they are terrible. Our 
systems of morality seems dwarfed by their downward plummetings, to pluck from the air 
their needs.  
 
At a certain depth, everything goes transparent: Carson wrote – as if we find them beautiful 
because art reveals that which is always already see-through. The deep unconscious. Their 
morality is an older, more primal form of expression.  We admire their honesty as 
expressed in their power. 
 
hunger, desire is never original. Nietzsche named it frankly in Zur Genealogie der Moral: our 
prescribed norms are motivated less by a desire to do good than an internalised terror of 
punishment, societal retribution. In which case, we appreciate the predatorily beautiful as 





Laurel emerged from the lake, once more gasping, eyes bright, naked. We made love on 
the banks taking care between the gnarled and protuberant roots, enjoying the pine needled 
cushioning. I thought on how sentiment gives out under the rawness of power, be it sex 
or death. We didn’t love one another. At least not in any sense that would bind us. Our 
sex was passionate, almost violent, but it wasn’t sentimental. Afterwards we both dived 
back in, to clean our bodies. 
 
I thought on those eagles with admiration, on how the body speaks in impulses made 
beautiful in their capacity to override sentiment’s reason. By beautiful I mean terrible – 
riffing of Rilke: 
 
We admire it because it disdains to destroy us 







On Late Stage Capitalism 
 
Dear Juniper,  
 
I’m glad you’ve found something to divert your attention, sex or love, terrible or 
beautiful. I’m working on something new and disheartening. A paper that feels like 
an indictment, like internment. 
 
I’m living with Grandma now, we’re looking after each other. She looks over my 
shoulder, she’s always curious. When I mentioned the title of my latest paper, 
Grandma thought Late-stage capitalism was a terminal illness. To which I kind of 
shrugged then nodded. 
 
What are the final stages of this cancer?  
 
Fatigue, an engine that has run its lot.  An extreme tiredness that doesn’t get better 
with rest. You find you’re eating less, losing weight, appetite. 
 
Delirium. Delirium can have many causes at the end of life.  
 
Shortness of Breath.  
 
Pain ... Coughing ... Constipation ... Trouble swallowing ... With all that’s 
happening in this state, now especially  









On rambling  
 
I’m writing leant against the wheel with a bic, in a small town in the Kootenays, British 
Columbia, a town that recalls a rural Tasmanian scene – little more than a dusty potaroo 
hop from a servo somewhere along the Midland highway. Alex and Sam are drinking berry 
smoothies while we refuel and wait out the heat before continuing into the Rockies. 
 
Hitching across British Columbia, feeling the rhythm of people and place, I’ve thought on 
the authors I’ve loved and the sensation of dipping into their books, catching the rhythm 
of their thinking, as I find my own.  
 
There’s a naturalistic vocabulary for how this works interpersonally: mirror neurons, 
unconscious identification. The process in writing is perhaps just as unconscious, but more 
fun. Who was it who said: reading delivers on the promise that sex raises, but hardly ever 
can fulfil – getting larger because you’re entering another person’s language, cadence, heart and mind.  
I’ve been rambling amidst different language lately, sluttish with the intimacy of voice. 
Conceiving this as flanneurie; meandering through a city of content, perspective. 
 
Plato called necessity a ‘wandering cause’ – in doing so he reinscribed it as The Rambler’s 
inheritance. Flanerie expresses a signal desire to forestall the exhaustive. It offers up the 
tangential, a jumble, provides a list subtended by a theme, but retains a willingness to 
surprise, a tease, denying you the closure of conviction. 
 
Still, the flanneur remains pedant, just of a unique variety; their collections responsive to 
an internal logic, opaque from the outside. If there exists a magnetism it resides in 
surprising the reader; that such a strange mind could still invoke, could retain attention. 
You learn to see through her bowerbird eyes, to predict which next adornment, tinsel or 
comb tooth, will feather the nest. 
 
Flanneurie should be considered in connection to an anti-productivity ethos; it’s 
cumulative but anti-capital & queer looking. The tendency and direction of academia is to 
flush out flanneurie. Barthes was flanneur all over; his notion of dossier was all about 
entering into a topic only to the extent that he wished to – suggesting the reader could 
delve deeper, but denying exhaustiveness as achievable. 
 
In fact the origins of The Rambler as walker, was in the rejection of privatisation and 
defence of the commons, a capital logic of exhaustiveness you could say – in which all is 














In writing this thing I was interested in poetry that relished incongruity, that defered, was 
at play with muddled context. That in making use of what was to hand embraced a sense 
of productive drift. The way evolution gathered branches to its tree through chance 
encounter.  At the same time I was interested in affecting a formalism that suggested 
systematicity, yet laboured under an apparent constraint; to respect the oblique. 
 
This wasn’t so much in defence of mysticism, from a theological perspective, but rather a 
taking up of Adrienne Rich’s suggestion that the distinction to be drawn isn’t between 
secularism and belief. Rather it is between those for whom language has metaphoric 
density, and those for whom it is merely formulaic: something that represses possibility, 
ensuring obedience by wielding empty certitudes. 
 
Rich writes as if she were forever seeking an engaged poetics at play on the shoreline of 
what can now be thought or said. Did she find it? Surely if she did, it slipped her fingers. 
It is an object that can never be at rest. 
 
She was concerned with poetries role in the continuous redefining of freedom, a freedom 
she characterised as forever over the horizon – shored up by there always being that in 
poetry which evades grasping, evades encapsulation in our theories, there exists what poet 
Americo Ferrari described as an unspeakable where, perhaps, the nucleus of the living relation 
between poem and world resides. 
 
Montaigne in his essays, Barthes in his mythologies, Flaubert with his dictionary of received ideas. 
each offered indictment of automated thinking – as a form of the domestic, standing as 
placeholder for thought, a standard formulae invoked. The un-interrogated inevitability of 
action being followed by precise reaction; the offered satirical definitions – each inquired 
into vulgar and common errors,  offering essayettes to disabuse the reader of thoughtless 
platitude, denunciation of cliché. 
 
These writers’ expertise derived not from scholarship but attention – being present to a 
subject, letting it touch them and hesitantly touching back. It was not with a dispassionate 
gaze but a brail-like intimacy with the word, a conviction that meaning arises in ridges, the 
contours of the terrain. 
 
Each set out on an endeavour to find what one knows, what one is able to know, where 
the limits of knowing lie – that which Montaine, standing amidst his library, put as the 
query Que sais-je? This constraint often leads to a diaristic aspect subtending collections -  
Dodie Bellamy’s The Buddhist, Wayne Krauste;nbaum’s examination of Humiliation, Brian 
Blanchfield’s Proxies, Eileen Myles’ Inferno. 
 
The diaristic and the vocational… It’s hard to classify what I’m doing here, alone in the 
woods. Would it be considered Vacation by some? There’s this perception that in writing 




possess an unhaltable, incorrigible vocation. It seems natural, then, as Barthes’ claimed, for 
the writer to always write, in all situations – literary production being assimilated to a kind 
of involuntary excretion. The writer as prey to an internal tyrannical god who speaks at all 
times.  The writer is on vacation but his muse is wide awake and gives birth non-stop. Is 
this vocation? Scripted purpose or class indulgence? 
 
I’ve been thinking on the nature of attention; the word deriving from Attendere; which 
implies a reaching towards – and maybe even a need to be met half way by the object to which 
you attend. 
 
Before there were either wave or particle descriptions of light, Pythagoras and Euclid 
imagined that our eyes emitted a kind of substance that illuminated whatever it fell upon. 
Later Epicurus proposed the inverse; that objects projected a kind of ray that reached for 
the eye. Yesterday I read an old Zen adage which has it that as you reach towards the 
world, the world reaches back, it meets you half way. 
 
Do you recall the feeling of love giving out beneath you? The way the springs groaned? 
Before there were either wave or particle descriptions of light, there was light. And there 
were eyes. And then there was Epicurus, and Zen, but always there was reaching towards, 
and always there were groaning springs and love, and attention, observers, cock and balls 






Posting from the road; we’re closer to the Rockies now, with Leaves of Grass on the 
dash (it felt fitting), Joanna Newsom on the radio, and Alex and Sam, arguing and 
canoodling by turn in the back seat.  Away from my café haunts and disputations, 
I’m pondering on Whitman; when he wrote that he found the night air, the large few 
stars, far more convincing than arguments. What do you find convincing these days? 
 
You know I drew this idea of writing you from Kraus’s I Love Dick, but now I’ve 
been thinking on the nature of argument. The previous days I’ve spent digging into 
tender spots in ideology with Alex: an old friend – perhaps adversary? – it’s an odd 
term but it’s part of our dynamic, as we range across the politics of manipulation, 
through the merit of evolutionary arguments for human tendencies.  
 
I conceive our conversations as a dialectical dance, three steps and a turn; thesis, 
antithesis, emergent synthesis -  then the turn finds us in our originary positions, 
facing forward or facing perhaps onto one another. Sam is the spectator for this 
rituals’ proceedings. On the topic of spectatorship: the relationship between the 
three of us, a triad on this voyage, seems to illustrate a Girardian triangle – a 
dynamic of two men one woman – in which the woman functioned as conduit for 




rationalisation for attraction, magnetism, otherwise forbidden? Not good thoughts 
if true; as a dynamic it instrumentalised and silenced Samantha. After a day’s 
debate, last night I felt fatigued, and had Whitman’s sympathy. Dissolving in a hot 
spring amongst the cedar trees, I drew the same conclusion looking up at the stars. 
 
Perhaps it plays into an old cliché about poets responsive not to reason, that 
masculine element projected onto nature, but to nature ‘her’ self – the ever 
perceived feminine element? Perhaps.  But then, Heidegger described the act of 
thinking as subscribing to a single thought that would one day stand like a star in 
the world’s sky. Maybe those singular stars, more convincing than the arguments 
Whitman found tedious, are Heidegger’s thoughts? What do you think? 
 
Years ago, in Sri Lanka, I recall reading Ocean Vuong’s Night Sky With Exit Wounds; 
after which I couldn’t help but conceive the pin pricks of astral light showing 
through as a negative space, a blind light that revealed the underside of something. 
In pessimistic moments I imagine the same sky peopled indiscriminately with 






In the Rockies we arrive at a glacial lake, we sit observing the still iridescent surface, a bird 
of prey swooped down from the air, alighted a moment and was gone, a fat bird in its 
talons. There had been only the briefest of tussles. I had read there existed a protein in the 
eyes of migrating birds which allowed them to identify electromagnetic fields; like mantis 
shrimps other worldly colour spectrum, the flies’ unrivalled frames per second, bats’ sonar. 
Whales, I learnt, possess an extra module connected to their auditory system, marking the 





Do whales sing for joy? I wondered, are they singing all the time? I thought on the 
eponymous character in Oliver Sack’s Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat – who would sing 
continuously as a way to navigate his world. 
 
What is it like to be a bat? A whale? A mantis shrimp? An Oliver Sachs? What is it like to 
be an amoeba, a eukaryote, a Christian, a queer, a sub, a dom, a mycelium network? Nagel’s 
famous pronouncement was initially intended as a retort; a response to the narrow 
delimiting of conscious experience via reduction to the physical. Now ‘what is it like’ is 
colloquial; a multipurpose tool bandied in academia; something like Descartes’s Cogito I 
think therefore I… Riff off the truism. Or a magic Eight ball Wittgenstein: whereas I cannot think 









I learnt a new word today: Sybarite. Cast disdainfully by someone over-educated. A native 
of Sybaris, Italy, whose Greek ancestors were known for notorious luxury, the voluptuary 
life. 
 
Thomas remove’s and admire her tin egg with its single bud of weed, the pink elephant 
emblazoned upon a single tab of acid, a gold-capped mushroom head severed from its 
stem. Tamara grinds dates and cocoa powder into bliss balls. Amber has an orange streaked 
snake, coil of languorous muscle, about her shoulders. Jumana is on her back twirling a 
fire-tipped staff between her thighs. Tianna tickles Magoober beneath the chin, he props 
his head forward, eyes blissfully squinted to receive. Iain is rolling out on a foam cylinder. 
I’m luxuriant, reading a book in a hammock beside. Laurel hangs upside down from a silk 
in the lounge. All of us, it seems, Sybarites by our own fashion. 
 
Every now and again I prop myself up on elbows and quote a passage. “have you read” I 
begin. “have you read,”  this was called a Juniper bingo moment – I was often reprimanded 
for this default phrase cropping up in conversation. I think it is considered philosophically 
specious in debate, a fallacious form of appeal to authority –  in reference we play a 
balancing act with repetition. As Bennet describes it in History Boys; some of the best times 
in poetry are when the poem seems to reach out and grab something in you, you’d thought 
distinctly your own. 
 
Perhaps it’s not such a shameful thing then, that, as Borges said; we are always rewriting what 
the ancient’s wrote, perhaps that should prove sufficient. As Wittgenstein in the opening 
section of his Tractatus wrote – that he didn’t much care who had thought those thoughts 
before him, he still claimed them as his own.  
 
Perhaps we reach for influence because one’s reach should always exceed one’s grasp; the 
asymptotic curve in geometry, a curve always moving towards zero, or infinity, but never 
touching the axis. Like the Zen aphorism; that we manifest our dreams only to find them 
ever so slightly tainted; the chink that shatters the illusion is staring at the finger that is 
pointing to some elsewhere. 
 










Dear Junip.,  
 
Like a sponge I was, content only to fill and rinse, gathering grot and grime, but 
passing through clean water. Like a sponge I absorbed it all. Took on everyone’s 
junk as my own. 
 
How it felt leaving?  You find the handle. You step through the door, inside there 
is nothing, the inside of an eyelid pinpricks of light. 
 
I am back in this old city that was home, amongst our friends, but without you. 
Dan was interested in cosmology at the time; I was always ready to be amazed, my 
greatest attribute I thought then. Some nights we’d climb up on the corrugated 
roof besides the bee hives. He taught me about Paralax.  
 
In Paralax, you move the foreground in puppet play and what emerges is the 
impression of depth. Distance & Depth as measured in perspectival shifts. 
Sometimes the backdrop changes, then what set are we left standing upon? With 
parallax everything takes on a new contorted shape: I think on how we awoke in 
that dingy room: shutters drawn, feeling blindly around each other’s faces, till we 
made out nose, cheek, a jaw and chin. I want to ask: what difference is there 









I’ll tell you about Skin 
 
Skin had hope, that’s what skin does. 
Heals over the scarred place, makes a road. 
Love means you breathe in two countries. 
(Naomi Shihab Nye) 
 
E: “It’s sad.” 
J: “Why sad?” 
E: “Can’t you see that it’s sad?” 
J: “But why.” 
E: “Because we’re each of us subject to continental drift.  
      Because of that pesky molten magma core that keeps us floating apart  
      Without our having much say in the matter  









I’m back on Vancouver Island, meandering about with Laurel. Today my thoughts 
are on dancing and on eyes. I wrap four boiled eggs in a ‘kerchief, as we tumble 
out the door. There is the now familiar workhorse grumble of her grandpa’s ‘truck’ 
as it starts up. 
 
“We say Ute, short for Utility vehicle,” I tell her wisely. The truck lacks a 
speedometer, and the locks don’t work. Flecks of lichen grow around the window 
frame. We arrive at Royal Roads, a fancy as hell private university where the 
peacocks graceful stalking is punctuated only by jagged birdy pecks of the lawn. 
 
I am seated in the undergrowth of a brackened forest, filled with little silences. 
With a lazy wave of my arms the mosquitoes will start, unsettled into the air. Later, 
walking to my café writing haunt, I will throw my body about, akimbo-limbed flicks 
and turns to Patti Smith’s Because the Night. I will startle drivers in passing vehicles, 
feel an odd guilt then a righteous pleasure – face contorted in the throes, a Billy 
Elliot, finally dancing, finally throwing his body disinhibited through the streets of 
Birmingham, a rebuke to repressive gender norms and Thatcher’s England. 
 
Milan Kundera wrote we have to live with the imagined eyes of others always upon 
us. Some need the eyes of a great anonymous public, others the eyes of close 
friends. Some need the tender eyes of a lover. Finally there are those who require 
the eyes of the imaginary, eyes that no longer or never did exist.  
 








I’m also writing you from a café watching a youth that resembles the me of not so 
many years ago.  The youth’s hair has knotted itself into whimsy’s dreads. Her 
jacket is winged in the armpits, the sleeves drape over her wrists. Her face now 
unwittingly sour. 
 
A little pooch cocks his leg, pisses on the wheel of the youth’s bike. Passers-by 
smile at it, the way they might at newborns. I imagine canines being bred into 
incapacity to displace the nurturing impulse. A sensible manoeuvre. Human’s 
demanding greater space, recognition. 
 
Across the street the girl in corduroy shorts and yellow polo shirt, bounces on the 




Her socks meet her knees. Remember that game we would play, German Tourist 
or Lesbian? Shorts, high-cut display pale stretch of tender skin. She resembles an 
eager, overgrown school student, backpack fastened at hip. 
 
The take-away coffee cup she swigs from has corrugated vertical bands that create 
a barrier, reduce loss of heat from the beverage and ensure her hands remains cool. 
Gertrude Stein claimed to like the feeling of words doing both what they wanted to do, 
and what they had to do. 
 
I don’t know you if would agree, would you argue the over-determination of the 
world allows words their freedom to mean again (and again)? Ever-adding 
inflections. Whilst syntax’s strictures dictate words’ necessity, does a words’ 
freedom resides in the world’s root unknowability? 
 
I like to think Stein liked the feeling of her own limits. Maybe a healthy attitude 
given the unalterable strictures of gender, a survival mechanism. In which case 
maybe irony is not the only song sung by a bird that has learnt to love its cage. And 











This evening I sit out on a hillside outcropping overlooking the city of Victoria, nestled 
into the crook of Vancouver Island’s neck. The sun is setting, while across the water 
Washington State’s Olympic mountain range frames this image. There are deer down 
below, grazing on the neighbour’s hedges. A hawk catches lazy currents over our house 
and I think of it in comparison to the hummingbirds’ frenetic insect-speed wings, 
siphoning nectar from flower trumpets. 
 
Laurel describes the phenomena of urmurations to me, and I am pulled back roughly 800 
days to where Electra and I sat on a little green knoll above a playground, looking over not 
the north-eastern, but south western shore of the pacific, as she described murmurations 
to me.  
 
Both times I’m quietly slack of jaw. My mouth falls open in shock and I shake my head 
side to side, the quickest way to communicate the unexpected, to gasp for oxygen if need 
be.  Both times I’d felt the imperative to appropriate murmuration as some sort of literary 
device, but it hadn’t yet entered my fiction. I wonder how Electra felt that morning in her 
quiet apartment in an outer Canberran suburb. She liked the world quiet in the mornings. 
I imagine her in a rocker with Earl Grey tea, fumes rising in curlicues about a wide-
mouthed cup, a club footed kitten padding on her knees, circling, preparing its space 
according to some ritual known only to kitten consciousness.  
 
I wonder what project lies before her on that table. What ready materials for those 
fashioning fingers. And what element has caught her attention of late? Fire. Paper. String. 
Water. Feather. Smoke? Primordial basic substances, yet seeming ethereal, subtle in their 
influence, light in their touch.  
 
I’m living with witches Electra would appreciate, witches she could lust and love. They 
pass their days twisting wicks in tallow, extracting oils into dark bottles, straining tinctures 
through muslin.  
 
As the sun fades I descend the hill, minding my footing between patches of long grass. I 
wonder how we will be when next opportunity convenes us? Perhaps changed in familiar 
ways. 
 
Perhaps I’ll write about Murmurations soon, or maybe I won’t, I’ll just write about writing 
about them. So a swarm of starlings may continue to flap singly, synchronically on the edge 









A lot is written about literary romances: peer to peer, master to apprentice. Much is written 
about the Master and always ‘his’ muse, a dynamic of inspiration and abuse, of oft creative 
usurpation, recurrent throughout narrative time. By contrast, what I valued most was the 
type of literary companionship that had us set out in cafés sometimes sharing a table, other 
times taking our separate spaces – but intuiting the other’s presence nonetheless. Our 
projects always distinct, but overlapping. Each of us given courage by sharing a mode of 
life. 
 
There were dozens, perhaps hundreds of cafés in which we enacted this dynamic, but 
certain ones rear up in memory. Like Jamjar in Battery Point, where we met Josh in his 
sweet-faced, golden-locked angelic youth. Where the owner Lou grew to think fondly of 
us, and support our indigent student ways (in a town altogether inhospitable to student 
culture) with leftover bread, day old friands. 
 
Today from an unfamiliar café on Vancouver Island I’m thinking on the Jewish artist 
Arnold Schönberg, and how he proclaimed “I have long since resolved to be a Jew… I 
regard that as more important than art.” It has stuck with me, remained pertinent. He 
seemed to be pointing to the way an ecological approach to art treats it as the fruiting body 
of a something else existing like mycelium beneath the soil. A painting emerges as if from 
nowhere, like Chanterelle mushrooms swelling in the rain. 
  
For Schönberg that something else meant according primacy to identity. When his work was 
labelled “abstruse, pretentious” or “hermetic, dry, bookish” he was unapologetic, these 
being adjectives commonly ascribed to Jewish people. Work that unapologetically 
embodies identity, without dissimulation, has substance and presence. It can’t be dismissed 
readily. It carries its own. 
 
And so I can’t help but address you in my writing. Sitting here, in this anonymous café, 
the dim lights, the chatter, from behind the perpetually empty stage and the average coffee, 
I can write and be invisible a time. The game I play again: to imagine myself into your 
situation. Somewhere across the world the sun’s arc is inverted, receding for you as it rises 
on me (in Dido’s timeless phrasing).  
 
I’ve been thinking on the unfortunate lot of Schopenhauer’s guineapig children. 
Schopenhauer pointed at how the experiences and illuminations of early youth become in 
later life the types, standards and patterns of all subsequent knowledge, “the categories 
according to which all later things are classified.” The view of the world we come to, then, 
can be seen as the unfolding and fulfilling of our childhood years. So you feared. 
 
Schopenhauer writes that that which is inborn, our intelligible character, unfolds only 
gradually and imperfectly, by trial and circumstance. The irony lies in our neighbours’ 




we learn what we are, we remain characterless, ignorant of ourselves – character must be 
earnt. 
 
Maybe you’re at Ainsley After School, steward of the wood-chipped playground, hand 
cupped sheltering eyes that scan over your charges. You wonder at these beings, as yet 
uninhibited in the ways that the years will work into the leather of our bodies. Knots that 
through numerous courses, multi-modality therapies, and community seeking we will hope 
to massage loose. We were born, society’s visible digits worked us over, then our real work 
began – the unschooling. The re-wilding. 
 
You would not helicopter above the children, yet remain cautious, astute. always 
wondering what game is taking place on the seesaw, the castle?  You know it’s the early 
concrete (yet capable of becoming symbolic) objects and their interactions with them, that 
will condition the people these children become. We are dynamic constructors of reality, 
yet inherit second-hand so much generational junk. How to imaginatively reconstitute the 
playground? Or retrospectively prescribe new significations, cleanse old meanings. I guess 
I’m asking: is your work there intended as redemptive? 
 
The day would end, and even your charges, with their seemingly infinite life-force, would 
tire and quieten, recede into themselves. I see you parted from them with many hugs; as 
you lean down and in, their little bodies reach up to the embrace, heels coming off the 
ground. I can imagine you lifting them till their feet dangle, laughing your laugh that rends 
the air - its upsurging and cascading, my once means of identifying you in a crowd. 
Something I always described to myself as uninhibited, childlike in its freeness, I recognise 
now possessed a second, more anxious face. 
 
The children filing past you to the racks don oversized backpacks, then march, supercilious 
cadets to their parents. You would wonder about their home life – who was going back 
into the arms of tumult, of love’s instability? What coping mechanisms were trial and error 
working into these young lives?  
 
Maggie Nelson describes the way, post 9/11, the children of firefighters who died could 
weeks later be seen shrieking and playing in the streets with philanthropic Yankees players 
– busy signing their bats, distributing caps. Now fatherless, Nelson asks, where does grief get 
lodged in such small vessels? 
 
And was our familial treatment so bad, we might both wonder, from our separate islands?  
How much was misattribution, foisting the blame? Where can we hunt for gratitude, while 
holding together the comely ceramic shards of our up-cycled life? We enter our twenties 







The morning before visiting an old friend, I’m reading Carson as she describes her 
understanding of ‘foam, spillage’.  To be willingly washed up as jetsam on the surf of your 
own design. It seems to imply a desire to be tossed and turned, to let story and theory step 
up, take just place. In our lives this is how we give plausibility to a world: delineate a life’s 
sharp corners, edges, contours. What is it for an artist to have sunk her hands into her own 
story, or a critic to storm and rage in the folds of her own deep theory?  
 
I’d taken the ferry to the city, to visit our once housemate and long missed friend Z. We 
meet Z in her home, a subdivided basement in one of Vancouver’s shittier suburbs, the 
room separated by a transparent hanging cloth. She wends her way around the space, 
unpacked boxes, unmade mattress, somehow she makes us tea, passes me a chipped mug 
with the tea bag still in it. Her roommates snore at night, they are flatulent, they fuck loudly 
and masturbate shamelessly. She can hardly afford this luxury of a quartered room, she 
says, gesturing around her. Meanwhile, for a Master’s degree, she’s researching the process 
of normalising something as foreign as property. Z has sunk her hands to the wrist in deep 
theory.   
 
I like this notion that deep theory is ecstatic, an attempt to get outside of, in order to look in 
on, the structure one is already in. Seeing Z, I became aware how in moving to Tasmania 
to circulate amongst ‘earthy’ or ‘grounded’ folk, I felt the grips of theory receding. Even 
writing a doctorate at UTAS I recall my co-worker griping about Judith Butler; muttering 
about the evils of theory for its own sake. So I worked myself, and more importantly 















When the day came to leave Canada, I found myself on the train heading to the airport, 
reading an old Keats book to distract myself. The first thing I noticed was how often Keats 
would pause to describe the position of his body or the state of his room at the time of 
writing, as if grounding his abstraction in that which was completely beyond dispute. “The 
ember in my tray is turning into ash and flaking,” he might write, “my foot rests atop a 
copy of War and War, the tilt of my neck is such that thoughts trip out unheeded. One 
could postulate a neck tilt, a particular cant of the jaw necessary for an unhindered 





I’m on a subterranean rail, bound for YVR (Vancouver) airport, the wheels are 
squealing in their ruts. The tunnel walls appear then recede with great rapidity. The 
forward carriage slides and slants into and out of focus with the twists in the tunnel. 
 
My sun-blanched canvas backpack, the seminal backpack, is full to burst. Who 
would guess the constituents? Not clothes, not tents – but a hundred brown bags 
filled with different herbs, a few dozen second hand hardbacks, a kitchen knife 
(blade wrapped in an old shirt), a walnut-handled steel, a mixing brush and 
accompanying powder, wads of hand scrawled notes to myself. I’m an odd 
creature, I recall at these times. 
 
As I scribble, eyes squinted, we come out into the light.  Below us lies a city, with a flavour, 
indistinguishable for me, from the other wealthy cities I’ve known.  There are oak trees, 
roots bound by cement, spilling their seed to no profit on the footpath (or sidewalk, to 
north Americans). It creates an acorn-powder pigment beneath the wheels of traffic. There 
are glass towers, of no obvious purpose or intent, as if merely bodies fruiting sui generis 
from this landscape. Tramlines black threads weave above the urban walkways. In the blur 
of motion I make out donar kebab and Starbucks dominating the storefronts. I write: 
 
I would like to describe more intimately the city, but realise I’m a stranger here, 
witness to only its surface. After three months living on Vancouver Island, 
however, surrounded by lakes and salty coastline I’m on the final leg, en route to a 
plane bound for home. 
 
I carry the sense that I have profited from my time on the island. Sowed seeds, and learnt 
lessons, experienced much that has brought joy and given hope. I want to convey this 
sense, so I pick up my laptop to write: 
 
I have drizzled chocolate into heart-shaped moulds to freeze. Rubbed CBD salve 




mushrooms in the charred remains of pine forest-fires,  and watched the full moon 
from alpine lakes in the Canadian Rockies.  
 
I’m going to be living in Santi Forest Monastery in rural NSW in the coming 
months, finishing my book. I would love to see you in November and hear about 













Dear El.,  
 
I’ve been considering planes as a ‘literary’ space, how they exhibit the tension of 
literary framing. At once bodies are rendered cargo, invisible in their opaque boxes, 
packages residing between sender and recipient.  Bored we slump in our allotted 
seats, test how many on-demand movies and whisky fizzes we can binge before 
descent.  
 
Simultaneously, however, planes should imply existential dread, mortal peril. 
Apparent biological laws are being contemptuously violated as we hurtle in a metal 
box through the stratosphere ... I’m in a carrier now, the package in transit is my 
life, comfortably on hold. 
  
As I write my knees feel the pressure, as the passenger in 22B wedges his buttocks further 
back into the seat. The allotted leg room in this aircraft is 33cm to knee. I’m anticipating 
circular bruises on each patella when we disembark. 
 
I’ve drunk more of the steward proffered coffee than is sensible. Caffeine I’ve known for 
a long time, just catalyses my more fidgety tendencies. If I’d made the mistake of leaving 
my nails untrimmed, I would pair them away neurotically with my right hand or teeth. 
Further things I learn that I do when at my wits end: plucking gossamer hairs from my 
ears, browsing inflight magazines.  
 
Looking down from my aerial vantage, amidst the puffs of cumulus upon the plotted, 





The aerial vantage is so often conceived as the privileged perspective, a 
dimension that in looking down, demonstrates dominance. But the perspective is 
always schematic, it captures its object, but never with the intimacy of first 
person. It is to first person what ruminant thought’s circularity is to actual 
embodied experience. 
 
There is often violence from above. 
 
Analytically trained in the mainstays of philosophy today - I saw my background 
as gearing me towards universalizing hypothesis, never meeting events in their 
particularity. Of course some philosophers ran against this trend, drew to light its 
shortfalls, the contradiction or absurdities it entailed - Derrida, Wittgenstein, 
Foucault. But their voices were side-lined. 
 
And so I found the aerial view eerie in the comfort it offered. It seems we can 
never fully evade our training 
 
At that moment the plane banked hard. I dropped my pen, clung to the walls. l felt my 







On the Island from Above 
 
I gaze over the snoring face of my neighbour in 23A through the ovoid window, on 
approach to Sydney Airport. Below us; a rectilinear patchwork of alternating ochre and 
green. 
 
Receding are cuboid strips of subdivided land, allotted in agrarian stretches of maize, 
canola, wheat. Toy tractors move amidst their lines and the humans manning them are not 
visible. The plane judders slightly in the air; heads rise from their books, eyebrows raised. 
A slight turbulence is enough to briefly destabilise the illusion that we are grounded, safe. 
Then eyes return to books. I peer again out the window. 
 
You could imagine this land had never been more than allotment, riparian subdivisions. 
Nothing in these long neat rectangular strips is free from domestication, none of it suggests 
wilderness. The terrain is the map.  
 
I’ve always felt the need to live in understory. Treed canopies overhead, dappling the light, 
so the sun can drizzle down not gush. It’s probably a long standing furtive trait, but I have 
no desire for open plains. Nothing about that landscape is opaque, all exposed. Exposition 
never appealed to me, exposition is synopsis, a blurted out punchline and the joke fallen 
flat.  
 
Yet as we bank through cloud, this seems to be a reductive, touristic gaze:  this land offers 
précis only to the untrained eye. If I took time I would find the complexity, the way 
desertification is as fecund as any rainforest, should you look with the right eyes. It was 
my precognition that abridged this place, I thought, not its content.  
 
 
The content ≠ my precognition 
 
Looking down on this terrain that was map, I thought of the fantasy maps my brother and 
I would construct in youth. The rivers and towns, the lines of allegiance in the imagined 
frontier wars, regions broken by mountain ranges - the raggedy edges of fjord structures, 
the sheer cliff lines. Mine were never to any reasonable scale; my roads diverged in 
haphazard and unlikely ways. 
 




teenage impulse into an art form. In this virtual community he has assumed the status of 
elder, he now provides recommendations on newcomers’ maps. It was an Apprentice to 
Journeyman relation - He would be surveyor, assessing the proffered landscapes – ensuring 
that their proportions produced conceivable scale, cities logic, and that environments’ 
physics didn’t diverge too radically from the imaginable.  His working was fastidious, 
laborious: a transcription of the rural. The engineer’s gaze. Mine was pure fantasy and play, 
silliness. Unlike mine, were his paper towns; they would fly.  
 
I thought on the Aerial view of Evandale, proximate to Launceston Airport as often 
approached, brought to mind Google Maps; and how with a flick of perspective, you could 
conjure a hazy edged landscape in reconstructed 3D. The cars and humans captured in 




The World from Above 
 
An aerial view of a valley town like Launceston felt in some ways violatory. I grew up in 
this valley. Growing up here meant pocketed heat in the summer, simmering tarmac, 
vaporous above, and thick walled fog come the winter. But there was something cosy, a 
blanketing effect it produced; like a deeper womb for an extended, protracted adolescence. 
I read once that children in a playground will often explore right up to the fence line. By 
contrast, in a playground absent a fence stretching out into infinite plane, the children 
would cluster around the central play equipment, lustre in exploration silenced. That is to 
say, the bounded nature of the grounds made them manageable – created an island of their 
own that could be fully known. This is just to say that attaining the supervisory, aerial view 
of my home town felt violatory.  
 
I’m back circling over Merrickvile when the intercom requests everyone return to their 
allotted seating. We would shortly be experiencing further turbulence. I took up my pen 







The Eros of Traction 
 
“The plane’s wheels grip the tarmac, only to spurn it.” 
“But enough rejection creates traction,” you told me. 
Still, an empty runway is a dismal place to part, 
its terms, unconditional. 
 
“To think logically is  
To be perpetually astonished.”  
So said Anne Carson’s saint  
Before Aphrodite destroyed her. 
 
“Logic? You mean the science of the bloody obvious,”  
scrawled my old coding professor Slaney, on my first assignment. 
Aphrodite told me that through the porthole’s double-plastic,  
the sun appeared to zigzag in its heaven. 
 
The plane’s trajectory violating her familiar arc. 
“Want is just another word for burning,” you write. 
Meanwhile the tarmac, still ho  











Part V Smell of Petrichor, Humus after Rains 





Can we unfold 
What we can’t figure? 






On Asobase and Nuns 
 
The Eucalypts are swaying, making complex brush strokes with their leaves. When it hot’s 
up here the winds come, and it’s hotting up. 15 years ago this place was a summer retreat 
for folk from Sydney, the big smoke. Now it’s only the beginning of spring and I’m wearing 
short shorts, meditating in a damp cave to avoid the heat.  
 
I live in a little Kuti, a Thai-style wooden hut in the forest, alone for a good few miles. In 
one direction there is a waterfall (though more a creek these days) in the other direction a 
glow worm cave. An old friend of mine, Patachara, a nun from Switzerland carved a 
beautiful sandstone Buddha out of the wall of the cave.  
 
I spend an inordinate amount of time snapping twigs these days. I do it with the Nuns 
beside me, we sit in silence, we snap twigs. It surprises me how much joy one can take in 
making larger sticks into smaller sticks, the satisfaction of a good crunch. Part of it has to 
do with the anticipation of the evening pot belly fire, rumbling like a furnace in the corner 
of my Kuti. 
 
Nuns, it turns out, wash the dishes like ordinary mortals. It makes me reflect on the 
Japanese verb asobase – to play at, to imitate: a low-stakes doing. This honorific suggests that 
the performed act is done with an awareness of its true, illusory nature.  
 
Today I decided to shave my head. Was this a type of Asobase play-acting of monastic 
life? A low-stakes doing? The full moon’s light bounces off my bald crown as I pass 
beneath the eucalypts. The glints off the scattered leaves create layers of refracted light, 
belated messages with intermediaries, relayed sun to moon, leaf to eye. 
 
Nathan says it’s the smell of the humus he loves, the understory’s decay. Silty loam, 
softening microbial, the swelling scent of petrichor. I like the bush hen’s movements in 
the brush, her hasty scattered remarks. Razor in hand ayya Nirodha, tells me I can keep 
my eyebrows – they serve a function, to catch the sweat. 
 
 





Those Canadian months: they already have a dream-texture, an immateriality that lends 
itself to doubt – did that happen? Will it come around again?  I’m glad I’m here. I could 
immediately settle into a new routine, tree-felling, wood cutting around the monastery. A 
good way to ground down with the sudden dislocation of return.  
 
The simple work here is the best: sweeping paths, cutting up kindling. It grounds me in 
the essentials – my efforts aren’t working to carve some particular future. It’s either about 
fulfilling basic necessities, or just practices for presence. Raking eucalypt leaves that will 
blanket the paths again tomorrow ... Coding impermanence in my body’s memory, by 
repetition. 
 
Those months on Vancouver Island feel like getting deeply intimate with a lover then 
parting ways abruptly. You find yourself still quoting them in conversation, wearing their 
old dressing robe, making their gestures. They don’t return your reference. 
 
Like Asobase – the remains after the loved one has parted – you continue to play at, to 
imitate the language love has taught you. But it is not Asobase; because it is not a low-
stakes play. The action is performed in a desperation, or simply because you don’t know 
how to be otherwise. Like a lonely lyrebird: a conversation, an imitation, continued on 
your own. 
 























On Retreat (Katoomba, Blue Mountains) 
 
The neighboring gullies are blue at dawn. Early light refracted through eucalypt oil casts 
long cobalt shadows. 
 
“Early light, late light.” 
She wrote 
“Light never seems to arrive on time.” 
 
Electra wrote me on the image of the poet and how in their own way, they have been – 
probably still are – as eager to prove themselves as war heroes. The image has it that they 
were ever seeking the thin happening edge of this crust of a star; something to get vertigo 
off of, to return home and write up about - to have sat down and  said, “I stood up.”  Is it 
true that they are ever wondering: how to seek the True, Good and Beautiful? Is 
deliverance from vulgarity, constraint, convention – truly possible? 
 
Eileen used to worry that her lesbianism was that ledge; one stepped upon to be *that* 
poet. I did too. Maybe we all did, one way or another - found some ambitious marginalia 
we could hope was novel enough to work for “the novel”. Authenticity helped, authenticity 
was prime real-estate, a commodious commodity, or failing that, a mineable collective 
experience we could relate back. Queerness as the thing, a select poverty as the thing, or 
then there were various spiritual ledges – like the way it took Ludwig the frontline-bends 
tandem’d with William James to seek the monastery.   
 
What nearly took Ludwig to the monastery was Willam James and war. The trenches  
barbarism gave blood to his Tractatus. I entered the monastery from a different front; love-
fucked and wretched. No Schopenhauer, no William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience 
for me to peruse here. No mysticism. I entered the meditation hall, windows blacked out 
with thick shade cloth for lobotomy; cut out the chink that glows red and beats your name 
in irregular tachycardic pulse, a rhythm ekphrastic of her likeness. 
 
Russell said that what Ludwig liked best in mysticism was its power to stop him from 
thinking. I don’t know if he mistook Ludwig’s intent but his criticism hit its mark with me; 







Dear El.,  
 
Would you consider yourself a ‘good’ reader? 
 
In primary school some of my earliest shaming experiences came in being made to 
acknowledge that I was in fact a ‘slow’ reader – or slow to learn to read. Not adept 
at the literary. A deficit readily explained, my parents thought, by gender. English 
was a girlish discipline, my aptitude for the natural sciences more than 
compensated for the lack perceived by my teachers. But I wasn’t satisfied. I 
pointedly began visiting the library each recess; in my first intimations of shame I 
would ask to have stamped the yellow slips of card that fit neatly into the hardbacks 
along their spines. My name and a return date in the Librarian’s elegant hand. I 
witnessed those insignias with a glow of pride – even then I was learning a means 
of performing a more successful self, a more acceptable self. I learnt to compensate 
for interior fragility with external transformation. More and more books I would 
loan, more than I could possibly read.  
 
What constitutes a good reader? Was it Frank O’Connor who wrote that reading 
is another form of height, and a more perilous one? I wonder this in the Blue 
Mountains walking these plateaus to where they fall away, a sheer drop into 
fathomless canopies beneath.  
 
Thinking on reading as a vertiginous height, I’ve always struggled with altitude and 
edges; a sensitive vestibular system has me clinging to railings for support. Feeling 
that dizzying sudden inversion of gravity. Kundera wrote that the vertigo, we feel, 
doesn’t come from the danger of falling; after all there are railings – no, it comes  
from recognising the urge to jump.  
 
Yet the reader who has jumped from a great height and survived cannot right 
herself and will live only a half-life. Consider the lobster; the lobster orients itself 
by micro-magnets in its ears and antennae – a lobster that has fallen, landed on its 
back with magnets shaken asunder, cannot right itself, and like the reader of fiction. 












At the monastery I’ve been designated woodsman, tree-herd of the forest. It has taken 
some getting used to. My wood skills are rudimentary at best. A local lumberer was brought 
in to teach me the basics of the chainsaw, of ringbarking. 
 
“You know when you see a tree with a pared away strip of bark around it’s centre like that? 
That’s Girdling, ring-barking.” He tells me with gesticulations.  
 
To denude; to strip bare. I learn that the bark, and phloem layer, carry the nutrients to 
leaves and back to root. When you strip a section of bark you prevent the down flow of 
food. the root dies, and so does the whole tree. It’s a slow process compared to felling, 
often done by tree-vandals. It’s ugly, the tree can’t resist, it stands there and groans and 
takes it. 
 
After he leaves I sit on an old log, perhaps itself once ring-barked, and listen to the ambient 
life about me. Skeetering through the underbrush of small marsupials, the crunch of dry 
eucalyptus leaves.  
 
What is it for a writer to refuse another writer the right of response? This I later wonder, while I sever 
branches into furnace-size twigs with the circular drop saw. A spray of wood dust hits my 
goggles. The sound is imminent even through earmuffs. 
 
Is it to strip a section of bark entire, prevent the down-flow of good nootch? I know you 
must express to eat. I wish you were writing me, but as you’re not I hope you still have an 
audience, someone you can feed, to live yourself.  I’m still curious, as ever, to understand 
how we relate.  
 
Curled by a steaming billy in my forest Kuti, I write: “You’re lucky if you can read the 
script you’re acting out,” and in this series of ongoing correspondence I would still like to 
know whether I truly offered you a voice. I know I owed you a voice. 
 
A lyre bird’s trill echoes; it sounds throughout the forest. I keep expecting it to repeat the 
gnaw of the circular saw’s teeth through wood. 
 
You used to read me passages of Spivak’s Can the Subaltern Speak?  “Heads up,” 
you’d say borrowing Spivak’s words. “You can’t simply make the subaltern visible, or lend 
her a voice. And if the subaltern is to be taught to speak… Well now what would that look 
like?” 
 
There was perhaps a plaintiff note in your voice, and pointedness to your target 
audience, something beseeching, left latent till retrospect tugged it up. It’s not like 
the subaltern failed to pronounce words, or produce sentences. The inability to 




being heard, and therein lay the silencing, in a failure of reception – foreign notes 
falling on deaf ears. 
 
It wasn’t a lack of access to institutionally validated language; you could weave 
Academese with the best of us. What got in the way for you was my presumption 
to know what you would say, when you went to speak, to pre-empt your meaning. 
As a consequence I refused you the freedom of ever surprising me. 
 
What you offered, what I failed to reciprocate, was the experience of being fully 
seen and understood. If every human action is a gesture, and every gesture 
theoretically over-determined and if power dictates meaning’s interpretation – my 
concern is that this project is a post-hoc continuation of your silencing, refusing 
your right to respond, to ‘interpret the meaning of our glances’ as it were. 
 









The lumberjack furnished me with another word before leaving: Snag: it refers to a standing 
dead wood.  Amongst the forest of our lives, is this what an abandoned relationship looks 
like: a standing dead wood? Pallid and stark-white, amongst the living canopy. 
 
We walked the water-works pipeline rivulet path; I point at the dead-wood,  the snags, a 
jagged bone piercing up through the understory. You comment on how different things 
would look to us if we didn’t tidy our dead out of sight. If our cities were more like India’s 
Varanasi, the smell of the burning dead in our nostrils, bloated corpses jetsam on the 
Ganga’s waterways. Instead of the nearly-dead, concealed in residential homes; that smell 
of lemon verbena-scented cleaning products, air-conditioner, lint. 
 
I remember when together we visited my grandad in an ‘aged care’ facility or residential 
home. The pamphlet in the foyer, besides imagery of the smiling elderly,  also uses 
interchangeably freestanding assisted living facility, nursing home, elder care, hospice care, assisted living. 
Names innocuous enough not to warrant second thoughts, but with an administrative 
touch that perhaps sanctifies their presence, the facility that understands. 
 
Walking the carpeted halls, the corridors are extra wide allowing for two electric scooters 
to pass abreast. Felt-time seems to slow down, entering these halls. Is it consequent on the 
fact that nobody is rushing, because there’s nowhere to go? I observe an elderly gentleman, 
with movements gradual as tectonic plates, reach down to pluck a piece of lint off his 
pants. Perhaps it’s that these beings are displaced in time. Only in being housed collectively 
can they keep living their stories as if they had a persisting reality. 
 
The residential home: a ship of memory, navigating change’s seas, time’s passage viewable 
through port holes. This gentleman still took the centrefold newspaper, as he set into his 
eggs and soldiers. He would exclaim, eyebrows a-bristle, each morning to his neighbour 
“well now, would you believe?” They would invariably not believe. Much head-shaking, 
tutting and “whatever nexts” would ensue. 
 
These temporal portholes, as with submarines, are made from acrylic plastic, several inches 
thick – for deep diving. The border is not porous, nothing gets through, so the view elicits 
no fear. 
 
In the papers the repetition of human folly in global relations may seem as hopeless as 
ever, but will no longer concern them, they are no longer playing. The technological growth 
will appear miraculous, as ever it has, but they’ll harbour the same doubts about it affecting 
the human condition overmuch. The newly emergent philosophical conundrums will 
appear simply incomprehensible. Unfathomable. And they will feel it fortuitous that they 







Along the corridors as we walked, there were framed odd paintings. Young children in 
bonnets, lilly ponds, cats in aprons – a strangely infantilising kitsch. Walking down the hall 
the doctor pauses over select pieces and describe them proudly. We passed a dining hall 
where afternoon tea was wheeled out on trolleys, cakes and quartered sandwiches 
(crustless), red rose tea. 
 
But my grandpa’s wing was another case altogether. Moving deeper through the 
labyrinthine corridors, we enter the domain of the more thoroughly demented. It was 
cleverly designed: the senile, if playing truant or AWOL, would have a lot more to navigate 
before encountering the peril of the open air, fast moving metal and other dangers. 
 
I was told by the doctor, as he walked us down the a hall, painted powder blue for soothing, 
that “there are commonly three types of Alzheimer’s patients.” Those who are happy, 
jubilant in their short attention, we say they’re like children and feel almost relief at their 
fate. The doctor pauses and breathes a sigh of appreciation over a Beatrix Potter, Peter 
Rabbit in waistcoat. Then there are those who are angry; they don’t understand so they 
rage, becoming more surly, bellicose and unpleasant than ever in life. Only duty keeps their 
children visiting. Then there are those who are afraid. Deeply afraid. They turn over their 
tea cups with trembling hands, they fear their own bedpans. “These are the Socratic ones,” 
he says magnanimously. The ones who understand that they don’t understand, not 
anymore. They know that they’ve lost, even if they can’t name what they’ve lost. Is what 




After I let go of my grandfather’s hand, the doctor’s prophetic words ring in my ears. I 
needed to be alone. Alone with you. Perhaps I just needed to be out of there. When the 
train pulled into Central Station I stepped into the local bookstore we had visited years 
back. 
 
The windowless bookstore was several levels above ground. The owner’s voice carried 
between its narrow aisles. Carrying the news to patrons, accepting in turn their 
lamentations. The bookstore was closing. The oldest poetry bookstore in Australia, and it 
couldn’t sustain itself. Many who had known the shop’s nooks for decades. There was 
obviously no money in poetry. A 35 year labour of love was being packed into cardboard 
boxes, sealed with translucent tape. 
 
In that moment, at that thought, I was aware of every window missing from the bookstore. 
But that’s not quite true, the labour of love had been carried out into the world over those 
35 years. I imagined the number of launches for first time published Australian poets, 
hesitant before a milestone, reading rite of passage in the act of presenting. Announcing 
themselves to their peers,  remaking the wheel. I imagined the books passed hand to hand, 
a fragile currency – existing only as long as a willingness for discontinuity, for 





I’d passed through this store years ago but then had no time. Poetry felt intransigent, 
reflexive – by that I guess I mean, that I thought that it refused to take any object other 
than itself; and it took itself over-seriously. But then if it was a relation, perhaps it was a 
gestalt relation, a greater than summation of its parts – and I was just blind to the several 









“I write poems for a living,” I had to say recently, at a loss for an answer to the 
dreaded ‘and what do you do.  “I write poems for a living,” is rarely uttered; the 
statement seems barely legible. Since when has anyone been able to survive on the 
profits of poems? Aren’t poems just descriptions of idyll days that the nineteenth-
century gentry spent meandering in meadows, sighing over tulips, expressing their 
transgressive sexualities via thinly-veiled allusion? Isn’t poetry just Romanticist-
nature-pornography, that time and the emergence of the incognito-browser 
rendered obsolete? 
 
In a modern digitised economy, with the bookstores rolling down their mournful 
shutters, we say goodbye to the third aisle middle row ‘poetry’ section, bookended 
and dwarfed by ghost-written biographies and self-help cum guide to reclaim-your-
masculinity. 
 
They figure they must have misunderstood some of the key words in the phrase 
‘make a living’ from poetry. Perhaps he means ‘teach’? An admirable profession 
teaching, after all in the public imaginary poetry resembles most closely ‘history’ 
also taught - something antiquated, most relevant now for collecting lyric gobbets 
that can be casually scattered throughout conversation, imbuing the quotidian with 
transcendent qualities, indicative of a well-rounded education. 
 
“I hope you write good poems,” he replied laughing. 
 
“But I just hate the pretentiousness of poetry,” ah. The Avant Garde. Why so hard, 
why so exclusionary? A form of haute couture, a pursuit of the glib Bourgie with 
rounded fingernails, he who insists on swinging his cultural capital between his 
thighs as he strolls down the street. 
 
Maybe there just is something innately pretentious about any art form that draws 
attention to the medium – language -- defamiliarising it to thereby rediscover it. 
“Humph.” Someone inevitably says.” My nephew could draw that, could write or 
sculpt that.” It gets wearing. So it goes. 
 
I’ve been wondering: in a world of constructs, do you think existential tension 
manifests as clenching, rigidity – adherence to received forms? A silent knowledge 
that we’re building our houses without foundation stone, on sand, or walking out 
onto ice as it turns to slush then to water. These make us clutch tightly to self-
limiting identities: masculinity so-defined, sexuality so-defined, language so 
defined. In such a context the desire for language to just behave and avoid the 





Post-structuralism whispered it in the academy, but it was heeded the way 
ornithologists are heeded by birds; the academy shat on post-structuralism’s head, 
peppered it with a liquid white paint from the height of an ivory tower’s topmost 
turret. 
 
Poets wrote it each other in their faggy veiled love letters, and monks mumbled it 
in thei equally faggy haiku. I guess I’m saying maybe we must liken the faggy, the 
transgressive and irreverent to the mystical, the inexpressible. That which can only 










Don’t feel any stress to respond, that’s working entirely against my intention - the 
idea of writing letters to each other was supposed to be a way for us to reclaim 
writing as a site of free play. Do you recall Winnicott’s writing about parents 
needing to create a container for their children to have free play in, that encourages 
them to imaginatively engage with and reconceive the world?  
 
The idea that we could establish an Edgelands where there is uninhibited play for 
the two of us. Something unbounded in possibilities, but bounded in form. The 
arena; a wood-chipped playground for knee grazing. In language we remake our 
surrounds. We exercise our independence. I guess I’m asking: do you still want to 
play in this sand pit with me?  
 
Roland Barthes, meditating upon the pleasure of selecting a word, didn’t emphasise 
fitness as a virtue, practicability or parsimony. Rather he considers the word’s 
“future praxis” or creative fecundity – its potential, in short, to be “put into play” 
with other words. The words fit for our playground. 
 
Though I proposed the metaphor, I wonder if you too intuit something sinister 
undergirding the playground? Perhaps in the way that Dualisms, in a Taoist vein, 
always contains the seed of, and so must evoke, its opposite.  A thesis that in the 
emergent pop-surrealist genre, finds its apogee in artist’s like Mark Ryden; his 
sinister amalgams of children, stuffed toys, meat and religious ephemera.  
 
I’ve been trying to place what I find sinister. I think the analogy reminds me that 
we have to carve out this space, that it is in no way owed us. That in some sense 
we must work to become again children. To Rupi Kaur’s question posed in wistful 
rhetoric – do you think flowers will grow here? I ask; In this third space, this derelict 













Of a spaceship: abandoned in outer space.   
 










That night I sat on the porch of my little wooden kuti, as it stormed outside. The tin roof 
and the rain tinkling down recalled to my mind untethered windchimes. Electra would 
have approved my little burrow. It contained only a single bed, a potbelly stove and a large 
window through which I watched the moving treed-silhouettes and the stars. 
 
The stars were vivid here, I noted. The gloam equally palpable. I thought on the interstellar 
gaps in the milky way, how in some indigenous dreamings it was known as the dark emu. 
I’ve watched that alien bird each night. It felt like reading the page of a book but staring at 
only the whites, running your eye down the in-between spaces and allowing the inked 
letters to be nothing more than their material signs. The way Derrida spoke on materiality 
usurping its signification. 
 
Returning inside I added another stick to the furnace. It catches, casts shadows of light 
that japed about the room.  I like the dead of light as a form of shadow. By the light from 




I’ve been re-reading early letters you wrote me, years back. I doubt you ever 
imagined them to be poured over multiple times. I really hope the collaging of our 
correspondence into something new is a project that excites you, rather than one 
that unsettles. How things change and move! We’ve been in  one of those dances 
with a hundred steps that arrives you back where you began, curtseying to your 
partner. 
 
I wake in the bush each morning, surrounded by eucalyptus scrub; to the imitations 
of lyrebirds, the warbles of King Parrots if I’m very lucky. I walk a few miles along 
sandy arteries, paths hedged with acacia unspooling as the spring sets in. Burst 
banksia pods provide a vivid litter – felt innards displayed on the path. It’s hard to 
describe the effect induced by encountering these surrounds each day. No human 
company, no conversation; just the misshapen trunks and gnarled limbs of old man 
banksia bearing down on me, only the crunch of corkscrewed eucalypt leaves 
underfoot. The ferreting of the lyrebird through the humus underbrush.  
 
So the book, Murmurations, is a good way towards being done. I hope you like it. I 
help the nuns out about the forest, I’ve got a chain saw licence now, I fell trees in 
preparation for fire season. They’ve invited me to stay on as their grounds keeper 
for the next year. I’m considering it… I’ve shaved my head, donned the precepts. 
I’m living the life of a lay monk. I have my books: Carson, Barthes, Blanchfield are 
still my sweeties – but there is a stack of Eric Fromm, Joseth Campbell – books 
gifted by one of the nuns, Ayya Nirodha, a wry old fire cracker from Austria who 





That’s all for now, there’s so much to tell. I stopped writing because you stopped 
replying. There’s a neat notion in Winnicot concerning good and bad 
interpenetration. Physically you can think of interpenetration as the exchange that 
happens between mother and suckling infant; between breast and mouth. Or in 
sex too, the exchange of emotional and accompanying physiological content.  
 
Blanchfield talks about it with regards to tickling, there’s an unspoken rim we are 
nevertheless conscious of, between good and bad tickling. It’s a rim I’ve teased at 
with pimple popping, sometimes overstepping boundaries. We’re learning to 
recognise boundaries, learning to put up boundaries where appropriate, but not 
being victim to past conditioning. Recognising what’s a trigger from old patterns 
that needn’t apply today. 
 
One of our marked struggles was with boundaries, with what belonged to you, me, 
to us both. Those lines got shaky, blurred at a distance. This is where you end, Maggie 
Nelson wrote, where others begin. 
 
But what instinctually communicates as extension of self? Think of the animal 
unreflective way we reach out to comfort one another, or shield our near ones. 
The way humans empathetically project ourselves into their pain. A projection 
reflexive, precognizant – before conscious will. 
 
Blanchfield refers to the process of Individuation from his mother as 
‘peripersonally troubling’ to her. Peripersonally - referring to the space at a moment, 
within a person’s reach, including everything at arm’s length, and a bit more – at a 
pinch. 
 
When I think on the peripersonal, I imagine a Vitruvian man in profile: genitals 
unabashed, limbs splayed and multiplied. An akimbo-appendaged Shiva – but with 
a naturalistic intent, to articulate what falls within man’s reach. The peripersonal is 
that plus a little more. 
 
The same, perhaps, with lovers’ disentangling: your loss was a peripersonal loss, 
felt as a wrenching, a separation, like the severing of a limb - but that would be to 
undersell it; more like the severing of body entire, res extensa. 
 
And what remains? Some appendage now vestigial? The rudimentary, or atrophied, 
forming a small part of what had once meant a larger whole.  Perhaps in years to 
come, looking back from the vantage of some unimaginable perch of the future, 
vestigial, might end up the correct word – what has become functionless in the 
course of evolution. 
 
But for now what remains more resembles a phantom limb, made to stiffen and 




colds that cannot be warmed against. Persistent phantoms are what it means to live 
with loss. 
 
How do you treat possession of a phantom limb? You can’t cure. You can’t. You 
try and accept it. Then you manage it. Management involves repositioning the 
phantom limb, with prop, pillow, cushion. Even Virtual Reality therapy helps.  
 
As a phantom limb: what do you make of my epistolary attempts to reposition 
you? Should they go unanswered, even unread, I would still seek to straighten out 
the knotted limb of our tale, our personal narrative. You will not be tormented, I 
shall make of the relationship a ghost we can both live with. Every love story being a 
ghost (limb) story. 
 











1) Your hands were sirens;  
gestures anticipate  
refusing my touch 
consolingly. 
 
2) The console of your face 
a tangle of back roads 
whose expressions were uncles, aunts 
distances known well  
 
3) To distance the transition 
from a and b,  
I’d fallen away  
Myself a disjunction & snoring 
 
4) A conversation of laughing  
and flinching, 








On Care and Solicity 
 
Reading Heidegger as I trudge along bush-bashed paths, through the southern highlands, 
kangaroo valley – I imagine Heidegger in the Black Forest – thinking on what it meant for 
us to support one another – and what care into the future may mean. 
 
Care, for Heidegger takes the form of solicitude: taking care of, or providing for, others.  
Heidegger differentiates two expressions; an authentic form – which supports others in 
taking responsibility for their own lives, standing in their own power. Set against a 
domineering, inauthentic form that reduces others to a state of dependency. 
 
Solicitude has always had a slippery insidious sibilance in my mouth; something you solicit. 
Perhaps the grimy aspect of this term derives from a culturally inflected form of sex worker 
erasure, to be worked against. Still, to solicit, felt like it implied a dangerous porousness to 
our borders, a propensity to letting in enemies under the radar. To get in close and not 
stick a knife between the ribs, to practice lowering your guard whilst facing a history of 
trust abused, was the work. 
 
But how to be solicitous in a way that refuses to play dependency? To be intimate, but 
maintain a distance without falling into the coldly stoic, the apparently detached? 
 
Heidegger held the term ‘care’ to simultaneously refer to concern as well as solicitude. Concern 
meant attending to, an active stance. I feel it telling that a current strand of debate amongst 
Tibetologists, concerns how to best characterise one of the four immeasurables (or 
brahmavihāras in the Sanskrit) that is; karuna (compassion) alongside metta (loving-
kindness) mudita (empathetic joy) and upekkha (equanimity).  
 
Karuna, while often translated as compassion, may be better understood as care.  
Compassion derives from the latin root pasio – like  pathos, possessing an empathetic root, 
it derives from a shared experience, a common frame. But translating Karuna as care is a 
better fit; it doesn’t assume a shared experiential framework, but maintains a bounding of 
sorts. 
 
Both the Heideggerian and Tibetan Buddhist notions of healthy solicity and care, maintain 
that a distance is necessary to witness one another. With too great a closeness between two 
people, the edge between you cannot be seen. 
 
Only now, backwards gazing, am I seeing the distance that was then lacking in our 
relationship, that would have been necessary for our mutual solicity and care. The way 
Khalil Gibran wrote; 
 
For the oak and the cypress grow not in each other’s shadow 
And the strings of the lute are a part;  















“What is the value of morality?”  
Nietzsche asked.  
A question that, in the asking,  
opened onto new terrain.  
A question demonstrating morality can’t  
exhaustively comprise the field of values. 
 
“What is the value of writing?” I asked you 
“What is the value in performing your own 
manner of thinking?” You respond 
“That depends,” I said 
“What is it preventing you from doing?” 
 
“Is there a reason I write you?” 
Is it just to ask: 
When communication breaks down,   
Must illogical speech ultimately issue in silence? 
Is a well-made lover’s discourse, already  






On Heidegger’s Anxiety 
 
I always admired how you had your sight of the Good so firmly set before you. My concept 
was more diffuse, divoted with internal contradictions, and so a wary project, constricting. 
 
None of the philosophical categories we played with described my dis-ease.  The tracks of 
scepticism, moral relativism, naturalism – felt so well-trodden that the earth compacted. 
Nothing could grow there, nothing to describe my condition to myself. My sense of Good 
was entangled with something foreign and imprecise: a phenomenology of ambivalence. 
 
You would shake your head, conceive me as a product of modernity at best, at worst the 
excesses of a ‘progressive’ university education. Evidence the conservatives had the sum 
and measure of a liberal arts training.  
 
“You don’t aim for molasses when you make honey,” you’d say feigning wisdom.  
 
I was not alone, not the only bitter treacle by-product. I was surrounded by sandstone-uni 
philosophy graduates, and the more brilliant they were as a rule, the less system-savy, like 
you. Who toiled and struggled, and failed and dropped out. The Sisyphean-boulder sized 
complex I would have had you drop, but you feared it would crush something fragile, if 
ever you did. 
 
“Vegemite began as just one more yeasty-crud we scraped off the beer barrel.” You added. 
 
Recently I’ve been reflecting on the deep anxiety that arises in facing, the inescapable fact, 
that we may die at any time. Heidegger claims that it’s through this awareness that we begin 
to care about our way of living. To enter into authentic existing, then, arises from the 
recognition of our Being-towards-death. A recognition, as Heiddegger puts it, that “I am 
this: I can die at any moment.” 
 
This orientation towards death – awaking to an unchosen yet unalterable trajectory – serves 
for Heidegger as the basis for an ethic; for care, but also for a spiritual or existential 
orientation.  
 
Sitting in meditation for days and days watching the flow of thought, feeling, sensation, 
you’re made to observe your inability to possess any single moment, to carry anything 
across instants. From it, the futility of grasping after any state, which nature’s law will claim 
back from you, becomes apparent. You start to feel that you are duration.  
 
Terms like purify, like cleanse, are difficult terms. We associate them with a loopy 
puritanism, a sallow-cheeked asceticism. But being dipped in time, leaves us feeling like 
denim jeans thoroughly doused in Napisan, after a high-intensity spin cycle.  It’s only from 
this state that I felt I could trust my intention again, that whatever the world threw up, I 
had found an existential font, a distance from which I could look upon my being-in-the-





It was from here that I reached out to you: to invite solicitude again; for it to alight on the 
branch between us. After a dip in this death-oriented perspective, it felt like the only space 
where I could trust myself in my intentions towards you, grounded in a care-ethic. A deep 
conviction emerged that things would be different; that while we couldn’t go back to where 
we had been, there was nonetheless a rightness to reconnection. I hoped, expected, an 
almost karmic chance to make good. 
 
Now, upon reflection I wonder: did the spiritual butt up  




On Exterminating Angels 
 
I recalled the last movie we watched together, curled up on your couch, a 60’s surrealist 
film; Luis Buñuel’s Exterminating Angels. From what I recall of the film, all the guests are 
somehow trapped at a dinner party.  Whether by design, or some facet of their underlying 
psychology, remains unstated, to be guessed at. A distractibility seems to descend upon 
anyone who shows an interest in leaving; an adjacent conversation, a half-formulated 
thought resurfaces requiring immediate communication, an unpardonable failure to greet 
another guest, cigars, desert, piano attendance. 
 
The subsequent day, having all slept in handsome piles about the dining room, the 
absurdity of the situation seems to dawn on some who then try more forcibly to break the 
spell and leave. They make it as far as the curtain before a sort of exhaustive horror claims 
them. They stagger into chairs ashen faced, sickening. 
 
A collective hysteria takes the group when realisation of their strange collective 
incapacitation finally occurs. The true character of the party members manifests in the 
subsequent action; leadership & altruism for some, weakness & egotism for others. When 
the spell is finally broken it is only because they’ve found themselves  situated as they had 
been during the dinner, just prior to parting. Somehow an in situ re-enactment of the lines 
that should’ve been, had they politely left, allows them to break away en-masse. 
 
I recall the allegory sticking to me. At the time I was dwelling on the cyclic patterns that 
govern thought and behaviour, the ruts of a track I  awake with my minds wheels spinning 
in. The notion that if I could find the seam in the gaffe tape where it began, the in situ entry 
point to the cyclic narratives,  then I could uproot those patterns where they entered the 
earth. 
 
Heidegger points toward this condition with the term Befindlickheit -  finding oneself placed 
in a situation that precedes awareness of that situation, an awakening to context. Perhaps we 
all find ourselves wary that life is falling away from us, that we’re enmeshed in contexts we 
didn’t chose, circles we can hardly see. My recent attempts to leave the dinner party, to 
evade the Exterminating Angels finds me in this context I’m awakening to right now: 
 
It’s evening. Some evenings I spend with a blanket in the cave beneath the phosphorescent 
worms that masquerade as stars. They are sensitive to vibrations, speak loudly and they 
wink out. Pause and reflect silently and they turn back on. Through the cave opening I 
observe the landscape that appears abrupt, like edged conversation. The way statement 
leads to precipice; like the silence of which we so often skirted the rim. The neighbouring 
gorge I note, has eyebrows; their many layered significations. A dense brush escarpment 
frustrates all efforts. Is it that I couldn’t penetrate, couldn’t conquer your meanings? I 
wondered. Stuck a flag in the silence, instead, claimed that? 
 
I get up early with the sun. Then I grab my thermos, don my brown beanie (over my bold 




here is all clay and crumbling sandstone, on either side of me a variety of eucalypts; stark 
white squiggly gums acacia teatree, perfuming the early morning. The golden wattle buds 
up and sweetening the air too. I greet silently the three nuns. It’s a small hermitage.  
 
Ayya Nirodha seems to have taken me under her wing, she dotes on me, and says I’ll be a 
monk in a year or two at most. The idea sort of comes to stick. I’m semi-seriously 
considering it. What do you think? But Befindlickheit is pervasive. Would donning the 
robes, mean waking up? I come to doubt it. Even here, where there is intentionality, where 
I live with purpose, I still live within a closed system. Meeting the same stages of the day’s 




On Taking Refuge 
 
I find myself faced with the task of reconciling writing with my newly fragmented 
subjectivity. Carson expresses this conundrum well when she asks; how can we square the self-
assertiveness of the writerly project with the decreation of our own subjectivity?  
 
It feels as if we can’t. As if the task were a necessarily impossible one; both requiring an 
act of subterfuge and calling on us to embrace contradiction. But this doesn’t mean defeat. 
Ask Nagarjuna, ask Wittgenstein:  
 








To the Beloved, 
 
I thought on addressing my next letter “to the beloved” the way Hafiz addresses his poems, 
but it felt affected and past tense. In some Islamic scripture the Koran though written in 
Arabic, is conceived as prior to language. In some scriptures the Koran is viewed not as a 
work of God, but an attribute of God; alongside his power, his justice, his temperance. 
 
When you wrote, though you never seemed to see it, it was the same way. Your words 
seemed not an echo of, but emanation from, the pre-verbal - not a work you produced, 
but an attribute. 
 
Each word seemed new, luminous and sharp; a stalactite held carefully up to the light. This 
was why you hammed up every time an assignment was due, why you needed extensions 
on your extensions, and had to repeat so many classes. Had writing been less your medium 
(literally medium as channel, pathway) you could have passed and kept on passing. 
 
Walking the beach edge, a trail of tangled seaweed ... I spot a ridged shark egg tangled in 
the seaweed, nest bobbing lightly in the foam. Stopping to inspect it I recall how walking 
you would invariably discover a leaf twisted in a corkscrew, a piece of dulled misshapen 
glass, a bottle cap with strange insignia. You’d offer them up to me. A gift. It seems an 
invasion of privacy now, to name them, because your relation to the world’s parts was so 
personal. 
 
You would make of your room a bowerbird’s nest of oddments and ends. This dovetailed 
with your writing practices intimately – they figured in the same creative act. Susan Langer 
once wrote that capturing experience in this way was a means of preserving it, staving off 
transience, decay. 
 
Walking together through your stories and letters; you proffer up a dulled marble with a 
Milkyway swirl, a sand-softened piece of stone.  When you read, you were discovering 
beautifully patterned paper scraps, just for you to fold into different shapes, to place next 
to each other for new effects. I hope you regain your sense of delight and curiosity the 




On Vipassana retreat 
 
I’m on retreat in Blackheath, the further reaches of the Blue Mountains. Sydney has turned 
Katoomba into an outer western suburb, and poverty is pushed back. But on retreat we’re 
away from any such worldly concerns. 
 
“There’s no fact, held in the body that can’t be looked at,” they tell me on repeat. In the 
urinal, in the silence, I find something telling in the gurgle a toilet pot makes from the 
cubicle beside. I hear the tinkling of a man pointedly pissing onto enamel, away from direct 
water – to significantly dull the sound. What does it say about character: furtiveness? 
Generosity? Shame? And why do I need to analyse other humans, even in this silencing? 
This turning inward. 
 
We walk the adjacent eucalypt forests, worn tracks hemmed in with fencing, telling our 
limits. Sitting I read the word, “PEACE” in ugly cuts across and down the tree’s face. 
“P.E.A.C.E.” can be like that. 
 
I think often about my silent companions. I never spoke to them before entering retreat. 
What do I know or guess about them? They are just slumped shoulders, reflective faces. 
Just bodies, only via accident allowed communication. In silence, avoiding eyes. We face 
onto the course boundary together. White nylon wire along rusting posts. We share the 
same teabags; was it Lipton’s? Bushell’s? The marker that divides the genders tells me to 
look inwards. Our hands sit at rest;  right in left. Right in left. 
 
I think back on how you described meditation, long ago, as a kind of doing that undoes. And 
later you described it as merely observation of causation. 
Then finally as grieving, accelerated. Which it is now? Our bodies reside in composed stillness. 





On Shears and Time 
 
Time is a distilling process; time distils. 
 
In the Southern highlands Ol’ Man Banskia hides in the heath, behind the dunes – his 
crown forms an enclosing canopy as we enter beneath. We wind with creak to a lower 
coal-bed. Bundanoon sits abreast a ridge of soft shale, patchy basalt; weathered red-clay 
soil. Stunted and gnarled, twisted and tortuous – only applied to eucalypts are these 
adjectives felt complements. Moth larvae abstractly pattern some trunks. “You’ll find me 
between the woolly butt and the spotted Euc,” you told me. “Between the stringy bark 
and the scribbly gum – there I will wait.” 
 
Deep gorge, steep-sided valley, cliff with sheer drop – this is the proverbial land of loaming 
range and lifting mountain. These gorges incised into the plateau, these undulating gulfs 
were a mystery of the 1800s. It was wondered what could have channelled such structures?  
The answer we have now – that the gorges were carved by the streams that flowed through 
them – seemed then preposterous. Even Charlie Darwin, who visited the neighbouring 
Blue Mountains, imagined the gorges had been huge marine sandbanks, once holding a 
sea. Yet the fact that trickling rivulets could wear down mountains doesn’t look so absurd 
when remembering that time is the one element geologists have indefinitely at their 
command. 
 
Living at this monastery the nuns like geologists, too, have time indefinitely at their 
command. Here we savour communications because they’re sparse. Here, I savour each 
spoonful, as meals come infrequently. Time is a distinct necessity for the particular 
teachings I’m learning. I’m made to learn as this landscapes did – the long way. Learning 
that time is not so different from rivers. Learning that rivers, like loves, carve the valleys 




Sulphur crested shrieks as the cockatoos descend en masse from plateau through gully. Red 




Haven, Hawksberry sandstone-crumbled, boulders of volcanic basalt, lichen clinging 
around rims. 
 
Everything here has contour lines, the stumps of trees measure their years in them, the 
ridges in the rock measure their weathering, the fissures wrought by slow seepage. A seam 
runs beneath Katoomba’s cliff line, connecting Blue Mountains Blackheath to Santi’s Erith 
coal mine. The eucalypt woodland around me emerges from this decomposed sandy soil. 
12 million years ago this would have been wet, temperate, akin to Tasmania misted south 
west. But this landscape is now all rocky gorge, dried gully. 
 
This land who has withstood raging fire, poor soil, long drought – now a ‘scape of rigid-
leaved sclerophylls, long and narrow acacias, stemmed casuarina. We tread around woody 
pod, nuts that guard jealously their seed, the corky bark, the fire retardant. Acacia shrubs 
prostrate themselves, the wattle dresses in renunciate yellow. 
 
Some nights the air is hot, roiling, thunder cracks and the clouds feel propulsive; a billows 
of sorts. When it rains the kuti’s roof transmutes the raindrops into the peppering of shells 
on tin-trench. In Rilke’s writing  the night, bestirred by sudden storm, is made spacious, as if 
elsewise it were merely “sheared between time’s pedantic seams.” 
 
I think on those seams of time, fastidious in regulation, fastening to the clock’s hands, 
feeding through its sorted minutes, demarking. When we met, in the dream, time had 
sundered its seams; we described history as looping, in our private kingdom. Motion for 
us there could be retrograde, elliptical. Could possess additional dimensions. 
 
What would it mean, I wonder, for us, for this land, in the difficulties to come - to feed 
time’s thread back into the cloth, to darn the fabric’s fray: to forget? Or should we take 
that loose thread, fix it to some new ends – a thread of our lives run through the needle’s 











In the liminal space which is this monastery, a place in-between living and for living 
in between, I’ve been wondering on why liminality as a concept is so gripping. 
Perhaps because while describeable as temporal, a transitional stage, itss spatial 
metaphor is twofold and contradictory. That is: a liminal ‘space’ occupies a position 
at a boundary or threshold (limen), or on both sides of that threshold. Liminality it 
seems, is both and neither. 
 
Gloria E. Anzaldua describes liminal spaces as bridges – indeed titularly as The 
Bridge We Call Home – literal thresholds between worlds. Anzaldua calls this space 
Nepantla a Nahuatl word translating to ‘tierra entre media’ – that is, an in-between 
space that entails precarity, that lacks clear boundaries. Living in such an entre-
media means inhabiting a state of perpetual displacement – a finding home in the 
incommodious. 
 
Reading her queer-of-colour poet anthology, incongruously conjured for me the 
largely white and hetro Irish pub we frequented. We would attend O’Malleys for 
Wednesday and Thursday French and Spanish discussion groups. You’d sip beer 
and chat, conversation punctuated with spontaneous laughter peels that would 
catch the patrons’ ears as Bonobo shrieks of alarm. I would knit the scarf that was 
already three lengths that of a useable scarf, functionally a mummy-wrap, serving 
more as excuse to fiddle rhythmically while pondering how best to formulate 
questions in Spanish, without English’s convenient Gerundif in the present 
participle. Or whether a statement were sufficiently hypothetical to warrant a 
French subjunctive. 
 
Anzaldua’s words conjure for me the way, when the non-smoking frontier was 
pushed further out of the public sphere, and beer garden patrons were forced to 
smoke outside their gardens yet couldn’t drink on the open street – they would 
stand legs spreadeagle across an invisible dividing line, arms akimbo; pint in left 
hand, fag in right, and alternate between puffs and glugs, perhaps nodding their 
head along to a half-heard drunken spiel from a work mate. 
 
A liminal space? 
 
Just the opposite I think. A liminal space was Derrida’s Aporia – an undecidable, 
something existing between two mutually contradictory states. Straddling a 
threshold, I’ve learnt, is not the same thing as embodying a contradiction. 
 
As with Winnicot’s conception of the transitional space, liminality is precisely where 
productive exchange between fantasy and reality occurs, where creative 




threshold, a position, my mother would claim, that my life-long indecisiveness 
condemned me to.  “Come in or Get Out,” she’d say. “All your ambivalence offers 
is a draft.”  But with this project, love’s Edge-Lands, I hoped to find something 
more – liminality; the embodiment of a contradiction, new ways to relate.  
 
 A  chill breeze slakes the warmth from the room as I stand hesitant like others 







Nepantla and Liminality 
 
The ivy works the brick till it crumbles. 
Road’s encroaching rumbles. 
You proffer a – thumbs up – 
palm canted to the side. 
 
A ‘64 Venetian (we’re told) gunmetal convertible 
takes our offer. 
His muffler’s rattling, cradled by 
chicken wire. 
 
I found a new home for our dysphoria 
– Nepantla – Tierra Entre Media –  
offering our discommode a glamour. 
The ambience leached the wood of moisture. 
 








Dear Junip.,  
 
Thoughts on your last poem: There’s some 
potential here, though a disquieting poem. I like the 
patterns of connections. There’s always scope to compress. 
to cull unnecessary words. Step carefully in lineation, in 
rhythm. You need to think on cadence, think on pace. Cut 
back, say each thing once. Your reader is as smart as you 
are. Avoid 19th century poeticisms. Be scathing with safe 
words, avoid vulgarity, avoid Bukowskian toughness. 
Avoid too loose a description of too vague a phenomenon. 
Rely on promising twists to old images. Reduce each to its 
barest essentials, read for archaisms: lest, atop. Read for trite 
turns of phrase. Be conscious of beats per line. Length, 
consider length. Always consider length then consider 
lyricism. Then consider personal sentimentalism think on 




Feeling too self-conscious? Think: where is that other 
perspective – that one that looks in on the involved Self? Cultivate 
your instinct for the specific, cull the waffle. There’s always 
something strong there, could you re-enter it. 
 
I liked the absence of an answer. I liked the long lines, their 
rhythmic difficulty. Still, learn to compress. Trim fat. You 
need to question the poem’s powerful “I.” Remember: 
some poems just arrive at themselves in the last few lines, 
other poems never arrive. 
 














The Buddhist Nagarjuna, like Butler, was concerned with fabrication. Both 
questioned the assumption that construction was something that happened to a 
ready-made object, a pre-given thing.   
 
When I began these letters I acted as if assuming the pre-given reality of this third 
space – a fertile crust existing between two people. That casual confidence on the 
ground beneath our feet was built in reality on a mythy, black lake. Perhaps I could 
as well have fantasized the existence of a third space between me and any stranger. 
The way Kraus in I Love Dick builds a dramatic torturous love affair from several 
chance encounters Dick describes as innocuous, mild.  
 
Am I guilty of the same? Delimiting through signification, a love to which I can 
then ‘refer’ in such a way that my reference presupposes (and thereby conceals) my 
prior fabrications? If you were in this scrubby forest I could show you the 
flowering Boronia in the understory, the misshapen Ol’ man banksia overhead. 
The squiggly gums protruding between mountain ash and red blood eucalypt. 
 
I’ve been thinking on sadness, on how we’ve both known a condition where the 
spirit withdraws, the petals enclose about their deliberating bud as the light turns 
away. After we parted, when I returned to Tasmania I capitulated internally to the 
unsentimental diagnosis: depression. Clinical, in its diagnostic symptomology. 
Anonymous in its refusal of my particularity. Deflationary in its assignation of a 
“chemical solution” to what was defined at root as a chemical problem. An 
uncomfortably pacifying nuero-reduction. Thinking on depression and self-care, 
reminds me that the personal is always structural. 
 
Do you recall how we curled up on Hampden road, watching Adam Curtis’s 
documentary Hyper Normalisation? That diorama of collaged, publically available 
footage, that together presents a visual tale in tandem and parallel to a written 
script. That describes the alienating process of neoliberalism, and how it 
engendered a surrender in the face of real world complexities, the embrace of a 
corporate-run and built reality, stabilized by politicians. 
 
The film hitting the eighties is symbolized by a Jane Fonda aerobic workout video, 
neon girls in figure-hugging latex, ‘dancercising’ on a televised stage. Market forces 
then took the wheel of demos. Incapable of addressing the cultural malaise as 
impersonal processes & structurally impotent – the masses give up on achieving 
change and turn their focus on self: seek selfimprovement to attain a self-autonomy. 
The given logic: that we may have no say in the direction of mankind, but we can 





The footage, you might remember, was intercut with film of Nicolae and Elena 
Ceaușescu, being executed by firing squad. 
 
Monastic life too, retains the focus on ‘self’ hence the common charge of political 
quietism. I wend my way along a sandy path, thermos joggling at hip, lyrebird trills 
from beside. Capitalism, gender squabbles, ecological violence, class warfare - all 
seem a long way from here.  
 







Juniper goes back to his kuti, thoughts bleak. They turn on love as something invasive, a 
corruption in the file. He sits down to read an old journal, to extract anything worth 
extracting. 
 
On Autopoiesis  
 
Autopoiesis comes from the Greek autos ‘self’ and poiein ‘to make’ or ‘produce’. An 
autopoietic system is one which produces its own components. Whilst originating 
with, this is not restricted to, biochemical systems that produce their own 
molecular components – It might as well be applied to for our sense of self, our 
identity. 
 
Conceiving narrative-self by analogy to a biochemical system is productive; it 
demonstrates a neat isomorphism – the fact, for instance, that a cell’s self-making 
is inclusive of a bounding, defining the inside against what’s outside the system. 
 
As with the delineating of in-group/out-group – where we bound ourselves as 
distinct from others. In a sense captured in Nelson’s phrase: this is where you end, 
where others begin. Similarly the acts we allow ourselves, those which cohere. That 
appear consistent with who we imagine ourselves to be. 
 
The family teaches this bounding, lovers teach this bounding. 
 
The border establishing this retention of control becomes an obstacle when it 
approaches the maladaptive & irreversible. When a disclosure or unclenching, the 
surrender to trust, is read as a failure or a loss of personal integrity. 
 
Not all biochemical systems are autopoietic, it should be noted. Consider the 
parasite. A virus has no metabolism, and doesn’t maintain itself in any autopoietic 
sense.  Eros, desire, is an (oft-willed) failure of autopoiesis – a breach of the 
boundary separating a cell’s internal contents from invaders. Like the parasite, in 
Eros your constitutive self is generated on the outside, in the host cell. 
 
Back in the room Juniper observes the small worlds taking place around him. The lyre bird 
pecking at the termite mounds, the cool breeze of the rock. He reflects that at the time of 
writing this, he had scorned the dependence of intimate relationships, acting as though 
dependence were incompatible with self-reliance, rather than the very condition of its 
possibility. In moments of smallness and fear, love’s violence, its threat was forgrounded. 
The termites break off in silent clouds, as their brothers and sisters are gobbled. Death 







 On Domestication 
 
Another section in the journal: friends concerned with domesticity, capitalism, the 
Anthropocene. He read on: 
 
So if in love we are parasitic on exterior hosts, a breaching of our cell walls, then 
under capitalist modes we see rather intensification of that wall, of that boundary. 
But this bounding is artificially achieved; it involves a rupture and suture job, which 
is then naturalised, made seamless; communities are reduced to communities of 
capital, the individual condensed to consumer.  This process of emptying, 
transfiguring then colonising is one Camatte articulates in The Wandering of Humanity 
as domestication. Domestication casts the image of man in the linear narrative of 
capitalism. A further illustration of “the process of the victory of our fathers over 
our lives, the way in which the social order laid down by the dead continues to 
haunt the living.”  
 
Whereas Capital sets out to conquer the imagination, queer desire is currently sexy 
because of its wider implications. It reimagines desire as a means of anti-
domestication, an undoing of the civilising influence of the nuclear family; its 
economics and metaphysics in tow. 
 
Such a fetish for the queer! Juniper thought. Youth-filled idealism, a young man again, forgive me. He 
was enamoured with the emerged in science as poetry. Trying to reimagine futures off the 
back of clinical models. From the suburbs of Canberra’s Inner North, the feel of 
domestication had been more urgent, pressing. Are they still fighting the good fight? 





On Being Compromised 
 
“We’re being compromised by other people, all the time,” Vic sighs, eyes intent, shoulders 
loose. His gesture makes vulnerable, surrenders before the indisputable. “Compromised.” 
“That’s what people do.” 
 
A compromise; met in the middle. Spat palms, squelching together between fists clenched 
in accord; a shake with conviction. Though the final drops arrive on your jeans.  
 
A compromise can be a sampsonic event; two disappointed parties. But ‘being 
compromised’ denotes a secret organisation – plans revealed by infiltrators, the gig’s up. 
The peanut butter toast is compromised by sunny-side contact with the kitchen floor. A 
good story is compromised by the facts. 
 
Living in a monastery, the silent work periods, the silent meals, silent meditations, alone in 
myself in the hut in the forest – the compromise foisted on one by others is dimmed – but 
still present.  Levinas shows us how this susceptibility, being impinged upon, inaugurates 
who we are. We are acted up by others in ways which we’re blind, mute to. This imposition 







In the 13th century in La queste del Saint Graal the knights set forth, each on a steed, apart, 
in search of that elusive grail. They departed Arthur’s castle separately, setting out into the 
forest alone: “at one point and another, where they saw it to be thickest.”  
 
la ou il la voient plus espesse 
 
We must leave of our own volition, the myth tells us, the good and familiar company, and 
forge unknown paths into the woods dark and deep – we must enter where we find it 
thickest. 
 
I imagine a stubborn bush-bashing rambler, machete in hand, making for the section of 
trees. In today’s context it would be considered pointless ecological vandalism – the sound 
advice is low-impact, stick to the path pre-trodden. But the essential idea still drives so 
many Bildungsroman youth onto pathless ways, from the known into unknown. 
 
What hidden narrative drove me into this isolated setting? Perhaps now more than ever, 
having cast off as shackling the notion of inheriting ideology wholesale. It seems folly to 
identify as ‘Buddhist’ – to identify with any religion in toto. The general idea being that it is 
always a contrivance to live within the folds of a traditional mythology. The garbed nuns, the 
unfamiliarity of prostrating oneself, bowing before a statue, chanting words in a dead 
language. 
 
At times I’ve struggled with this. We adopt much that seems inane, and drop some things 
that carry value. For instance, the precept of celibacy. It is hard to conceive long run 
celibacy as other than an opt out for those who can’t hack the vulnerability and messiness 
that marks human intimacy. Yet, I’ve seen differently here.  
 
Nuns, I’ve learnt, have a transgressive sexuality. One worthy of admiration, but whose 
intentions are usually concealed by the layperson’s incomprehension, whose actions are 
peremptorily conceived as admissions of defeat, an incapacity to live in the world.  
 
The pair of nuns who teach and guide me in these months had been a couple for many 
years, before renouncing sexual intimacy, for a deeper pursuit to be shared. These nuns I 
witnessed, helping one another climb ladders, lift wood, their souls related to their bodies 







Attached is a photo of my little Kuti in the woods. I’ve got a small pot belly stove in there, 
it keeps me warm of an evening… A sandy meditation walking path that I sweep regularly 
– who was it continually pushing that boulder up a hill? I hope he didn’t expect much from 
it. 
 
These three months will be my first proper stretch of isolation. Wherever I have been there 
has always been the prospects of a social life, or on short retreats I’ve taken the silence as 
a reprieve. But here, unless well managed, the imposed silence can feel viscous, molasses-
thick. I’m learning more and more to ignore that discursive, ruminating mind I’ve carried 
forever on my neck, always looking down, a guilty child, pondering in circles. 
 
For company I have a flock of sulphur crested cockatoos – what’s the collective noun for 
cockatoo? I hope it’s something fittingly ignominious and raucous. A crackle. They swoop 
down making a racket through the neighbouring gullies at sunset – the bush equivalent of 
packs of Australians on holidays.  
 
A lyrebird has been digging through the sand around my Kuti with its claws, mucking up 
my carefully swept path.  Though he’s very beautiful; long tiger- tail feathers, gossamer 
whiskers in a veil above them. The mimicry I’ve heard is impressive car alarms, a camera, 
once a human cry. I’ve been wondering on how they communicate back and forth, what 
meaning is relayed in their mimicking, what sense? 
 
In my teens, as an Italian boy in an Anglophone school, I have emblazed in memory the 
image of an adolescent peer mockingly making a waggish expansive gesture, thumbs and 
forefingers connected in a circuit. “Perfectto” he cried, chin jutting forward, then “Mama 
Mia” pronounced with dramatic intonation. 
 
There’s a Youtube sensation of a European band doing a striking if garbled rendition of 
what an English singer sounds like – it’s uncanny. It resembles the strange feeling while 





There has to be a term for this act of partially failed cognition. Or is it partially-successful 
fraudulent meaning-construction? I wonder.  I’ve been wondering too, is this synecdochic 
for poetry; which derives at least part of its meaning from the almost sensical, afforded 
significance on account of the reader’s faith in the possibilities of the medium? 
 
The way Ashberry’s sentences always felt meaningful, but no sense of their sense could be 
given. The appearance of narratival flow, the use of syntactical connectives, the deictics 
and pronouns that suggested shifting narrators. These created a propulsive force that 
lacked content. 
 
People ponder the relationship between meditation and introspection, asking – how can 
true insights be derived non-propositionally, by sitting, watching air  vacate and inhabit 
lungs? Perhaps Lerner’s response stands best, once again; in both the arc or feel of thinking is 








On Undigested Love 
 
The human biome’s popularity of late staggers - the gut, our second brain. What if your 
world experience could be radically altered by the consistency of your stool? What if 
existential angst, the saying goes, were a product of indigestion? 
 
Indigestion; how petty to be forever immersed in a constant struggle to modulate our own 
internal environments. We have grown weary of thoughts habituated, thoughts consistent 
within their own parameters, but maddening from the outside. Such inescapable yet empty 
certitudes up our self-concept. Paul de Man, reflecting on insight and blindness, disrupts 
the usual associations. He demonstrates how insight can obscure other things. Insight can 
be a clarity that clouds our vision.  
 
Rilke wrote too, that everything, Everything is gestation and then a bringing forth. So best, 
he suggests, to leave your opinions to their own quiet undisturbed development. This 
requires a level of patience and trust that wisdom’s growth is accretive, like the sedimentary 
layers of coastal mangroves. It forgets that the digestive tract is an internal, that constitutes 
another outside. Could love, like digestion, be by-product of taut muscles? Requiring fascia 
release, solvable with a 10 buck foam roller from Kmart? 
 
Right now I’m being eaten by mosquitoes, reclining on a bolster. On the step is a thermos 
filled with Gen Mai Cha – some gymnast hoops hang from the tree in front of me. The 
mosquitoes are unfortunately waking up with the warmth. 
 
I’m learning the proliferation that flows from stopping. It’s so easy to get high on doing, 
but within days my high is cyclic, habituated – just living out patterns I’m oblivious to. It’s 
in stopping that I’ve found a different sort of flow. Not the flow of ritual, but perhaps its 
breaking; I allow action to be asymmetric and in disrupting thought’s familiar sequence, 
new possibilities open up.  
 
From the deck of my kuti I’m looking down into Kangaroo Valley, across the  yellow 
streaked cliffs.  There’s a wide open gorge on one side, on the other a cave’s open mouth. 
A cool breeze flows from it. I go outside to hang up my wet clothes. There is a nylon wire 
strung between a stringy bark and a squiggly gum. I attempt to peg a shirt, but the plastic 
pegs adorning it are brittle from slow erosion, one snaps when I reach for it. I like the 
domicile feel the clothes line provides; out here one my own. I could be home. 
 
Though I shouldn’t say alone; at sunset the Sulphur Crested cockatoos descend, white 
phantoms through the neighboring gorge. Earlier that afternoon in the heat, an echidna 
waddled through the underbrush beside my sandy walking path.  
 
That day I saw Electra everywhere. I could see her racing ahead of me into the forest with 
a camera, coming back to the kuti, jumper laden with flaura. I envision her marvelling over 
the burst banksia pods littering the ground with vivid red. The new ferns unfurling their 





The Shoalhaven had been haven for me. Coming here for a decade, each time had been 
formative in different ways. It is a rare and beautiful thing in the world to have a place for 
retreat, quiet reflection. For growing patience and tenderness. After reading a collection of 








The wind is ever present somewhere, I get to know its different tones. At midnight 
under the moon the wombat’s stalk, stolid silhouettes all that I see, while at dawn 
the bush hens scratch.  
 
Keats, in his letters, would never exclude or count as irrelevant the physical 
particulars of his letter writing, we’ve established this. He was always describing his 
bodily position at the time of writing, or the conditions of his room; “the fire is at 
its last click, I am sitting here with my back to it with one foot rather askew upon 
the rug…” etc. etc. 
 
I’ll follow his lead. The evening is setting in, settling down. The moon is half and 
on the up, gibbous and waxing. Mars is adjacent, as if tellingly – the red giant is the 
only visible star amidst satellites and the distinctive thunder of train lines some 
miles off. 
 
The ‘energy’, or whatever I mean, in this forest retreat is profoundly dense. Almost 
overwhelmingly so at times. Attribute it to the moon. Attribute it to the Vassa rains 
retreat, attribute it to the presence of three highly awakened nuns I admire greatly 
as teachers and role models. Attribute it to the forest’s still; crimson rosellas, 
Wendy the wallaby. But then it could be the fasting till 12 noon, the medicinal 
mushroom tinctures, the removal from technology, from society. How puritanical 
I’ve become! How confused, in my certainty. 
 
A friend referred to an Osho retreat as not just secluded, but prohibitively isolated. 
That, in pursuing the goal to create space for a decolonizing of self (lovely phrase) 
they fell to a cultish extreme. 
 
I’d been thinking on the Intermediate disturbance hypothesis in biology: Shake 
something too much nothing can grow. Shake something too little nothing can change. 
An ecological regulatory principle of non-equilibrium.  
 
I’m reading Walter Benjamin again. Strange to read someone and know at the same 




a visa (which for a Jew in France in WWII, was a death sentence). Perhaps 
Benjamin suffered the condition he attributes Proust, as he wrote: “[Proust] died 
of the same inexperience that permitted him to write his works. He died of 
ignorance, because he did not know how to make a fire, to open a window.”   
 
Is there some implied masculine stoicism here? I wonder as I feed wood into my 
stove. Some latent attempt to dispel an ignorance that arises not from some special 
Proustian genius (of which worldly inexperience is the sign) – but from worldly 
comfort, an urban-doting, equally debilitating? 
 
I thought on Ludwig living on the edge of some Fjord. What am I trying to live into here, 
alone in this forest, writing something into existence?   
 
After laying the foundations in his Tractatus to delight even the most rabid logical 
positivists, Wittegenstein then, true to form, back-flipped and turn-faced. He began to seek 
the therapeutic in what was deflationary. Took the world like a glass snow ball – shook it 
upside down to observe the contents in freefall. White glitter as false snow – he opened 
his eyes to language’s various winks; its sly likenings. 
 
“What if all metaphysical angst, was a product of indigestion?” we asked. After that I would 
bemuse or exasperate professors by writing my essays steeped in the body’s historicity: 
 
What kind of a chair did Marx sit in? I ask; and could he even sit, suffering those haemorrhoids? In my 
mind’s eye I see him shifting distractedly in that reading room in the British Museum. What 
bearing did this have on the pessimism in his Historical Materialism?  
 
How pious was the agricultural town Heidegger grew from? How devout his Catholic 
family? And what to deduce from the father as bell-ringer, gravedigger, and caretaker of 
the vestments and sacred vessels.  
 
As a gardener what did Ludwig plant?  Did he always preference a deck chair? What bearing 
on his philosophy of the austerity of his spartan bedroom?  
 
What about Kant, who never travelled - categorically refused to leave the town you could 
say… Was he prone at least to walk the park, as constitutional, and if so what bearing of 
the presence of his landlord’s Doberman? Did he pat it, by way of charity – did it bite his 
hand, securing him in the conviction that its worth was purely instrumental to the 
cultivation of human virtue? 
 
Did Descartes room, from which he composed The Meditations, look out onto a busy 
square? Did the church opposite have steeples?  
 
Did Bakhtin really roll up his final manuscript as tallyhoes? And what bearing did it have 





I stretch my limbs every morning, alone on my deck in the early light. I think on the years 
spent in a sweaty room, on a sprayed down mat, surrounded by the latex clad. I use a 
spiked foam-roller to self-massage, for myofascial release. The cliffs are notched where 
streams once drained the plateau. Stretching beyond you see the Kangaroo Valley’s heath, 
its hedgelands wreathed in mist – and beyond that I imagine the coastal escarpments, Jarvis 
Bay, finally the sea. 
 
Now I’m overlooking the looming cliffs, a mix of quartzite and clay, in high vertical stripes. 











Roland Barthes was fatally struck down by a laundry van on campus. Walter 
Benjamin died with a refused Visa. That we should not judge of our life’s meaning till after 
our death – I read in Montaigne, but what meaning to ascribe these deaths? And why 
is it only at the last cast that all our actions must be tried? One day to judge all days 
that preceded? 
 
Spinoza said we can desire to live life in the right way, only if we desire to live first.  We 
must write epigraphically, as if our first thoughts to be read condition the sense of 
the whole – but ultimately the whole’s meaning, is it determined in the final stanza? 
A passage reflecting back on the totality? 
 
For the Tibetans, the grandest occasion to prepare for in life is its finale, Fin – the 
closing movement and exit scene. For them, it is a weighty moment as a 
determination of your soul’s trajectory is there decided. You have to practice for 
death, for how you will face it.  
 
Granted to complicate this picture: Buddhism denies transmigration, of the soul 
or anything. The core of impermanence is non-persistence; from instant to instant 
all is sacrificed; no remainder on the roof. There is this this – instantaneous ripples, 
discrete wavelets that propagate, spread, dwindle – that burn themselves out 
algorithmically. 
 
Following the Tibetans, in this book’s final moments: what image should I leave 
you on? What decisive comment? Just as surely the point of composition, its 
leading lines, is to pull the viewer’s eyes across the painting, so the gaze may finally 
fall where it must. In which case: is the meaning of the whole read in its final stanza; 
where the eye takes its rest?  
 
As I write a bush hen skitters about in the very dry underbrush. I can hear the lyre 
birds echoing off one another. The sun rising. I’m going to head to breakfast and 
gather fire wood for the nuns. 
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